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 i 
Abstract  
 
In 1899, one of the most powerful cyclones recorded struck the eastern coast of 
Cape York, Queensland, resulting in 298 known deaths, most of whom were foreign 
workers of the Thursday Island pearling fleets. Today, Australia’s deadliest cyclone 
is barely remembered nationally, although there is increasing interest internationally 
in the cyclone’s world record storm surge by scientists studying past cyclones to 
assess the risks of future disasters, particularly from a changing climate. The 1899 
pearling fleet disaster, attributed by Queensland Government meteorologist Clement 
Wragge to a cyclone he named Mahina, has not until now been the subject of 
scholarly historical inquiry. This thesis examines the evidence, as well as the factors 
that influenced how the cyclone and its disaster have been remembered, reported, 
and studied.  
 
Personal and public archives were searched for references to, and evidence for, the 
event. A methodology was developed to test the credibility of documents and the 
evidence they contained, including the data of interest to science. Theories of 
narrative and memory were applied to those documents to show how and why 
evidence changed over time. Finally, the best evidence was used to reconstruct 
aspects of the event, including the fate of several communities, the cyclone’s track, 
and the elements that contributed to the internationally significant storm tide.  
 
The thesis concludes that powerful cultural narratives were responsible for the nation 
forgetting a disaster in which 96 percent of the victims were considered not to be 
citizens of the anticipated White Australia. Cultural narratives, coupled with media 
errors, were responsible for the changing, over time, of much of the data. As a result, 
most data for this cyclone in official government and scientific databases differ 
significantly from the best evidence and primary source data. This thesis 
demonstrates how historical inquiry can produce better evidence to help science 
study historic events and help disaster managers better prepare for future disasters.   
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
On the 4th and 5th of March, 1899, the East coast of Queensland, 
in the neighbourhood of Princess Charlotte Bay, between 13deg. 
30min. and 14deg. 30min. S.L. was visited by a terrific hurricane, 
which destroyed vegetation on the shore, wrecked a lightship, 
schooners, and caused the loss of over 300 lives.1 
 
With this sentence, the anonymous author of the booklet The Pearling Disaster, 
1899: A Memorial begins to describe Australia’s deadliest recorded cyclone.2 This 
description marks the point at which the uncontested evidence ends and the 
contested evidence begins. The memorial booklet was written to provide, “some 
account of the Europeans who were lost therein … to the immediate relatives of the 
deceased and to others interested. The information has been compiled from press 
and official reports and from the testimony of survivors.”3 As such, it is a compilation 
of individual memories and newspaper reports influenced by cultural, including racial 
and political, narratives. The pearling disaster, also known as the Bathurst Bay 
Hurricane and the 1899 cyclone, has been attributed by Queensland Government 
meteorologist Clement Wragge to a cyclone he named Mahina.4 Wragge is credited 
with being the first to begin the convention of naming tropical storms and it is 
significant that he used a literary device of personifying weather phenomena, 
because this thesis will show that literary and media narratives have significantly 
changed the historical record for this disaster.5  
 
The 1899 cyclone, as a phenomenon, holds a significant place in international and 
national scientific and disaster-related records. The cyclone holds the current world 
record for a storm tide; 13 metres (also recorded as 42 feet).6 It is considered 
                                                
1 Anonymous, The Pearling Disaster, 1899: A Memorial, Brisbane: Outridge Printing Company, 
1899, 9. 
2 As will be described in Chapter Two, the publisher of the booklet is Frederick Andrew Outridge. His 
brother Percival Pitman Outridge can be identified as an author of sections of the booklet.  
3 Ibid. 
4 I will refer to the event as the 1899 cyclone, unless the cyclone's name, Mahina, is more relevant. As 
will be shown in Chapter Two, Mahina is the name of one of the cyclones Wragge retrospectively 
blamed for the disaster. 
5 Peter Adamson, “Clement Lindley Wragge and the Naming of Weather Disturbances”, Weather, 58, 
No. 9, September 2003, 359–363. 
6 Jonathan Nott, Camilla Green, Ian Townsend, and Jeffrey Callaghan, “The World Record Storm 
Surge and the Most Intense Southern Hemisphere Tropical Cyclone: New Evidence and Modeling”, 
Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, 95, No. 5, May 2014, 757–765; World Meteorological 
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Australia’s deadliest cyclone for having killed more than 400 people.7 Aside from 
epidemics and heat waves, the cyclone that struck Cape York Peninsula in 1899 is 
Australia’s deadliest natural disaster. Although natural disasters are part of 
Australian identity,8 the 1899 cyclone, one of the most dramatic and destructive, was 
never positioned as a national tragedy and failed to enter the nation’s social 
memory.   
 
Partly because it was a little-remembered event, and had all the elements for “a 
good story”, I began to research it for a novel that was published in 2008.9 The 
Devil’s Eye was a dramatic recreation, fiction based on fact, of the 1899 cyclone that 
had struck Bathurst Bay on Cape York Peninsula.10 I was a journalist and had 
worked in North Queensland where cyclones were part of the social narrative and 
cultural identity. When I spoke to local meteorologists, they would sometimes 
mention the 1899 cyclone in the context of what they considered to be a worst-case 
scenario, but I observed that people even in cyclone-aware North Queensland 
communities knew little, if anything, about the details of this cyclone. It became 
obvious, in researching the cyclone for a work of fiction, that few severe cyclones in 
recorded Australian history, before the age of satellites, had been so well observed, 
and yet there appeared to have been no previous attempt to find the primary 
sources for those observations. For an internationally-significant event, the historical 
record appeared to be based almost entirely on secondary sources and it had not 
attracted serious scholarly attention by historians. Researching beyond The Pearling 
                                                
Organization (WMO), “Tropical Cyclone: Largest Storm Surge associated with Tropical Cyclone”, 
WMO World Weather and Climate Extremes Archive, https://wmo.asu.edu/content/ 
tropical-cyclone-largest-storm-surge-associated-tropical-cyclone (accessed 17 March 2019). Since 
beginning this thesis, the WMO began an initiative to increase awareness of storm tides. See 
https://public.wmo.int/en/media/news/wmo-acts-storm-surges (accessed 26 May 2016). The Coastal 
Inundation Forecasting Project is coordinated by the Joint WMO-Intergovernmental Oceanographic 
Commission, focussing mainly on the US east coast.  
7 Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience, “Cyclone Mahina 1899”, Disaster Resilience Knowledge 
Hub, https://knowledge.aidr.org.au/resources/cyclone-cyclone-mahina-cape-york-queensland (accessed 
7 February 2019); Guinness World Records Limited, “Highest Storm Surge”, Guinness World Records 
2014, New York: Bantam, 2014, 107.  
8 Brad West and Philip L. Smith, “Natural Disasters and National Identity: Time, Space and 
Mythology”, Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology, 33, No. 2, August 1997, 205–215, 
http://search.informit.com.au/documentSummary;dn=980201378;res=IELAPA (accessed 7 February 
2019). 
9 There are some elements to a “good story” on which writers and journalists generally agree. It often 
includes conflict, drama, something new or surprising, and it must be relevant to an audience. The 
literary non-fiction narrative will be discussed further in Chapter Four.  
10 Ian Townsend, The Devil's Eye, Pymble, NSW: Fourth Estate (HarperCollins), 2008.  
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Disaster, 1899: A Memorial (hereafter referred to as the Outridge booklet), it was 
also clear that there were differences between what the official records stated as 
fact (for example, the cyclone’s central pressure, the height of the storm tide, and 
the death toll) and what the earliest primary source evidence showed.  
 
As mentioned, many official sources today report a death toll of 400, but 
contemporary reports show 100 fewer deaths.11 The central air pressure of the 
cyclone is listed in databases as 914 hectopascals (hereafter written as 914hPa, 
originally recorded as 27 inches of mercury, or 27inHg). However, the captain of the 
schooner Crest of the Wave had reported a low pressure of 880hPa (26inHg).12 
Depending on which scientific paper is cited, the storm tide associated with the 
cyclone is listed as somewhere between 12.19 and 14.6 metres, but the original 
sources for the data are often not clear. They appear to stem from a report in the 
Outridge booklet that was copied from a newspaper article based on a letter 
referring to a conversation in which the height of the water was estimated, not 
measured. The original letter on which the surge height was based stated that the 
man who reported it, John Martin Kenny, was camping “40 feet [12.19 metres] 
above sea level” and described the sea rising to his waist.13 Whether the height of 
the storm tide was 12.19, 13, or 14.6 metres does matter because, if used as 
empirical evidence for scientific studies, the measurement chosen will affect the 
findings of that study. A difference of two metres has significant implications for 
coastal communities preparing for storm tide impacts.  
 
Apart from the Outridge booklet, there are two other works commonly cited in 
literature to support the scientific data. The first is a 1958 scientific reconstruction of 
the event in an article in a scientific journal by Australian meteorologist Herbert E. 
                                                
11 Anonymous 1899. The Outridge booklet reports 307 deaths. See also George Bennett, “Return 
Giving Names and Nationality of Persons Belonging to Pearling Fleet Lost in Hurricane of 4th and 5th 
March, 1899, in Neighbourhood of Cape Melville”, in T. M. Almond, “Report on the Marine Department 
for the Year 1898–1899”, Queensland Legislative Assembly Votes and Proceedings (hereafter QVP), 
3, 24 September 1899, 24. Bennett reports 247 names.   
12 William Field Porter, “The Great Hurricane at Queensland. A Struggle for Life. An Aucklander and 
His Wife and Child. Forcing the Blacks to the Pumps”, New Zealand Herald (Supplement), 1 April 
1899, 1. 
13 A. R. Vidgen, “Northern Hurricanes”, Telegraph (Brisbane), 17 April 1899, 5. 
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Whittingham.14 The second is a dramatic recreation of the disaster in a non-fiction 
anthology entitled Cyclone, by Queensland journalist Hector Holthouse.15 Both rely 
heavily on the Outridge booklet for their data and beg the question; how reliable is 
the Outridge booklet as a primary source for scientific as well as historical 
information?  
 
There were also questions about why the 1899 cyclone has been left out of the 
narratives of Australian disasters. For example, in examining climate in relation to 
culture, the National Museum of Australia’s 2005 publication, A Change In The 
Weather: Climate And Culture In Australia, did not mention cyclone Mahina, but 
described cyclone Tracy as “the worst storm in recorded Australian history.”16 In the 
Australian Bureau of Meteorology’s (BOM) selected list of historic impacts along the 
east coast of Queensland, the 1899 cyclone is missing, while other major impacts 
are described.17 The deep and long-standing separation of the disaster from 
Australia’s cultural narratives persists.  
  
This lapse in collective memory and the quoting, when articles were written, of 
data from secondary sources have practical implications not just for the 
understanding of history, but for its application to disaster management. For 
example, environmental risk scientist Ken Granger observed that a community’s 
memory of previous disasters was vital to disaster management in that it helped 
to “overcome the inherent problem that human memory tends to be significantly 
shorter than the return period of most hazard phenomena.”18  
   
Historians will debate memory’s representations of history, but scientists rely on the 
historical record for data. In the case of the 1899 cyclone, what is remembered 
                                                
14 H. E. Whittingham, “The Bathurst Bay Hurricane and Associated Storm Surge”, Australian 
Meteorological Magazine, 23, 1958, 4–36. 
15 Hector Holthouse, Cyclone, Adelaide: Rigby, 1971, 4–15. 
16 Bill Bunbury, “Cyclone Tracy: Voices on the Wind”, in Tim Sherratt, Tom Griffiths, and Libby Rodin 
(eds), A Change in the Weather: Climate and Culture in Australia, Canberra: National Museum of 
Australia Press, 2005, 165–173. Bunbury examines cyclone Tracy, “the worst storm in recorded 
Australian history.”  
17 Australian Government, “Historical Impacts Along the East Coast”, Canberra: BOM, n. d. 
http://www.bom.gov.au/cyclone/history/eastern.shtml (accessed 3 February 2017). 
18 Ken Granger, “An Information Infrastructure for Disaster Management in Pacific Island Countries”, 
Australian Journal of Emergency Management, 15, No. 1, Autumn 2000, 25.  
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today does not always reflect the best evidence from 1899, and this is a problem for 
disaster management. For example, the officially recorded death toll is 400,19 but 
this is a significant increase on the 307 originally reported in the Outridge booklet.20 
The difference in the numbers will be shown in Chapter Three of this thesis to be 
based on the addition of 100 Aboriginal deaths in 1971.21 As stated, the central 
pressure of the cyclone is officially 914hPa (27inHg), but the captain of the Crest of 
the Wave, who reported the observation on which the record is based, insisted it 
was lower; 880hPa (26inHg). Why the discrepancy? The difference between these 
figures is not trivial. As Granger states, it has an impact on how communities 
remember past, and prepare for future, cyclones.22  
 
Questions of empirical evidence lead to questions of their context in social memory, 
as well as the impact that cultural and political narratives have on what communities 
accept as the historical record. As mentioned, the pearling disaster has not been 
positioned as a national tragedy. Why has it been overlooked in discourses on 
Australian disasters?23 A memorial at the All Souls St Bartholomew Quetta Memorial 
Church on Thursday Island names seven white men who drowned, but not the “295 
coloured men” who also drowned.24 A memorial at Bathurst Bay names 12 
Europeans, but none of “Over 300 Coloured Men Drowned.”25 Who were the 
“coloured men”, where did they come from, and what memory exists of them?26 The 
names of most were known at the time, so why were they left off the memorials? 
The answer has its origins in the political and social attitudes towards race in the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries, and I will argue that the lack of recognition in the 
21st century is a continuation of those original narratives. There is evidence that the 
stories journalists told about the event were “confused with historical narratives”, as 
                                                
19 Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience, “Cyclone Mahina 1899”.  
20 Anonymous 1899, 10. 
21 Holthouse 1971, 13. 
22 Granger 2000, 25. 
23 See, for example, Bunbury 2005; Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience, “Cyclone Mahina 
1899”.  
24 Text of the memorial plaque on Thursday Island.  
25 Text of the memorial monument at Bathurst Bay.  
26 The term “coloured” was used by contemporary observers to describe people not considered to be 
“white”, or to describe people of mixed race. It was widely used after the cyclone to describe the non-
European crews. Where possible, I use the term “non-European”, but the contemporary term is often 
difficult to avoid in its contemporary context. 
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American historian Hayden White warns.27 In explaining how narratives about the 
pearling disaster have changed, this thesis will reconstruct the disaster from the best 
evidence.  
 
This thesis investigates the original records to determine the strength of the 
evidence on which the Outridge booklet, and the subsequent historical record, was 
based. An exhaustive search for references to the disaster reveals where narratives 
have diverged over time. This thesis, then, considers how and why the disaster has 
been both overlooked and the evidence for it changed.  
 
Finally, the thesis reconsiders the event not only within the theories of media and 
memory, but the application of those theories to current social narratives and 
disaster preparation. In the case of the pearling disaster, its significance has been 
both exaggerated and understated. For instance, the thesis explains the confusion 
over a significant scientific anomaly; why a cyclone reported to have a central 
pressure of 914hPa — far from the most intense recorded — managed to produce a 
world record storm tide. The thesis will show that the reported lowest pressure of the 
cyclone was far lower than the official record shows, making the 1899 cyclone the 
most powerful cyclone recorded in the southern hemisphere, and one of the most 
powerful to strike land anywhere in the world. This raises broader questions about 
the quality of data from historical sources in official disaster databases, and the risks 
posed to the Queensland coast by cyclones in the Coral Sea.  
 
The methodology and structure of the thesis will be discussed in greater detail, but 
first I will address the key concepts that inform this work. These concepts and 
theories of media, memory, and disaster are distinct, but they also overlap.  
 
Media  
 
The role of the media has been crucial to the way the pearling disaster was 
originally framed and recorded, and the way it has continued to be framed and 
                                                
27 Hayden White, The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation, 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987, 172.  
 7 
repeated during the 20th century. There is no consensus on the definition of 
“media”, but it is generally applied to the means of mass communication; to 
newspapers, magazines, books, radio, television, and, today, social media on the 
internet. In 1899, the media consisted mainly of newspapers and magazines, but 
I will include the telegraph as not just a tool used by newspapers, but a distinct 
medium that also affected the message. The media shaped the way in which the 
pearling disaster was framed and reported, and in which the federation of 
Australia’s colonies and a White Australia Policy was also being debated. The 
telegraph plays other roles in the disaster. It was employed by the Queensland 
Government meteorologist Clement Wragge to receive data on barometric 
pressure, temperature, wind direction, and strength and to construct weather 
forecasts, which he then published in newspapers. It was used to warn coastal 
communities of approaching cyclones, and the telegraph lines were also 
vulnerable to damage by cyclones, which was the case during the 1899 cyclone, 
affecting the way the disaster was reported. The telegraph was crucial to 
newspapers and influenced the way events entered national discourses.    
 
In the 1950s, Canadian political economist Harold Innis proposed a theory that, 
with the increasing mechanisation of communication, the media had begun to 
damage culture and what was reported was being distorted by sensationalism, 
with the media involved in a “ruthless destruction of elements of permanence 
essential to cultural activity.”28 In the 1960s, Canadian media professor Marshall 
McLuhan coined the phrase, “the medium is the message.”29 McLuhan’s theory 
described a “medium”, such as a newspaper, or the radio, or television, as an 
extension of ourselves, the radio being an extension of hearing, and television of 
seeing, and so on. What we read, see, and hear — the “message” — is shaped 
by the medium. McLuhan described the medium’s physical characteristic as 
embedding itself in any message transmitted, creating a symbiotic relationship in 
which the medium influences how the message is perceived.30 It follows that the 
media, including the telegraph and newspapers in the late 19th century, shaped 
messages and therefore influenced their meaning. The messages were also 
                                                
28 Harold Innis, Changing Concepts of Time, Lanham, Canada: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004, 11.  
29 Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964, 7. 
30 Ibid. 
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framed by the social narratives that influenced the writers and editors, who were 
in turn heavily influenced by political discourse. This had a direct effect on the 
collective memory which, as Paula Hamilton points out, is influenced through 
media by power structures.31 The media (and a century ago it was mainly 
newspapers) amplified the voice of opinion-makers and extended the power of 
businessmen and politicians who, in many cases, framed the cultural discourse 
and what would therefore become memory.  
 
Social attitudes in 1899, in the soon-to-be federated colonies of Australia, were 
reflected and amplified through media, especially newspapers and books. Media 
owners are self-interested agents of memory, and it is in their interests to promote 
the integrity and accuracy of their products — the information they convey — to 
maintain sales. The now widely-quoted description of newspapers being “the rough 
draft of history” has been attributed to the State newspaper, of Columbia, South 
Carolina, in 1905, which stated: “The newspapers are making morning after morning 
the rough draft of history. Later, the historian will come, take down the old files, and 
transform the crude but sincere and accurate annals of editors and reporters into 
history, into literature.”32 It is a powerful statement and it suggests that newspapers 
have long been aware of their role in shaping memory. Like all institutions of any 
time and place, however, newspapers were influenced by cultural narratives as well 
as the limitations of technology, science, and knowledge of their age. Accuracy is 
relative, and while newspapers may try to be impartial and accurate, and can 
achieve those ideals to varying degrees, they are heavily influenced by the cultural 
narratives of the day.33 It is argued that the media’s impact on memory has been 
increasing and, as historian Tessa Morris-Suzuki notes, “today, more than ever, we 
learn about the past from a multiplicity of media.”34 Andrew Hoskins agrees that 
                                                
31 Paula Hamilton, “The Knife Edge: Debates about Memory and History”, in Kate Darian-Smith and 
Paula Hamilton (eds), Memory and History in Twentieth-Century Australia, Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press, 1994, 20. 
32 “The Educational Value of ‘News’”, State (Columbia, South Carolina), 5 December 1905, 1. The 
sentiment can be shown to go back further, for example, in “A Newspaper. The Best Source of 
Instruction”, The Academic Review and General Literary Magazine (London), 1 September 1827, 1, 
No. 1, 21. The article states: “’Tis a Newspaper affords data to a Historian.”  
33 Barbie Zelizer, “Why Memory’s Work on Journalism Does Not Reflect Journalism’s Work on 
Memory”, Memory Studies, 1, No. 1, 2008, 79–87.  
34 Tessa Morris-Suzuki, The Past Within Us: Media, Memory History, New York: Verso, 2005, 2. 
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media provides “the very stuff from which new memory is formed”35 and Joy 
Damousi states that not only do people usually get a sense of their past through the 
media, but particular forms of histories are shaped through popular narratives in 
creative media, such as novels and film.36 This thesis will explore the role of the 
media generally and journalism, including narrative non-fiction, in particular, in 
shaping the memory of the pearling disaster. I argue that the Outridge booklet is a 
work of journalism and that its form, narrative non-fiction, is a medium that has a 
symbiotic relationship with its message and a powerful effect on memory. The 
booklet was written for an exclusive audience; the European families grieving for 
their loss. It should be therefore viewed in its social and cultural contexts. The 
narrative in the Outridge booklet reflects the white pearling fleet owners, its stated 
intention being to provide an account of the Europeans killed. There was no serious 
attempt to provide an account of the non-European crew, except as their experience 
reflected the European experience. Percival Pitman Outridge was part-owner of 
several fleets and lost a brother and nephew in the disaster. What of the narrative 
representing most of those killed; the non-European crews? The dictating force of 
narrative, and the need to tell a story within a framework of a particular industry or 
community, immediately frames that first draft of history. Outridge was also writing at 
a time when he would have been conscious that he was creating an historical 
record. As Courtney Rivard notes in her thesis Archiving Disaster, the 19th century 
was a time when history focused on big events and powerful men, “thereby either 
erasing the many rich histories of communities and cultures that were not related to 
elite, white power-holders or rather, in the case of colonial histories, using 
communities in colonized regions as objects of inquiry in the great Western history 
of progression.”37 Outridge would have been conscious of his role in history when he 
published his booklet. This thesis, therefore, questions those cultural accounts by 
contextualising the history of the pearling disaster. Representations of disaster, like 
other historical events, have been a process of remembering, forgetting, and re-
interpreting, but they also draw on sources that frame memory according to the 
                                                
35 Andrew Hoskins, “New Memory: Mediating History”, Historical Journal of Film, Radio and 
Television, 21, No. 4, 2001, 342. 
36 Joy Damousi, “History Matters: The Politics of Grief and Injury in Australian History”, Australian 
Historical Studies, 33, No. 118, 2002, 101. 
37 Courtney J. Rivard, Archiving Disaster: A Comparative Study of September 11, 2001 and Hurricane 
Katrina, PhD thesis, University of California, 2012, 51.  
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cultural discourse of the time. Different aspects of the disaster have been 
emphasised at different times in the past 120 years within changing cultural 
frameworks and attitudes, and what is remembered is, inevitably, a product of these 
influences.  
 
Before moving on to the theoretical framework of memory, I want to reiterate the 
importance of the relationship between media, particularly journalists, and public 
memory. Journalism and memory theorist, and professor of communication at the 
University of Pennsylvania, Barbie Zelizer, believes journalists are “a key agent of 
memory work, even if journalists themselves are averse to admitting it as part of 
what they do and even if memory scholars have not yet given journalism its due.”38 I 
argue that journalists have always been aware of writing the “rough draft of history” 
and therefore have always knowingly been the agents of memory.  
 
Memory  
 
As stated, memory and media are today inextricably linked. British psychologist 
Nigel C. Hunt goes further, and says cultural narratives are shared mainly through 
mass media, and increasingly through the internet, rather than just books, 
newspapers, and oral sources. Hunt states that, “memory and identities are also 
shaped by the media. We cannot understand memory without drawing on the social 
and cultural influences of memory.”39 
  
The first theories of “collective memory” were formulated by Emile Durkheim and 
his student Maurice Halbwachs. Halbwachs published The Social Framework of 
Memory in 1925 arguing that what individuals remembered was determined by 
the group to which they identified or belonged.40 Rather than memory being a 
record of the past, it was reconstructed “with data borrowed from the present,” 
and memory was then sustained by memorials, rituals, and repetition as 
stories.41 It did not have to be true to be remembered. White, in expanding on the 
                                                
38 Zelizer 2008, 85.  
39 Nigel C. Hunt, Memory, War, and Trauma, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 120.  
40 Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992, 43.  
41 Maurice Halbwachs, The Collective Memory, New York: Harper and Row, 1980, 69. 
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theory, argues that history is also a narrative, more an art than a science. It is a 
representation of events and its narrative structure actively prevents it from being 
an accurate record of fact.42 Collective memory also includes a cultural 
framework in which individual memories are shared in a representation of the 
past that resonates with the present. That framework involves exclusion and 
forgetting, as Paula Hamilton explains: “Defining groups or nations always 
necessitates a dual process of inclusion and exclusion and remembering the 
past is a central mechanism of that process. Many have noted that forgetting is 
one of the most powerful forces that shape national remembering.”43 The cultural 
framework of Australia since 1899 affected the way the pearling disaster was 
recorded, reported, and commemorated. Initially, and for much of the 20th 
century, the foreign workers and Aboriginal people who died in the pearling 
disaster were largely excluded from the collective memory, as they were from the 
memorials. German historian Jan Assmann explains that “individual memory 
constitutes itself in communication with others. These ‘others,’ however, are not 
just any set of people, rather they are groups who conceive their unity and 
peculiarity through a common image of their past.”44 As Assmann states, every 
individual belongs to many groups which share numerous presentations of 
memories, from families to professional groups, and communities to nations. It is 
significant that the pearling disaster occurred just before Australian Federation, 
when a new nation was already anticipated and imagined. Political scientist 
Benedict Anderson describes an “imagined community” whose members already 
conceive of themselves as being part of a nation.45 In 1899, before the nation 
was formed, the “coloured aliens”, who constituted most of the victims of the 
pearling disaster, had already been excluded from the imagined Australian 
nation. The pearling fleet was made up of not one, but several, sub-communities 
and while some remember the disaster on individual, family, and local levels, to 
various degrees, the disaster does not resonate on a national level.  
 
                                                
42 White 1987. 
43 Hamilton 1994, 23.  
44 Jan Assmann and John Czaplicka, “Collective Memory and Cultural Identity”, New German 
Critique, 65, 1995, 127. 
45 Benedict R. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, London: Verso, 2006, 6. 
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Halbwachs distinguishes collective memory from history, describing collective 
memory as a continuous process that “retains from the past only what still lives or is 
capable of living in the consciousness of the groups keeping the memory alive.”46 It 
is not static, but can change, and is framed by social narratives that also change. In 
cases of disaster and war, it is also framed by trauma, and this thesis will examine 
memory and trauma in families. Damousi describes the way in which trauma affects 
memory, especially in war widows whose memories are “imbued with particular 
images of nostalgia, lost opportunities, hopes left unrealised and a disavowal of 
grief.”47 By speaking to descendants of the those who experienced the 1899 
cyclone, particularly the descendants of those who died, the role of intergenerational 
trauma will be examined as it relates to memory.     
The role of the media today grows more complex as it evolves, and the internet’s 
influence on the message, and therefore memory, is being shaped, as McLuhan 
suggests, by the medium itself. That is a rapidly evolving paradigm beyond the remit 
of this thesis. Suffice to say that, more than a century since the pearling disaster, the 
collective memory of the event, as portrayed in books, newspapers, memorials, and 
today in mass media and online articles, differs in significant ways not just from what 
happened, but from how the event was recorded immediately after, and then as 
media and society changed during the 20th century. As much has been forgotten 
about the event as remembered, but what has been forgotten is telling. As 
sociologist Elizabeth Jelin points out, “Insofar as the frameworks of memory are 
historical and subject to change, all memories are more reconstructions than 
recollections,” and the memories that do not fit within the framework are often 
forgotten.48 Collective memory, like individual memory, is selective and subjective, 
something psychologists conclude is a response to change. This, as historian David 
Thelen notes, can be enlightened by historians, and he explains that “questions 
about the construction of memory can illuminate how individuals, ethnic groups, 
political parties, and cultures shape and reshape their identities — as known to 
46 Halbwachs 1980, 80. 
47 Joy Damousi, Living with the Aftermath: Trauma, Nostalgia and Grief in Post-war Australia, 
Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2001, 193. 
48 Elizabeth Jelin, State Repression and the Labors of Memory, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2003, 11. 
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themselves and to others.”49 This is significant when considering why data and 
narratives associated with the disaster have changed over a century. The changes 
reveal insights into changes in Australian politics, for example, and in social and 
cultural discourses. In the case of the disaster, the narratives from the perspective of 
the “other” — the non-European crews and the Aboriginal people ashore — did not 
form part of the original European narrative. As Henry Reynolds noted, “Historical 
neglect of the Aborigines persisted until the 1960s,”50 and it was not until after a 
1967 referendum that the Constitution was amended to count Aboriginal people in 
the census. Writing four years later, in 1971, Holthouse reintroduced narratives from 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander perspectives of the 1899 disaster, revising the 
Aboriginal death toll up to “about 100” and introducing a myth as part of the cultural 
narrative based on Darnley Island woman Moira Newi (also known as Moara or 
Muara Lifu) and her rescue of “two white men” during the cyclone.51  
Memory of the disaster, though, does exist in other communities and this thesis 
brings them into a body of research that reconstructs the disaster. For instance, 
there is a document remembering the disaster in the Japanese town of 
Shionomisaki, part of Wakayama Province from which many of the Japanese 
workers in the pearling industry were recruited in the late 19th century.52 Memories of 
the cyclone also exist in Aboriginal family groups in far North Queensland.53 Indeed, 
Aboriginal groups around the country have memorialised cyclones as legends and 
art and they offer perspectives that, in some cases, challenge the official record.54 
Attempts have been made previously to reconstruct the pearling disaster narrative to 
include the largely ignored Aboriginal and other non-European communities. 
Holthouse’s non-fiction narrative, Cyclone, in 1971 is one example.55 Another is my 
own fictional novel, The Devil’s Eye.56 The role of literature, including creative non-
fiction, will also be examined. Creative non-fiction uses the styles and the 
49 David Thelen. “Memory and American History”, Journal of American History, 75, No. 4, 1989, 1118. 
50 Henry Reynolds, “Introduction”, in Dispossession: Black Australians and White Invaders, Sydney: 
Allen and Unwin, 1989, xiii.  
51 Holthouse 1971, 9. This myth will be examined in detail in Chapter Five.  
52 John Lamb, Cape of Tides, Canberra: John Lamb, n. d., 11.  
53 Daniel Gordon in an interview with Ian Townsend, 2 March 2015.  
54 Ibid. Daniel Gordon says there is no community memory amongst the Traditional Owners of Cape 
Melville of 100 Aboriginal people being killed in the storm. 
55 Holthouse 1971. 
56 Townsend 2008. 
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techniques of novel writing, while attempting to remain factually correct. Gay Talese 
describes creative non-fiction as “often reading like fiction, [although] it is not fiction. 
It is, or should be, as reliable as the most reliable reportage, although it seeks a 
larger truth than is possible through the mere compilation of verifiable facts.”57 Lee 
Gutkind describes it as more of a movement than a genre,58 and Norman Sims 
prefers the term “literary journalism” in that it involves novel-writing tools such as 
“elaborate structures, characterization, and even symbolism, but with the added 
requirement of accuracy.”59 The Australian writer Paul Ham defended what he called 
“popular histories”; the use of narrative non-fiction to tell history.  
Great popular histories — as distinct from populist ones that, like 
politicians, wilfully distort the truth to boost sales and are soon forgotten 
— share distinctive qualities. They are written in a rich narrative style, 
with a strong authorial voice and an intimate sense of character and 
place. They accept accident, cock-up and personality as drivers of 
human affairs. They synthesise a vast amount of research into a 
coherent narrative.60  
Popular histories are often successful because they tap into contemporary 
cultural discourses, including narratives that already resonate within a group, 
reintroducing stories and influencing and reinforcing memory. Ham does it well, 
but he sets up a conflict between writers of popular or cultural histories and 
academics writing scholarly histories, as if it were a zero-sum game. The two are 
distinct. As will be shown, scientific and official data today for the 1899 cyclone 
has been drawn from journalism and narrative non-fiction. In many cases, it 
differs significantly from what an historical methodology shows to be the best 
evidence. I agree with Arthur Marwick, in distinguishing between the two, that 
scholarly historians should “be profoundly conscious that they should not be 
trying to emulate novelists or poets. Duties, of course, pertain to the historian, not 
history.”61  
57 Gay Talese, Fame and Obscurity, New York and Cleveland: World, 1970, vii.  
58 Lee Gutkind, “Creative Nonfiction”, Writer, 117, No. 5, May 2004, 14–15. 
59 Norman Sims, “International Literary Journalism in Three Dimensions”, World Literature Today, 86, 
No. 2, 2012, 34.  
60 Paul Ham, “Human Factors”, Sydney Morning Herald (SMH), 22 March 2014, 
http://www.smh.com.au/entertainment/books/human-factors-20140320-353nd.html (accessed 2 
October 2018).  
61 Arthur Marwick, The New Nature of History: Knowledge, Evidence, Language, Basingstoke, UK: 
Palgrave, 2001, 81.  
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I have written two historical novels, Affection and The Devil’s Eye, which 
attempted to place historical events back into a cultural narrative.62 I did not write 
them as an historian, but as a journalist, and as Marwick says, a distinction 
should be made between cultural and historical narrative. Affection was based on 
the 1900 outbreak of plague in Queensland and The Devil’s Eye on the 1899 
cyclone. Both books re-examined events that had largely vanished from the 
collective memory, and were re-interpreted through a fictional narrative. A third 
book, Line of Fire,63 was narrative non-fiction; an attempt to investigate the 
invasion by the Japanese of Rabaul, in the Australian mandated Territory of New 
Guinea, in 1942, and it took what Alun Munslow would describe as a 
deconstructionist approach.64 All three books are cultural narratives and distinct 
from an historian’s approach to history. Historians have a duty to history, not to 
literature, but literature, as well as film and television, often shapes history and 
needs, therefore, close attention.65 As mentioned, some narrative non-fiction 
books have changed the historical record. Holthouse’s 1971 anthology, Cyclone, 
described the pearling disaster and, imaginatively, the Darnley Island woman, 
Muara, rescuing two European men. His writing was imaginative and 
unreferenced when he wrote, for example: “Holding grimly to her semi-conscious 
burden, Muara swam on through the hurricane-lashed waters. Once a wrecked 
lugger, driven before the wind, almost swept over the top of her.”66 There is no 
evidence for this, and Holthouse’s work has to be considered in its contemporary 
context. As Marwick says, “A cultural artefact, like any other primary source, is a 
source for the period in which it was produced, not for the period to which it 
refers.”67 I would argue that it applies to narrative non-fiction, in that Holthouse’s 
book is a primary source for 1971, not 1899. The problem is, however, that it has 
been treated by some as a source for data for the 1899 cyclone.   
62 Ian Townsend, Affection, Pymble, NSW: Fourth Estate (HarperCollins), 2005; Townsend 2008. 
63 Ian Townsend, Line of Fire, Pymble, NSW: Fourth Estate (HarperCollins), 2017.  
64 Alun Munslow, Deconstructing History, New York: Routledge, 2006, 71 
65 Damousi 2002, 101. 
66 Holthouse 1971, 187.  
67 Marwick 2001, 81. 
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Disaster 
There are probably as many definitions of disaster as there are of media and 
memory. The Council of Australian Government’s (COAG) National Strategy for 
Disaster Resilience defines disaster as:  
A serious disruption to community life which threatens or causes death 
or injury in that community and/or damage to property which is beyond 
the day-to-day capacity of the prescribed statutory authorities and which 
requires special mobilisation and organisation of resources other than 
those normally available to those authorities.68  
Another useful definition is from the Brussels-based Center for Research on the 
Epidemiology of Disasters, used by the Red Cross, which defines disaster as “a 
situation or event which overwhelms local capacity.”69 The criteria used for entering 
a disaster into their database includes 10 or more people dead, and/or 100 or more 
affected, and/or a state of emergency declared, and/or international assistance 
requested. These definitions are useful in helping governments respond. There is no 
universally-accepted definition, but the pearling disaster fits all definitions of disaster. 
A more useful way of looking at the disaster, and of natural disasters in general, is to 
consider theories of risk, where: 
Risk = Hazard x Vulnerability70 
Considering vulnerability when it comes to disaster is important to many aspects of 
this thesis because vulnerability involves memory and empathy. How likely people 
are to identify themselves or their families, or group, with victims of a disaster 
determines whether they believe that a disaster could affect them, and therefore if 
they will act to avoid it. David Etkins also cites research suggesting that people 
respond more strongly when individual victims can be identified, but become less 
68 COAG, National Strategy for Disaster Resilience: Building the Resilience of Our Nation to 
Disasters, COAG, Barton, ACT, 2011, 22, https://knowledge.aidr.org.au/media/2153/ 
nationalstrategyfordisasterresilience.pdf (accessed 17 March 2019).  
69 Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, Université Catholique de Louvain, The 
International Disaster Database, Brussels, Belgium, http://www.emdat.be (accessed 17 March 2019). 
70 See David Etkins, Disaster Theory: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Concepts and Causes, Boston: 
Butterworth–Heinemann, 2015.  
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concerned when events are large and impersonalised. He calls this “psychosocial 
numbing”, and it is why disaster relief organisations identify individual victims, 
particularly children, when raising money.71 This psychosocial aspect explains 
contemporary responses to the pearling disaster, including why a Queensland-wide 
relief fund in 1899 for the “sufferers of the North Queensland pearling fleet disaster” 
raised only £23/2-, most of which came from the Queensland Governor, Brisbane’s 
Mayor, and a shipping agent. Only three members of the public subscribed, donating 
£2/12- between them.72 By comparison, a relief fund in East Maitland in NSW set up 
for the families of three men killed at a colliery disaster at nearby East Greta three 
months earlier raised £150 pounds.73  
Globally, tropical cyclones are among the most destructive of natural disasters. Of 
the top 10 most costly natural disasters in the US between 1900 and 2007, 
measured by insured losses, nine were hurricanes (the other was the San Francisco 
earthquake of 1906).74 In Australia between 1967 and 1999, cyclones cost an 
average $266 million each year.75 The Insurance Council of Australia’s preliminary 
estimate of damage caused by cyclone Debbie, which struck Queensland in March 
2017, was $660 million.76 As world populations increase and settle mainly in coastal 
areas, the global annual cost of cyclones — currently $US26 billion — is expected 
to double within a century,77 and some researchers predict that with climate change 
it may quadruple to $US109 billion by 2100.78 
71 Ibid., 75 
72 “Pearling Disaster. Mayor of Brisbane’s Fund”, Telegraph (Brisbane), 8 April 1899, 9.  
73 “New South Wales”, Telegraph (Brisbane), 7 February 1899, 5. 
74 Etkins 2015, 45. 
75 Alan Sharp, Craig Arthur, Bob Cechet, and Mark Edwards, “Tropical Cyclones”, in Miriam. H. 
Middelmann (ed.), Natural Hazards in Australia: Identifying Risk Analysis Requirements, Canberra: 
Geoscience Australia, 2007, 43, http://www.ga.gov.au/metadata-gateway/metadata/record/65444/ 
(accessed 18 March 2019). 
76 “Insurance Forums Planned as Cyclone Debbie Losses Cross $660m”, Insurance and Risk 
Magazine, National Insurance Brokers Association, 11 April 2017,  
http://www.insuranceandrisk.com.au/insurance-foruma-planned-as-cyclone-debbie-losses-cross-
660m/ (accessed 17 March 2019). 
77 Jennifer Chu, “The Cost of Tropical Cyclones,” MIT News, 17 January 2012, 
http://news.mit.edu/2012/tropical-cyclones-0117 (accessed 17 March 2019). 
78 Robert Mendelsohn, Kerry Emanuel, Shun Chonabayashi, and Laura Bakkensen, “The Impact of 
Climate Change on Global Tropical Cyclone Damage”, Nature Climate Change, 2, March 2012, 205–
209, http://www.nature.com.ezproxy.library.uq.edu.au/nclimate/journal/v2/n3/pdf/nclimate1357.pdf 
(accessed 17 March 2019). 
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The 2013 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has projected fewer 
cyclones overall, but an increase of 15 percent in the number of severe cyclones in 
the near term in the South West Pacific, including the Coral Sea.79 In other words, a 
greater proportion of the cyclones in the South West Pacific are expected to be 
severe. Cyclones draw their energy from the warmth of the water beneath them, and 
the warmer the sea, the more available energy. It is significant that the cyclone that 
caused the 1899 pearling fleet disaster was the only severe cyclone recorded on the 
far North Queensland coast in the summer of 1898–99.80 That summer fell within a 
prolonged period of El Nino weather patterns that were responsible for what is now 
called the Federation Drought. El Nino conditions generally produce less rain on 
Australia’s east coast and fewer, but more, severe cyclones. The conditions leading 
up to March 1899 could be said to match those anticipated as a result of climate 
change, in which more frequent El Nino conditions are predicted. The IPCC notes, 
however, that there is a lack of historical data on tropical cyclones in the South West 
Pacific and, as a result, confidence in those predictions is less certain than it is for 
other regions where there is better historical data.81 
The historical records of cyclones are a vital tool for cyclone prediction and disaster 
planning, because human memory is usually shorter than the recurrence, in any 
specified community, of severe cyclones. The destructive impacts of cyclones are 
localised, and it can be a long time between impacts for any specific community. For 
example, although the city of Mackay in Queensland has experienced the effects of 
cyclones, it has not experienced the level of disaster caused by a severe cyclone 
since 1918, when the damaging core passed near the city. The destructive winds at 
the core are hard to imagine unless they have been experienced, and that 
experience can happen more than 100 years apart for any specific community. For a 
nation where most of the population does not live in a cyclone zone, the destructive 
79 B. Kirtman et al., “Near-term Climate Change: Projections and Predictability”, in T. F. Stocker et al. 
(eds), Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth 
Assessment Report of the IPCC, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013, 992. 
The report noted that there was not enough data to show whether there would be more or fewer 
cyclones in the South West Pacific, but that a greater proportion of them would likely be severe. The 
report cited L. M. Leslie et al., “Variability of Tropical Cyclones over the Southwest Pacific Ocean 
Using a High-resolution Climate Model”, Meteorology and Atmospheric Physics, 97, No. 1, 2007, 171.  
80 Jeffrey Callaghan and Peter Helman, Severe Storms on The East Coast of Australia 1770–2008, 
Southport, Gold Coast: Griffith University, Griffith Centre for Coastal Management, 2008.  
81 Kirtman et al. 2013, 992. 
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force of a severe cyclone’s core is even more difficult to comprehend. A rapidly 
growing naïve population in far North Queensland further increases North 
Queensland’s vulnerability to disaster. A study of the Pacific Islands by 
environmental scientist Fes de Scally found that memory was an important factor in 
vulnerability, or risk,82 as did Monica Zappa’s study in South America that concluded, 
“If the return interval of the natural hazard is longer, the population is potentially 
more vulnerable to the natural hazard.”83  
 
Theories of social memory are, therefore, significant in disaster theory, as are 
theories of media as they relate to culture. In some ways, disasters can be 
considered cultural objects because they do play a role in Australian cultural 
identity.84 Considering them as cultural objects helps explain why some disasters, 
such as cyclone Tracy, resonate and others, such as cyclone Mahina, do not. As 
Michael Schudson explained, “The relevance of a cultural object to its audience, its 
utility, if you will, is a property not only of the object's content or nature and the 
audience's interest in it but of the position of the object in the cultural tradition of the 
society the audience is a part of.”85 For a disaster to be a relevant cultural object, it 
helps if a narrative has already been established within which an audience can place 
that object. The social, political, and cultural narratives at the time of the pearling 
disaster were framed by the White Australia debates, which included a fear of 
“aliens.” The alien was also, in a sense, a cultural object and objectified in the 
media, and here theories of semiotics as they apply to cultural narratives are 
considered.86 The widespread use of the word “alien” helps explain contemporary 
cultural discourses. “Settling the Alien Difficulty”, the title of a woodcut image in an 
1899 newspaper showing Death with a net standing amongst drowning men (Figure 
A1), was meant to portray irony and sympathy. It also tapped in to the dominant 
political discourse and this was reflected by what today seems a gross oversight; the 
absence from the disaster memorials of the names of about 300 non-European 
                                                
82 Fes A. de Scally, “Historical Tropical Cyclone Activity and Impacts in the Cook 
Islands”, Pacific Science, 62, No. 4, 2007, 443–460. 
83 Monica Zappa, Assessing Human Vulnerability to Hurricanes: A Case Study of Bluefields, 
Nicaragua, PhD thesis, Department of Geography, Northern Illinois University, 2009, 70. 
84 West and Smith 1997.  
85 Michael Schudson, “How Culture Works”, Theory and Society, 18, No. 2, 1989, 169.  
86 Roland Barthes, Elements of Semiology, Annette Lavers and Colin Smith (trans.), New York: Hill 
and Wang, 1968, 11.  
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crew. They were described at the time as “alien”, which framed the disaster as a 
mostly foreign event and played a key role in forgetting.  
 
  
Figure A1 A woodcut entitled “Settling the Alien Difficulty” published in Townsville’s North 
Queensland Register (NQR), 20 March 1899, 25.  
 
Finally, it is useful to also examine the words “cyclone” and “hurricane” in the 
context of the disaster. In the late 19th century, the term “hurricane” generally 
described the strength of the wind, but both “cyclone” and “hurricane” were used to 
described the tropical storms known also as “typhoons” in the Northern Pacific and 
“hurricanes” in the Atlantic. In Australia, the term hurricane could be used for any 
destructive wind, whether it was a cyclone or a severe storm. The word itself comes 
from the Spanish translation of the word “Huracan”, from the Aztec language, and it 
is significant that Walter Roth, the Cooktown-based Northern Protector of 
Aboriginals who travelled to the disaster scene in 1899, later investigated the origins 
of the word “hurricane.” He noted that the Aztec “Huracan” resembled words used 
by the Indigenous people of central America, and he wrote:  
 
Huracan means the Spirit (corazon) of the Sea, the Spirit of Heaven 
and Earth: the Nahuas were unable to conceive of the author of the 
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universe except in a cataclysm. Cyclone, Hurricane, or Cordonazo de 
San Francisco are names of the same phenomenon. Hurakan of the 
Quiche myths is the Kukulcan of the Maya, the Quetzalcouatl (morning-
star) of Mexican mythology.87   
  
The thesis will show that the descriptors and symbolism in social discourse at the 
time had powerful effects on the way the disaster was framed, as something exotic, 
and this also played a role in preventing it from being accepted as a national 
tragedy.  
 
Methodology  
  
The thesis begins as an attempt to see where evidence and the historical record 
diverge over time, and then to reconstruct the event based on the best evidence. 
This may seem to descend into what Munslow calls “hard core” empiricism,88 but 
in the sections of this thesis that deal with empirical data, a sense that the past 
can provide sound evidence is necessary. Scientists rely on the historical record 
to prepare for the meteorological impacts of a changing climate. Facts which 
might be considered too remote to be trustworthy to historians (as Munslow 
suggests)89 will often be used, regardless, as data by scientists. It could be said 
that there are two parts to the disaster: The phenomena originally observed and 
recorded, and the narratives in which they have later been placed. Although one 
impinges on the other, they can enlighten each other, and they can also be 
considered separately. We are still able to judge the likelihood that something 
happened, and some evidence can be accepted as credible.90 History may not 
be science, but primary sources exist and although there may be biases and 
imperfections in them, caused by the way they are framed, there are objective, 
recoverable data concerning the pearling disaster, as Marwick’s approach 
suggests.91  
 
                                                
87 Walter Roth, “An Inquiry into the Animism and Folklore of the Guiana Indians”, 30th Annual Report, 
Bureau of American Ethnology, Government Printing Office, Washington, 1915, 170–171.  
88 Munslow 2006, 2. 
89 Ibid. 
90 See Keith Jenkins, Re-Thinking History, London: Routledge, 1991, 5–6. 
91 Marwick 2001. 
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The research for this thesis examines surviving material of the cyclone’s impact 
on Queensland, the northern pearling fleets, and the survivors at sea and 
ashore. It examines available contemporary and subsequent reports, and the 
oral and written histories and stories that have survived. It involves primary 
research at numerous archives, as well as interviews with families and an 
examination of family documents. It examines eye-witness accounts, including 
ship logs, meteorological data, and the documents of survivors, and compares 
these with subsequent interpretations of the event. It produces a database of the 
victims, a bibliography of surviving material, and a critical assessment of the 
impact. Some of the data uncovered during research for this thesis has already 
been used to remodel the cyclone,92 and is now the main reference for the world 
record storm surge height used by the World Meteorological Organization 
(WMO).93  
What I offer is a new look at the event and the reasons why the memory of it has 
changed, and why it did not become a national memory. This has implications for 
science, and for rethinking our relationship with past disasters and preparing for 
future ones.  
Chapters 
This thesis examines Australia’s deadliest cyclone and seeks to evaluate the 
evidence. It will show how changing cultural narratives changed the evidence, 
affected the historical record, and prevented the event from entering the 
collective (national) memory. Chapter One begins with the development of a 
methodology with which to test the evidence for the cyclone. On what historical 
documents is the data in scientific literature, popular histories, and government 
databases based? Are more credible documents and data available? If it is 
shown that there are errors in the data, what caused them? A methodology is 
developed by which to test the data, to find the best evidence for the cyclone 
and the disaster it caused. Chapter Two examines the elements that provide 
context 
92 See Nott et al. 2014. 
93 WMO, “Tropical Cyclone: Largest Storm Surge associated with Tropical Cyclone”. 
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to the disaster, including the pearling industry, the people ashore and the 
cyclone’s genesis. Using the methodology to extract the best evidence from 
historical documents, the disaster will be reconstructed. Chapter Three will apply 
the methodology to evidence for deaths at sea and ashore, and produce a death 
toll based on the best evidence. There appear to be myths associated with the 
disaster, particularly the death toll. These are deconstructed, and better evidence 
applied to reconstruct a narrative of the Torres Strait Islander experience of the 
cyclone. The memories and narratives of the Aboriginal people ashore are 
examined. Chapter Four considers the effect of political, social, and media 
narratives on memory. The White Australia Policy, the debates over Federation, 
and popular European cultural narratives are considered, as is their influence on 
how the disaster was recorded, especially in the media. Meteorologist Clement 
Wragge’s revision of the event, and the later impact of trauma, are examined as 
key influences of memory. Chapter Five reconstructs the cyclone using 
quantitative data extracted with the methodology from historical documents. How 
can historical inquiry be applied to science? In what ways can it help scientists 
and emergency managers prepare for future disasters caused by cyclones? 
What can the new data show about the cyclone’s lowest pressure and the world 
record storm tide associated with it? Simple models are used to reveal new 
information about the cyclone’s track and the site and impact of the storm tide, 
the cyclone’s most dangerous feature.      
This thesis begins with a historiography of the 1899 pearling disaster and the 
development of a methodology to test the evidence.   
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CHAPTER 1 
A veritable mine of [mis]information: The Outridge booklet 
Errors like straws, upon the surface flow, 
He who would search for pearls must dive below. 
John Dryden, All for Love, 16781 
“Probably no Australian cyclone has been so well documented,” said meteorologist 
Herbert E. Whittingham in his 1958 analysis of the cyclone that caused the 1899 
pearling disaster.2 The disaster of 4 and 5 March 1899 at Cape Melville, 
Queensland, is, apart from heatwaves and epidemics, regarded as Australia’s 
deadliest natural disaster, killing about 300 people and holding the world record for a 
storm tide.3 Whittingham noted that before 1958, and despite its scientific 
significance, meteorologists had discussed the cyclone briefly and only twice since 
1899: in 1914 and 1925.4 It was only when Whittingham was shown a copy of The 
Pearling Disaster, 1899: A Memorial,5 (which he called the Outridge booklet, “for 
want of a better name”)6 that he reconstructed the event for a scientific paper.7 
Whittingham described the Outridge booklet as “a veritable mine of information”8 and 
used it as his main source for data from which to understand the meteorological 
nature of the cyclone and to reconstruct its path.9 Whittingham’s 1958 paper and the 
1899 Outridge booklet on which it is based have become the main sources for 
1	John Dryden and William Shakespeare, All For Love, or, The World Well Lost: A Tragedy. Written in
Imitation of Shakespeare's Stile, 1677, available from Early English books online 
https://eebo.chadwyck.com (accessed 3 April 2018). This is a reproduction of the original in 
Worcester College Library, Oxford. 	
2 H. E. Whittingham, “The Bathurst Bay Hurricane and Associated Storm Surge”, Australian 
Meteorological Magazine, 23, 1958, 22.  
3 WMO, “Tropical Cyclone: Largest Storm Surge associated with Tropical Cyclone”, WMO World 
Weather and Climate Extremes Archive, https://wmo.asu.edu/content/tropical-cyclone- 
largest-storm-surge-associated-tropical-cyclone (accessed 26 May 2016). 
4 Whittingham 1958, 36. Whittingham cites H. A. Hunt, Results of Rainfall Observations Made in 
Queensland, Melbourne: Albert J. Mullett, Government Printer, 1914, and S. S. Visher and D. Hodge, 
Australian Hurricanes and Related Storms, with an Appendix on Hurricanes in the South Pacific, 
Commonwealth Bureau of Meteorology Bulletin No. 16, 1925. 
5 Anonymous, The Pearling Disaster, 1899: A Memorial, Brisbane: Outridge Printing Company, 1899. 
6 Whittingham 1958, 15. 
7 Ibid. Whittingham thanked John Zillman, then a cadet meteorologist in Brisbane, who “discovered 
the Outridge booklet and brought it to the attention of the writer.” Zillman was later to become director 
of BOM. 
8 Ibid., 15. 
9 Ibid., 36. Whittingham also used 1899 regional weather observations, and the barometric charts of 
the Queensland Weather Bureau drawn by Government Meteorologist Clement Wragge. 
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information on the event in scientific and popular literature.10 Data from 
Whittingham’s paper has been used in studies that assess the impact of future 
cyclones and the possible impacts of climate change.11 Whittingham assumed that 
the information in the Outridge booklet was reliable, but there has never been an 
epistemological review of the disaster.  
This chapter shows by example the methodology used to review the reliability of 
sources, particularly newspaper articles, for the pearling disaster. In considering 
whether the historical record reflects the best evidence, it deconstructs the Outridge 
booklet and Whittingham’s paper to provide a foundation on which to reconstruct, 
later in this thesis, the disaster and the cyclone that caused it. This reconstructionist 
approach will in turn provide the foundation of evidence upon which other aspects 
of the event, such as cultural memories and narratives, will be examined in the 
following chapters. To review the large number of sources, the methodology has 
been developed with newspapers in mind because the data they contain is the 
basis for much of the evidence on which the popular and scientific narratives are 
based. This methodology is designed to identify the best evidence, and while it 
differs from what has been generally accepted by scientists, it does not alter the 
conclusions that the 1899 cyclone was Australia’s deadliest and produced a world 
record storm surge. This thesis should also not be seen as a repudiation of 
Outridge and Whittingham’s works. Without those works, significant aspects of the 
cyclone would remain unrecorded. That these two sources have remained 
uncriticised and untested is not the fault of their authors, who defined their 
objectives and the limitations of their research. 
10 See for example, Jonathan Nott and Matthew Hayne, “How High Was the Storm Surge from 
Tropical Cyclone Mahina? North Queensland, 1899”, Australian Journal of Emergency Management, 
15, No. 1, Autumn 2000, 11–13; Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience, “Cyclone Mahina 1899”, 
Disaster Resilience Knowledge Hub, https://knowledge.aidr.org.au/resources/cyclone-cyclone-
mahina-cape-york-queensland (accessed 7 February 2019); Guinness World Records Limited, 
“Highest Storm Surge”, Guinness World Records 2014, New York: Bantam, 2014, 107. 
11 See for example, Alan Sharp, “Assessing Risk from Meteorological Phenomena Using Limited and 
Biased Databases”, The Australian Journal of Emergency Management, 23, No. 4, November 2008, 
9–13; Sarah Zielinski, “Australian Cyclone Activity Hits Record Low Levels”, Smithsonian.com, 29 
January 2014, https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/australian-cyclone-activity-hits-
record-low-levels-180949527/ (accessed 25 May 2018). Zielinski writes: “Scientists and the public 
have been interested in how hurricane and tropical cyclone activity might change in the future 
because these can be incredibly devastating storms. … Cyclone Mahina, which struck Queensland in 
1899, for instance, holds the world storm surge record at 48 feet.” 
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As explained in the Introduction and as shown in the Bibliography, I have reviewed 
many documents from as wide a range of sources as possible, to reveal evidence in 
which more confidence can be placed. Because of the world record storm surge, 
high death toll, and extraordinarily low central pressure associated with the cyclone, 
scientists and disaster researchers have written more about the 1899 pearling 
disaster than have historians.12 As will be discussed in Chapter Four, disasters “are 
not usually regarded as the substance of scholarly work by historians,”13 even 
though they represent “one of life’s most significant events, both individually and for 
the community.”14 Scientists have in the past few decades displayed a greater 
interest in historical disasters as the “science of disaster prediction flourishes”15 and 
the cost and number of natural disasters globally rises.16 Articles published in 
scientific journals have used, often uncritically, information drawn either from the 
Outridge booklet, or from Whittingham, or both. Outridge drew information largely 
from newspaper reports, suggesting that much of what science knows about the 
event is based on untested secondary and sometimes anecdotal sources. This 
raises questions about the validity of conclusions drawn by scientific studies using 
that information, as well as how scientists use historical sources more generally.  
 
Many archives, particularly newspaper archives, have become more easily 
accessible as computer technology has improved and more documents are 
digitised,17 giving researchers in all disciplines greater access to more historical 
                                                
12 A literature search using Google Scholar with the words “Mahina”, “1899”, and “cyclone”, for 
example, reveals 149 scholarly articles, most of which are related to science or disaster management 
https://scholar.google.com.au/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5&q=mahina+1899+cyclone+&oq= 
(accessed 18 March 2019).  
13 Paula Hamilton, “Memory Remains: Ferry Disaster, Sydney 1938”, History Workshop Journal 1999, 
No. 47, 1999, 197. 
14 Thomas R. Forrest, “Disaster Anniversary: A Social Reconstruction of Time”, Sociological Inquiry, 
63, No. 4, 1993, 447. 
15 Nathaniel Rich, “The New Science of Disaster Prediction”, New Yorker, 19 November 2013, 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-new-science-of-disaster-prediction (accessed 18 
March 2019); Jessica Bosari, “Catastrophic Risk Modeling and Recent Disasters: How the Insurance 
Industry Rides Out the Storms”, Forbes Magazine, 24 August 2012, https://www.forbes.com/sites 
/moneywisewomen/2012/08/24/catastrophic-risk-modeling-and-recent-disasters-how-the-insurance-
industry-rides-out-the-storms/#27e5e9de56ba (accessed 18 March 2019). Bosari writes: “There is 
much insurance companies can do to be prepared for each level of disaster through catastrophic risk 
modeling, and — based on historical records — some level of predictive accuracy they can achieve in 
guessing the likelihood of disaster occurrence.” 
16 Oliver Suess, “Who Pays Cost of Mother Nature's Destructive Fury?”, Bloomberg, 8 September 
2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-08/who-pays-cost-of-mother-nature-s-
destructive-fury-quicktake-q-a (accessed 18 March 2019). 
17 See Roberta Kwok, “Historical Data: Hidden in the Past”, Nature, 549, 21 September 2017, 
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information. The sources for that information, particularly newspapers, remain prone 
to the errors of their era. For example, newspapers contain errors arising from the 
use of the telegraph, the day-to-day production errors in the linotype era, limited 
access to information (relative to today), and the powerful influence of contemporary 
cultural narratives. A review of the earliest and primary sources for evidence in the 
1899 pearling disaster reveals how production errors and cultural narratives in 
newspapers, when repeated, attached themselves to the historical record. It also 
reveals the point at which memory and history begin to diverge in what Pierre Nora 
describes as memory’s “permanent evolution” as history moves further away from 
“what is no longer.”18 The apparent failure, especially by scientists, to distinguish 
between memory and history and to consider the risk of errors in newspapers raises 
broader questions about the scientific interpretation of disasters and what scientists 
are prepared to accept as valid historical data. This has implications for disaster 
planning.19    
 
The Outridge booklet  
 
The Pearling Disaster 1899: A Memorial (the Outridge booklet) was published 
anonymously in September 1899 to provide relatives of the dead and others “some 
account of the Europeans who were lost” six months earlier.20 Although the booklet 
acknowledged and expressed sympathy to all killed in the disaster, it was published 
as a memorial for the Europeans, to be given to their relatives and friends. As such, 
it reflects European cultural discourses of 1899 (which will be discussed in Chapter 
                                                
419–421. Kwok writes: “Much exploration of historical archives is concentrated in ecology and climate 
science, owing partly to rising concerns about the effects of climate change.” 
18 Pierre Nora and Marc Roudebush (trans.), “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de mémoire”, 
Representations, 26, Spring 1989, 8. 
19 Alan Sharp, Craig Arthur, Bob Cechet, and Mark Edwards, “Tropical Cyclones”, in Miriam. H. 
Middelmann (ed.), Natural Hazards in Australia: Identifying Risk Analysis Requirements, Canberra: 
Geoscience Australia, 2007, 50–51, http://www.ga.gov.au/metadata-gateway/metadata/record/65444/ 
(accessed 18 March 2019). The authors write: “To assess the probability of impact by tropical 
cyclones in a particular area, there is a heavy reliance on historical data. … For extreme events, 
newspaper records extending beyond the timescale of BOM’s database, which dates back to 1909, 
will help in the assessment.” See also Thomas R. Knutson et al., “Tropical Cyclones and Climate 
Change”, Nature Geoscience, 3, No. 3, 2010, 157. The authors write that there has been an ongoing 
effort to improve historical cyclone data because the detection of climate change trends has been 
“impeded by substantial limitations in the availability and quality of global historical records of tropical 
cyclones.” 
20 Anonymous 1899, 6. 
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Four). It is, as Whittingham described, a “mine of information”,21 but as the Outridge 
booklet declares in its Preface: “The information has been compiled from Press and 
official reports, and from the testimony of survivors.”22 The booklet, being the result 
of the collection and presenting of information gathered from those sources, can also 
be considered a work of journalism,23 and as historian Hayden White warns, the 
stories journalists tell should not be confused with historical narratives because such 
journalistic stories are already “locked within the confines” of a contemporary 
chronicle.24 The author of the Outridge booklet appears to be conscious that what he 
wrote would constitute an historical record of the event and he situates the work 
within a tradition of historical writing by quoting from classical works such as 
Shakespeare, Alexander Pope, Lord Byron, and the Bible.25 The intention may have 
been to give the booklet the impression of objective authority, but it remains a 
subjective account written during a period of grief. It memorialises one culture, and 
particularly members of one family. The booklet’s form includes narration in the third 
person, a literary device often used to convey the impression of objectivity. It also 
uses the first person plural “we”, which can be considered an editorial “we” as it is 
used in newspapers when the author of an editorial refers to himself or herself as a 
spokesperson for a newspaper or, in this case, the Outridge family.26 Although the 
booklet does not name an author, two individuals are closely associated with it: 
Percival Pitman Outridge, part-owner of several pearling fleets, and his brother 
Frederick Andrew Outridge, the major shareholder of the Outridge Printing 
Company, the booklet’s publisher. The booklet clearly identifies the perspective of 
                                                
21 Whittingham 1958, 15. 
22 Anonymous 1899, 6. 
23 Brian McNair, The Sociology of Journalism, London: Arnold, 1998, 4. McNair defines journalism as: 
“Any authored text, in written, audio or visual form which claims to be (i.e. is presented to its audience 
as) a truthful statement about, or record of, some hitherto unknown (new) feature of the actual, social 
world.” 
24 Hayden White, The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation, 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987, 172.  
25 Anonymous 1899. There are numerous examples in the booklet, including: “One touch of nature 
makes the whole world kin”, from Shakespeare’s Troilus and Cressida; the hymn God Moves in a 
Mysterious Way, by William Cowper; and “unknelled, uncoffined, and unknown,” from Childe Harold's 
Pilgrimage by Lord Byron. 
26 Anonymous 1899, 50. The author uses the editorial “we”, for example, when referring to Alfred St 
John Outridge; “… we know that he never forgot the training of his earlier years.” This also appears to 
be an attempt to convey impartiality and to suggest the booklet was not solely about the two Outridge 
family members killed. This may also be the reason why the author is not named.  
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one man throughout: Percival Pitman Outridge (hereafter referred to as P. P. 
Outridge).27 The narrator and main author is almost certainly P. P. Outridge.  
 
P. P. Outridge and the publisher Frederick Outridge were the brothers of Alfred St 
John Outridge and the uncles of 23-year-old Harold Outridge (son of another brother, 
Arthur) who died in the cyclone on the schooner Sagitta. P. P. Outridge was a 
managing partner in several of James Clark’s pearling fleets, including the Sagitta 
and its fleet of luggers. He had for some time before the disaster been living on 
Thursday Island, the fleet’s base, but was managing the fleet from Brisbane when 
the cyclone struck.28 P. P. Outridge can be identified as the author where his 
observations are described, where he offers analysis and opinion, and where he 
interviews survivors. In those sections, the Outridge booklet can be considered a 
primary source. Where the booklet repeats information from newspapers and other 
sources, it is regarded, for the purposes of extracting information or scientific data, 
as a secondary source.29  
 
The Outridge booklet, being predominantly an “account of the Europeans who were 
lost”, represents the perspective of a community that comprised four percent of the 
people killed (Chart 1.1), which was also the same proportion of Europeans 
employed in the Thursday Island fishing fleets, and a similar proportion of the more 
than 1,000 people at sea who experienced the destructive path of the cyclone as it 
crossed Cape Melville.30 The surviving accounts of the non-European crews at sea 
                                                
27 Ibid., 6. The Outridge booklet’s author speaks most often in the third person: “The nearest relatives 
of the late Alfred St John Outridge and Harold Arthur Outridge … have decided to print this volume.” 
Ibid., 7. “A short description of the fishery, written by one engaged in the industry, may not be out of 
place in this brochure,” clearly refers to Percival Pitman Outridge as the only surviving member of the 
family still engaged in the industry; Ibid., 44. “To visit the scene of the disaster some weeks after the 
cyclone was the painful duty of one of the heaviest losers.” P. P. Outridge visited Cape Melville and 
Thursday Island in May and June 1899; Ibid., 50. “When Walla saw Mr P. P. Outridge in May last, on 
the latter’s visit to Thursday island, he was very much affected.” “Shipping. Arrivals”, Week, 30 June 
1899, 15. P. P. Outridge returned to Brisbane on 22 June 1899.  
28 “Death of Mr. P. P. Outridge”, Telegraph (Brisbane), 2nd Edition, 27 July 1938, 12.  
29 The Outridge booklet is divided into sections. The “Preface”, “Pearling Industry — General 
Description”, “Some Statements of Survivors”, “Salvage Operations”, “Biographical Sketches”, “Goode 
Island”, “Sympathy with Bereaved”, “Monument”, and “Conclusion”, are, apart from contributed 
biographies and letters, almost certainly written by P. P. Outridge. The “Tabulated Statement — 
Vessels Wrecked and Lives Lost”, “Weather Report and Charts”, “The Hurricane — Vessels under its 
influence”, “Description — Experience of Constable Kenny”, “Experiences of the Different Schooners”, 
and “Assistance to the Wrecked”, are drawn primarily from newspaper reports and official records.  
30 John Douglas, “Report of the Government Resident at Thursday Island for 1898”, QVP, 1, 1899, 
100. Four percent is the proportion of Europeans on the shipping articles registered with the Thursday 
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and the Aboriginal people ashore are also, in most cases, recorded by Europeans. 
Most of the hundreds of primary documents, including the reports and charts of 
Queensland meteorologist Clement Wragge, the journals and notes of ships’ 
captains, and interviews with survivors, reflect the event as it affected the European 
community, including reports of the economic losses, the marine observations, and 
the anecdotes that conform to British narratives of social and racial behaviour. The 
accounts of the Aboriginal people ashore are rarely considered, although accounts 
exist in oral histories.31 (This thesis attempts to represent the experiences of all 
cultures and the Aboriginal experience will be examined in Chapters Three and 
Five.) 
 
                                                
Island Shipping office (86 Europeans of 2,132 people). This is a similar proportion to the Europeans in 
the fleets anchored around Cape Melville (about 40 of the nearly 1,000 people on vessels); “Hurricane 
in the North”, Brisbane Courier, 10 March 1899, 5. Pearling fleet owner James Clark said: “The crews 
employed on these vessels would number in all not far short of 1,000.” Walter Roth to Under 
Secretary Home Office, “Report Re Distribution of Gifts to Coastal Aboriginals”, 9 April 1899, 
HOM/A23/99/5252, QSA, ID847561, 4. The Northern Protector of Aboriginals, Walter Roth, distributed 
aid to the Aboriginal people affected by the cyclone and found “upwards of 120 men, women and 
children” on the beach at Bathurst Bay and “45 or 50” people at Bathurst Head a month after the 
cyclone.  
31 See for example, Regina Ganter, “Human Use of the Great Barrier Reef: An Oral History: 
Transcripts of Tapes”, 1994, Ganter_R01 FTS1–96/MS3126, Australian Institute of Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Studies, Griffith University, Brisbane. 
 31 
1.1 Nationalities and origins of people known to have been killed in the pearling disaster (based on 1899 terminology).32 
                                                
32 The chart is based on the list of known dead in Appendix 1, and reflects the terminology of 1899. For example, people of Batavia were distinguished from 
people from the rest of Java. The captains of two boats are also described as French, from New Caledonia, but their identities are unknown.  
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Scientific data from historical newspapers: A methodology 
 
Most academic interest in the pearling disaster has not been by social scientists, but 
by natural scientists studying aspects of the tropical cyclone that caused it. Concerns 
about climate change and its impact on cyclone strength and frequency have led to 
an increasing focus on quantitative assessments of disaster risk as part of disaster 
preparation.33 In the US, since 1990, here has been a program to review the 
National Hurricane Center’s Hurricane Database (HURDAT), and in 2004, the US 
Hurricane Reanalysis Project began to extend its dataset of historical records for 
Atlantic hurricanes back to the 19th century, seeking more data to make statistical 
analysis more accurate.34 Much of the data comes from newspapers, as well as 
weather bureaus, diaries, and ship logs.35 In Australia, satellite databases for tropical 
cyclones have also been reassessed and historical databases, also called datasets, 
have been consolidated.36 There has been no project to reanalyse the Australian 
historical data on the scale of the US Hurricane Reanalysis Project, even though 
there has been concern that “on the cusp of needing accurate intensity trend 
information, we are likely to be frustrated by doubts and uncertainties about the 
quality of much of the global TC [Tropical Cyclone] datasets.”37 
                                                
33 Sharp et al. 2007, 46. The authors write: “The detection and attribution of any trends in tropical 
cyclone frequency and intensity requires significant research.” See also Trevor Jones, “Advances in 
Risk Assessment for Australian Emergency Management”, Australian Journal of Emergency 
Management, 23, No. 4, November 2008, 12–13.  
34 Christopher W. Landsea et al., “The Atlantic Hurricane Database Reanalysis Project”, in Richard J. 
Murnane and Kam-Biu Liu (eds), Hurricanes and Typhoons: Past, Present and Future, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2004, 177–221; Christopher W. Landsea, “Counting Atlantic Tropical 
Cyclones Back to 1900”, EOS, 88, 2007,197–200. 
35 J. Fernandez-Partagas and H. F. Diaz, A Reconstruction of Historical Tropical Cyclone Frequency 
in the Atlantic from Documentary and other Historical Sources, Part VI: 1909–1910, Boulder, 
Colorado: Climate Diagnostics Center, US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 
1999. The report’s aim was to determine more accurately the frequency of tropical cyclones in the 
Atlantic using historical sources, including newspapers, to check previous data.  
36 Jeffrey Callaghan and Scott B. Power, “Variability and Decline in the Number of Severe Tropical 
Cyclones Making Land-Fall Over Eastern Australia Since the Late Nineteenth Century”, Climate 
Dynamics, 37, No. 3, 1 August 2011, 647–662; Blair Trewin, “An Enhanced Tropical Cyclone Data Set 
for the Australian Region”, in 20th Conference on Climate Variability and Change, New Orleans 
American Meteorological Society 2008; B. A. Harper, S. A. Stroud, M. McCormack, and S. West, “A 
Review of Historical Tropical Cyclone Intensity in Northwestern Australia and Implications for Climate 
Change Trend Analysis”, Australian Meteorological Magazine, 57, 2008, 121–141; BOM, “Australian 
Tropical Cyclone Database”, http://www.bom.gov.au/cyclone/history/eastern.shtml (accessed 18 
March 2019); BOM, “List Of Disturbance IDS”, http://www.bom.gov.au/clim_data/IDCKMSTM0S.csv 
(accessed 4 April 2018). 
37 B. A. Harper and Jeffrey Callaghan, “On the Importance of Reviewing Historical Tropical Cyclone 
Intensities”, Twenty-seventh American Meteorological Society Conference on Hurricanes and Tropical 
Meteorology, 24–28 April 2006, Monterey, United States; See Sharp et al. 2007, 43. The authors 
write: “Equally important [in assessing the effect of climate change on tropical cyclone frequencies 
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In computing, a dataset is a collection of data, or information, usually relating to a 
specific area of research. For the purposes of this thesis, data is the information 
scientists extract from any document related to the cyclone. This data from historical 
documents is often included in datasets relating to historical cyclones, from which it 
is used as evidence to support an argument and conclusion. In the case of the 
cyclone that caused the pearling disaster, there appears to have been an 
assumption that data in these datasets has been tested in some way, and is 
therefore reliable and valid. However, nearly all the data shown in the official 
Australian Government dataset of Australian disasters, for example, appears to be 
from secondary sources using untested data that can be traced to the Outridge 
booklet.38 In 2014, I reviewed primary sources for a scientific paper that revised the 
cyclone’s central pressure, but there has been no epistemological review of all 
aspects of the 1899 cyclone.39 Since that 2014 review, the historical methodology 
described in this chapter has been developed further to produce more reliable data 
from which evidence can be applied to investigate the cyclone’s behaviour, track, 
and impacts, including its storm tide (as will be shown in Chapters Two and Five).   
 
As mentioned, there has been increasing interest in disaster studies by scientists in 
Australia, but little corresponding interest by historians. Quantitative historical 
research, however, can provide an empirical foundation that will be shown to better 
explain the social impact of disaster, while untested data from secondary sources 
can be shown to distort an understanding of the social impacts.40 The review of 
                                                
and intensities] is the need to objectively reanalyse the existing historical datasets for the very 
significant changes that have occurred over the past 50 years.” See also Joe Courtney and Andrew 
Burton, Joint Industry Project for Objective Tropical Cyclone Reanalysis: Final Report, BOM, 7 
September 2018. http://www.bom.gov.au/cyclone/history/index.shtml (accessed 6 July 2019). The 
project set out to “produce a TC database for the Australian region (southern hemisphere between 
longitudes 90 and 160°E) covering the period from 1981 onwards.” However, it was unable to produce 
a reliable database pre-1989 “due to a high proportion of missing or poorly navigated imagery in the 
early satellite record.”  
38 Australian Government Department of the Attorney General, Disaster Events with Category Impact 
and Location (dataset), https://data.gov.au/dataset/disaster-events-with-category-impact-and-location 
(accessed 18 March 2019). The listing under cyclone Mahina repeats information from the Australian 
Disaster Resilience Knowledge Hub, citing untested data from secondary sources (see Chapter Five). 
39 Jonathan Nott, Camilla Green, Ian Townsend and Jeffrey Callaghan, “The World Record Storm 
Surge and the Most Intense Southern Hemisphere Tropical Cyclone: New Evidence and Modeling”, 
Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, 95, No. 5, May 2014, 757–765. 
40 Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience, “Cyclone Mahina 1899.” The Australian Disaster 
Resilience Knowledge Hub states: “Over 100 Aboriginals died while trying to help the shipwrecked.” 
As will be discussed in Chapter Three, there is no evidence for the deaths of 100 Aboriginal people.   
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evidence used to describe the pearling disaster has revealed an apparent 
misunderstanding by natural scientists of the importance of historiography. It has 
also revealed a misunderstanding by historians of how important quantitative 
research is in the field of disaster studies. This may be partly explained by the 
different perceptions of historians and scientists as to what constitutes meaningful 
information in historical documents. Meteorologists and climate scientists tend to 
favour quantitative techniques, seeking to understand the behaviour of a cyclone, for 
example, by measuring it. The cyclone is something that was once objectively 
measurable; it existed and was observable, and if a measurement exists, it may be 
useful in helping understand its strength and track, which can help predict future 
cyclones. Historians tend to use qualitative techniques to understand the behaviour 
of people and how they respond to the disasters that cyclones cause. The disaster, 
describing the impact of the cyclone on people, is more subjective. Historians also 
understand that, as postmodern historiography recognises, the evidence for the 
cyclone is not neutral, existing independently of a memory or a document, but is a 
concept of reality contingent on the document or memory itself.41 An historian 
recognises that, even if a source can be shown to be authentic and the evidence 
credible, the information may not reflect exactly what happened. As historian Louis 
Gottschalk points out, “What is meant by credible is not that it happened, but that it is 
as close to what actually happened as we can learn from a critical examination of the 
best available sources.”42 These qualifications are difficult to measure and for 
scientists to include in statistical models that use historical datasets to forecast 
tropical cyclones. However, a measure of credibility or validity from the best available 
sources would give scientists more confidence in their datasets.  
 
Scientists researching historical disasters appear to rely heavily on newspapers for 
data.43 Easier access through the internet to historical newspapers is now producing 
                                                
41 Linda Hutcheon, A Poetics of Postmodernism: History, Theory, Fiction, New York: Routledge, 1988, 
122. 
42 Louis Gottschalk, “The Historian and the Historical Document”, in The Use of Personal Documents 
in History, Anthropology, and Sociology, prepared for the Committee on Appraisal of Research, Louis 
Gottschalk et al. (eds), New York: Social Science Research Council, 1945, 35. 
43 R. M. W. Musson, “The Use of Newspaper Data in Historical Earthquake Studies”, Disasters, 10, 
No. 3, 1986, 222. Musson writes: “… for most historical British earthquakes of the last three centuries 
they [newspapers] provide the bulk of the extant macroseismic data”; Cary J. Mock, “Tropical Cyclone 
Reconstructions from Documentary Records; Examples from South Carolina”, in Richard J. Murnane 
and Kam-Biu Liu (eds), Hurricanes and Typhoons: Past, Present and Future, New York: Columbia 
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a large amount of data, despite some uneasiness expressed about its reliability.44 
This appears to be an area of scientific research in which historians and 
historiography are missing. Historians’ skills, says Marwick, “lie in sorting these 
matters out, in understanding how and why a particular source came into existence, 
[and] how relevant it is to the topic under investigation.”45 Historians also have an 
obligation to treat quantitative data as they would qualitative texts, and subject them 
to tests of reliability, such as the conventional use of historical method.46  
 
The historical method is a convention analogous to the rules of evidence in law 
where statements are interrogated and corroborated and witnesses are assessed as 
to their reliability and motives. Historians have devised various tests based on the 
historical method, designed to provide a process for source criticism. These tests 
generally emphasise a preference for primary sources, objectivity, and corroboration. 
A search of the literature has found, for example, articles by climate scientists on 
issues affecting the digitisation of historic climate data in archives,47 and articles by 
sociologists on the use of newspapers as sources for socio-historical data.48 Despite 
one interesting exception,49 no methodologies to specifically address the credibility 
                                                
University Press, 2004, 124. Mock writes: “Newspapers provide the most detailed source of tropical 
cyclones.”  
44 Musson 1986, 222. Musson concludes his study for the British Geological Survey by saying that 
newspaper data provides an “adequate basis for studying many major earthquakes” although “the 
main limitations result from the fact that newspaper data has not been published with scientific intent” 
and is therefore “incomplete.” 
45 Arthur Marwick, The New Nature of History: Knowledge, Evidence, Language, Basingstoke, UK: 
Palgrave, 2001, 27. 
46 John Tosh, The Pursuit of History: Aims, Methods and New Directions in the Study of History, 
London: Routledge, 2015, 113. Tosh writes: “Statistical know-how can only be effective if it is subject 
to the normal controls of historical method.” 
47 S. Brönnimann et al., “A Guide for Digitising Manuscript Climate Data”, Climate of the Past, 2, No. 
2, 2006, 137–144.  
48 Roberto Franzosi, “The Press as a Source of Socio-Historical Data: Issues in the Methodology of 
Data Collection from Newspapers”, Historical Methods: A Journal of Quantitative and Interdisciplinary 
History, 20, No. 1, Winter 1987, 5–16. Franzosi also had difficulty finding methodologies for assessing 
quantitative data in newspapers: “At best, measurement problems are acknowledged in hard-to-find 
footnotes or methodological appendices.”  
49 J. Añel et al., “Obtaining Meteorological Data from Historical Newspapers: La Integridad”, 
Weather, 72, No. 12, 2017, 366–371. This paper describes the analysis and validation of 
meteorological data in the late 19th and early 20th centuries from a Spanish observatory published in 
one Spanish newspaper. It used an historical methodology to validate the data by comparing the 
newspaper reports with surviving primary source notes from the observatory, as well as external 
meteorological observations. The authors write: “Cross-check of the seasonal cycle against 
independent databases verifies the validity of the work undertaken, as well as the reliability of the 
recovered series for use in studies of anthropogenic climatic change and for validating numerical 
models.” It found some typographical errors and other anomalies that could be reasonably explained, 
but the study’s scope was restricted to investigating one historical source for one newspaper. 
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of data in historical newspapers have been found, even though natural scientists are 
increasingly mining historical newspapers for data.50 This may be because when 
social scientists apply the historical method to newspapers, they are “relatively 
unconcerned with problems of measurement.”51 Similarly, when natural scientists 
seek data from historical sources, such as newspapers, they are relatively 
unconcerned with the problems of historiography. The pearling disaster of 1899 is a 
significant event both scientifically and socially, and not only are both qualitative and 
quantitative research methods needed to accurately describe the social and scientific 
impacts, but the two can be shown to inform each other.      
 
In producing for this thesis a methodology for assessing whether a piece of 
information or data constitutes good evidence, a useful foundation has been 
provided by the historian Louis Gottschalk.52 Gottschalk emphasises that, because 
few documents are completely reliable, the credibility of any particular piece of 
information should be tested regardless of the overall credibility of the source.53 
Such an approach is suitable for testing information within historical newspaper 
articles because, despite journalists’ efforts to be “accurate and precise” and editors 
to make sound judgments on what is important,54 they are also subject to 
contemporary narratives, newspapers vary in their reporting practices, the quality of 
articles can vary widely between and within newspapers, they are prone to a variety 
of production errors, and the journalists and contributors of articles are often 
unidentified. In other words, this methodology treats each piece of information or 
data on its merits. I have adapted Gottschalk to apply four tests to each piece of 
                                                
50 See for example, A. Yzaguirre, M. Smit, and R. Warren, “Newspaper Archives + Text Mining = Rich 
Sources of Historical Geo-spatial Data”, IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental 
Science, 34, No. 1, 2016. This paper describes a pilot study by earth scientists using algorithms to 
extract data on floods from one newspaper in Nova Scotia, Canada. The methodology is used to 
obtain large amounts of data, but stops short of testing individual datum because it assumes a degree 
of validity already exists. 
51 Franzosi 1987, 5. 
52 Gottschalk 1945, 3–78. See also Martha Howell and Walter Prevenier, From Reliable Sources: An 
Introduction to Historical Methods, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2001; C. Behan 
McCullagh, Justifying Historical Descriptions, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984;  
R. J. Shafer, A Guide to Historical Method, Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1974.  
53 Louis Gottschalk, Understanding History: A Primer of Historical Method, New York: Knopf, 1950, 
144. 
54 Yzaguirre et al. 2016, 1. The abstract of this paper describes an assumption about the quality of 
data derived from newspapers: “The effort of journalists to be accurate and precise means that there 
is often rich geo-spatial data embedded in the text, alongside text describing events that editors 
considered to be of sufficient importance to the region or the world to merit column inches.”  
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information, or data, within a document: Is the primary source able to tell the truth? Is 
the primary source willing to tell the truth? Is a secondary source able and willing to 
identify a primary source (to which the first and second questions can be asked) and 
report what was said accurately? Can the information be corroborated?55 
 
Is the primary source of the information able to tell the truth?  
 
The preference is for sources closest to the event temporally and spatially. As 
Gottschalk says, “Witness's testimony tends to vary in proportion to … his own 
remoteness from the scene in time and space.”56 This first test also goes to the 
credibility of the source. Is the source or the author identifiable and, if so, how 
competent were they to report what happened? An effort should be made to identify 
an author or witness, in order to judge competency on expertise, experience, and 
reputation. Were they in a position to report accurately? A witness can describe their 
own experience better than another witness’s experience, and their ability to have 
seen or experienced what happened directly contributes to their ability to tell the 
truth. In what form was the testimony communicated? Journalists, like court 
reporters, are tasked with recording events accurately, but can be prone to human 
errors, such as mishearing words or misunderstanding what is said. As will be 
discussed, errors in translation and transmission also distort information.  
 
Is the primary source willing to tell the truth?  
 
People will sometimes lie about what they saw or experienced, sometimes to portray 
themselves in a better light, or to protect someone else. Might there have been a 
motive to lie? Might the source or author be biased in some way that would change 
their testimony? All witnesses are locked into contemporary political, cultural and 
social narratives. Pressure from peers, or leading questions from people in positions 
of power, can make it difficult for witnesses to tell the whole truth. 
 
                                                
55 Gottschalk 1945, 38.  
56 Ibid. 
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Is a secondary source able and willing to identify a primary source, and is 
what they said accurate?  
 
If there is no primary source, does the secondary source identify a primary source? If 
not, it may be rumour. By considering historical evidence as analogous to the rules 
of evidence in law, it is worth considering the “chain of custody” for evidence. Can 
the information be shown to be passed from an identified primary source to the 
identified secondary source? How was it transferred? If both parties are identified, if 
there was opportunity for the information to be passed from one to the other, and if 
the parties can be shown to be reliable and acting in good faith, more confidence can 
be placed in the reliability of the information. If a chain of custody can be shown, can 
any or all parts of the information also be shown to be accurate?   
  
Can the information be corroborated?  
 
Information of a particular event is more likely to be credible if it can be corroborated 
by at least two primary sources. If it cannot be corroborated by a witness, can it be 
corroborated with other known facts? The intention here is to establish if the 
document is credible regardless of the author’s credibility. The credibility of the 
author, source, or newspaper alone is not enough to corroborate it.  
 
Any piece of information within a document, such as a newspaper article, that 
passes all tests can be considered good evidence, as Gottschalk suggests,57 but 
before applying the methodology to historical newspaper articles, aspects of 
newspaper production in the late 19th century must also be considered.    
 
External criticism: The problem of syndicated newspaper articles 
 
“No source can be used for historical reconstruction until some estimate of its 
standing as historical evidence has been made,” says British historian and 
historiographer John Tosh, who suggests that an historian, as someone who 
understands the historical context, is best placed to evaluate the reliability of a 
                                                
57 Ibid.  
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historical source.58 The convention is first, to ensure that the document is what it 
claims to be. In the case of newspapers in 1899, external criticism is less a matter of 
identifying authentic documents from fabricated ones, than identifying original 
articles from syndicated copies. A widespread practice of newspapers of the period 
was to exchange articles with each other by telegraph. Many of the hundreds of 
newspaper articles reporting on the disaster in 1899 were articles copied from other 
newspapers, quoted verbatim, paraphrased, or re-written. Most were unattributed 
and often contained errors. For example, on Thursday 8 March 1899, four days after 
the disaster, a telegram was sent from the harbour-master at Townsville to the 
Brisbane Portmaster, Captain Almond. This telegram was reprinted verbatim and 
within quotation marks in the Brisbane Courier the next day, 9 March.  
 
Captain Jenkins, of the steamer Duke of Norfolk, which arrived this 
morning from London, reports beacons on B and D Reefs down; those 
on A and F not seen. Throughout locality saw evidences recent severe 
hurricane. … schooner Crest of Wave which had dragged from 
anchorage in Bathurst Bay, dismasted, and flying distress signals.59 
 
Newspapers often exchanged articles by arrangement, and the Courier article was 
sent by telegraph to Adelaide’s Advertiser newspaper. The article appeared, 
paraphrased, in Adelaide the same day:  
 
The captain of the Duke of Norfolk reports that many beacons have been 
washed away north of Cape Melville, and that a number of pearl shelling 
boats are stranded. He sighted the schooner Crest of the Waves 
dragging her anchor and flying distress signals.60 
 
The paraphrased story was sent by telegraph to the Kalgoorlie Miner:  
 
Captain Duke, of the steamer Norfolk, reports that many beacons have 
been washed away to the north of Cape Melville, and that a number of 
pearl shelling boats are stranded. Captain Duke sighted a schooner on 
the crest of the waves dragging her anchor and flying distress signals.61 
 
                                                
58 Tosh 2015, 105.  
59 “Shipping”, Brisbane Courier, 9 March 1899, 3.  
60 “Rough Weather at Sea. Boats Stranded. A Schooner in Distress”, Advertiser (Adelaide), 9 March 
1899, 5. 
61 “The Recent Gale”, Kalgoorlie Miner, 9 March 1899, 5. 
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The risk of error was amplified by telegraph repeater stations and this article, for 
example, passed through Eucla near the border of South Australia and Western 
Australia, where telegraph operators from each colony sat at opposite sides of a 
table, writing down the Morse Code, decoding the messages, and passing them 
through holes in a partition to their opposite numbers, who would recode the 
messages and then send them on.62 The reports of Adelaide’s Advertiser and the 
Kalgoorlie Miner obviously do not corroborate each other because they are versions 
of the same report from the same source. Failing the discovery of the original 
telegram, the most credible source — the one with the least risk of error — is the 
Brisbane Courier, which received and printed verbatim the contents of the telegram 
from Townsville. The Brisbane Courier’s offices in Queen Street were across the 
road from the Post and Telegraph Office and a few blocks from the Port Office in 
Edward Street, and its staff had direct access to the original telegram and its 
recipient, Captain Almond. All other reports can be considered syndicated copies of 
the Brisbane Courier’s report. Of the hundreds of newspaper articles reporting the 
disaster and published in the Australian colonies at the time, most were syndicated 
copies of fewer than 20 articles, telegrams and letters originally published in 
Brisbane newspapers. Nearly all syndicated copies of these reports contain errors 
and are invalid. However, the authors of most of the original reports and their 
sources, which include ships captains, fleet owners, police and government officials, 
can be identified and an assessment made as to their credibility by the methodology.  
 
Only one journalist, the editor of the Cooktown Independent, James Fowler, went to 
the disaster scene soon after the cyclone, on the steamship Warrego, dispatched by 
the Queensland Government to search for survivors.63 No copies of the Cooktown 
Independent for that period have been found, but when Fowler returned to Cooktown 
he appears to have sent reports to the Brisbane Courier under the byline, “Our 
Special Correspondent.”64 Brisbane newspapers employed regional correspondents 
                                                
62 Ann Moyal, Clear across Australia: A History of Telecommunications, Melbourne: Thomas Nelson 
Australia, 1984, 59–60. Moyal writes that it was not until 1901 that the partition was removed. In 1909, 
electromagnetic repeaters replaced the telegraph operators. 
63 “The Late Hurricane. Return of the Warrego. Reports from the Boats”, Brisbane Courier, 20 March 
1899, 6. 
64 “Personals”, Queensland Figaro (Brisbane), 5 May 1883, 10. The article says: “James Fowler … 
acts as a correspondent to some southern papers.” 
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who were often politicians and journalists,65 such as Fowler and the politician, Jack 
Hamilton.66 Hamilton was also a correspondent writing articles for Brisbane 
newspapers, but he cannot be considered a primary witness for data because he 
was not near the scene at the time, despite claiming to be, and was not aboard the 
steamship Warrego when it went to the scene.67 These correspondents are 
significant because newspaper reports originating from the Warrego’s rescue 
mission, including reports by “Our Special Correspondent”, informed the Outridge 
booklet, which was to be the basis for the historical record and the original source of 
data upon which most scientific studies rely. Fowler and the Warrego’s purser, 
William Colvin, were responsible for the most detailed reporting of the cyclone to be 
published in the Brisbane newspapers, particularly the Brisbane Courier. The 
Cooktown store manager with the trading company Burns Philp, Arthur Richard 
Vidgen (hereafter A. R. Vidgen), who was also on the Warrego, was responsible for 
the letter that was to become the basis for the world record storm surge statistic.68  
 
Being able to identify an author and their sources, and to be able to judge the 
competency of both, helps establish through the methodology the credibility of their 
evidence. However, the credibility of any piece of information within an article does 
not rest with the credibility of the article, its author or their source alone. As 
Gottschalk explains: “Because the whole can be no greater than the sum of its parts, 
because the general credibility of a document can be no greater than the credibility 
                                                
65 Denis Cryle, The Press in Colonial Queensland: A Social and Political History, 1845–1875, St. 
Lucia: University of Queensland Press (UQP), 1989, 2–3.  
66 “The Late Hurricane”, Brisbane Courier, 8 April 1899, 6. The article reports: “Mr. J. Hamilton, 
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of the separate details in it, corroboration by general credibility is weak corroboration 
at best.”69 Correspondents, even experienced journalists, mishear words, 
misinterpret what is said, and leave out qualifying information. All documents, 
including this thesis, contain errors and biases. Newspapers are subject to 
production errors in the editing process and the transmission of information. The 
risks of errors in contemporary newspapers must be considered before applying the 
methodology.  
 
Errors of transmission: Newspapers and the telegraph 
 
Even the most reliable primary sources are not immune from human errors. Apart 
from telegrams and letters from witnesses published verbatim, the most significant 
newspaper reportage was by Colvin and Fowler, who were both on the Warrego 
when it was sent to the scene to search for survivors. Both can be considered 
primary witnesses to aspects of the disaster, as well as the authors of the primary 
accounts of other witnesses. Their reports published soon after the event, however, 
differ significantly. For example, the Brisbane Courier on 15 March published a 
report sent from Cooktown by telegram from “Our Special Correspondent”, 
presumed to be Fowler:  
 
The steamer Warrego left Cooktown on Friday last, and anchored 
abreast Ingram Island on the 11th instant. The cutter Spray was seen, 
and Captain Dakle [sic], the master, stated that on the 4th instant he 
anchored at Stapleton Island, in company with a cutter owned by a 
Japanese.70 
 
The Warrego’s purser, Colvin, when he arrived with the steamship in Brisbane three 
days later, gave a more detailed account of the same event:  
 
At about 8 a.m. three boats were seen at anchor off Ingram Island. They 
proved to be the Spray, a cutter of 2 tons, owned by Edward Moresby 
[sic], of York Island, and commanded by R. Hanson, a Dane; the Dackle, 
A11, owner Douglas, of Darnley Island, ‘Jimime,’ [sic] a York Islander, in 
charge. … On being interviewed, Hanson reported that on the 4th he 
                                                
69 Gottschalk 1945, 46.  
70 “The Late Hurricane. Cruise of the Warrego. Further Particulars. Reports of the Pearling Captains. 
The Estimated Loss of Life”, Brisbane Courier, 15 March 1899, 5.  
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was anchored off Stapleton Island, in company with a Japanese cutter 
…71 
    
The first report, presumed to be by Fowler, has confused the name of the vessel 
Dackle with Captain Hanson of another vessel, Spray. The Warrego’s purser Colvin 
indicates that he witnessed an interview with Captain Hanson (Colvin states, “On 
being interviewed, Hanson reported …”). The only journalist aboard the Warrego 
was Fowler, although he may not have conducted the interview.72 In any case, if 
“Our Special Correspondent” was Fowler, an experienced journalist, how did he 
make such a basic error as to confuse the name of the vessel with the captain? 
There are other significant differences between Fowler’s 15 March article and 
Colvin’s 20 March article, which describe similar information from the same sources 
in a similar chronology.  
 
(Our Special Correspondent) … at 10 o'clock it was blowing a gale, the 
glass standing at 29.10in.73 
(William Colvin) … at 10 p.m. the Olive's glass was 29.60, and fell 
rapidly to 29.10.74  
 
(Our Special Correspondent) The bodies of twenty-seven coloured 
people were seen at Cape Melville.75 
(William Colvin) Vidgen went ashore on the mainland, and found twenty-
seven live men.76 
 
(Our Special Correspondent) The wind at midnight on the 4th blew with 
hurricane force from east to north.77 
(William Colvin) ... at midnight, and from then till daylight [the wind] 
worked from west to north, blowing with hurricane force all the time.78 
 
“Our Special Correspondent’s” 15 March report also contradicts many aspects of 
what appears to be his more reliable, but abbreviated, report the day before 
                                                
71 “The Late Hurricane. Return of the Warrego”, 6. The name Jimime is almost certainly a 
typographical error, and should be Jimmie. 
72 Ibid. Only four passengers were reported to be aboard the Warrego when it returned to the scene, 
including James Fowler, the only journalist.  
73 “The Late Hurricane. Cruise of the Warrego”, 5. 
74 “The Late Hurricane. Return of the Warrego”, 6. 
75 “The Late Hurricane. Cruise of the Warrego”, 5. 
76 “The Late Hurricane. Return of the Warrego”, 6. 
77 “The Late Hurricane. Cruise of the Warrego”, 5. 
78 “The Late Hurricane. Return of the Warrego”, 6. 
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(published in the Brisbane Courier on 14 March, but written 13 March, the same day 
the Warrego arrived in Cooktown from the scene).79  
 
 (Our Special Correspondent, 14 March) Thirteen porpoises were found 
15ft. up the cliff at Flinders.80 
 
 (Our Special Correspondent, 15 March) Many porpoises were found at 
a height of 50ft.81 
 
The direction of the wind, the air pressure, and the height of porpoises on a cliff are 
significant observations for natural scientists studying the cyclone and its storm tide, 
so identifying the most reliable source is crucial to producing reliable findings.82 
Which is the more reliable of the reports? Fowler’s article was sent “By Telegraph 
from Our Special Correspondent” from Cooktown to Brisbane, an expensive exercise 
that often meant a report was abbreviated.83 Telegrams carried little or no 
punctuation, so when a report reached Brisbane the punctuation had to be added 
(Figure 1.1).  
 
The lack of punctuation in telegrams often led to misinterpretation. For example, the 
Telegraph officer-in-charge at Cooktown sent a telegram to the Under Secretary and 
Superintendent of Telegraphs in Brisbane, which was reprinted in the Brisbane 
Courier as: “The Channel Island lightship and four men were lost at Douglas Spit. A 
coloured man reached the shore with two women after swimming for four days.”84 
                                                
79 It is possible that the reports of 14 and 15 March from Cooktown by “Our Special Correspondent”, 
which in parts contradict each other, were written by two different “Special Correspondents”. 
However, the similarity between the reports of Colvin and both reports of the Special Correspondent, 
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the Warrego. 
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81 “The Late Hurricane. Return of the Warrego”, 6.  
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September 2009. Entel writes: “Porpoises apparently found 15m up on cliffs on Flinders Island.” H. E. 
Whittingham, “Storm Surges Along the Queensland Coast Associated with Tropical Cyclones”, 
Australian Meteorological and Oceanographic Journal, 27, October 1959, 40. Whittingham quotes 
Norman Bartlett, The Pearl Seekers, London: Andrew Melrose Ltd, 1954, 251: “At Flinders Island 
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83 Richard B. Kielbowicz, “News Gathering by Mail in the Age of the Telegraph: Adapting to a New 
Technology”, Technology and Culture, 28, No. 1, 1987, 33. 
84 “The Late Hurricane”, Brisbane Courier, 14 March 1899, 5. 
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Figure 1.1 Example of a telegram from Walter Roth, Protector of Aboriginals, Cooktown, received in 
Brisbane, showing the lack of punctuation (from Roth, “Report Re Distribution of Gifts to Coastal 
Aboriginals”, 1899.) 
 
There was no “Douglas Spit” at Cape Melville, but there was a man named Douglas 
Pitt who swam ashore with several women. The sender meant to say: “The Channel 
Island lightship and four men were lost. Douglas Pitt, a coloured man, reached the 
shore with two women after swimming for four days.” A telegraph operator had to 
interpret handwritten or dictated messages, which, after being sent by Morse code, 
had to be deciphered by another operator and, if taken down by hand, the 
handwriting deciphered again by an editor or typesetter before it was published. This 
added several layers to the risk of mishearing or misreading words and numbers.85 
Fowler’s reports sent by telegraph cannot be completely dismissed. The 
                                                
85 The interpretation of handwriting was an issue at the time and it remains an issue today for people 
dealing with handwritten records. The project manager at QBDM in Brisbane, Mike Vitobello, 
described in an interview with me on 26 June 2015 the difficulty of transcribing handwritten records 
held by the registry: “We can only go by what we understand the interpretation of the name to be and, 
of course, again the disparity of some of the registrars’ handwriting made it a lot of fun to interpret 
those names.” 
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methodology is applied to each piece of information separately, but the risk of errors 
is greater because of their transmission by telegraph.    
   
The Warrego’s purser, Colvin, “supplied” his report in person to the Brisbane Courier 
when the steamship docked at the Australian United Steam Navigation Company 
(A.U.S.N.) Wharf at North Quay in Brisbane on Saturday 18 March, thereby 
bypassing the vagaries of the telegraph.86 That report published on 20 March 
contains many details that can be corroborated, so the report in general is more 
credible than Fowler’s report of 15 March. Both newspaper reports were sent by 
telegraph to other newspapers and were quoted or paraphrased by Outridge, and 
the information they contained, including errors, entered the historical record.  
 
Errors of translation: The grounding of the Meg Merrilies 
 
The reports of primary witnesses can also be altered by being misheard or 
misunderstood. For example, on the night of 4 and 5 March 1899, the schooner Meg 
Merrilies, owned by Herbert Bowden and Patrick John Doyle, two prominent 
Thursday Island businessmen, and captained by William Naphtali Thompson, was 
grounded and wrecked on a coral reef in the north-western part of Princess Charlotte 
Bay. The positions before and after the cyclone of the schooners Meg Merrilies and 
Tarawa,87 which anchored near each other, are significant because their movements 
as described by Outridge conflict with other evidence about the behaviour of this 
cyclone. The Outridge booklet describes the anchorage of the Meg Merrilies as 
being east of Pelican Island.     
    
This schooner was anchored about a mile to the east of Pelican Island 
on the Saturday afternoon. She experienced a moderate breeze from the 
east, commencing at 7 p.m.88 
 
                                                
86 “The Late Hurricane. Return of the Warrego”, 6. 
87 The Tarawa was owned by the Queensland Pearl Shell Fishery Company Ltd, which is also 
referred to as the Queensland Pearlshell Fishing Company in the Australian Register of Shipping and 
the Queensland Pearl Fishing Company in the Outridge booklet. I have instead used the name by 
which the company refers to itself on company letterheads, in newspaper advertisements, Lloyds 
Register of Shipping, and Sands Directory of Sydney businesses. 
88 Anonymous 1899, 18.  
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The Marine Board of Inquiry reported 4 April 1899 that the schooner was anchored 
“north-west” of the Pelican Island. 
  
... the ‘Meg Merrilies’ was anchored on the night of the 4th of March one 
mile north-west of Pelican island, wind S.E. moderate.89  
 
The schooner’s captain appears to describe his position as “south-east” of the island 
in a statement published on 20 March 1899.   
 
I was anchored off Pelican Island, being south-east, distance 1min., on 
Saturday, 4th instant, at 4 p.m. A moderate breeze commenced from the 
east at 7 p.m. …90  
 
Each source appears to place the schooner at a different position in relation to 
Pelican Island; east, north-west, and south-east. The official report of the inquiry into 
the ship’s stranding was dated 4 April 1899, four weeks after the disaster, and based 
on eye witness statements, including Thompson’s own account.91 The Outridge 
booklet, published in September 1899, used information from “Press reports.” The 
earliest of these was published in the Brisbane Courier on 20 March, and is a 
statement from the ship’s captain written days after the event.92 Thompson stated:  
 
A moderate breeze commenced from the east at 7 p.m., changed to 
south-east, and increased in force, working to south-west at midnight.93 
 
Outridge’s description, published six months later, is a version of that 20 March 
report:  
 
She experienced a moderate breeze from the east, commencing at 7 
p.m., which, changing to the south-east, increased in force, working to 
the south-west at midnight.94 
                                                
89 W. T. Atkinson, Reports and Decisions on Shipping Accidents, “Marine Board of Queensland 
Report on the Stranding of the Meg Merrilies”, 4 April 1899, HAR/81, ID84435. The report is dated 4 
April 1899 and published 9 June 1899.  
90 “The Late Hurricane. Return of the Warrego”, 6. 
91 Atkinson 1899. Atkinson concluded: “After taking the evidence of William N. Thompson, the master, 
Walter Harrison, clerk, and E. Richardson, sailmaker, I find the Meg Merrilies was anchored on the 
night of the 4th of March one mile north-west of Pelican island.” 
92 Ibid.  
93 “The Late Hurricane. Return of the Warrego”, 6. 
94 Anonymous 1899, 18. 
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The Outridge booklet is a secondary source for those observations. The primary 
sources, Captain Thompson’s statement and the Board of Inquiry finding, however, 
appear to contradict each other. Captain Thompson said he was anchored “off 
Pelican Island, being south-east”, but Shipping Inspector Atkinson found the captain 
was anchored “north-west of Pelican Island.”95 A chain of custody for the evidence 
supports the reliability of Thompson’s statement, passed by Thompson to the 
Warrego’s purser Colvin,96 who handed it to the Brisbane Courier in Brisbane, which 
published it beside Colvin’s own account from the scene. In both cases, the authors 
can be identified and a reasonable judgment made that the reports were not 
distorted in transmission. Both sources are reliable. Using the methodology, can any 
other observations or any “insight into human nature”97 explain the discrepancy? 
 
Pelican Island is “a sandbank, with grass and a few bushes on it” and lies to the west 
of a two-mile long reef running north to south (Figure 1.2).98 The wind during the day 
on 4 March was blowing from the east and south-east and strengthened to gale force 
during the evening. Although it is possible that the schooners were anchored in the 
afternoon on the eastern and exposed side of the island close to the island’s reef, 
there appears to be no good reason to do so when an anchorage more sheltered 
from the south-easterly wind was available on the north-western side. However, both 
the Meg Merrilies and the Tarawa are described by Outridge as being anchored near 
each other on the island’s exposed side. By 10 p.m. the wind direction had changed 
to south-west and by daylight it was blowing from the north-west.99 At 3 a.m. the 
                                                
95 The inquiry into the stranding of the Meg Merrilies was the only official inquiry into the disaster. The 
schooner was the only one wrecked in which the captain survived and could therefore give an 
account of his actions. The schooner Tarawa, anchored nearby, was also stranded, but was later 
floated free. 
96 “The Late Hurricane. Return of the Warrego”, 6. The article states: “The following account of the trip 
from Cooktown to Claremont Islands, and the various reefs in the vicinity, has been supplied by the 
purser of the steamer: …”. Ancestry.com.au, “W. C. Colvin, clerk, Burketown-Brisbane, s.s. Warrego”, 
Reports of Vessels Arrived, Unassisted Immigrant Passenger Lists, 6 January 1898 (originally from 
NRS 1291, Reels 1263–1285, 2851, NSW State Archives); “Shipping”, Daily News (Perth), 19 August 
1899, 4. The reports together show that the purser on the Warrego between January 1898 and 
August 1899 was William Christopher Colvin.  
97 Tosh 2015, 105.  
98 Charles B. Yule and G. A. Browning, Great Britain, Hydrographic Department, Australia Directory. 
Compiled Chiefly from Various Surveys Made by Order of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty 
Volume ii, 5th edition, London: Hydrographic Office, Admiralty, 1898, 386. 
99 “The Late Hurricane. Return of the Warrego”, 6. The Olive, anchored on the north-west side of 
Burkitt Island, five miles west of Pelican Island, reported that the wind “blew with hurricane force from 
south-west” after 10 p.m; Simon Edwin Munro's notes in his own hand, written 1899, supplied by 
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hurricane force wind from the north-west broke the Tarawa’s cables and the 
schooner was blown onto Pelican Island,100 but that grounding could not have 
happened if the Tarawa was anchored east or south-east of the island.  
 
  
Figure 1.2 Pelican Island showing the anchorage of the Meg Merrilies, according to the Outridge 
booklet and Captain Thompson’s statement. The methodology shows that the schooner was 
anchored north-west of Pelican Island, not east (satellite image by Google Earth). 
                                                
Duncan McArdle, husband of Catriona Mary Munro McArdle, Edwin Munro's granddaughter. 
Photocopy from Munro family papers. Munro writes that at daylight the Aladdin, also at Burkitt Island, 
reported the wind was “W x N” (west by north).  
100 Ibid. 
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Both schooners were clearly anchored on the north-western side of the island, as 
stated in the Marine Department’s report, so why did Thompson state; “I was 
anchored off Pelican Island, being south-east, distance 1min.”? Thompson was 
using a nautical idiom, sometimes seen in ships’ logs, to describe the bearing of a 
landmark in relation to the ship.101 In this case, he was not describing the schooner 
being south-east of Pelican Island, but Pelican Island bearing south-east of the 
schooner. Thompson also placed it not “one mile” distance as Outridge said, but 
“one minute”, referring to one minute latitude and meaning one nautical mile, 1.15 
miles, or 1.85 kilometres. An anchorage one mile or one nautical mile south-east of 
Pelican Island was implausible because it placed the schooner on top of a reef. 
Outridge appears to have realised the implausibility of a south-eastern anchorage 
because he adjusted the position to “east”, perhaps to save Thompson from 
embarrassment. As Tosh warns, language is a product of history and we need to be 
“on our guard against reading modern meanings into the past.”102 Tosh is describing 
errors in translation between the past and present, but there are also language 
differences between contemporary social groups, cultures, industries and 
individuals.103   
 
Misplacing the positions of the schooners might seem trivial or inconsequential, but it 
contributed to an error in a paper widely cited as a source for scientific data on the 
cyclone. In his 1958 paper, Whittingham avoided the anomalous grounding of the 
Tarawa against the wind by confusing the fate of the schooner Tarawa with the fate 
of the Meg Merrilies which grounded not on Pelican Island, but on a reef 10 miles (16 
kilometres) to the north-east.104 This was a fortunate mistake for Whittingham’s 
                                                
101 See for example, Captain John Thomas Bebrouth, “Logbook of the schooner Louise J. Kenney”, 
1903–1904, H13827, Queensland Museum. This contemporary log of a pearling schooner in the 
Torres Strait describes, for example, anchoring 9 December 1903 at 2 p.m., “Badu Hill bearing ExN ¼ 
N distance 12 miles”, describing the position of Badu Hill in relation to the schooner. (Bebrouth’s wife, 
Ann, is listed as owner of the lugger Pirate, which sank in the cyclone with the loss of four lives. See 
Appendix 1.)  
102 Tosh 2015, 105.  
103 “Sudden Death of Captain W. N. Thompson”, Port Adelaide News, 22 November 1918, 4. 
Thompson was 44 years old at the time of the disaster, born in a lighthouse, a veteran of the British 
Navy, and spent his life at sea; “Death of Mr. P. P. Outridge”, Courier-Mail (Brisbane), 28 July 1938, 
3. P. P. Outridge, 35 in 1899, was born in Brisbane, sailed yachts as a hobby, and became a 
manager of a Clark Combination fleet, but was primarily a businessman. 
104 Whittingham 1958, 25. Referring to the Tarawa: “About 3 a.m. several large waves washed away 
her whale-boat. She dragged her anchors 10 miles …” Anonymous 1899, 20. Referring to the Meg 
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paper, because if he had repeated Outridge’s claim, in which the Tarawa was 
grounded on Pelican Island from an anchorage east of the island, it would have 
contradicted the other data about the wind’s direction. The error, however, raises 
questions about the conclusions Whittingham made in a study that was based on 
untested data from the Outridge booklet. Data from Outridge and Whittingham have 
been widely used as evidence in scientific papers since then.105 (Other errors and 
their effect on the historical record are discussed in later chapters.) 
 
Narrative influence: Captain Porter’s reading  
 
The methodology asks if a primary witness is willing or given the opportunity to tell 
the truth. As seen with the grounding of the Meg Merrilies, Thompson’s statement 
appears to have been not only mistranslated in the Outridge booklet, but revised to 
fit a narrative. Nora argues that in the process of transforming history into memory, 
memory attempts to suppress and replace history,106 and there is evidence that 
cultural narratives, as powerful influences on memory, exerted pressure on primary 
witnesses to change their testimony immediately after the pearling disaster. On the 
day the cyclone crossed the coast, 5 March, William Field Porter, the captain of the 
Crest of the Wave, the only schooner to survive the eye of the cyclone, told the 
captain of a passing steamer, Duke of Norfolk, that his barometer had recorded a 
lowest pressure of 26inHg, equivalent to 880hPa, near the cyclone’s eye,107 a 
reading so low that today it would constitute the lowest recorded central pressure of 
a cyclone in the southern hemisphere.108 The next day, 6 March, Porter penned a 
                                                
Merrilies: “About 3 a.m. several large waves struck the vessel, washing away the whaleboat (since 
picked up). The schooner dragged her anchors for 10 miles ...” Anonymous 1899, 20. Referring to the 
Tarawa: “… both cables parted at 3 a.m. on Sunday and the schooner was driven ashore on the only 
patch of sand on [Pelican] island.” 
105 See note 11 above; R. C. Nelson, “Tropical Cyclone Storm Surges in Australia 1880 to 1970”, 
in Proceedings from Second Australian Conference for Coastal and Ocean Engineering, Institution of 
Engineers, Australia, 1975; Jeffrey Masters, “World Storm Surge Records”, Weather Underground 
wunderground.com, 2014, http://www.wunderground.com/hurricane/surge_world_records.asp 
(accessed 18 March 2019); Entel 2009. 
106 Nora 1989, 9.  
107 “The Steamer Duke of Norfolk. Captain Jenkins Explains”, Brisbane Courier, 18 March 1899, 8. 
108 See South Pacific Enhanced Archive for Tropical Cyclones (SPEArTC), [Seasons 1841–2014] 
Asia Pacific Data Research Center, University of Hawai‘i, Mānoa. updated 25 October 2017, 
http://apdrc.soest.hawaii.edu/projects/speartc/ (accessed 18 March 2019). Cyclone Winston struck Fiji 
in 2016 and had an officially registered central pressure 884hPa (26.1inHg) before it made landfall, 
and is considered the most intense tropical cyclone recorded in the southern hemisphere. The world 
record lowest minimum sea level pressure of a cyclone, 870hPa (25.69inHg), was attributed in 1979 
to typhoon Tip in the western North Pacific. 
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letter to his parents describing in his own words the air pressure falling to 26inHg 
“about 4.30 a.m.”109 Three days later he conveyed this same observation to Captain 
Craig, the pilot of another steamship Kasuga Maru.110 However, in the Brisbane 
Courier newspaper on 15 March, Captain Craig expressed his doubts about the air 
pressure reading of 26inHg (880hPa) because, as Craig said, he had “been in some 
of the worst typhoons ever experienced in the China seas; but he had never known 
the glass to fall lower than about 27.30 [924.48hPa].”111 Weeks later, Porter’s revised 
log appeared in a report to the Queensland Government with the reading increased 
to 27inHg (914hPa). The time it was measured was also altered from 4.30 a.m. to 
4.45 a.m.112 None of the captains of the other schooners anchored in Bathurst Bay 
who experienced the cyclone’s eye, and who therefore could corroborate the 
reading, survived. The captains of the schooners Olive and Aladdin, anchored 70 
kilometres to the north-west, recorded lowest readings of 29.10inHg113 (985.4hPa) 
and 29.09inHg114 (985.1hPa) respectively. Their lowest readings were significantly 
higher than Porter’s reading, and they may not have understood how atmospheric 
pressure can fall exponentially closer to the cyclone’s centre (Figure 1.3). The 
evidence suggests that Porter, then 33 and an experienced sea captain in Australia 
and New Zealand, was persuaded to revise his reading.  
Porter’s original report of 26inHg (880hPa) comes from a reliable primary source; his 
letter to his parents in Auckland, including his father who was a master mariner,115 
reprinted verbatim in the New Zealand Herald.116 That he believed this was the 
correct reading at the time is corroborated by two reliably reported conversations 
with the captains of passing steamships. Porter was a respected ship’s captain, and 
used a ship’s barometer to measure the observation. Although extraordinarily low, 
109 William Field Porter, “The Great Hurricane at Queensland. A Struggle for Life. An Aucklander and 
His Wife and Child. Forcing the Blacks to the Pumps”, New Zealand Herald (Supplement), 1 April 
1899, 1. 
110 “Report by the Kasuga Maru”, Brisbane Courier, 15 March 1899, 5. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Douglas 1899, 100. 
113 “The Late Hurricane. Return of the Warrego”, 6. 
114 Munro 1899.  
115 William Porter, Miranda Field Law, and Garry Law, Recollections of a Voyage to South Australia 
and New Zealand Commenced in 1838, Recorded at Huntly 1907, Auckland, NZ: Maruiwi Press, 
2007, 83. 
116 Porter, “The Great Hurricane at Queensland. A Struggle for Life”, 1. The letter written in Bathurst 
Bay can be shown to have been sent by steamer to Auckland, where it was passed to the newspaper 
for publication. 
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the barometric pressure is partly supported by the world record storm tide associated 
with the cyclone, as well as the descriptions of the destruction and the disaster’s high 
death toll.117 The methodology shows that the later report of 27inHg (914hPa) is less 
reliable. The revised reading appears in the report by the Thursday Island 
Government Resident John Douglas to the Home Secretary on 13 April 1899,118 and 
in the Outridge booklet in September 1899.119 There is evidence that Porter was 
under pressure to change his observation because it did not fit the experience of his 
peers. The reading of 26inHg (880hPa), being earlier and better sourced, is more 
reliable than the later report of 27inHg (914hPa). There is no evidence that the 
adjustment was based on anything other than the opinions of his peers. However, 
because the Outridge booklet, written by one of those peers, reported the claim of 
27inHg (914hPa), Whittingham and subsequent meteorologists appear to have 
assumed it is true, and 914hPa has remained the official central pressure for the 
cyclone. 
Figure 1.3 Air pressure and wind distribution across a cyclone, from the University of Illinois 
Department of Atmospheric Sciences WW2010 Project, http://ww2010.atmos.uiuc.edu/(Gh)/ 
guides/mtr/hurr/stages/cane/pswd.rxml (accessed 18 March 2019).  
117 Nott et al. 2014.  
118 Douglas 1899, 100.  
119 Anonymous 1899, 26. The account quoting Porter is prefaced: “The following account is from 
information supplied by Captain Porter:” It is paraphrased and can be considered a secondary source. 
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There are qualifications, though, that must be applied to the reading of 26inHg 
(880hPa). Firstly, the difference between 26inHg (880hPa) and 27inHg (914hPa) is 
significant. Small changes in air pressure help ships captains predict the weather 
and under normal circumstances they carefully record the air pressure to two 
decimal places. As mentioned, the captains of the Aladdin and the Olive, anchored 
near each other, but 70 kilometres away from the cyclone’s centre, reported their 
lowest readings to two decimal places and those readings were remarkably similar; 
29.10inHg120 (985.44hPa) and 29.09inHg121 (985.10hPa). The log supplied by 
Douglas and attributed to Porter states, “At Dark: Barometer 29.60” (1002.37hPa) 
and at 11 p.m., “29.40” (995.60hPa).122 In Porter’s letter to his parents and in the 
observations after 11 p.m. in the ship’s log attributed to him, the pressures after 
midnight are reported as whole numbers; 28inHg (948hPa) at 1 a.m.,123 and 26inHg 
(880hPa) at 4.30 a.m.124 Between 11 p.m. and 4.30 a.m. the wind was hurricane 
force and increasing in strength, the schooner was dragging its anchors towards the 
outer reefs of the Great Barrier Reef, and the ship was leaking and in danger of 
sinking. During this time, the wind was so strong that the force against the bare 
masts caused the schooner to breech, and the masts had to be cut away. Porter’s 
wife and baby daughter were in the cabin and it is reasonable to assume it was too 
rough, and Porter was too busy, to write in his log, although he had both the 
opportunities and motive to read the barometer. If Porter had a mercury-based 
marine Fortin barometer he would not have been able to adjust it for temperature in 
such a sea and so the observation of “26” suggests that Porter was not confident 
that the pressure was 26.00inHg (880.46hPa) exactly, but that it was observable as 
26inHg unadjusted for temperature. Allowing for a margin of error is appropriate, but 
Porter did not qualify his report, or say it was “26 and a half inches”, for example. It is 
reasonable to assume that Porter believed it was close enough to 26.00inHg 
(880.46hPa) that it did not need qualifying.  
120 “The Late Hurricane. Return of the Warrego”, 6. 
121 Munro 1899. 
122 Douglas 1899, 100.  
123 Ibid. 
124 Porter, “The Great Hurricane at Queensland. A Struggle for Life”, 1. 
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Secondly, Porter’s reading was taken in the cyclone’s eye wall and not in the eye 
where the pressure would have been even lower (Figure 1.3).125 Porter’s reading 
under the circumstances could be considered 26.00inHg (880.46hPa) with a margin 
of error, for example, of less than 0.5inHg (16.93hPa), but the central pressure of the 
cyclone would be lower than Porter’s reading because the air pressure was still 
falling when he took that reading. A degree of scepticism about such a low 
atmospheric pressure is warranted, but the best evidence suggests that the pressure 
was 26inHg (880hPa) in the eye wall and that the cyclone’s central pressure was 
lower than this. (The central pressure of the cyclone is further discussed in Chapters 
Two and Five.)   
 
Narrative influence: Sugimoto’s account 
 
Sometime after 5 a.m. on 5 March 1899 in Bathurst Bay, when the eye of the 
cyclone passed and the winds came from the north and north-west, the schooner 
Silvery Wave began to break up. The Brisbane Courier’s “Special Correspondent” 
aboard the steamer Warrego, presumed to be the editor of the Cooktown 
Independent, James Fowler, reported that, “One Malay stayed aboard, and came 
ashore on a plank.”126 The Warrego’s purser Colvin reported the survivor as having 
said that, "Captain Jefferson and Messrs. Nicholas and Atthow had previously gone 
off in a dingey [sic], but were immediately swamped, and were seen no more.”127 
Three days later the Brisbane Courier issued a correction:  
 
This seemed an unlikely story on the face of it, besides casting 
reflections on the humanity of Captain Jefferson, who was not in the 
least likely to desert one of his crew in that fashion. Now, however, the 
Malay states that a great sea came on board, washing overboard the 
deckhouse, in which Captain Jefferson and all the crew, white and 
coloured, were congregated.128 
 
                                                
125 Ibid. Porter wrote that at 4.30 a.m., “the barometer was down to 26. Then came a lull.” 
126 “The Late Hurricane. Further Particulars”, 5. The Special Correspondent, presumed to be Fowler, 
reports: “The Silvery Wave went down at 5 o'clock on Sunday morning. One Malay stayed aboard, 
and came ashore on a plank.” 
127 “The Late Hurricane. Return of the Warrego”, 6.  
128 “The Recent Hurricane. A Correction”, Brisbane Courier, 23 March 1899, 4. 
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The Brisbane Courier’s new information came from one of the vessel’s owners, and 
later the Outridge booklet author, P. P. Outridge, who, the Brisbane Courier said, 
“was naturally surprised that Captain Jefferson should have acted in the manner first 
ascribed to him.” P. P. Outridge was in Brisbane at the time and could not have 
spoken personally to the survivor, whom he identified as a Malay man. Two months 
later, P. P. Outridge spoke to the survivor on Thursday Island, now identified as a 
Japanese man named Sugimoto, a diver on one of the fleet’s luggers.129 According 
to P. P. Outridge, Sugimoto had reported sick the day before and managed only to 
get onto the deck at 7.30 a.m. on Sunday, after the aft house with the white officers 
had been carried away by a wave.130 The report of the Silvery Wave’s captain and 
white officers abandoning ship had been quickly asserted not to be true because 
Jefferson, as a white officer, could not have “acted in the manner first ascribed to 
him.”131 The Outridge booklet later called Sugimoto’s own survival story into 
question: “It is strange that Sugimoto should have been the only man saved from the 
Silvery Wave. He was a sick man, and was not of a very powerful constitution.”132 
This appears to be an attempt to restore the European narrative of the white man as 
hero and all others somehow untrustworthy. P. P. Outridge interviewed Sugimoto, so 
this account can be considered a primary source, although the interview took place 
more than two months after the event and it contradicts the initial reports.  
The methodology asks, is the primary source willing to tell the truth? The stated 
purpose of the Outridge booklet was to control the narrative by providing an “account 
of the Europeans”133 and to “bring comfort to the hearts of the bereaved.”134 As a 
memorial to the Europeans, it reflected contemporary European attitudes and racial 
stereotypes. For example, in describing the pearling crews enjoying their time off on 
Saturday afternoons and Sundays, P. P. Outridge writes:  
129 Anonymous 1899, 32–33. Outridge was at Thursday Island in May, when Sugimoto was still in 
hospital.  
130 Ibid., 32. 
131 “The Recent Hurricane. A Correction”, 4; Also see “The Recent Storm”, Torres Straits Pilot, 1 April 
1899. This article repeats the story of Jefferson’s desertion with a note by Alexander Corran, the 
editor of the Torres Straits Pilot: “This story is untrue — Ed. ‘T. S. P.’” 
132 Anonymous 1899, 32. 
133 Ibid., 6. 
134 Ibid., 71.  
 57 
Most of the coloured men are but ‘children of a larger growth,’ and they 
enjoy their holiday with just such abandon as children let loose from 
school. The officers take care that liberty does not degenerate into 
licence.135 
 
The suggestion, then, by a non-European man that the European officers abrogated 
a responsibility to care for their men by abandoning ship, and that the “coloured” 
man who reported their desertion could be the only survivor of the schooner, were 
details that did not match the European narrative. P. P. Outridge discredited the 
source and proposed a counter narrative that conformed with contemporary racial 
narratives. Despite its narrow cultural focus, the Outridge booklet has been accepted 
as the authoritative account of the disaster, a de facto official history given credibility 
by Whittingham and, later, by scientists and journalists who have treated it as the 
main source of evidence for the pearling disaster and its cyclone. As Australian 
historian Paula Hamilton warns, official histories are told by storytellers who avoid 
and suppress conflicting accounts and, “since all memory is subject to structures of 
power in any society”, historians need to do more to investigate how some memories 
are erased and others merge with cultural narratives.136 Such is the case with the 
pearling disaster where the Outridge booklet has become its official history, but 
which, in fact, marks a point where history and memory diverge, where evidence that 
does not conform with accepted narratives of European society or maritime 
experience is discarded, and, as will be shown, where myths begin.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The Outridge booklet and Whittingham’s 1958 scientific paper have been considered 
the authoritative accounts of the 1899 pearling disaster, and the information they 
published is used predominantly by scientists in the burgeoning fields of climate 
change and disaster studies. A historiographic review reveals significant differences 
between the claims of the Outridge booklet (and hence much of Whittingham) and 
information from earlier, primary sources. The methodology developed to test the 
validity of those sources, particularly historical newspapers, shows by example that 
                                                
135 Ibid., 17. 
136 Paula Hamilton, “The Knife Edge: Debates about Memory and History”, in Kate Darian-Smith and 
Paula Hamilton (eds), Memory and History in Twentieth-Century Australia, Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press, 1994, 20. 
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the primary information from the disaster came under pressure within days of the 
event to conform with cultural and social narratives. Significant quantitative 
observations of the cyclone, such as barometer readings, wind direction, and the 
height to which porpoises were washed ashore, can also be shown to be subject to 
errors stemming from newspaper production, including the syndication of stories that 
compounded errors associated with their transmission by telegraph. The 
methodology recognises that each piece of information must be assessed 
separately, a task that can only be done by collecting a wide range of information 
from numerous sources (as described, more than 100 vessels and 1,000 people at 
sea experienced the cyclone).  
 
In reconstructing the disaster from primary sources in the following chapter, the 
methodology is explained in the context in which aspects of the disaster occurred. In 
choosing which aspects to describe, this thesis can also be considered subjective, 
and this is acknowledged. However, key aspects of the methodology, including close 
interrogation of sources, a preference for primary sources, and corroboration can be 
shown to produce more reliable data for scientists as well as a more reliable 
foundation for understanding the social impacts of the disaster. Because the disaster 
is a consequence of the impact of a natural event (a cyclone) on a social activity (the 
pearling industry) the following chapter will examine the behaviour of the cyclone and 
the operations of the pearling fleets in 1899, before reconstructing the disaster, 
based on the best evidence, as it unfolded.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 The Hurricane 
Now all our boats have gone and only a hulk of a schooner left — but so 
far we have our lives. Dead bodies have been going by us all day.   
William Field Porter in a letter to his parents in Auckland, 
dated Crest of the Wave, Cape Melville, 6th March 1899.1 
The pearling disaster of 1899 was the result of a tropical cyclone, later named 
Mahina, passing over the Thursday Island pearling fleets anchored near Cape 
Melville on the morning of 5 March 1899. How Australia’s most severe recorded 
cyclone came to intersect with such a large congregation of vessels is understood by 
considering both the history of the pearling fleets and the meteorological behaviour 
of the cyclone. This chapter begins by providing a background to the pearling 
industry and the cyclone’s genesis.2 The methodology described in Chapter One is 
then used to extract the best evidence from relevant documents to describe more 
accurately the sites at which key observations were made, including the site of the 
world record storm tide. By more accurately describing the positions of the 
observers, their observations can be better corroborated and used with more 
confidence to reconstruct the event. (Meteorologically significant observations to be 
used in the reconstruction in Chapter Five are listed in Appendix 2.) The latter part of 
the chapter will recount, chronologically from selected observations, how the disaster 
unfolded. The personal experiences of those at sea and ashore, including the 
Indigenous people and the pearling crews, will be assessed in Chapter Three.   
The pearling industry 
Indigenous people across northern Australia had been using the shell of the pearl 
oyster, Pinctada maxima, for ornaments and tools for centuries before Europeans 
1 William Field Porter, “The Great Hurricane at Queensland. A Struggle for Life. An Aucklander and 
His Wife and Child. Forcing the Blacks to the Pumps”, New Zealand Herald (Supplement), 1 April 
1899, 1. 
2 There is a large body of research on the pearling industry, and this thesis does not attempt to 
replicate the work of researchers such as Regina Ganter and Steve Mullins, whose books and articles 
are listed in the bibliography and whose relevant work is cited.  
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began commercially exploiting pearl shell in Australia during the 1860s.3 In 
Queensland, Captain William Banner collected pearl shell on Tudu (Warrior) Island 
in 1869 and within a decade pearling fleets were operating across the Torres Strait.4 
The discovery of the Australia pearl shell beds coincided with technological 
improvements in the manufacturing of buttons and ornaments in Europe, fuelling the 
growth in demand in the late 19th century.5 At first, the shell could be collected close 
to shore, but when those beds were exhausted, specialist divers were employed to 
collect shell from depths of five or six fathoms. As pearl shell prospecting moved 
further from shore, larger vessels replaced smaller dinghies. Western Australia had 
also become a major source of pearl shell, and in the 1870s diving suits with air 
pumps allowed divers to reach shell below six fathoms, operate further from shore, 
and spend more time collecting shell. This led to a system of “floating stations”,6 in 
which company-owned schooners accompanied by fleets of luggers travelled further 
and stayed at sea longer.7 As new luggers were built for the expanding industry, the 
design evolved to accommodate the new diving technology and the environments in 
which the divers worked.8 In 1884, the Illustrated Sydney News described luggers 
built in Sydney for the Thursday Island pearl shell business.  
These handy little vessels range from six to fourteen tons burden, are of 
yacht-like model, can thrash a passage against a head breeze, or run 
down the wind at a clipping pace under a pair of French lugs; and in a 
clock calm can be easily propelled by sweeps.9 
3 John P. S. Bach, The Pearling Industry of Australia: An Account of its Social and Economic 
Development, Canberra: Department of Commerce and Agriculture, 1955, 8.  
4 Stephen Mullins, Torres Strait: A History of Colonial Occupation and Culture Contact 1864–1897, 
Rockhampton: CQUP, 1994, 77–78.  
5 John P. S. Bach, “The Political Economy of Pearlshelling”, The Economic History Review, 14, No. 1, 
1961, 106.  
6 Stephen Mullins, “To Break ‘The Trinity’ or ‘Wipe Out The Smaller Fry’: The Australian Pearl Shell 
Convention of 1913”, Journal for Maritime Research, 7, No.1, 2005, 219–222. 
7 Technically, a lugger is lug-rigged, with a square lug sail raised on a spar that overlaps the mast, but 
the term lugger in the 1880s came also to describe ketches that were gaff-rigged, with the sail raised 
on a smaller spar, or gaff, attached to the mast. These small boats by 1899 weighed eight to sixteen 
tons and had two masts, the mainmast taller than the mizzen. See Garry Kerr, Craft and Craftsman of 
Australian Fishing, Portland, Victoria: Mains’l Books, 1985, 232–253.  
8 Graeme Henderson, “The Australian Pearling Lugger and Maritime Archaeology”, in W. Jeffrey and 
J. Amess (eds), Proceedings of the Second Southern Hemisphere Conference on Maritime 
Archaeology, Adelaide: South Australian Department of Environment and Planning, 1983, 281.  
9 “Pearl Fishing in Torres Straits”, Illustrated Sydney News, 25 October 1884, 3. 
61 
In 1886, Clark took his fleet of schooners and luggers to Western Australia, but in 
1891 returned to the Torres Strait where he began to cultivate the pearl oyster and 
invest in more fleets, increasing his influence in the industry.10 By 1899, Broome and 
Thursday Island were supplying more than half the world’s pearl shell market.11 In 
Queensland, pearl shell was the colony’s fourth most valuable export behind meat 
products, sugar, and wool.12 The annual value of pearl shell declared to Customs on 
Thursday Island in 1898 was £109,401, the equivalent of about $A16.5 million 
today.13 (The economic, political, and cultural background of the industry will be 
described in its context with the White Australia Policy and Federation in Chapter 
Four.)   
By 1899, the pearling industry was dominated by large companies and Clark, with 
shares in six fleets, had the largest stake.14 Clark, who lived in Brisbane, oversaw 
the fleets with his brother-in-law, George Smith, who lived on Thursday Island.15 
Individual fleets were owned by companies in which the shareholders included fleet 
managers and ships captains. The complex arrangement meant that other 
businessmen formed close business arrangements with Clark and by 1899, these 
fleets were known collectively as the Clark Combination.16 Each fleet consisted of a 
schooner and as many as 16 luggers, and although they were identified as Thursday 
Island fleets, many were based at islands nearby such as Goods (also called 
Goode), Wai Weer, and Friday islands.  
10 Mullins 2005, 221; David Payne, “Walter Reeks, James Clark and the Origins of the Thursday 
Island Pearl Sheller”, Great Circle: Journal of the Australian Association for Maritime History, 28, No. 
2, 2006, 3–25.  
11 Bach 1961, 106. 
12 Queensland Office of Economic and Statistical Research, “Value of Exports by Commodity, 
Queensland”, Historical Tables, Economy, 1860–2008 (Q150 Release), Queensland Treasury, 2009. 
http://www.qgso.qld.gov.au/products/tables/historical-tables-economy/index.php (accessed 2 April 
2018). 
13 John Douglas, “Report of the Government Resident at Thursday Island for 1898”, QVP, 1, 1899, 91. 
The value was calculated on 16 May 2018 using the Reserve Bank of Australia’s “Pre-decimal 
Inflation Calculator” available at https://www.rba.gov.au/calculator/annualPreDecimal.html assuming a 
value of £109,401 in 1901 (the earliest date available) calculated at 2017 (the latest date available) 
being $16,459,045.76. The value of pearl shell did not include the value of pearls, considered a by-
product and usually not declared. In 1898, Thursday island Government Resident, John Douglas, 
estimated that £20,000 to £30,000 (between $3 million and $4.5 million today) worth of pearls was 
sent by registered letter to London annually. 
14 Robert Lehane, The Pearl King, Brisbane: Boolarong Press, 2014, 141.  
15 Mullins 2005, 221–222. 
16 “Pearl Fisheries Question”, Brisbane Courier, 20 November 1896, 5. The term appears to have 
been first used to describe Clark’s fleets in 1896 when he was lobbying the Queensland Government 
to amend the Pearl-Shell and Beche-de-Mer Fishery Act to exclude the Japanese.  
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In competition with the Clark Combination were other fleets, including Herbert 
Bowden and Patrick John Doyle’s schooner Meg Merrilies, and the Queensland 
Pearl Shell Fishery Company schooner Tarawa. There were also individual, shore-
based operators of luggers and cutters operating from Thursday Island and other 
Torres Strait islands including Erub (Darnley), Mer (Murray) and Masig (Yorke) 
islands.17 Japanese businessmen who owned and leased luggers on Thursday 
Island also competed with the company fleets and in 1898, because of fears that the 
Japanese were becoming too influential, the Pearl-Shell and Beche-de-Mer Fishery 
Act was amended to prevent leasing of vessels to “aliens”, a law aimed specifically 
at restricting the number of Japanese in the industry. In October 1898, at least 61 
Thursday Island-based pearl shell and beche-de-mer fishing boats were owned and 
leased by Japanese.18 Within weeks of the Pearl-Shell and Beche-de-Mer Fishery 
Act amendment becoming law in December 1898, Japanese boats changed 
hands.19 However, as historian Steve Mullins explains, “it was a simple matter to 
‘dummy’, that is to make arrangements just short of leasing, but which benefited both 
parties just as well.”20 Some of the Japanese boats followed the fleets more than 400 
kilometres south to Princess Charlotte Bay (Figures 2.1 and 2.2) because some 
floating stations bought their shell and sold them supplies at sea.21 The subterfuge 
over leasing arrangements, as well as transfers of ownership in the first two months 
of 1899, added to the confusion over who owned the vessels, who was aboard, and 
who died during the disaster.22  
17 See Regina Ganter, The Pearl-Shellers of Torres Strait: Resource Use, Development and Decline 
1860s–1960s, Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 1994, 25–27. Ganter describes more 
fully the South Sea Islander and London Missionary Society influence in the pearl shelling industry.  
18 Sato Torajiro to Okuma Shigenobu, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, “Petition” (to cease a 
moratorium on the issue of passports), 29 October 1898, National Library of Australia, MS3092, 
Sissons Papers, Box 41. A copy and translation by John Lamb, Canberra, was sent to Ian Townsend 
on 30 June 2018. The petition states, “'Owned and leased boats 61 in total”, but lists 52 vessels.  
19 Ibid. The lugger North Wales, owned by Aplin Brown and Co., and leased to Yoshioka Tsunejiro, 
was sold to Hamilton Pearling Company Limited and was being sailed for delivery to Cooktown in 
March 1899 when it was caught by the cyclone and sank. The Japanese cutters Sun and Ada, also 
known to be in the cyclone, had European owners by the beginning of March. See T. M. Almond, 
“Report on the Marine Department for the Year 1898–1899”, QVP, 3, 24 September 1899, 24.     
20 Mullins 2005, 223.  
21 “Tarawa”, Torres Straits Pilot, 11 March 1899,1.  
22 “The Late Hurricane. Return of the Warrego. Reports from the Boats”, Brisbane Courier, 20 March 
1899, 6. The article identifies the cutter Yunyo, “owner a Jap, and native in command,” which survived 
the cyclone. The Outridge booklet used the article as a source and repeated the spelling. However, 
see Sato 1898 (note 18, above) where the cutter’s name appears to be a misspelling or a contraction 
of Jun Yoshi, owned by Fujiwara Jin, Hamaguchi Shigematsu, and Mikami Kanzo. (N.B. It is possible 
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On 1 March 1899, a police census showed 1,515 people living on Thursday Island.23 
This did not include the hundreds associated with the pearling industry who lived on 
islands within three miles of Thursday Island,24 nor did it include most of the 2,132 
men on shipping articles registered at the Thursday Island shipping office who lived 
offshore on the company boats.25 The Thursday Island Government Resident, John 
Douglas, estimated “possibly 5 per cent” of the men on articles lived on Thursday 
Island. By the time of the 1 March 1899 census, though, most of the Clark 
Combination had left for pearl shelling grounds in Princess Charlotte Bay.26 Other 
fleets had also left port to follow them or to prospect in the Torres Strait. The 
population of Thursday Island and on boats associated with the island is, therefore, 
likely to have been approximately 3,647 people (the number of men on shipping 
articles plus the number of people recorded by the census). By 1 March 1899, as 
many as 1,000 were with the company fleets in and near Princess Charlotte Bay.27   
The cyclone’s genesis 
In the days leading up to the disaster, the winds in Princess Charlotte Bay varied 
from south-east to north-east.28 Meteorologist Herbert Whittingham, who studied the 
February 1899 weather charts of Clement Wragge, placed the monsoon above Cape 
York, except for a period around 20 February.29 
that Mikami, a pearl diver from Awaji Island near Wakayama in Japan, was on the Jun Yoshi during 
the cyclone. Ten months later he was to suffocate diving off Murray Island in a fate similar to the 
fictional Kanzo Makame from A.B. “Banjo” Paterson’s 1902 poem, “The Pearl Diver”. Paterson had 
visited Thursday Island in 1901, after Mikami’s death. See Death Certificate of Mikami Kanzo, 3 
January 1900, QBDM, Cooktown, 1900/C3988.) 
23 “Return of Population Collected by Police as on 1st March, 1899”, in Douglas, QVP, 1899, 92. 
24 Ewen McPhee, “Archaeology of the Pearlshelling Industry in Torres Strait”, in Ian McNiven and 
Michael Quinnell (eds), “Torres Strait Archaeology and Material Culture”, Memoirs of the Queensland 
Museum, 3, No. 1, Brisbane, 2004, 367.  
25 “Nationality of Men on Shipping Articles” in Douglas, QVP, 1899, 92. 
26 Steve Mullins, Octopus Crowd: Maritime History and the Business of Australian Pearling in Its 
Schooner Age, Tuscaloosa, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 2019, 164. Referring to the Clark 
Combination, Mullins writes: “All the fleets set off south in the first week of February 1899, except 
Wanetta, which had touched bottom and had its steering gear under repair.” 
27 “Hurricane in the North”, Brisbane Courier, 10 March 1899, 5. Pearling fleet owner James Clark 
said: “The crews employed on these [company] vessels would number in all not far short of 1,000.”  
28 Simon Edwin Munro's notes in his own hand, written 1899, supplied by Duncan McArdle, husband 
of Catriona Mary Munro McArdle, Munro's granddaughter. Photocopy from Munro family papers. 
29 Clement Wragge, “March 4th 1899”, “March 5” 1899”, and chart “January 25, ‘99”, copies courtesy 
Jeffrey Callaghan, BOM, Brisbane, in 2006. They are now at NAA, BP57/40, 3/19/1; H. E. 
Whittingham, “The Bathurst Bay Hurricane and Associated Storm Surge”, Australian Meteorological 
Magazine, 23, 1958, 18. The monsoon trough, also known as the intertropical convergence zone, is a 
trough of low pressure where the south-easterly trade winds converge with winds from the north.  
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Figure 2.1 Satellite map of Princess Charlotte Bay (satellite image Geoscience Australia). 
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Figure 2.2 Map of Cape York, from Ursula H. McConnel, “Cape York Peninsula”, Walkabout, 1 June 
1936, 16. (Inset, see Figure 2.1.) 
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On the east coast of Cape York, the prevailing south-easterly winds tend to be 
weaker in the wet season (generally November to April) than in the dry season (May 
to October). In the wet season, the monsoon trough can move from the equator 
south into the Solomon and Coral seas. Areas of low pressure develop along the 
trough as warm moist air rises from the ocean to form storm clouds, and cyclones 
can form within these low-pressure areas, where the sea surface temperature is 
generally above 27 degrees Celsius. When the warm air above the sea rises, it is 
replaced by air drawn in from areas of higher pressure.30 The earth’s rotation 
deflects that wind and the storms in the low pressure area begin to rotate. In the 
Southern Hemisphere, they rotate clockwise. This is the Coriolis Effect (Figure 2.3), 
and its influence is negligible at the Equator, but increases towards the poles.31 Only 
one percent of tropical cyclones form within five degrees of the equator, while 74 
percent of tropical cyclones in the South Pacific develop in latitudes 10 to 20 
degrees south.32 Most impacts on the Queensland coast occur between 16.5 
degrees south and 25.5 degrees south, reflecting a tendency for westward moving 
cyclones from the Coral Sea to eventually swing south.33 Cape Melville is 14 
degrees south latitude and during the short history of European occupation before 
1899, cyclones were rarely recorded north of Cape Melville. That part of Cape York 
came to be considered too far north to be in the “cyclonic zone.”34 Between October 
1898 and 4 March 1899, no cyclones were recorded as having crossed the coast of 
Cape York Peninsula.35 
30 James P. Terry, Tropical Cyclones Climatology and Impacts in the South Pacific, New York: 
Springer, 2007, 16. 
31 Ibid.  
32 Ibid., 18. 
33 Alan Sharp, Craig Arthur, Bob Cechet, and Mark Edwards, “Tropical Cyclones”, in Miriam. H. 
Middelmann (ed.), Natural Hazards in Australia: Identifying Risk Analysis Requirements, Canberra: 
Geoscience Australia, 2007, 43, http://www.ga.gov.au/metadata-gateway/metadata/record/65444/ 
(accessed 18 March 2019). 
34 “Hurricanes, Queensland Coast”, Queensland Government Gazette 1897, Brisbane: T. P. Pugh's 
Printing Office, 67. Hurricanes “... may strike the land at any point between latitudes 14° and 26° (that 
is, between Cape Melville and Wide Bay).” John Douglas to Under Secretary, Home Office, “Memo in 
reference to several matters connected with the Cyclone of the 4th and 5th of March last”, 13 April 
1899, TRE/A69, QSA, ID950347, 36. “I am inclined to think that the cyclonic zone may extend as far 
North as the 13th parallel of South latitude.” However, Aboriginal people ashore were aware of 
damaging cyclones before the arrival of Europeans. Queensland Land Tribunal, “Aboriginal Land 
Claim to Cliff Islands National Park”, in Report of the Land Tribunal Established Under the Aboriginal 
Land Act 1991 to the Hon. The Minister for Natural Resources, Brisbane: UQ Libraries, 1996, 1853. 
35 Jeffrey Callaghan and Peter Helman, Severe Storms on The East Coast of Australia 1770–2008, 
Southport, Gold Coast: Griffith University, Griffith Centre for Coastal Management, 2008. The National 
Library of Australia’s Trove newspaper archive was also searched. However, see “Cyclone at Bowen”, 
Telegraph (Brisbane), 31 January 1899, 5. A cyclone passed close to Bowen on 27 and 28 January.  
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Figure 2.3 The Coriolis Effect in the Southern Hemisphere (from Terry 2007, 18).   
In a weather report dated 21 February 1899, the Queensland Government 
meteorologist Clement Wragge wrote: “Conditions have now become decidedly 
suspicious between New Caledonia, the Solomons, and the Louisiades (where a 
tropical depression undoubtedly exists).”36 Wragge could not have known where 
along the trough the tropical depression was centred, but he placed it about 15 
degrees south latitude and 169 degrees east longitude, east of Cape Melville and 
south of the eastern tip of the British New Guinea mainland, in a common region of 
cyclogenesis in the Coral Sea.37 He named it Tirau, “after a dusky damsel in the 
South Sea Islands,”38 and until 28 February (four days before the cyclone was felt on 
the coast), Tirau was the only disturbance Wragge noted in the Coral Sea.39  
36 “The Weather”, Telegraph (Brisbane), 22 February 1899, 6. 
37 “The Weather”, Week (Brisbane), 24 February 1899, 22.  
38 Ibid.  
39 “The Weather”, Telegraph (Brisbane) 1 March 1899, 7. 
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Wragge had been appointed Government Meteorologist of Queensland at the end of 
1886,40 and he set up a chain of weather stations at telegraph stations along the 
Queensland coast. When the undersea telegraph cable was laid, he supervised the 
setting up of weather stations around the Coral Sea, at Gomen and Nouméa in New 
Caledonia, Norfolk Island, and Port Moresby and Samarai in British New Guinea.41 
Wragge had telegraph operators send him daily observations, including air pressure, 
temperature, humidity, and wind direction, and from these he created daily 
barometric charts and weather reports that were followed closely by the shipping and 
rural industries.42 (Wragge’s role will be discussed more fully in Chapter Four.) 
Nothing in Wragge’s forecasts leading up to the disaster suggested cause for alarm 
by the pearling fleet. As Edwin Munro aboard the schooner Aladdin noted: “How did 
Mr Wragge miss this storm?” Munro also noted that it was not until 6 March, the day 
after the cyclone crossed the coast, that Wragge wrote: “A new tropical disturbance 
(Mahina) [sic] is about 350 miles SE from Sudest.”43  
The pearling fleets 
As mentioned, the pearling fleets had considered the coast between the Torres Strait 
and Cape Melville to be relatively safe from cyclones, and James Clark had not 
insured most of his fleets.44 Since Christmas 1898, the fleets had been anchored in 
the Torres Strait for the “lay up.” It had become a practice in Western Australia to 
stop fishing from Christmas through to January or February when the crews were 
paid off and given time ashore. Pearling luggers built for the fleets in Western 
Australia were designed with a shallow draft and straight keel to “lay up” on their 
sides without damage in creeks at low tide.45 The lay up on Thursday Island followed 
the West Australian tradition of being a time when “festivity, enjoyment, and a 
reckless spending of their wages took place, accompanied by a general breaking of 
40 “Scientific”, Adelaide Observer, 18 December 1886, 44.  
41 Clement L. Wragge, “Meteorological Stations in Queensland, New Guinea, New Caledonia and the 
South Sea Islands”, Wragge's Australasian Almanac and Weather Guide 1899, Brisbane: Sapsford 
and Co., 1899, 92–97.  
42 For a comprehensive list of cyclones and damage to the shipping and therefore trade, see 
Callaghan and Helman 2008. 
43 Munro 1899.  
44 “Mr. James Clark Interviewed”, Queenslander, 18 March 1899, 477. Also see Lehane 2014, 193. 
Clark financed the rebuilding of his fleets by selling shares in his mining companies.  
45 Payne 2006, 6. 
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last year's resolutions.”46 In January 1899, during the lay up, the price of pearl shell 
in London had fallen and Clark told the manager of the Olive fleet, Herbert Grahame 
Vidgen (hereafter H. G. Vidgen), that he would prefer his fleets to fish for shell in the 
Torres Strait, where the shell and pearls were of a higher quality than in Princess 
Charlotte Bay, and would therefore fetch a better price.47 Despite that, the Clark 
Combination schooner Crest of the Wave left Thursday Island in early February, 
perhaps taking advantage of northerly winds as the monsoon hovered over the 
Torres Strait, to prospect for pearl shell off Barrow Point, near Cape Melville, more 
than 400 kilometres south.48 Behind it came the bulk of the Thursday Island fleets, 
more than 100 vessels including four other Clark Combination fleets, arriving in 
Princess Charlotte Bay, a broad north-facing bight on Cape York Peninsula bounded 
by Cape Melville on its eastern side and Cape York to its west (see Figures 2.1 and 
2.2).49 The relatively shallow waters were sheltered from the south-easterly trade 
winds and the shell beds and anchorages were well-known. The floating stations of 
the pearling fleets anchored near fresh water sources, and in Princess Charlotte Bay 
the watering places were at Port Stewart, where there was also a store,50 on Flinders 
Island, and at the eastern end of Bathurst Bay near the tip of Cape Melville.51 In 
Bathurst Bay, the schooners anchored four to 6.5 kilometres (2.5 to four miles) 
offshore to avoid shallow water, but the smaller luggers anchored in rows about 2.5 
kilometres (1.5 miles) off the beach.52 The scene is described by the Australian artist 
46 K. O. Mackenzie, “Pearl Shelling in the Torres Strait”, in Chapter Five of Gilbert White, Thirty Years 
in Tropical Australia, London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1918, 62.  
47 James Clark letter to H. G. Vidgen dated 19 January 1899, in Lehane 2014, 177.  
48 “Provincial Pickings”, Telegraph (Brisbane), 23 February 1899, 2. The article describes a fleet 
owned by Clark and Smith that could only be the Crest of the Wave fleet. The fleet was “prospecting 
near Barrow Point without success” and instead of proceeding further south, as the article suggested, 
the fleet returned to Princess Charlotte Bay, possibly because the south-easterly winds had 
strengthened. Frank Illidge, “The Log of the Lally”, Northern Herald (Cairns), 5 December 1923, 30. 
Illidge interviewed Edward Pitt, who was fishing in the area before the cyclone. Pitt had told him that 
there “had been a new find of pearl shell outside Barron [sic] Point, and all the boats had congregated 
to fish there.”  
49 Of the six Clark Combination fleets, only the Wanetta fleet escaped the cyclone because it 
remained in the Torres Strait.  
50 Basalt (Clement Wragge), “Through York Peninsula”, Queenslander, 1896, 1176. Wragge 
described Port Stewart, a small European settlement on the western side of Princess Charlotte Bay at 
the mouth of the Stewart River and the landing point for the Coen goldfields.  
51 Charles B. Yule and G. A. Browning, Great Britain, Hydrographic Department, Australia Directory. 
Compiled Chiefly from Various Surveys Made by Order of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty 
Volume ii, 5th edition, London: Hydrographic Office, Admiralty, 1898, 381–382. The Admiralty advised 
that there was “permanent water at the cape [Melville], but the vessel has to lie some distance off 
shore, and the natives are unfriendly, so that it is better to water at Flinders group.”  
52 Anonymous 1899, 31. 
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Tom Roberts, who was with the fleet of George Smith’s floating station Sketty Belle 
when it anchored off the watering place in Bathurst Bay seven years earlier, in 
1892.53 
Near the station is water trickling between the granite boulders in a 
narrow shaded gully, and all day long the string of men — Port Darwins, 
Binghis, Japs, Manila, and Rotamah [sic] men — are kept going, 
laughing and calling as they follow each other with the water-bags, or 
standing waist deep in the warm sea lift them from their shoulders into 
the boats. … Early in the morning we are at anchor in the main body of 
the fleet, a long row of luggers, ketches, and cutters, running up to 15 or 
16 tons.54 
The people ashore 
The history of contact between the fishing industry, the Aboriginal people ashore, 
and the Native Police shows not only the context for the social impacts of the 
disaster, but, as will be demonstrated, answers scientific questions such as the 
location and height of the storm tide. As discussed in Chapter One, climate scientists 
have increasingly sought quantitative data from newspapers. That data is not 
neutral, but is contingent on memory and can be influenced by social narratives.55 It 
cannot be assessed without an understanding of the social contexts under which it 
was recorded.   
The Native Police was a para-military force originally formed by the NSW 
Government in 1848 to protect the settlers who were colonising Aboriginal land from 
attacks by the Aboriginal people who lived there.56 When the Queensland colony 
separated from NSW in 1859, the Queensland Government retained the Native 
Police force which patrolled the frontier as white settlers moved further into 
53 The Register of Australian and New Zealand Shipping 1902–1903, Melbourne, Victoria: Marine 
Underwriters and Salvage Association of Victoria, 1902, 122. The Sketty Belle and the Crest of the 
Wave, both part of the Clark Combination at different times, are sometimes confused. The Sketty 
Belle was a 184 ton brigantine built in Canada in 1866. George Smith, the majority shareholder, later 
replaced it with the 95 ton schooner Crest of the Wave. The Crest of the Wave fleet included luggers 
from the old Sketty Belle fleet. After the cyclone, Smith renamed Crest of the Wave the Sketty Belle.  
54 Tom Roberts, “Going North”, Argus (Melbourne), 10 December 1892, 4. 
55 Linda Hutcheon, A Poetics of Postmodernism: History, Theory, Fiction, New York: Routledge, 1988, 
122. 
56 Jonathan Richards, A Question of Necessity: The Native Police in Queensland, PhD thesis, School 
of Arts, Media and Culture, Griffith University, Brisbane, 2005, 1–2.  
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Aboriginal lands.57 In 1897, after Queensland Commissioner of Police, William Parry-
Okeden, presented a report to Parliament suggesting ways to establish “friendly 
relations” with Aboriginal people, the Native Police force was reorganised.58 The 
Aboriginals Protection and Prevention of the Sale of Opium Act 1897 changed the 
role of the Native Police from one of punishing Aboriginal people, to one of protecting 
them from abuse, particularly by the fishing industry.59 In 1898, ethnologist and 
physician Dr Walter Roth was appointed Northern Protector for Aboriginals with 
responsibility for both the Native Police and the welfare of Aboriginal people.60 Roth 
was based in Cooktown and in November 1898, three months before the pearling 
disaster, he made a tour of the Princess Charlotte Bay hinterland, meeting 416 
Aboriginal people and estimating the population of the region to be greater than 
1,000.61 His route took him from the Normanby River “along the head-water of 
Birthday Creek to Bowen Bay, and so to the Jeannie and Starcke (rivers),” passing 
through the country of the people that Roth identified as Kokoolkoolo, 
Kokolamalama, Kokowara, and Kokoyimidir, as well as smaller groups of people on 
the coast, which included the Barrow Point people (Figure 2.4).  
57 Jonathan Richards, The Secret War, St Lucia: UQP, 2008, 5.  
58 William E. Parry-Okeden, “Report on the North Queensland Aborigines and the Native Police”, 
QVP, 1897, 8.  
59 Regina Ganter and Ros Kidd, “The Powers of Protectors: Conflicts Surrounding Queensland's 1897 
Aboriginal Legislation”, Australian Historical Studies, 25, No. 101, 1993, 539.  
60 Kate Kahn, “The Man Who Collected Everything: W. E. Roth”, in Nicolas Peterson, Lindy Allen, and 
Louise Hamb (eds), The Makers and Making of Indigenous Australian Museum Collections, Carlton, 
Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 2008, 164.  
61 Walter Roth, “A Report to the Commissioner of Police on the Aboriginals Occupying the 'Hinter-
Land' of Princess Charlotte Bay Together with a Preface Containing Suggestions for Their Better 
Protection and Improvement”, 30 December 1898, A/19899, QSA, ID1154345, ii. 
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Figure 2.4 Roth’s “Sketch Map of Country Traversed” (colour enhanced to show the original details) 
from “A Report to the Commissioner of Police”, 1898, i. The continuous red line marks Roth’s route, 
and the blue area is a proposed Aboriginal reserve.  
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In 1974, in his book Aboriginal Tribes of Australia, the anthropologist Norman 
Tindale also described the people of the Princess Charlotte Bay region,62 but the 
nomenclature has been questioned by the people whose country is named.63 
Instead, anthropologist Bruce Rigsby has identified the language groups and 
suggests a nuanced approach to describing the people who lived in that region.64 
This is also the approach of anthropologist Peter Sutton, who identifies three main 
language groups of the Cape Melville region: The Princess Charlotte Bay people, the 
Flinders Islands/ Bathurst Bay/Barrow Point people, and the Guugu-Yimidhirr-
speaking people south-east of Princess Charlotte Bay. The names of these language 
groups vary depending on which language describes them. In Guugu-Yimidhirr, for 
example, people from Flinders Islands, Cape Melville, and Barrow Point are Bama 
Yiidhuwarra. Sutton explains that language areas are not areas to which the owners 
of the languages were physically restricted, but represented the collective countries 
of the clans owning each particular language.65 “Clans bore names that were widely 
recognized, but each clan’s name could be given in any of half a dozen or more 
languages of the region.”66 In other words, the temptation to categorise and map 
areas by name does not reflect the mosaic of languages and wide-ranging groups 
living within those areas. However, because this thesis looks at the impact of the 
cyclone on geographical areas, as well as reflecting descriptions in historical 
documents, I will refer to geographical areas as described in 1899 to identify the 
people who lived there, recognising that the people themselves had a much more 
nuanced understanding of their cultural and country boundaries. 
 
The region has been the home of Aboriginal people for thousands of years, and 
contact with Europeans in the early part of the 19th century began violently.67 With 
the increased effort to fish surrounding waters for pearl shell and beche-de-mer in 
                                                
62 Norman Tindale, Aboriginal Tribes of Australia: Their Terrain, Environmental Controls, Distribution, 
Limits, and Proper Names, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974. 
63 Queensland Land Tribunal, 1996, 41.  
64 Bruce Rigsby, “The Languages of the Princess Charlotte Bay Region”, in Tom Dutton, Malcolm 
Ross and Darrell Tryon (eds), The Language Game: Papers in Memory of Donald C. Laycock, 
Canberra: Pacific Linguistics, 1992, 353–360.  
65 Peter Sutton, “The Flinders Islands and Cape Melville People in History”, in Jean-Christophe, 
Verstraete and Diane Hafner (eds), Land and Language in Cape York Peninsula and the Gulf 
Country, Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2016, 96. 
66 Ibid., 98  
67 Ibid., 87, 89.  
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the second half of the 19th century, tensions increased as more fishermen came 
ashore for firewood and water, to recruit local men as labour,68 and to hunt.69  There 
were frequent reports of fishermen sexually abusing women.70 The people living in 
the vicinity of Barrow Point, in particular, became the target of Native Police reprisals 
after a string of attacks on the fishing industry in the late 19th century. In September 
1881, a group of Guugu-Yimidhirr men found a beche-de-mer fishing station on 
Lizard Island, forbidden under their law.71 They killed a Chinese employee and Mary 
Watson, her baby, and another Chinese man fled in an iron tank. The three later died 
of thirst on Howick No. 5 Island (now called Watson Island).72 In October 1881, a few 
weeks after the Lizard Island incident, a group of 15 Aboriginal men attacked a 
beche-de-mer station at Barrow Island, off Barrow Point, a place sacred to the 
Barrow Point people. They killed one of the fishermen, while six or seven attackers 
were reported killed by two fishermen who later escaped ashore and then overland 
to Cooktown.73 In an expedition to punish the attackers, Inspector Hervey Fitzgerald, 
the officer in command of Native Police in Cooktown, led a party to Cape Melville 
and afterwards reported: “All the tribes implicated in the recent murder [referring to 
Mary Watson] have been punished; also those connected with Barrow Point.”74 A 
Cooktown correspondent to the Brisbane Telegraph reported that Mary Watson’s 
68 “Deputation to Home Secretary by British Shellers Protesting Aliens Employing Aborigines in 
Industry”, 14 July 1899, COL/142, ID17980. During his visit to the Torres Strait in July 1899, British 
pearl shellers presented a petition to Queensland Home Secretary Justin Foxton, protesting aliens 
employing Aboriginal people in the industry, claiming several were not paid after the recent cyclone. 
Foxton was told 300 Aboriginal people were employed in the industry.  
69 Roberts, “Going North”, 10 December 1892, 4. Roberts travelled with George Smith’s pearling 
schooner Sketty Belle in 1892, and describes being anchored in Bathurst Bay on a Saturday and by 5 
p.m. “most of the boats are away towards the land with their guns, to get their Sunday ashore.”  
70 Walter Roth letter to Commissioner of Police William Parry-Okeden, 23 March 1899, Microfilm 
Z1609, QSA ID17980. Roth writes: “I feel more and more convinced, as time goes on, that trouble will 
most certainly sooner or later arise amongst these coastal tribes, consequent on the depredations 
and outrages inflicted upon them by the beche-de-mer men, pearlers etc.” Roth, “A Report to the 
Commissioner of Police”, 1898, iv and 19. See also Ganter 1994, 45.  
71 Willie Gordon, Guurrbi: My Family and Other Stories, Cooktown: Guurrbi Tours, 2012, 30. 
72 Suzanne Falkiner and Alan Oldfield, Lizard Island: The Journey of Mary Watson, Sydney: Allen and 
Unwin, 2000. 
73 “The Barrow Island Murders”, Queenslander, 19 November 1881, 659; “Murderous Attack by 
Blacks”, Capricornian, 12 November 1881, 15. Around the same time, Captain John Frederick Miller’s 
beche-de-mer station on Flinders Island in Bathurst Bay was attacked, but the attackers were 
repulsed. On 9 November, two fishermen men were found dead on Cairncross Island near the tip of 
Cape York, both speared a month earlier, and a station on Night Island in Princess Charlotte Bay was 
reported to have been robbed of firearms about the same time. The number of incidents so close 
together led to speculation that the attacks were being co-ordinated, which may explain the 
widespread nature of the Native Police reprisals. See “The Lizard Island Outrage.” Queenslander, 12 
November 1881, 2. “The raid seems to have been deliberately planned, with the intention of surprising 
all the fishing camps off the coast, killing the people and destroying the property found there.” 
74 “Notices to Correspondents”, Queenslander, 17 December 1881, 785. 
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husband accompanied the Native Police on their raid, when they “scoured the coast 
beyond Barron [sic] Point, and fell in with the tribe of blacks who had, in the first 
instance, escaped.”75   
Ethnologist and linguist John Haviland, who has studied the Barrow Point people, 
was told that following the 1881 Native Police reprisals, the people of Barrow Point 
retreated to a few camps near Ninian Bay.76 The main focus of the reprisal was a 
camp at the mouth of Wakooka Creek, the first camp of the Barrow Point people that 
a Native Police patrol by horseback or boat from the south would have encountered. 
Haviland also described stockmen remembering “having once turned up a mass 
grave with many skulls, testifying to some early massacre” at the mouth of Wakooka 
Creek,77 and also that “survivors of a police rampage on a salt pan inland from the 
mouth of Wakooka Creek came upon one of the native troopers abusing a local 
woman and killed him on the spot.”78 In May 1893, two Japanese beche-de-mer 
fishermen were killed on their fishing boat, Miranda, at Cape Melville.79 The patrol 
sent north from the Native Police camp at McIvor (between Cooktown and Barrow 
Point) “discovered the tribe of blacks that committed the murder and punished them 
accordingly.”80 
After the Native Police’s role ostensibly changed from one of punishment to 
protection in 1897, the Barrow Point people remained wary of the Native Police and 
the fishermen who continued to enter their country.81 On or about 17 February 1899, 
about two weeks before the disaster, two crew members of a fishing boat came 
ashore near Barrow Point and were speared.82 One of the men, Jamie or Jimmy 
75 “The Outrage at Lizard Island”, Telegraph (Brisbane), 8 December 1881, 2. 
76 John Haviland and Roger Hart, Old Man Fog and the Last Aborigines of Barrow Point, Bathurst: 
Crawford House Press, 1999, 35. 
77 Ibid., 140.  
78 Ibid., 36. 
79 “Cooktown”, Week (Brisbane), 9 June 1893, 22.  
80 D. C. S. Sissons, “The Japanese In the Australian Pearling Industry”, Queensland Heritage, 3, No. 
10, 1979, 20. Sissons cites a letter from Sub-Inspector of Police at the Mclvor Native Police Camp to 
Inspector of Police, Cooktown, 7 October 1893, filed with letters from the Honorary Japanese Consul, 
Melbourne to Chief Secretary of the Japanese Government, 27 November 1893.  
81 Walter Roth to Under Secretary Home Office, “Report Re Distribution of Gifts to Coastal 
Aboriginals”, 9 April 1899, HOM/A23/99/5252, QSA, ID847561, 6–7. When Roth visited the people of 
Bathurst Head in 1899 they “recognised the troopers by their caps, and all cleared away to the hills 
…”  
82 Cooktown Hospital, Admission Registers 27/8/1897 – 7/5/1899, “Discharge record of Jimmy 
Thomas”, 17 March 1899, HOS13/23, QSA, ID7363.  
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Thomas, survived.83 He walked 80 kilometres south taking seven days to reach the 
mining town of Munburra, from where he was taken to the Eight Mile Native Police 
Camp, arriving on 28 February and being admitted to the Cooktown hospital on 1 
March.84 He was treated by Dr Helmuth Kortum, who described him as 45 years old, 
born in Bombay, India, and living on Thursday Island:  
This patient was out in a little boat fishing about 100 miles north of 
Cooktown, boat lost, and patient was cast ashore with another man a 
country man, after been two days ashore were speared by Blacks. This 
man got a spear through the right arm above the elbow, and was 
afterward lost in the bush for 7 days without food. There is also a wound 
on the right side of chest, to all appearances caused by the same spear 
after penetrating through the arm.85 
The Native Police officer responsible for the area of coast north from Cooktown to 
the tip of Cape Melville (Figure 2.5), Constable John Martin Kenny of the Eight Mile 
Police Station near Cooktown,86 took a party of four troopers and ten horses north 
to investigate.87 Kenny described the two men as “kanakas” who had landed a 
dinghy near Barrow Point and who were “supposed to have deserted from the pearl 
fleet.”88 The George Smith and James Clark-owned schooner Crest of the Wave 
had been fishing off Barrow Point in early February,89 and although it had a fleet of 
13 luggers, it is reported to have arrived in Cooktown with 12.90 It may have been 
that the missing lugger had remained behind, waiting for the men to return from 
shore or to search for the dinghy.  
83 Ibid. The name is spelt both Jimmy and Jamie in the hospital records.  
84 A. R. Vidgen, “Northern Hurricanes”, Telegraph (Brisbane), 17 April 1899, 5. 
85 Cooktown Hospital Admission Registers, 17 March 1899. Thomas was discharged 17 March 1899.  
86 Police Staff File, John Martin Kenny, A/38868, QSA, ID563796. Kenny was born near Grafton in 
NSW in 1872 and was sworn into the Queensland Police Force on Christmas Eve 1896. He served 
with the Native Police at Cooktown and Highbury before becoming the constable in charge of the 
Eight Mile Native Police Station in April 1898. He was 27 when the cyclone struck in 1899 and had a 
sister and blind father living with him at the Eight Mile at the time.  
87 Vidgen, “Northern Hurricanes”, 5. 
88 Ibid. Kenny had left for the scene on 28 February and Khortum wrote his report on 1 March.   
89 “Queensland”, Brisbane Courier, 13 February 1899, 5; “Provincial Pickings”, Telegraph (Brisbane), 
23 February 1899, 2. The fleet was described as owned by Clark and Smith, and the Crest of the 
Wave fleet is the only one that fits this description.  
90 NQR (Townsville), 20 February 1899, 6. This article quotes the Cooktown Independent newspaper, 
no copies of which are known to exist for this period.  
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Figure 2.5 Map showing Constable John Martin Kenny’s patrol area from Cooktown to Bathurst Bay 
(from “Native Police Camps”, Laura Police Station files 1900, Administration files, A/41364, QSA, 
ID290072). 
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It is also possible the two men were from one of several small vessels fishing for 
beche-de-mer in the area.91 Four months earlier, in October 1898, Roth reported that 
Kenny had found a man nicknamed “Frenchy” camped on the police reserve at 
Munburra, “with four gins and three black boys.” Roth, in a handwritten note in the 
margin of his report, said: “This Frenchy lately took 3 or 4 blacks in his boat without 
permission from the Starcke River to one of the outlying islands. He is a bad 
character.”92 Frenchy was a miner named John Duval, who had recently bought a 
vessel named the Lotus.93 On 4 January 1899, he reported the vessel missing with 
an Aboriginal crew who might have “run away with the vessel, which was well-
provisioned.”94 This was not uncommon. Queensland Police Commissioner, William 
Parry-Okeden, described the practice of fishermen owning small vessels employing 
“two congenial ruffians as a mate and a cook” and illegally recruiting local Aboriginal 
men to collect beche-de-mer, mistreating the men who then throw the “ruffians” 
overboard and run away.95 Whether this was the fate of Thomas and his countryman 
remains unknown because Kenny made no further investigation after the cyclone, 
which struck just as he arrived south of Barrow Point. When he returned to 
Cooktown, he was sent back to Bathurst Bay to help search for survivors and to bury 
the dead. During that time, Thomas was released from hospital and disappeared. 
With no evidence and no complainant, the case appears to have been forgotten.96  
Constable Kenny’s unofficial report 
One of the most significant aspects of the pearling disaster was the storm tide 
reported by Kenny when he was searching for the perpetrators of the spearing of 
Thomas. In his 1958 paper on the cyclone, meteorologist Herbert Whittingham uses 
the Outridge booklet as his source and significantly places Kenny’s report within 
91 Tom Roberts, “Going North”, Argus (Melbourne), 3 December 1892, 13. Roberts writes: “There is a 
good market at Cooktown, where the beche will fetch from perhaps £20 to over £100 per ton, 
according to the quality, the large prickly red being the least valued. Most of the fish goes to China …” 
92 Roth, “A Report to the Commissioner of Police”, 1898, iii.  
93 “Shipping”, Northern Miner (Charters Towers), 21 December 1898, 7; “Provincial Pickings”, 
Telegraph (Brisbane), 14 January 1899, 5.  
94 “The Sugar Yield”, NQR (Townsville), 30 January 1899, 10.  
95 Parry-Okeden, “Report on the North Queensland Aborigines and the Native Police”, 1897, 8.  
96 Thomas was discharged from hospital on 17 March, the same day Kenny returned to Cape Melville 
to search for survivors. There is no evidence that an official report on the spearing was written.  
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quotation marks, which makes it appear that it is a report written by Kenny.97 The 
Outridge booklet had also given the impression that the words were Kenny’s when it 
said, “Constable J. M. Kenny, constable in charge of the Eightmile [sic] Police 
Station, Cooktown, relates the following: …” placing a quotation mark at the end of 
the report (although there is no quotation mark at the beginning).98 That letter quoted 
in Outridge and repeated by Whittingham appears to be, apart from some 
typographical errors, a copy of a letter taken from the Brisbane Courier dated 18 
April 1899.99 That Brisbane Courier report, however, is a copy of a newspaper article 
published the day before, 17 April 1899, in the Brisbane Telegraph, an evening 
newspaper. That article makes it clear that Kenny did not write the words, but that it 
is a copy of a private letter sent by A. R. Vidgen to an unnamed friend in Brisbane, 
who took it to the Telegraph offices. The letter, quoted verbatim, begins: “The 
following is an extract from a private letter sent by Mr. A. R. Vidgen to a friend in 
Brisbane : — Mr. Vidgen says Constable J. M. Kenny, constable in charge of the 8-
Mile police station, Cooktown, relates the following: …”100 The Telegraph reproduced 
Vidgen’s letter and, although it is a secondary source, the methodology shows the 
source is credible.  
A. R. Vidgen was the Cooktown store manager of the trading company Burns Philp 
who went to the scene of the disaster on the Warrego to look for his brother, H. G. 
Vidgen, the manager of the Olive pearling fleet.101 The letter was sent by steamer 
and handed to the Telegraph newspaper, avoiding the risk of transmission errors of 
the telegraph (as described in Chapter One). A. R. Vidgen is considered a reliable 
witness, who was at the scene shortly after the disaster and who had two 
opportunities to speak to Kenny in Cooktown. Because A. R. Vidgen was reporting 
what Kenny said, the letter is a secondary source for Kenny’s observations, but a 
chain of custody can be established between Kenny the police officer, A. R. Vidgen 
the store manager, and the newspaper’s copy of the letter. Kenny and A. R. Vidgen 
were both witnesses in positions to tell the truth and report accurately, and they are 
97 Whittingham 1958, 22. 
98 Anonymous 1899, 18–19.  
99 “The Late Northern Hurricane”, Brisbane Courier, 18 April 1899, 9. 
100 Vidgen, “Northern Hurricanes”, 5.  
101 Graham Taylor, a relative by marriage to A. R. Vidgen, in an email to Ian Townsend, 13 June 
2018. 
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both identified.102 Although Kenny’s report to A. R. Vidgen can be considered 
credible, his observations relating to the storm tide need corroborating. As 
mentioned, Kenny’s campsite is significant because it is the basis for a world 
record.103 Previous researchers have placed the campsite in Ninian Bay west of 
Barrow Point,104 at Barrow Point,105 or on the beach just south of Barrow Point in 
Bowen Bay.106 However, its precise location has, until now, been unknown, and 
details such as the height of the ridge on which Kenny camped and its distance from 
the beach have not been corroborated and have therefore been the subject of 
speculation.107 However, after examining all available data, the social contexts in 
which the data were recorded, and applying the methodology developed in Chapter 
One, this thesis identifies the location of Kenny’s campsite.  
A. R. Vidgen’s letter describes Kenny reaching Barrow Point before making camp at 
6 p.m.,108 and Whittingham interpreted this literally as the Barrow Point headland.109 
However, when the Native Police referred to Barrow Point, they were describing the 
country of the Barrow Point people, not the rocky headland. Kenny’s superior, Walter 
Roth, described Barrow Point as a “tract of country” which the Barrow Point people 
traversed.110 The distinction between Barrow Point, the geological feature, and 
Barrow Point, the land occupied by the Barrow Point people, is an example of an 
102 The interview probably occurred after Kenny’s second trip to the scene, when he returned to 
Cooktown on the cutter Mystery on 9 April. Vidgen’s letter was published 17 April.  
103 Jeffrey Callaghan, “Our Interpretation”, BOM, 2006. (Typed notes courtesy of Jeffrey Callaghan.) 
Callaghan writes: “We need to understand what caused such a very large storm surge as there [are] 
other parts of the Queensland coast with similar complicated bathymetry.”  
104 Jonathan Nott and Matthew Hayne, “How High Was the Storm Surge from Tropical Cyclone 
Mahina? North Queensland, 1899”, Australian Journal of Emergency Management, 15, No. 1, Autumn 
2000. Nott and Hayne searched unsuccessfully for evidence of a 13-metre storm surge at Ninian Bay 
and Bathurst Bay.  
105 Whittingham 1958, 24. 
106 Jonathan Nott, Camilla Green, Ian Townsend and Jeffrey Callaghan, “The World Record Storm 
Surge and the Most Intense Southern Hemisphere Tropical Cyclone: New Evidence and Modeling”, 
Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, 95, No. 5, May 2014, 759.  
107 Ibid; Nott and Hayne 2000, 12. 
108 Vidgen, “Northern Hurricanes”, 5. ”Kenny reached Barron [sic] Point on Saturday, March 4, 1899, 
and camped about 6 p.m.”  
109 Whittingham 1958, 24.  
110 Walter Roth, “North Queensland Ethnography Bulletin No. 18, Social and Individual 
Nomenclature”, Records of the Australian Museum, 8, No. 1, 15 November 1910, 79. “Each tract of 
country is specialised by the people traversing, occupying, or hunting over it, and hence, as often 
happens, may be called by different names. Barrow Point, for instance, is known to the local blacks as 
E-polin [Iipwulin]…” Roth, “Report Re Distribution of Gifts to Coastal Aboriginals”, 1899, 1. Roth 
describes being “anxious to reach the main camp of the Barrow Point tribe as soon as possible” and 
landed at a point on the coast 15 kilometres south of the Barrow Point headland, where he came 
upon “a few Barrow Point blacks, the majority of the mob being away at Cape Melville.”  
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error of translation between the past and present, as described in Chapter One. The 
country of the Barrow Point people extended south from the headland for about 14 
kilometres to Wakooka Creek, and north about the same distance to Rocky Point.111 
Kenny was in charge of the Eight Mile Native Police station west of Cooktown. His 
patrol area was defined by the country of the Aboriginal people for whom he was 
responsible. On the Native Police patrol map of 1900 (Figure 2.5), the Barrow Point 
headland is the next natural feature north of Cape Bowen, and a European 
convention was to name an area or a people after a geographical feature. Kenny 
could reasonably have considered a 28 kilometre length of coastline, north and south 
of the Barrow Point headland, as his destination.  
   
Using the methodology, Kenny’s route can be reconstructed. According to A. R. 
Vidgen’s letter, Kenny had left the mining settlement of Munburra and then “struck 
the coast.”112 The coast closest to Munburra, at the mouth of the Starcke River, is 
blocked by a large area of mangroves and is impassable by horseback, as are the 
mangrove and mudflat estuaries of the Jeannie and Howick rivers further north. In 
emphasising the “beach”, Kenny was describing one of only two possible routes from 
Munburra to Barrow Point: An inland track via James Gap west of the Altanmoui 
Range, which would have also taken him outside his patrol territory (Figures 2.5 and 
2.6), and a route east of the Altanmoui Range that runs along the beach and joins an 
Aboriginal road that runs from Cape Bowen through the country of the Barrow Point 
people to Ninian Bay. This was a road that Roth described on his tour of the 
Princess Charlotte Bay hinterland in 1898 when he arrived at the mouth of Wakooka 
Creek “in the neighbourhood of Barrow Point”113 and met 30 people “the main mob 
having left for [Cape] Melville.”114 Roth was accompanied on that trip by a Native 
Police tracker named Euro “a Normanby River boy” who knew the area and the 
languages “between Cape Melville and Bathurst Head, and on the Flinders.”115 Euro 
                                                
111 Haviland and Hart 1999, 49.  
112 Vidgen, “Northern Hurricanes”, 5.  
113 Roth, “A Report to the Commissioner of Police”, 1898, 1. Roth’s “Sketch map of Country traversed” 
shows that he touched the coast at the mouth of Wakooka Creek, south of Barrow Point.  
114 Roth, “A Report to the Commissioner of Police”, 1898, ii.  
115 Bruce Rigsby email to Ian Townsend 12 October 2007. In a transcribed copy of Roth’s “Report re 
Distribution of Gifts to Coastal Aboriginals” 1899, annotated by anthropologist Bruce Rigsby, the 
tracker “Euro” is described as a Lamalama man of the Mbarimakorrkoma clan. Roth identified him as 
“Koko Warra”, which, as Rigsby says, is “not troubling” given “the intermarriage of members of clans 
in that region.”  
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showed Roth the "northern ‘road’ along the coast to Barrow Point” which was “very 
well marked indeed.”116 This northern road, which Roth described as being “like a 
cattle track”, was used by local people to travel between Cape Bowen and Ninian 
Bay, linking two of the main camps of the Barrow Point people, Iiwalin and Iipwulin 
west of Barrow Point,117 with a large camp near the mouth of Wakooka Creek.118 The 
road begins four kilometres north of Cape Bowen where it leaves the beach, crosses 
Wakooka Creek, and continues inland to avoid the deep creek estuaries and 
mangroves on the coast north of Wakooka Creek (Figures 2.6 and 2.7).119 Kenny 
had told Vidgen that he took the beach route from Munburra, which required him to 
ride about 50 kilometres along the road north-west from Munburra, and then strike 
for the coast to reach the beach five kilometres south of Cape Bowen. This is the 
only part of the coast where Kenny could ride along the beach for any distance. It 
was the only route north that was inside Kenny’s patrol territory, and it was a route 
Kenny took at other times.120 It also allowed him to search the beach for the dinghy 
in which Thomas and his mate came ashore in February, and it appears to be the 
quicker route by horseback to Barrow Point (Figure 2.7). Both routes, however, lead 
to the mouth of Wakooka Creek in Bowen Bay.  
116 Roth, “A Report to the Commissioner of Police”, 1898, 22; Herbert M. Hale and Norman B. 
Tindale, “Aborigines of Princess Charlotte Bay, North Queensland, Part 1”, Records of the South 
Australian Museum, 5, No. 1, 1933, 69. Hale and Tindale describe the “Mutumui” people, who appear 
to have occupied the region south of the Altanmoui Range, who visited and camped at Barrow Point, 
making tracks or “pads” which “extend everywhere along the coast turning inland only when 
necessary to avoid rocky cliffs.”    
117 Haviland and Hart 1999, 49.  
118 Ibid., 50. “The main camp in the [Wakooka] area was located on the beach near the mouth of 
Wakooka Creek, a way station between Barrow Point and Cape Bowen to the south.”  
119 Roth, “Report Re Distribution of Gifts to Coastal Aboriginals”, 1899, 1. Roth describes landing “at a 
spot about two-and-a-half miles [four kilometres] north of Cape Bowen, where Euro found no 
inconsiderable difficulty in picking up the main track leading through the scrubs” because of the 
cyclone damage, to meet Kenny and 30 Barrow Point people.  
120 Ibid., 2. Roth states that Kenny “told me that just south of Cape Bowen he had found a dingey [sic] 
…” belonging to the North Wales, probably on his trip back to Cooktown after the cyclone. 
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Figure 2.6 Satellite photograph showing, in red, Kenny’s route to Wakooka Creek. The black line 
represents the boundary, in Figure 2.5, of Kenny’s patrol territory (satellite image Geoscience 
Australia). 
 
  
Figure 2.7 The Northern Road, in red, avoids the mouth of Wakooka Creek and follows a path now 
marked by a vehicular track. A ridge near the track about 800 metres inland shows signs of a large 
Aboriginal camp and matches the description of Kenny’s 1899 campsite. The track continues west to 
cross Wakooka Creek 2.4 kilometres inland before turning north (satellite image Geoscience 
Australia).  
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Wakooka Creek is lined with mangroves and is tidal for 2.4 kilometres (1.5 miles) 
inland (Figure 2.7). Near the tidal limit there is a ford, with fresh waterholes above. 
Here the creek can be crossed on foot and horseback.121 The creek mouth is open to 
the sea, although it can be crossed at low tide by walking out into the bay. In 1899, 
the “well marked” Aboriginal road crossed the creek more easily and safely at the 
inland ford.122 It was also a more direct route (on high ground, through open scrub 
and crossing fresh water creeks), to the main camps of the Barrow Point people.123 
When Kenny, his five troopers and 10 horses made camp at 6 p.m. on 4 March, 
about an hour before sunset,124 “on a ridge fully 40 feet above sea level and about 
half a mile from the beach, with scrub and a high sand ridge between the camp and 
beach,”125 he was following the Northern Road.126 There are no other routes within 
Kenny’s narrow patrol area on this strip of coast (Figure 2.6). It is also likely that, 
because the Native Police had patrolled Barrow Point regularly for decades, they 
camped at known and carefully chosen sites.127 Kenny almost certainly timed his 
arrival for 6 p.m. at a known campsite where the horses could be watered and tents 
erected before dark.    
Two kilometres south of Wakooka Creek, the Northern Road leaves the beach and 
travels behind the southern end of a line of sand ridges built up by prevailing south-
easterly winds.128 One sand ridge comes close to the road about 800 metres or half 
a mile from the beach. This small area south of Wakooka Creek is the only place that 
matches Kenny’s description of his campsite. The area also has features that make it 
121 The ford is marked by shade trees on a southern bank that slopes gently down to a crossing of flat 
rock that is several metres wide, although pitted in places with holes.  
122 Haviland and Hart 1999, 47. There are crocodiles in the area. 
123 Ibid., 48–49. Iipwulin is the main camp on a north-facing beach about two miles west of Barrow 
Point. Another large camp, Iiwalin, was “on the high flat ground to the south” near a fresh water creek. 
124 “Time of sun’s rising and setting throughout the colony”, Pugh’s Almanac 1899, Brisbane: T.P. 
Pugh's Printing Office, 1899, 40. Sunset at Cooktown on 1 March 1899 was 6.53 p.m. and the sun 
sets at Cape Melville three minutes later. Therefore, sunset at Wakooka Creek on 4 March 1899 
would be about 6.56 p.m.  
125 Vidgen, “Northern Hurricanes”, 5.  
126 Because of its significance and to distinguish it from other tracks, I will use capital letters for 
Northern Road hereafter.  
127 Richards 2005, 353–354. The Eight Mile Native Police Station opened in 1881. “The Queensland 
Native Police”, Telegraph (Brisbane), 1 April 1879, 3. There was a Native Police detachment in 
Cooktown in the mid-1870s.  
128 Roth, “Report Re Distribution of Gifts to Coastal Aboriginals”, 1899, 2. Three months after he was 
shown the Northern Road at Wakooka Creek, Roth came ashore by dinghy south of Wakooka Creek 
and “about 2 1/2 miles north of Cape Bowen.” Roth describes Euro searching for the track at this 
point.   
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a suitable campsite for a patrol on horseback. I inspected the ridge in September 
2018 in a field trip to the area. The campsite is near the track, and in the wet season 
has fresh water lagoons to the south and east for watering horses and open areas of 
grass on its flat top. (There is no easy access to fresh water on the beach north of 
Wakooka Creek. To reach Barrow Point along the beach, horses would need to 
cross four saltwater estuaries draining large areas of mangroves and mudflats 
behind the beach.)129 Being at the extreme southern end of the Bowen Bay sand 
dune system, the campsite is partly sheltered from the more common south-easterly 
winds by Cape Bowen. There is, as Kenny described to A. R. Vidgen, a “high sand 
ridge between the camp and the beach”, rising to 15 metres.130 The sand ridge on 
which Kenny camped appears to be nine to 13 metres above sea level and flanked 
north by the tidal creek and mangroves, a salt pan to the west, and seasonal fresh 
water lagoons south and east, making it more easily defended. As will be described 
in Chapter Three, an inspection of this ridge showed evidence of it having been a 
large Aboriginal camp, with marine shells and stone tools visible. By 1899, it had 
been abandoned after earlier Native Police reprisals and the camps of the Barrow 
Point people were two or three hours ride north. If Kenny was planning to visit those 
people, or to search the beach north of Wakooka Creek for the missing man and the 
dinghy, he could use this site as a base to which to return the next night. As will be 
shown, the low-lying land behind the dunes between Wakooka Creek and Saltwater 
Creek two kilometres north is also the only place on the coast north or south of 
Barrow Point where the sea rising 13 metres could reach “two to three miles” (3.2 to 
4.8 kilometres) inland. 
The fleets 
Using the methodology already outlined, the most reliable evidence is used in this 
thesis to recreate the positions of the fleets before the cyclone. Appendix 2 lists the 
observations that will be used in Chapter Five to remodel aspects of the cyclone. 
Because the event involved more than 100 vessels and 1,000 people at sea, the 
129 Haviland and Hart 1999, 144–145.  
130 Geoscience Australia ArcGis data. These elevations from satellite data are not accurate and the 
ridge needs to be measured more precisely. 
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experiences of all vessels and people cannot be fully described in this thesis. 
Instead, an abbreviated description using selected evidence follows.  
By 4 March, the pearling fleets had congregated in Princess Charlotte Bay. The 
pearling schooner Aladdin was anchored on the western side of Princess Charlotte 
Bay, about 80 kilometres west-north-west of Cape Melville. The Aladdin was 
captained by Edwin Munro, and owned by Munro, P. P. Outridge, and James Clark. 
It and its fleet of 14 luggers were anchored on the north-west side of Burkitt Island,131 
a low sandy island about two-and-a-half kilometres in circumference and covered in 
bushes.132 Burkitt Island, also known as No. 1 Claremont Island, is part of a group of 
five islands known as the Claremont Group (see Figure 2.8). Nearby was the 
schooner Olive, owned by James Clark, his older brother and ship’s captain Steve 
Clark, and the fleet manager H. G. Vidgen. Victor Clark, a nephew of James and 
Steve Clark, was also aboard.133 The Olive also had its fleet of 14 luggers anchored 
nearby.134 About eight kilometres to the east-north-east of Burkitt Island was Pelican 
Island, a coral reef with an exposed sand beach. Anchored north-west of Pelican 
Island was the schooner Meg Merrilies and its 14 luggers, owned by Herbert Bowden 
and Patrick John Doyle, two prominent Thursday Island businessmen.135 Nearby 
was the fleet of Sydney-registered schooner Tarawa, captained by David Jones, the 
fleet’s tender Wai Weer, and 15 luggers owned by the Queensland Pearl Shell 
Fishery Company.136 
131 Munro 1899.  
132 Yule and Browning (Admiralty Survey), 1898, 386. 
133 Lehane 2014, 169–171. Victor was the son of James Clark’s older brother Aaron Clark. 
134 “The Late Hurricane. Return of the Warrego”, 6. 
135 Ibid. See Chapter One for a description of the methodology used to show the position of the Meg 
Merrilies. 
136 Ibid.  
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Figure 2.8 The positions of the fishing fleets on the evening of 4 March 1899, before the cyclone (satellite image Geoscience Australia). 
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About 80 kilometres east, amongst or near the Flinders Group of islands that marks 
the western edge of Bathurst Bay, were between 10 and 13 privately-owned cutters 
and luggers from the Torres Strait.137 On the afternoon of 4 March, many of these 
small vessels were likely gathered at Port Stanley, a deep anchorage between 
Stanley, Blackwood and Flinders islands that was sheltered from northerly, easterly 
and southerly winds and was close to a watering point on Flinders Island.138 Among 
the small vessels was the cutter Marchand, skippered by Edward Pitt from Darnley 
Island. The exact locations of the other vessels are unrecorded, but nearby were 
probably three of the Pitt family’s other cutters: Adi Alum (skippered by Edward Pitt’s 
brother William), Fiji, and Ocean Bride.139 James Mills, from Naghir Island, but 
originally from Samoa, had three cutters in the area: Lucia, Molyneaux, and 
Paleatea.140 Another Samoan living in the Torres Strait, Peter Bee, owned the cutter 
Pacific.141 Somewhere in the area were the cutters Pirate, registered to Ann Jane 
Bebrouth, Maygalle, operated by Barney Erromanga, and Sun, owned by Fred 
Morey, as well as a lugger, Nancy.142 On his way south from Thursday Island to buy 
a new vessel was Edward Pitt’s brother-in-law, Pedro Guivarra, originally from the 
Philippines, on the cutter Francis.143  
 
                                                
137 Illidge, “The Log of the Lally”, 30. Illidge interviewed Edward Pitt, who said 10 vessels were 
anchored in the Flinders Group. Illidge was a magistrate at Chillagoe and Edward Pitt had witnessed 
the 1899 cyclone. This is a credible account, although separated from the event by nearly 25 years. 
Edward Pitt’s recounting of names and events is consistent with other accounts, although the cutter 
Marchand is misspelled by Illidge “Marshen.” The vessel was owned by Edward Pitt’s father, Douglas 
Pitt Snr, who had lived in New Caledonia, and Illidge may have heard the French pronunciation of 
Marchand as Marshen. Its sister vessel Daggie (misnamed Dackle in the Outridge booklet) is itself 
likely a mishearing of the French word for dagger, Dague. “A Successful Mission”, Morning Post 
(Cairns), 15 June 1905, 2. Edward Pitt’s father, Douglas Pitt Snr, in 1905 had eight pearling boats 
including Marchand and another survivor of the 1899 cyclone, Daggie.    
138 Yule and Browning (Admiralty Survey) 1898, 382. “The watering place is at the extreme of Flinders 
island, just above high water mark, among a grove of pandanus trees, and easily found by landing 
where the mangroves join the sandy beach.”  
139 Almond 1899. The report lists most of the vessels lost and their owners, although there are 
spelling errors. The exact positions of the vessels that sank in the Flinders Group are unknown.    
140 Ibid. Also see John Singe, The Torres Strait. People and History, St Lucia: UQP, 1979, 210. Singe 
writes that, “during the cyclone at Princess Charlotte Bay Mills lost a number of his luggers and men 
and never recovered sufficiently to carry on with his fleet.”  
141 Almond 1899; Anna Shnukal, ““A Century of Christianity on Mabuyag”, in Ian McNiven and Garrick 
Hitchcock (eds), “Goemulgaw Lagal: Cultural and Natural Histories of the Island of Mabuyag, Torres 
Strait”, Memoirs of the Queensland Museum, 8, No. 2, 2015, 184.  
142 Almond 1899. The owner of the Sun was Fred Morey, manager of Aplin Brown and Crawshay’s 
Thursday Island fleet. Morey was not aboard the Sun, which appears to have been leased to a 
Japanese man. The owner of the lugger Nancy is listed as “Coen”, which may be a misspelling of 
Cohen.  
143 Frank Guivarra in an email to Ian Townsend, 3 August 2018. Pedro Guivarra was born in 1867 at 
Masbate in the Philippines, and married Annie Pitt, sister of Edward Pitt, on Darnley Island in 1894.  
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About 24 kilometres east of the Flinders Group, on the other side of Bathurst Bay, 
anchored off the watering place at Cape Melville and sheltered from the south-
easterlies by the Melville Range were three Clark Combination fleets.144 The 
schooner Sagitta, of the Sagitta Pearling Company, with its nine luggers was owned 
jointly by James Clark, brothers P. P. Outridge and Alfred St John Outridge, and the 
ship’s Captain Robert Murray. Nearby was the Silvery Wave, owned by James Clark 
and Edward Jefferson, the fleet’s manager and schooner captain.145 Near it were the 
fleet’s 15 luggers. The schooner Crest of the Wave, owned by George Smith and 
James Clark, was anchored nearby with 13 luggers. The smaller schooner Admiral, 
a tender for the Clark Combination fleets, had arrived with supplies and passengers 
from Thursday Island on the Saturday and was anchored with them. On Saturday 4 
March 1899, while the Admiral unloaded crew and supplies, the fleets’ luggers 
transferred their weekly catch of shell to the schooners, repaired diving equipment, 
and fetched fire wood and water from the shore.146 One of the luggers anchored off 
the watering place was the Sagitta fleet’s Zoe, skippered by Willie Tanna, with a 
crew of six. The crew went ashore for water in the morning and in the afternoon, 
after waiting their turn, loaded shell onto the Sagitta and took on supplies for the 
following week.147 Four miles north-east, within sight of the fleet in Bathurst Bay, was 
the Channel Rock Lightship, with its crew of four. It was anchored next to the main 
shipping channel about two miles north of Cape Melville, marking a reef called 
Channel Rock.148  
 
Forty-five kilometres south-east of Cape Melville, at Noble Island, the lugger North 
Wales anchored in the afternoon. It was being sailed from Thursday Island to 
Cooktown where William Hamilton, its new owner, was to sail it to Samarai in British 
New Guinea.149 About 15 kilometres east of Noble Island was a cluster of islands 
called the Howick Group, where at least seven cutters were anchored. The Rattler 
and Daggie, owned by the Pitt family of Darnley Island, were anchored at Ingram 
                                                
144 “The Late Hurricane. Return of the Warrego”, 6.  
145 Lehane 2014, 169. Lehane cites a letter from James Clark to Reginald Hockings dated 17 August 
1898.  
146 Anonymous 1899, 22. 
147 Ibid., 31. 
148 Yule and Browning (Admiralty Survey) 1898, 385. 
149 “Statement of Adrianna, [sic] Manilla”, in William Hamilton, “Account of Prospecting Voyages for 
Pearl Shell in New Guinea and the Solomons 1899–1901”, John Oxley Library, OM71–4, 1, Brisbane, 
1.   
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(No. 8 Howick) Island.150 Nearby, also at Ingram Island, was the Thursday Island 
cutter Jun Yoshi (also called Yunyo) and two cutters from New Caledonia, Caledonia 
and La France.151 The position of the cutter Ada, owned by William Campbell (and 
previously owned by the same consortium that owned the Jun Yoshi), is unknown, 
but two unnamed cutters seen at Noble Island and Stapleton Island that evening 
may have been the Ada and a Japanese-owned boat, the Kotohira.152 Near 
Stapleton (No. 10 Howick) Island, a cutter owned by Edward Mosby was anchored. 
This was the Spray, with R. Hanson, a Dane, reported to be in charge.153 About 55 
kilometres south-east of the Howicks, near Lizard Island, were anchored the cutters 
Jamaica, owned by Douglas Pitt Snr, and the Loafer, owned by Charlie Lifu.154  
 
Cyclone observations 
 
In the Claremont Group, the schooner Aladdin reported a light wind from the south 
during the day, although it was calm at noon, and the barometer read 29.59inHg 
(1002.03hPa).155 Although this was 0.11inHg (0.33hPa) below the previous day, the 
ships’ captains were not suspicious. Edwin Munro on the Aladdin noted his 
barometer readings (Table 2.1) and later wrote, "The bar had been pretty steady 
before the blow.”156 About 2 or 3 p.m. he reported a sharp south-easterly rain squall 
followed by light wind, writing that, “from the readings up to 6 p.m. on the 4th, we 
would not expect anything more than a fresh breeze — perhaps squally with rain.”157 
At 6 p.m. on Saturday, the barometer was 29.61inHg (1002.7hPa), a slight rise since 
the 3 p.m. reading, but lower than the previous three days.  
 
 
                                                
150 “The Late Hurricane. Return of the Warrego”, 6. Rattler was skippered by Douglas Pitt Jnr, whose 
brother Edward was in the Flinders Group and father, Douglas Pitt Snr, was at Lizard island.   
151 Ibid. The Jun Yoshi and a lugger named Yunyo in newspapers appear to be the same vessel. 
Douglas Pitt Jnr described the Caledonia and La France as being skippered by “two Frenchmen, with 
a crew of six aboriginals and one Bengalee.” It is likely they had come from New Caledonia and 
recruited local Aboriginal people.  
152 Almond 1899. Of the Japanese cutters Sun, Ada, and Jun Yoshi, known to be in the cyclone, Ada 
and Sun appear to have had European owners by the beginning of March. The owner of the Kotohira 
is listed as W. Utagiro. 
153 “The Late Hurricane. Return of the Warrego”, 6.  
154 Ibid. Charlie Lifu’s daughter Annai was married to Edward Pitt, one of Douglas Pitt Snr’s sons. The 
experience of the extended Pitt family will be discussed in Chapter Three. 
155 Munro 1899.  
156 Ibid. 
157 Ibid. 
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Table 2.1 Edwin Munro’s barometer readings aboard the Aladdin, from his handwritten notes. Above 
the table, Munro wrote: “The Bar had been pretty steady before the blow.” (Simon Edwin Munro's 
notes in his own hand, written 1899, supplied by Duncan McArdle, husband of Catriona Mary Munro 
McArdle, Munro's granddaughter. Photocopy from Munro family papers.) 
On the eastern side of Cape Melville, at Noble Island, the lugger North Wales had 
anchored about 1 or 2 p.m. and Adriana, the brother of one of the Manilla crew 
members, recalled that the winds at the time where light and from south-east.158 
Riding north along the beach near Cape Bowen, west of the North Wales, that 
afternoon, Constable Kenny observed a light south-easterly wind and drizzling 
rain.159 By 4 p.m. the wind in the Claremonts, where the Meg Merrilies, Aladdin, 
Tarawa, and Olive were anchored, was moderate from the south-east,160 but then at 
5.30 p.m. a rainsquall came in “with a rush.”161 A feature of an approaching cyclone 
is concentric squall lines, which can sometimes cause vessels further away from the 
cyclone’s centre to experience stronger winds and heavier rain than vessels 
closer.162 At the same time, Munro on the Aladdin recorded that the wind “came in a 
rush,”163 Captain William Field Porter aboard the Crest of the Wave, who was 80 
kilometres closer to the approaching cyclone, in Bathurst Bay, reported that there 
158 Hamilton 1899–1901, 1.  
159 Vidgen, “Northern Hurricanes”, 5.  
160 W. T. Atkinson, Reports and Decisions on Shipping Accidents, “Marine Board of Queensland 
Report on the Stranding of the Meg Merrilies”, 4 April 1899, HAR/81, QSA, ID84435. 
161 Munro 1899.  
162 Terry 2007, 54. 
163 Munro 1899.  
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“wasn’t much wind,”164 although it had been blowing “fresh all day SE, going SSE.”165 
Around this time, however, some vessels prepared for bad weather.166 Willie Tanna, 
of the lugger Zoe, moved the lugger closer to shore, under the lee of the Cape 
Melville Range, after one of the crew members who had worked with the Clark fleets 
in Western Australia had told him a cyclone was coming.167 At Noble Island, the crew 
of the North Wales was playing cards and Captain Powell was “lying on the skylight, 
singing, when heavy rain came on” and they all went below.168 
 
At 7 p.m., Captain William Thompson on the schooner Meg Merrilies, anchored 
north-east of Pelican Island, reported a moderate breeze from the south-east.169 
Steve Clark, the captain of the nearby schooner Olive, also described the wind at 
that time from the south-east.170 The Aladdin recorded an air pressure of 29.61Hg 
(1002.7hPa), similar to the reading recorded by the Crest of the Wave 80 kilometres 
east in Bathurst Bay.171  
 
At 9 p.m. in Bathurst Bay, the wind strengthened. Porter of the Crest of the Wave 
later wrote to his parents that at 9 p.m. the wind “blew fearfully hard, the glass going 
down fast.”172 The eye of the cyclone was still nearly eight hours away, but the 
squalls were so strong that some vessels broke their moorings. At Stapleton Island, 
on the more exposed eastern side of Cape Melville, Captain Hanson of the cutter 
Spray said that at 9 p.m. a nearby Japanese boat was blown onto a reef, and 
disappeared.173 Between 9 and 10 p.m. in Bathurst Bay, the wind came from the 
south-west and the luggers close to shore began to drag their anchors.174 The lugger 
                                                
164 Anonymous 1899, 31. 
165 “Log Crest of the Wave”, in John Douglas, “Report of the Government Resident at Thursday Island 
for 1898”, QVP, 1, 1899, 100. This log and the narratives surrounding Captain Porter’s experience are 
discussed in Chapter Three.  
166 “Late Northern Storm”, Week (Brisbane), 7 April 1899, 13. At least one of the Sagitta’s luggers, 
Zephyr, moved to the Flinders Group, where it sank.  
167 Anonymous 1899, 50.  
168 Hamilton 1899–1901, 1.  
169 Atkinson 1899, 333. Thompson reported, “wind S.E. moderate, but freshening gradually to 
midnight.” 
170 “The Late Hurricane. Return of the Warrego”, 6. 
171 Munro 1899. 
172 Porter, “The Great Hurricane at Queensland. A Struggle for Life”, 1.  
173 “The Late Hurricane. Return of the Warrego”, 6. 
174 Anonymous 1899, 31. This information comes from Willie Tanna of the lugger Zoe. The luggers 
were close to the coast, beneath the Melville Range, where turbulence caused by the range may have 
influenced wind speed and direction.  
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Zoe let out 45 fathoms or 80 metres of anchor chain, but still dragged generally north 
towards rocks off the tip of Cape Melville.175 About this time, at 9 or 10 p.m., the men 
on the lugger North Wales, south of Cape Melville at Noble Island, were woken by “a 
strong wind from the South East which kept on increasing in force.”176 Soon after, a 
small red cutter that had been anchored close to the island sank, “those on the 
Wales hearing the cries for help but could give no assistance.”177 
 
At 10 p.m. in Bathurst Bay, the Crest of the Wave had also begun to drag its anchor 
and drift away from the shore. Captain Porter dropped another anchor, but by that 
time, “it blew so hard that even with both anchors down she was running away with 
them, and got broadside on to the blast.”178 Porter also ordered the masts cut down, 
the wind so strong that the force against the masts threatened to push the ship over. 
At 10 p.m., west of Bathurst Bay in the Claremonts, the wind was gale force and the 
schooner Olive began to drag its anchor.179 
 
By 11 p.m. all vessels described gale force winds. In the Claremonts, the Aladdin 
reported the wind veering to the south-west, and nearby the Meg Merrilies also 
reported the gale force wind veering to the south-west by midnight.180 More than 100 
kilometres east-south-east, on the exposed eastern side of Cape Melville, closer to 
the centre of the approaching cyclone, the cutter Spray ran aground on Stapleton 
Island.181 At Noble Island, the North Wales dragged its anchor. In Bathurst Bay, the 
Crest of the Wave reported that the air pressure was down to 29.40inHg 
(995.59hPa) at 11 p.m.182 This was about the same time Porter also said he saw the 
Channel Rock Lightship. The lightship was anchored beside the shipping channel 
and the Crest of the Wave was by then being driven out of Bathurst Bay and further 
                                                
175 Anonymous 1899, 31. 
176 Hamilton 1899–1901, 1. 
177 Ibid.  
178 “The Late Hurricane. Cruise of the Warrego”, 5. 
179 Ibid.  
180 Munro 1899. Munro wrote that the wind from the south-east continued to “blow right on, veering by 
11pm to SW.” 
181 “The Late Hurricane. Return of the Warrego”, 6. The report describes the Spray being pushed into 
mangroves, but there are no mangroves on Stapleton Island or on the reefs nearby. It is likely that 
Colvin, the ships purser who reported the event, confused the account of the Spray with the account 
of the Daggie. The Daggie, anchored at Ingram Island, survived the cyclone’s eye and was blown 
south into mangroves somewhere between Beanley Island and Murdoch Point.  
182 “Log Crest of the Wave”, in Douglas, QVP, 1899.   
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north.183 At 11.30 p.m., Porter reported the “wind went to S and came in rainy 
squalls.”184 Constable Kenny at Wakooka Creek south of Barrow Point also reported 
the wind from the south-south-east at 11.30 p.m. and increasing “every minute.”185 
About midnight at Noble Island, Captain Powell on the North Wales threw out a 
second anchor, the lugger held, but the waves broke over it and it began to fill with 
water.186 Further east at Stapleton Island, the wind changed to the east.187   
In Bathurst Bay, many of the luggers that had anchored close to the shore were at 
the end of their anchor chains and were also, like the Crest of the Wave, being 
pushed north or north-east. At midnight, the lugger Zoe struck Inner Boulder Rocks 
and broke up (Figure 2.9).188 Nearby, the lugger Little Bill sank and two of the crew, 
“Albert and Moses, natives of Ware island in the South Seas,” were swept by the 
wind towards Pipon Island.189 The North Wales sank south of Cape Melville, near 
Noble Island.190  
Figure 2.9 Inner Boulder 
Rocks off the tip of Cape 
Melville, where several 
pearling luggers were 
wrecked in the cyclone 
(photograph Melisha McIvor, 
Queensland Government). 
183 “The Late Hurricane. Further Particulars. Return of the Steamer Warrego. Loss of Life Estimated at 
400”, Brisbane Courier, 14 March 1899, 5. This article says the barometer went down to 27 inches at 
11 p.m., but this is a typographical error and should read 29 inches.  
184 “Log Crest of the Wave”, in Douglas, QVP, 1899.   
185 Vidgen, “Northern Hurricanes”, 5.  
186 Hamilton 1899–1901, 1.  
187 “The Late Hurricane. Return of the Warrego”, 6.  
188 Anonymous 1899, 31. 
189 Ibid., 34.  
190 Hamilton 1899–1901, 2.  
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At the Claremonts, on the western side of Princess Charlotte Bay, the Meg Merrilies 
reported the wind suddenly veering to the south-west at midnight and reaching 
hurricane force. The schooner dragged its anchor, and Captain Thompson ordered 
the masts to be cut down. The full length of anchor chain, 100 fathoms (180 metres) 
had been let out, but the schooner was blown to the north-east towards a number of 
large coral reefs.191 Not far from the Meg Merrilies, the Olive also reported the 
hurricane force wind veering to the south-west at midnight. 
North of Bathurst Bay, in or just north of the shipping channel, Captain Porter on the 
Crest of the Wave at 1 a.m. reported that the air pressure had fallen to 28inHg 
(948hPa).192 This is equivalent to the lowest recorded pressure of Cyclone Tracy 
(950hPa) which ravaged Darwin in 1974 and where wind gusts of 217km/h were 
recorded.193 The pressure was to continue to fall, and the wind to increase, for 
another four hours. At Wakooka Creek, the tents of Kenny and his troopers had been 
blown away and “all hands made for the biggest open space near, guided by very 
vivid lightning, which occurred at intervals. Here it was necessary to cover up face 
and hands in a blanket to keep off the pelting rain, which seemed to hit as hard as 
hail.”194 At 2 a.m., the wind at Wakooka Creek, which since 11.30 p.m. had been 
blowing from the south-south-east, veered “a few points” to the east and blew with 
hurricane force.195  
By 3 a.m., the wind in the Claremonts was blowing from the south-west and veering 
to the west. Sometime later, the anchor cables of the schooner Tarawa, which had 
been anchored near the Meg Merrilies north-west of Pelican Island, parted and the 
Tarawa was blown onto the island.196 The schooner Olive, which had been anchored 
north-west of Burkitt Island, about eight kilometres west of Pelican Island, was also 
dragging its anchor and as the wind veered, it was blown clockwise around the 
island so that by daylight it was on the south-eastern side.197  
191 Atkinson 1899, 333.  
192 “Log Crest of the Wave”, in Douglas, QVP, 1899. 
193 BOM, Report on Cyclone Tracy, December, 1974, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing 
Service, 1977, 37–41.  
194 Vidgen, “Northern Hurricanes”, 5.  
195 Ibid. 
196 “The Late Hurricane. Return of the Warrego”, 6. 
197 Ibid. 
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Between 3 a.m. and 4 a.m., several luggers in Bathurst Bay sank almost intact, and 
were later salvaged. James Clark speculated that this must have been after the 
cyclone’s centre crossed Bathurst Bay, the wind reversing direction.198 However, as 
will be discussed in Chapter Five, it was not until after 5 a.m. that the wind came 
from the opposite direction, as the eye passed.199 The evidence suggests that many 
boats in Bathurst Bay sank at the end of their anchor chains close to the shipping 
channel more than an hour before the wind reversed direction. Why did they sink at 
that time? 
 
The lugger Zanoni sank about 3.30 a.m., “when the waves were found to be 
breaking over the boat” near Boulders Rocks, according to the lugger’s Japanese 
diver and its only survivor, Gentaro.200 The Zanoni was at the end of its anchor chain 
when it broke up on the rocks, and this appears to be around the time other luggers 
sank in a line north-west of Inner Boulder Rocks. Clark described the clocks of the 
luggers recovered having stopped between 3 and 4 a.m., when he assumed the 
wind changed to blow from the north-west catching them all against “a dead lee 
shore in shallow water, with the larger vessels probably thumping on the bottom in 
the hollow of the sea.”201 However, the winds did not shift to the north-west until after 
5 a.m. Between 3 and 4 a.m. the cyclone’s eye wall, with the most destructive winds 
from the south and south-east, began to pass over Bathurst Bay.202 The “bumping on 
the bottom” of the schooners in Bathurst Bay was caused by a negative storm surge, 
in which the sea level falls on the opposite side of the cyclone to which the storm 
surge occurs.203 When the eye passed after 5 a.m., the sea level in Bathurst Bay 
rose, the waves and wind returned with a rush from the north-west, and the 
                                                
198 “The Late Hurricane. Letter from Mr. James Clark”, Brisbane Courier, 15 May 1899, 7. Of the 10 
boats that were later raised intact from the seabed, many had their clocks stopped between 3 a.m. 
and 4 a.m. 
199 Porter, “The Great Hurricane at Queensland. A Struggle for Life”, 1. Porter said the lull arrived after 
he read the barometer at 4.30 a.m. (The “log” published in John Douglas’s report to the Government 
says the lull started at 4.45 a.m.) The Crest of the Wave by that time was north of Bathurst Bay. The 
lugger Estelle experienced a short lull after 5am, but it too had drifted north. The movement of the 
cyclone will be examined in Chapter Five.  
200 Anonymous 1899, 33.  
201 “The Late Hurricane. Letter from Mr. James Clark”, 7. 
202 For a reconstruction of the cyclone, see Chapter Five.  
203 Benjamin Wong and Ralf Toumi, "Model Study of the Asymmetry in Tropical Cyclone-induced 
Positive and Negative Surges”, Atmospheric Science Letters, 17, No. 5, 2016, 334–338. 
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wreckage from the schooners Sagitta and Silvery Wave was swept towards the 
shore to be scattered along the Bathurst Bay beaches.204  
 
At 4.30 a.m., Captain Porter on the Crest of the Wave, then well north of Bathurst 
Bay, reported that his barometer registered 26inHg (880hPa).205 Later that day, he 
told Captain Jenkins, the captain of the British India steamship Duke of Norfolk, of 
the low barometric pressure.206 The Duke of Norfolk had anchored beside the Crest 
of the Wave that evening and the next day, 6 March, Porter wrote a letter to his 
parents and sent it aboard the Duke of Norfolk with his wife, Maggie, stating again 
that “about 4.30 a.m.” the “barometer was down to 26.” That reading was viewed 
with scepticism by Captain Hugh Craig, the Thursday Island-based pilot of the 
steamship Kasuga Maru, which two days later, at 7 a.m. on 8 March, also stopped to 
speak to Porter. Captain Craig said that he had “been in some of the worst typhoons 
ever experienced in the China seas; but he had never known the glass to fall lower 
than about 27.30inHg (924hPa).”207 Porter’s reading was later altered in the Outridge 
booklet to 27inHg (914hPa) and this changing of the record will be discussed in 
Chapter Five.208 After taking the barometer reading at 4.30 a.m., Porter reported a 
lull, followed “a few minutes” later by hurricane force winds from the north-west.209 
Edwin Munro on the Aladdin, later considered the observations of the Crest of the 
Wave, which was by 4.30 a.m. about 70 kilometres east of the Aladdin.  
 
The Crest reports the wind starting at SE and veering to SW when it 
appeared, after a few minutes lull to come from NW with even greater 
force. The Nor West change came in with her about daylight, whereas 
with us at the Claremonts it was about 9 a.m. before it changed to that 
direction.210 
 
                                                
204 “The Late Hurricane. Letter from Mr. James Clark”, 7. James Clark described the “raging mass of 
breakers two miles outside of the place the boats anchored in”, which is approximately where many of 
the boats sank.  
205 Porter, “The Great Hurricane at Queensland. A Struggle for Life”, 1. 
206 “The Steamer Duke of Norfolk. Captain Jenkins Explains”, Brisbane Courier, 18 March 1899, 8. 
207 “Report by the Kasuga Maru”, 5.  
208 Nott et al. 2014, 757–765 
209 Porter, “The Great Hurricane at Queensland. A Struggle for Life”, 1. 
210 Munro 1899. 
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The Aladdin recorded its lowest pressure, 29.09inHg (985.1hPa), at 6 a.m.211 
Nearby, the schooner Olive recorded 29.10inHg (985.4hPa),212 a reading almost 
identical to the Aladdin’s and suggesting a high level of consistency in the schooner 
captains’ observations and between their instruments. The Aladdin did not 
experience the lull, but Munro observed that the Crest of the Wave “was evidently 
near the centre of it, but not exactly in the centre.”213 As will be shown in Chapter 
Five, the Crest of the Wave was in the top of the cyclone’s eye. 
The storm tide at Constable Kenny’s campsite 
At 5 a.m., at Wakooka Creek south of Cape Melville and the cyclone’s eye, the wind 
shifted to the north-east, “and if possible blew harder than ever, with torrents of rain.” 
Kenny did not experience the lull, but he was in the southern part of the cyclone 
when the destructive eye wall passed over Cape Melville.   
Shortly after the wind shifted to north-east an immense tidal wave swept 
in shore and reached waist deep on the ridge with the camp on it, 
completing the misery of the constable and troopers, also spoiling 
Kenny's watch. Here the wave stretched between 2 and 3 miles 
inland.214 
As discussed, there is only one small area where Kenny could have observed what 
he described, and that is on a ridge on the southern side of Wakooka Creek (as 
marked on Figure 2.10). It is also the only area where a storm tide is corroborated by 
other witnesses. Walter Roth came ashore four weeks after the cyclone and met 
Kenny on the Northern Road of the Barrow Point people. On 3 April 1899, Roth 
landed near Wakooka Creek because he was “anxious to reach the main camp of 
the Barrow Point tribe as soon as possible.”215 However, the main camp of the 
Barrow Point people was at Ninian Bay, 14 kilometres north. Roth’s official mission 
was to distribute aid to the Aboriginal people and would have reached the main 
camp of the Barrow Point people quicker if he had sailed directly to Ninian Bay, so 
211 Ibid. 
212 “The Late Hurricane. Return of the Warrego”, 6. 
213 Munro 1899. 
214 Vidgen, “Northern Hurricanes”, 5.  
215 Roth 1899, 2. 
	 99 
why did Roth meet Kenny at Wakooka Creek? He had pre-arranged to meet Kenny 
2.5 kilometres (1.5 miles) inland at a place known to both; the ford where the 
Northern Road crossed Wakooka Creek, which Roth had visited three months 
earlier. It is likely Roth arranged to meet Kenny at that place because he was curious 
about Kenny’s description of the sea flooding inland. Making his way inland to meet 
Kenny, Roth described the “incursion of the sea being evidenced throughout in the 
tufts of sea-weed dangling on high branches, and in the numerous heaps of putrid 
mullet and rock-cod stenching the surrounding atmosphere.”216 The captain of the 
schooner Canomie, William Hamilton, who put Roth ashore near Wakooka Creek, 
later also described depressions in the land “a considerable distance inland with a 
quantity of sea mullet and Rock Cod dead, the sea having left them there.”217 (The 
evidence for the storm tide will be discussed further in Chapter Five.)  
 
  
Figure 2.10 Topographical map of Wakooka Creek showing in red the area generally below 13 metres 
elevation (from NATMAP, Geoscience Australia). 
 
                                                
216 Ibid. 
217 Hamilton 1899–1901, 4.   
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The fleets after 5 a.m. 
 
In Bathurst Bay, after the eye passed and the winds came from the north-west, the 
schooner Silvery Wave sank.218 The hurricane-force wind swept debris, bodies, and 
survivors back towards the north-facing beach in Bathurst Bay. The diver Seto, who 
had been aboard the lugger Estelle, which sank at 6 a.m. north of Bathurst Bay, had 
experienced the eye of the cyclone for 10 minutes and was washed ashore at 
Bathurst Bay after six hours in the water.219 The schooners Admiral and Sagitta sank 
at unknown times, the debris from the Sagitta washing ashore at Bathurst Bay.220 
Outridge described wreckage found 400 metres inshore at Bathurst Bay,221 likely 
caused by a combination of an high astronomical tide just after 5 a.m.,222 the raised 
dome of sea beneath the cyclone’s low central pressure,223 and wave run-up 
generated after the eye passed and the winds returned with hurricane force across 
30 kilometres of open sea north of Bathurst Bay. As will be further described in 
Chapter Five, this is not the area of the cyclone’s main storm tide, which occurred 
further south at Wakooka Creek. Of 43 vessels anchored in Bathurst Bay before the 
cyclone, only one, the schooner Crest of the Wave, was still afloat. All four men 
aboard the Channel Rock Lightship drowned when it sank at its moorings. Most 
vessels near the Flinders Group sank or had been blown long distances earlier in the 
night. The cutter Sun was found grounded on a sandbank 80 kilometres north-west 
of Flinders Island. In the Claremonts, the schooner Meg Merrilies was washed onto a 
reef and wrecked 16 kilometres north-east of Pelican Island. Four of its 14 luggers 
                                                
218 “The Late Hurricane. Further Particulars”, 5. This report states that the Silvery Wave sank at 5 a.m. 
“The Late Hurricane. Cruise of the Warrego”, 5. This report states the survivor “remained on the 
wreck till daylight, when he escaped on a plank.” “The Late Hurricane. Return of the Warrego”, 6. This 
report states that the Silvery Wave “went down about 6 a.m.” Anonymous 1899, 32. Outridge reports 
that the vessel sank about 7.30 a.m.  
219 Anonymous 1899, 33. 
220 Ibid., 24.  
221 Ibid., 50. Outridge visited the scene and described his experience. “About two miles from the 
Cape, wreckage is most plentiful, and in some cases is a quarter of a mile inland from the seashore.”  
222 Tidal Unit, MSQ, Brisbane, 23 August 2018. MSQ was consulted and its tidal prediction program 
CPRED produced estimates of high tide at Munro Reef and Leggatt Island, the closest recording 
stations today. High tide at Munro Reef, 26 kilometres south-west of Cape Melville, is estimated to 
have been at 5.11 a.m. on 4 March 1899. Anomalies between that tidal estimate today and 
contemporary tide charts will be discussed in Chapter Five.  
223 Terry 2007, 68. In what is called the “inverse barometer effect”, the sea level rises one centimetre 
for every one hectopascal fall in air pressure. The air pressure on 4 and 5 March fell from 1007hPa to 
880hPa, representing a sea level rise of 27 centimetres beneath the cyclone’s core due to air 
pressure alone.  
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were lost.224 The Tarawa lost four boats,225 the Aladdin lost two boats and the Olive 
none. South of Cape Melville in the Howick Group, six vessels sank.  
 
The known deaths are detailed in Appendix 1. At sea, 290 people are known to have 
drowned. On shore, Roth reported that three Barrow Point people died and four men 
and one woman were killed by falling trees or flying debris at Bathurst Bay. More 
may have later starved because these families “had also experienced great losses in 
the way of food plants and hunting gear.”226 (More deaths may have occurred when 
the cyclone moved inland across the countries of other people. The memories of the 
Aboriginal people will be discussed in Chapter Three.) The cyclone’s centre passed 
close to the town of Musgrave on the morning of 6 March, blowing down the 
Musgrave Telegraph Office “and all other buildings, including the police station.” It 
also knocked down the telegraph line for 55 kilometres miles north of Musgrave,227 
and to an unknown point south between Musgrave and the Fairview Telegraph 
Station.228 The line was restored on Friday 10 March.229 The cyclone caused 
widespread flooding down the east Queensland coast, and squalls or tornadoes 
damaged buildings at Cooktown,230 and the Cape Bedford mission.231      
 
Conclusion 
 
Applying the methodology described in Chapter One to historic documents, including 
newspapers, reveals the best evidence for the pearling disaster caused by the 1899 
cyclone that struck Bathurst Bay. Contemporary political, social and economic 
narratives give that evidence context, providing insights that explain the social 
behaviour of the people who were there, as well as the natural behaviour of the 
                                                
224 “The Late Hurricane. Return of the Warrego”, 6.  
225 Ibid. 
226 Roth 1899, 7–8. 
227 “Late Bowen Cyclone”, Brisbane Courier, 14 March 1899, 4. 
228 “Telegraphic Interruptions”, Queenslander, 18 March 1899, 477. Fairview is near the town of 
Laura.  
229 “Telegraphic Communication Restored”, Brisbane Courier, 11 March 1899, 7. 
230 “Rain in the North”, Telegraph (Brisbane), 7 March 1899, 5. 
231 Magdalen Mulum and Walter Roth, “A Letter to the Commissioner of Police from Magdalen Mulum 
of the Cape Bedford Mission with translation by W. E. Roth”, 23 March 1899, in Walter Roth, Reports 
to the Commissioner of Police and Others, on Queensland Aborigines, 1898–1900, A/19899, QSA, 
ID271655. Magdalen Mulum writes in Guugu-Yimidhirr: “Just now a big storm came here, broke some 
of our houses, throwing them, and also broke the banana stalks, leaving only young ones.” 
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cyclone. The lack of cyclones experienced north of Cape Melville during the short 
period of European settlement in Australia before 1899 led the pearling fleet owners 
to believe that the area was safe from cyclones. The world demand for pearl shell 
and the use by company pearling fleets of the floating station system led to a large 
number of vessels congregating in the Princess Charlotte Bay area before the end of 
the wet season in February and March 1899. The history of abuse of Aboriginal 
people by some members of the pearling and beche-de-mer fishing industries led to 
outbreaks of violence, explaining the presence of the Native Police in the area at the 
time of the disaster. Understanding the social history of the people ashore, including 
the long-running conflict between the Aboriginal people of Barrow Point and the 
Native Police, helps identify the camp site of the Native Police patrol and, therefore, 
a more precise location for the world record storm tide observed by Constable 
Kenny. The site was visited in September 2018 and found to contain evidence of a 
large Aboriginal campsite. Reports of the positions of the vessels in the area, and 
their observations, have been tested using the methodology, taking into account 
errors of translation and transmission. By more accurately describing the positions of 
the observers, their observations can be used with more confidence to reconstruct 
the cyclone and the disaster it caused. This data has been tabulated and will be 
used in Chapter Five to remodel the cyclone’s behaviour. The following chapter 
explores the death toll and the European narratives of the disaster. It evaluates 
memories, deconstructs myths, and reconstructs the experiences of one Torres 
Strait Islander family from the best evidence.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
The People 
 
Then we find dead mans. All along beach, plenty dead mans — plenty. 
Plenty Island boy, plenty mainland, plenty harp-caste, plenty New 
Guinea boy, plenty Jap man. An' white man he lie there, too, alla same, 
alla same dead. An' altogether they lie longa plenty shark an' plenty 
kingpish, an' barr'couta; plenty dead pish altogether lie 'longside dead 
mans. My word, he verra terrible storm that one! 
 
Moira Newi reported by Ion Idriess in an interview published in 1927.1  
 
The methodology developed in Chapter One was applied to documentary evidence 
in Chapter Two to identify the best evidence from which to reconstruct the 1899 
cyclone. This chapter will extend that process to explore the death toll, as well as 
the origin of several myths associated with the non-European experience of the 
pearling disaster. There is evidence that narratives involving Torres Strait Islanders 
and the Aboriginal people ashore evolved into myths that have been incorporated 
into social memory, as well as entering government and scientific datasets. For 
example, there is evidence that the Aboriginal death toll was altered in 1971, 
possibly as a response to contemporary national media discourses. How has this 
influenced the social memory of the disaster, and the application of science to the 
study of this cyclone? Evidence for the 1899 death toll will be reviewed, and the 
difficulties experienced identifying the dead discussed. A list of the known dead is 
provided in Appendix 1.   
 
As discussed in the previous chapters, the European community represented four 
percent of the crews of the pearling fleets and four percent of the death toll, but 
Europeans were the main sources for all narratives associated with the 1899 cyclone 
and, therefore, had the most influence on the recording of history as well as the 
memorialisation of the event.2 The 298 people known to have been killed can be 
                                                
1 Gouger (Ion Idriess), “Aboriginalities. Made in Australia”, The Bulletin, 11 August 1927, 27. Idriess 
visited the Torres Strait islands several times in the 1920s. For example, see Ion Idriess, “The White 
Man’s Prestige”, Sunday Mail (Brisbane), 22 January 1928, 8. Idriess recounts his earlier visit to 
Masig (Yorke) Island where he met a woman named Moira, a servant of the school teacher Norma 
Reid. 
2 For example, Anonymous, The Pearling Disaster, 1899: A Memorial, Brisbane: Outridge Printing 
Company, 1899, which was written as an “account of the Europeans who were lost therein.” The 
memorial at Bathurst Bay names the Europeans who drowned and states, “Over 300 Coloured Men 
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shown to come from more than 20 distinct nations or regions, but the social memory 
of the pearling disaster is based on the narratives of one culture, reflecting not just 
what is remembered, but, as historian Joy Damousi says, “that which we disavow.”3 
(The influence of the political discourse in 1899 leading up to Federation and the 
White Australia Policy will be discussed in Chapter Four.) 
One of the difficulties in reconstructing the non-European narratives is the departure 
from Australia after Federation of most of the surviving crew members, who took 
their memories with them. Many were repatriated when their contracts expired, left 
with the Clark Combination fleets to the Dutch East Indies, or were deported.4 This 
is particularly the case for most of Japanese, the Filipino, Malay and South Sea 
Islanders, who made up 71 percent of the men employed in the fleets on Shipping 
Articles (Chart 3.1). However, two non-European communities remained: The 
Australian Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island communities. Some foreign crew 
members who had settled in the Torres Strait and married also remained, and family 
memories as well as records of their experience exist. 
One of the few such experiences to which the methodology, outlined in Chapter 
One, can be applied is that of the extended Pitt family from the Torres Strait, 
including Darnley Island woman Moira Newi, who survived by swimming about 20 
kilometres to shore. She was awarded a medal for bravery during the cyclone by the 
Queensland Government, but her experience, as will be shown, evolved into a myth 
that reflected European narratives. 
Drowned.” A memorial plaque in the All Souls St Bartholomew Quetta Memorial Church on Thursday 
Island names the Europeans and adds “295 coloured men.” 
3 Joy Damousi, “History Matters: The Politics of Grief and Injury in Australian History”, Australian 
Historical Studies, 33, No. 118, 2002, 100. 
4 The Pacific Island Labourers Act 1901 led to the end of the recruitment of South Sea Islanders and 
the deportation of nearly 7,000 islanders after 31 December 1906, although some remained. See 
also, for example; Peter Corris, “‘White Australia’ in Action: The Repatriation of Pacific Islanders from 
Queensland”, Historical Studies, 15, No. 58, 1972, 237–250; Clive Moore, “‘Good-bye, Queensland, 
Good-bye, White Australia; Good-bye, Christians’: Australia's South Sea Islander community and 
deportation, 1901–1908”, New Federalist, 4 December 1999, 22–29; Stephen Mullins, Octopus 
Crowd: Maritime History and the Business of Australian Pearling in Its Schooner Age, Tuscaloosa, 
Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 2019; Regina Ganter, The Pearl-Shellers of Torres Strait: 
Resource Use, Development and Decline 1860s–1960s, Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University 
Press, 1994; Anna Shnukal, “Historical Mua”, in Bruno David, Louise Manas and Michael Quinnell 
(eds), “Gelam's Homeland, Cultural and Natural History on the Island of Mua, Torres Strait”, Memoirs 
of the Queensland Museum, 4, No. 2, 2008, 61–205.  
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Chart 3.1 Nationalities of Men on Shipping Articles at Thursday Island for 1898, reflecting the descriptions of origins in John Douglas, “Report of the 
Government Resident at Thursday Island for 1898”, QVP, 1, 1899, 92. 
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That these myths persist may reflect what Paula Hamilton has described as a lack of 
interest by historians in Australia’s historical disasters,5 but they also appear to be 
examples of the selectivity of social memory as evidence is discarded, subsumed 
into or altered by more dominant European narratives. The persistence of myths can 
also be explained by their inclusion in popular forms of story-telling throughout the 
20th century, especially in popular histories written as narrative non-fiction.  
Finally, this chapter will consider why the evidence of the Aboriginal experience 
ashore appears to be limited. Ethnographer and Northern Protector of Aboriginals, 
Walter Roth, estimated in 1898 that there were more than 1,000 Aboriginal people 
living in the Princess Charlotte Bay hinterland and coastline, the area which the 
cyclone later devastated.6 Although the 1899 cyclone is remembered by Traditional 
Owners, there appear to be relatively few Aboriginal narratives associated with the 
disaster despite the large number of Aboriginal people who experienced it.  
 The death toll 
There is evidence for 298 deaths during the cyclone that struck Cape Melville in 
1899.7 (Deaths reported from injuries or suicide after the cyclone are not included in 
the toll, but are detailed later in this chapter). It is possible the death toll as a direct 
result of the cyclone exceeded 300, because Appendix 1 does not include deaths 
from two unidentified vessels, possibly the cutter Ada and lugger Kotohira, reported 
to have sunk in the Howick Group of islands. Although there is evidence that more 
than 69 vessels sank or ran aground, it is not clear where some vessels were at the 
time. It is, therefore, difficult to identify the two unnamed vessels in the Howick 
5 Paula Hamilton, “Memory Remains: Ferry Disaster, Sydney, 1938”, History Workshop Journal 1999, 
No. 47, 1999, 197. 
6 Walter Roth, “A Report to the Commissioner of Police on the Aboriginals Occupying the 'Hinter-
Land' of Princess Charlotte Bay Together with a Preface Containing Suggestions for Their Better 
Protection and Improvement”, 30 December 1898, A/19899, QSA, ID1154345, ii. This is Roth’s 
original hand-written report. 
7 Appendix 1. The list shows 299 individuals, but includes two death certificates for one man, Marco 
Perez, master of the schooner Admiral, whose case will be considered later in this chapter and in 
Chapter Four. 
Group described by an observer as sinking. It is also not clear how many people 
were aboard these vessels, and if any or all survived.8
Not all vessel owners reported deaths to authorities. Captain William Thompson of 
the Meg Merrilies described nine deaths, but these were not subsequently reported 
to the Cooktown Registrar of Deaths, Arthur Dean, nor the Marine Department.9
They are included in Appendix 1 because the evidence for the deaths associated 
with the Meg Merrilies fleet is considered credible by the methodology.10 None of the 
crew of the lugger North Wales, owned by William Hamilton, has a Queensland 
death certificate. Their names are listed among the dead by the Marine Department, 
but that list includes one crew member, Adriana, who survived. Appendix 1 reflects 
this evidence. Even allowing for unreported and unknown deaths from vessels 
known to have sunk or been wrecked during the 1899 cyclone, there is no evidence 
that 400 people died, as is claimed in official records today.11 With credible evidence 
for 298 individual deaths, it remains Australia’s deadliest recorded cyclone. A 
cyclone in Western Australia in 1887 is reported to have killed 220 people.12 The 
passenger vessel Koombana sank between Port Hedland and Broome in 1912 
during a cyclone, drowning an estimated 150.13 The 1918 Mackay cyclone is said to 
have killed 30 people and another cyclone in 1918, at Innisfail, killed as many as 
8 George Bennett, “Return Giving Names and Nationality of Persons Belonging to Pearling Fleet Lost 
in Hurricane of 4th and 5th March, 1899, in Neighbourhood of Cape Melville”, in T. M. Almond, “Report 
on the Marine Department for the Year 1898–1899”, QVP, 3, 24 September 1899, 24; Anonymous 
1899, 10. Although the Outridge booklet and the Marine Department in September 1899 both reported 
54 vessels lost, Outridge’s list does not include the lugger, Kate, nor the two New Caledonian vessels, 
La France and Caledonia. The Marine Department counted only vessels licenced for fishing, and so 
did not report the two New Caledonia vessels nor the lugger North Wales, which was passing through 
the area after having been sold. The best evidence shows 57 vessels lost in the disaster and a further 
12 that sank or were grounded and later salvaged. 
9 “The Late Hurricane. Return of the Warrego. Reports from the Boats”, Brisbane Courier, 20 March 
1899, 6. 
10 Captain Thompson’s statement, delivered by hand to the Brisbane Courier by the purser of the 
steamship Warrego, William Colvin, is considered by the methodology used in this thesis to be 
credible. 
11 Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience, “Cyclone Mahina 1899”, Disaster Resilience Knowledge 
Hub, https://knowledge.aidr.org.au/resources/cyclone-cyclone-mahina-cape-york-queensland (accessed 
7 February 2019). The website states: “It’s estimated more than 400 people perished …” It also states 
that the hub is managed on behalf of the Australian Government and “informs policy, planning, 
decision making and contemporary good practice in disaster resilience.” A disclaimer notice on the 
website’s Terms and Conditions, states that, “no claim is made as to the accuracy or authenticity of 
the content.” However, in seeking contributions it states: “All submissions will be reviewed and 
verified before they are added to the collections.” 
12 Mullins 2019, 89.  
13 “Koombana Inquiry”, Hedland Advocate (Port Hedland), 18 May 1912, 3. 
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87.14 In 1934, a cyclone is reported to have drowned 75 people aboard pearling 
fleets off Cape Tribulation,15 and 71 died in Darwin during Cyclone Tracy in 1974.16
The death toll for the 1899 pearling disaster has never been reviewed. In reviewing 
the death toll (see Appendix 1), I located several sources, including three major lists 
of fatalities: A Marine Department list that records 249 names,17 the Registry of 
Births Deaths and Marriages (QBDM) which lists 242 distinct individuals,18 and a list 
reproduced from the Cooktown Death Register, which shows 239 names.19 An 
inspection of the records of the Cooktown Register of Deaths and the register held 
by the QBDM in Brisbane was conducted.20
Most of the names in the Registry of Deaths in 1899 were reported to the Cooktown 
Registrar by the managers of the company fleets and originated from the ships’ 
articles of agreement, which outlined the employment contract between the fleet 
owners and the seamen. Following the disaster, a muster of surviving crews 
appears to have been held by the companies, and the names of those missing were 
supplied to the Thursday Island Shipping Master, George Bennett (who compiled a 
list for the Marine Department),21 and the Registrar of Deaths in Cooktown, Arthur 
Dean. The ships’ articles included the names, ages and nationalities of those 
employed by the company fleets operating in the area of Princess Charlotte Bay and 
Cape Melville at the time of the cyclone. Although the names reported to both the 
14 
Australian Government, “Historical Impacts Along the East Coast”, Canberra: BOM, 
http://www.bom.gov.au/cyclone/history/eastern.shtml (accessed 3 February 2017). Among the deaths 
during the 1899 Innisfail cyclone is John Martin Kenny, the Native Police officer who survived the  
1899 cyclone at Cape Melville. In 1918, he was Superintendent of the Hull River Mission at what is 
now Mission Beach. 
15
Ibid. 
16
Don Withers, “Disaster Medicine in Australia: A National Perspective”, Australian Journal of Emergency 
Management, 12, No. 2, Winter 1997, 39. Withers stated 65 deaths, but a further six were added to the 
death toll by Northern Territory coroner Greg Cavanagh in 2005. 
17  
Bennett 1899, 21–24. 
18 
Register of Deaths, Cooktown District — Cook, 1890–1901, QBDM, QSA, ID1273107. Permission 
was obtained from the Registrar General to view these records, which cannot be viewed by the public. 
19 
John Shay and Bev Shay, The Greatest of All Cyclones Bathurst Bay 1899, Cooktown, 
Queensland: Cooktown and District Historical Association, 1999, 35–40. 
20 
Two copies of the registers of the Cook district, one kept in Cooktown and the other in Brisbane,   
are generally identical, the practice being for the registrar at the time to make two hand-written copies. 
Therefore, the list copied from the Cooktown register by Shay is not considered the best evidence. 
However, it does include an interpretation of the spellings of names that demonstrates the difficulty in 
translating the handwriting of the Cooktown Registrar, Arthur Dean. 
21 
John Douglas, “Report of the Government Resident at Thursday Island for 1898”, QVP, 1, 1899, 
100. 
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Marine Department and the Cooktown Registrar appear to have originated from 
ships’ articles, the Marine Department list includes names that do not have death 
certificates, and some people with death certificates do not appear to have been 
reported to the Marine Department. The spellings of names often vary significantly 
between the lists as a result of errors of translation and transmission (as described 
in Chapter One).     
Estimates of the death toll varied in the weeks following the disaster. In his report 
dated 13 April 1899, the Thursday Island Government Resident John Douglas put 
the loss of life at 250, attributing that figure to the Thursday Island shipping master, 
but noting the “difficulty in arriving at any accurate measurement of the loss of life” 
until the ships’ articles were studied in full.22 The report of the Marine Department on 
24 September 1899 estimated that “nearly 300 lives were lost,” but listed 249 
names, noting: “This return is only approximate, as it is possible some small boats 
with their crews may have been lost and the loss not reported to the Shipping Office, 
Thursday Island.”23 Many of the crews on small boats may not have had contracts.24 
As detailed in previous chapters, most accounts today of the disaster can be traced 
back to the Outridge booklet, published in September 1899. The booklet concludes 
that 307 members of the fleets died, including an estimate of “about 30” people who 
were in small boats not associated with the bigger company fleets.25 The review of 
the death toll for this thesis, using the methodology, shows that figure to be 
reasonably accurate.     
Between the two primary sources, the Marine Department list and the Cooktown 
death register held by the Queensland State Archives (QSA) for the Brisbane 
QBDM, there is a difference of seven names and the spelling of many names varies. 
It might be expected that the names on these lists would match each other, 
considering that they shared the same source, the ships’ articles. However, many of 
22 Ibid. The difficulty is not explained, but it may refer to the number of articles for each vessel, each 
listing a new intake of employees usually on contract for three years, with separate articles for South 
Sea Islanders. Douglas emphasised in his report that the laws relating to the shipment of seamen 
needed to be changed, alluding to difficulty in accessing the different sets of articles.  
23 Bennett 1899, 24. 
24 Walter Roth, “Report of the Northern Protector of Aboriginals for 1899”, QVP, 5 1900, 4–5. Some 
small boat owners recruited Aboriginal men illegally for little of no wages. Others sometimes 
employed their own relatives, including women and children.   
25 Anonymous 1899, 10. 
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the men on the list were migrant workers, some illiterate, and many spoke little or no 
English. Names were written by hand into the ship’s articles and many appear to 
have been interpreted phonetically. The misinterpretation of handwriting might have 
been compounded if the names were transmitted by telegraph between the ports 
where the articles were held to the Shipping Master at Thursday island and the 
Registrar of Deaths in Cooktown. There is evidence of multiple spellings for 
individual names in other Government documents. For example, there are four 
different spellings for Mayden, a 32-year-old illiterate Malay man who died in the 
cyclone (Figures 3.1 and 3.2). 
Figure 3.1 “Moyden” written by two different people in one transcript of the Magistrate’s Court 
Thursday Island January 1899 (from “Assaulting one George Masta with Intent”, Thursday Island 
Police Summons Book/Sheet, 25 January 1899, PRV7022/1/2, QSA, ID6398). 
Figure 3.2 Mayden as written, in Death Certificate of Mayden, 5 March 1899, Queensland Births, 
Death and Marriages Registry, Cooktown, 1899/1219. This name has been interpreted as “Meydeu” 
in the Index to Queensland Deaths by staff at the QBDM.26  
Mayden, was a crew member of the lugger Kate in the fleet of the Sketty Belle, and 
the recording of his details is an example of the difficulty faced correctly identifying 
people and vessels. The Kate was registered to the fleet of George Smith’s 
brigantine Sketty Belle. Smith had replaced Sketty Belle with the schooner Crest of 
the Wave the year before the cyclone, but the Kate appears still to have been on the 
Sketty Belle’s books when the cyclone struck. This may explain why the Kate was 
not on the Outridge booklet’s list of vessels lost. The Thursday Island Magistrates 
Court records describe the trial on 25 January 1899 of three men — Mayden, Joe 
Harry and Ah Mat — who pleaded not guilty to assaulting George Masta two months 
26 “Index — Death registers L–R”, 1890–1899, QSA, ID2785668. The series notes: “These indexes 
were typed using the event information available at the time (one line per person).” 
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earlier.27 The court documents, in which Mayden and most of the witnesses signed 
with a cross, show Masta was also spelt “Master.” Joe Harry from Rotumah is an 
Anglicised name or nickname. Ah Mat is one of three men with the same name who 
died during the cyclone (Appendix 1). All the men named in court were to perish two 
months after the trial, when the luggers Kate and Vision sank in Bathurst Bay.  
Many of the floating stations were registered in Sydney in the colony of NSW and 
the crew signed up under foreign-going articles.28 Few ships’ articles of the pearling 
fleets covering 1899 have been found, but the articles for the schooner Aladdin in 
the NSW State Archives provide an example and demonstrate how names can be 
misinterpreted.29 These articles for the Aladdin represent a contract between South 
Sea Islander crew members and the fleet’s representative Edwin Munro (Figure 3.3). 
Figure 3.3 Details from “Ship’s Articles of Agreement: Aladdin”, Shipping Master’s Office, NRS 13280, 
Articles of Agreement of Crews 1898, 4/9408, NSW State Archives. 
27 “Assaulting one George Masta with Intent”, Thursday Island Police Summons Book/Sheet, 25 
January 1899, PRV7022/1/2, QSA, ID6398. 
28 Departmental Commission on Pearl-shell and Beche-de-Mer Fisheries, “Report, Together with 
Minutes of Evidence and Proceedings, of the Commission Appointed to Inquire into the General 
Working of the Laws Regulating the Pearl-Shell and Beche-De-Mer Fisheries in the Colony”, 
Brisbane: Edmund Gregory, Government Printer, 1897.   
29 “Ship’s Articles of Agreement: Aladdin”, Shipping Master’s Office, NRS 13280, Articles of 
Agreement of Crews 1898, 4/9408, NSW State Archives. 
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Figure 3.4 Edwin Munro’s signature, witnessed four months after it was signed (from “Ship’s Articles 
of Agreement: Aladdin”, Shipping Master’s Office, NRS 13280, Articles of Agreement of Crews 1898, 
4/9408, NSW State Archives). 
 
The articles signed by Edwin Munro spell his name “Edward” in a handwriting that 
does not match Munro’s handwriting. This suggests that when he signed it on 14 
April 1898, he did not fill the rest of the form in. He also appears to have signed the 
contract four months before his signature was witnessed in Sydney by the Shipping 
Master, on 18 August 1898. The practice may have been for Munro to sign blank 
articles so crew could be recruited when he was not aboard, and there appears also 
to be a practice of retrospectively witnessing a signature (Figure 3.4). The 
agreement was made under the NSW Islanders Shipping Engagements Act and 
covered only the 12 seamen from the South Sea Islands who joined the Aladdin 
fleet between August 1898 and January 1899 on a three-year contract.30 Some of 
the crew joined the ship at Thursday Island and some in Sydney. Two, Jimmy 
Rotuma [sic], aged 19, and Timothy, aged 23, both from Rotumah, signed with a 
cross, and some of the signatures of the other crew are difficult to interpret (Figure 
3.5). None of these crew members appears to have died in the cyclone, the Aladdin 
having reported no casualties, but the articles demonstrate how difficult it can be to 
interpret names from signatures on ships’ articles.  
 
 
                                                
30 See Statues of NSW, Islanders' Shipping Engagements Act (1879 No 30a). 
https://www.legislation.nsw.gov.au/acts/1879-30a.pdf  
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Figure 3.5 Names written into “Ship’s Articles of Agreement: Aladdin”, Shipping Master’s Office, NRS 
13280, Articles of Agreement of Crews 1898, 4/9408, NSW State Archives. 
After cross-referencing names of the dead from the Marine Department and the 
Death Register, and adding reports of deaths from other credible sources, I have 
compiled a list of 298 individual deaths (Appendix 1), including deaths ashore. This 
composite list is an interpretation of the names and not necessarily the names the 
men were born with or were known by in their own communities. It also considers 
omissions and duplications. For example, William Powell, the captain of the lugger 
North Wales who drowned in the cyclone, has no Queensland death certificate. (The 
death of a William Joseph Powell was recorded on 6 March, but the details show a 
baby.) On the other hand, Marco Perez has two death certificates. “Marcus” Perez 
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was reported dead by William Hayne, the manager of the Crest of the Wave fleet.31 
The death of Marco Perez, the captain of that fleet’s schooner Admiral, was also 
reported by Perez’s wife, Maria.32 While other details on the death certificates differ, 
such as their ages, it is the same man from the same fleet and Perez’s wife can be 
considered the more credible source. (Maria Perez reported the details directly, 
while the fleet manager Hayne transcribed them from the ship’s articles.) This 
anomaly raises questions about whether there are other duplications and mistakes 
that cannot be so easily identified. For example, although Sugimoto is a common 
Japanese name, a diver named Sugimoto from the Silvery Wave fleet has a death 
certificate,33 but another diver from the Silvery Wave fleet, also named Sugimoto, is 
reported to have survived the cyclone.34 As already mentioned, the Marine 
Department recorded the name of Adriana from the lugger North Wales as 
drowning, but Adriana survived.35   
There is also evidence that other lists of names may exist overseas. Many of the 
young men who joined the fleets came from the same communities, and the large 
loss of life would have been felt keenly and remembered if or when details of the 
disaster reached their homes. John Lamb, a Canberra-based researcher of the 
Japanese in the Australian pearling industry, visited the town of Shionomisaki, in the 
prefecture of Wakayama, and was told that inside the Koshoji temple was a 
document listing eight men killed in a cyclone near Cooktown on 23 January 1899. 
As Lamb points out, the Lunar Japanese calendar was still being used even though 
Japan officially changed to the Gregorian calendar in 1871. In 1899, the Lunar New 
Year occurred on 10 February, and 23 days from that date was 5 March.36 Until the  
document can be found, or there is corroborating evidence that places these men at 
the scene, their names cannot be added to the list. There are, though, strong links 
between the town of Shionomisaki, the Wakayama prefecture, and the Thursday 
Island pearling shelling industry. Most of the more than 300 Japanese men who 
31 See Appendix 1.  
32 Ibid.  
33 Death certificate of Sugimoto, 5 March 1899, QBDM, Cooktown, 1899/1161. 
34 Anonymous 1899, 32.  
35 Bennett 1899, 23. 
36 John Lamb, Cape of Tides, Canberra: John Lamb, n. d., 11. Lamb cites T. Ogawa, Arafura-kai no 
shinju, 1976, 47–48. 
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travelled to Thursday Island in 1892 and 1893 were from Wakayama prefecture.37 
Historian David Sissons suggests three reasons for the influx: A village system of 
sponsoring the young men with fares for steamship passages, the Japanese 
Foreign Ministry allowing them to leave Japan to earn wages, and a consortium of 
10 Japanese on Thursday Island which won the 1890 Tattersall’s sweepstake in 
1890, when the racehorse Carbine won the Melbourne Cup. That consortium shared 
£22,500 prize money,38 and at least four from Wakayama returned to the province 
wealthy men, sparking a mass exodus of young men from Shionomisaki village, 
particularly, to Thursday Island.39  
There is evidence for other deaths associated with the cyclone that may not have 
been officially reported to the Marine Department or the Registrar of Deaths. Five 
unidentified bodies were found eight months after the cyclone on Bewick Island by 
the survey ship, HMS Dart. The bodies were found about five kilometres from where 
two New Caledonian vessels, La France and Caledonia, with two Frenchmen and a 
crew of “six aboriginals and one Bengalee” were last seen.40 The bodies found by 
the Dart were described in detail by Commander John Franklin Perry, in his report of 
November 1899, as being probably two Europeans, two Aboriginal men, and a 
Japanese man. (It cannot be assumed that the bodies were from the La France and 
Caledonia. Two men described as Aboriginal may have been the crew of the Rattler, 
which also sank nearby.) The men were buried on the island under a wooden cross 
on the western side of Bewick Island.41 On 9 March, four days after the cyclone, 
Captain Alfred Ernest King aboard the steamer Victory counted 13 bodies, “all 
Japanese”, floating between eight and 10 miles (16 kilometres) southeast of Bewick 
(Howick No. 6) Island.42 Some of these may have been the Filipino crew of the North 
37 David Sissons, “Japanese in the Pearling Industry”, Queensland Heritage, 3, No. 10, 1979, 12. 
38 Ibid., 13. See also “The Melbourne Cup”, Argus (Melbourne), 6 November 1890, 5. The syndicate 
leader was Nakagawa Tamiji, also known as Tommy Nakagawa and Tommy Japan.   
39 Sissons 1979, 13–15. See also Shuju Kyuhara and Yoshihoko Yabuuchi (trans.), “Remains of 
Japanese on Torres Strait Islands”, manuscript held by the Historical Society, Cairns, 1977. A 
boarding house on Thursday Island was named Shionomisaki. Kyuhara has recorded 28 men from 
the Wakayama prefecture who were married on Thursday Island. “All the Japanese were compelled 
to repatriate to Japan in 1946. The remainders were only a few who had been naturalised as 
Australian nationals and who had have [sic] native wives.” 
40 “The Late Hurricane. Return of the Warrego”, 6. 
41 “The Pearling Disaster. Discovery of five more bodies. Two white men”, Torres Straits Pilot, 25 
November 1899.  
42 “The Cyclonic Disaster”, Morning Post (Cairns), 22 March 1899, 3. 
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Wales, or the Japanese crews of the Ada and the Kotohira. These deaths have not 
been included in the list because it is unclear whether all or any of the bodies were 
from vessels that had already reported deaths.         
There is evidence that people died in the days after the cyclone. On 25 March 1899, 
the Torres Straits Pilot on Thursday Island reported that “one man, who had to be 
sent to the hospital suffering exposure, has since died.”43 There is also evidence 
that the cyclone took a severe psychological toll on survivors. On 3 April 1899, a 30-
year-old South Sea Islander seaman named as Tommy Attanino, who was in the 
Thursday Island hospital, jumped from the town jetty and drowned.44 H. G. Vidgen, 
the fleet manager on the schooner Olive, appears to have suffered post-traumatic 
stress.  
As a result of his trying experience Mr Vidgen had a temporary 
breakdown in health and in 1900 he retired to the Cape York mainland 
at a place called ‘Piara’ near Somerset.45  
Vidgen recovered, however, and in 1911 went to work for Clark and Munro’s 
Celebes Trading Company in the Dutch East Indies.46 Sugimoto, the only survivor of 
the schooner Silvery Wave, remained in hospital for at least two months.  
Sugimoto suffered considerably from his exposure; he was sent to the 
Hospital at Thursday Island, but two months later had not quite 
recovered from the trying ordeal through which he had passed.47  
The police summons books from Thursday Island, from April 1899 until the end of 
that year, reveal cases of pearling crew suspected of being of “unsound mind.”48 On 
5 April 1899, the Thursday Island Magistrate’s Court heard the case of three men 
who had survived the cyclone, but who later refused to go aboard a surviving lugger 
of the Silvery Wave fleet, Tarachio. The Magistrate and Government Resident John 
43 “The Hurricane”, Torres Straits Pilot, 25 March 1899, 2. 
44 “Telegraphic Items”, NQR, 24 April 1899. Death certificate of Tommy Attnino, 5 March 1899, 
QBDM, Cooktown, 1899/4316. 
45 W. J. Gallegly, “An Anniversary and a Biography (an Account of Herbert Grahame Vidgen)”, Bulletin of 
The Historical Society, Cairns, North Queensland, February 1959, 4. 
46 Grahame Jardine-Vidgen in an email to Ian Townsend, 12 February 2019.  
47 Anonymous 1899, 32 
48 Thursday Island Police Summons Book/Sheet, 1899, PRV7022/1/2, QSA, ID6398.  
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Douglas ordered the men aboard, and that the fleet owners should give them 
clothing.49 
 
Despite the difficulty in identifying individual victims, there is no evidence that the 
dead number significantly more than the 307 estimated in the Outridge booklet. This 
raises questions about how the official death toll today came to be widely reported 
as 400.  
 
The Aboriginal death toll 
 
As mentioned in Chapter One, the Disaster Resilience Knowledge Hub is a disaster 
database for the Australian Government that “informs policy, planning, decision 
making and contemporary good practice in disaster resilience.”50 Its entry for 
“Cyclone Mahina, 1899”, states that: “Over 100 Aboriginal people died trying to help 
the shipwrecked.”51 It quotes an article from National Geographic magazine that 
states: “It’s estimated more than 400 people perished when Cyclone Mahina hit 
Princess Charlotte Bay in March 1899,” a figure that includes 100 Aboriginal 
people.52 These figures are ubiquitous in media articles on the cyclone and are also 
quoted by other Government authorities such the Australian Bureau of Statistics.53 
The first mention of any local Aboriginal people ashore being killed in the cyclone 
was published on 15 March 1899, 10 days after the storm.  
 
Several aboriginals on shore perished in the storm. The harbour-master 
at Cooktown has distributed bags of flour among the aboriginals.54  
 
This is attributed to the Brisbane Courier's special correspondent, likely to have 
been the editor of the Cooktown Independent, James Fowler, who wired the report 
                                                
49 Ibid. The judgment is dated 4 April 1899. 
50 Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience, “Cyclone Mahina 1899”. 
51 Ibid.  
52 Ibid. See also Marina Kamenev, “Australia’s Worst Cyclones: Timeline”, Australian Geographic 
website, published online 2 February 2011, https://www.australiangeographic.com.au/topics/science-
environment/2011/02/australias-worst-cyclones-timeline/ (accessed 7 February 2019). The article 
states that there are stories suggesting “100 were local Aboriginal people.”  
53 Australian Bureau of Statistics, “150 Years of Queensland's Economic History: Key Dates, Facts 
and Figures”, published online 23 February 2009, http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/ 
Lookup/1318.3Feature%20Article14Feb%202009 (accessed 10 February 2019). 
54 “The Late Hurricane. Cruise of the Warrego. Further Particulars. Reports of the Pearling Captains. 
The Estimated Loss of Life”, Brisbane Courier, 15 March 1899, 5. 
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from Cooktown to Brisbane on Tuesday 14 March. On 2 April, the Northern 
Protector of Aboriginals, Walter Roth, visited the scene of the disaster to distribute 
more flour and clothing, and to make a report for the Government (see Figure 3.6). 
Roth was a medical doctor who studied at University College School, London, and 
Magdalen College, Oxford, and he later became an internationally respected 
anthropologist.55 In late 1898, Roth toured the Cape Melville region, and four weeks 
after the cyclone he returned to the area to distribute gifts to the Aboriginal people at 
Barrow Point, Bathurst Bay and Flinders Island; the people ashore most affected by 
the cyclone.  
 
 
Figure 3.6 Roth’s sketch map of his route to distribute gifts to Aboriginal people after the cyclone 
(from Walter Roth to Under Secretary Home Office, "Report Re Distribution of Gifts to Coastal 
Aboriginals”, 9 April 1899, HOM/A23/99/5252, QSA, ID847561, 11). 
 
On 3 April, he spoke to the Barrow Point people and reported: “There have been 
three deaths, attributable to the cyclone, among these Barrow Point blacks.”56 On 5 
April, Roth came ashore in Bathurst Bay and “found upwards of 120 men, women, 
and children, waiting my arrival. I explained to them fully the nature of my mission, & 
thanked them for what they had done” (which was to help bury dead bodies as they 
                                                
55 Barrie Reynolds, “Roth, Walter Edmund (1861–1933)”, Australian Dictionary of Biography, National 
Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/roth-walter-
edmund-8280/text14509 (accessed 26 February 2015). 
56 Ibid., 3.  
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were washed ashore). Roth reported no deaths amongst the Cape Melville people. 
On the western side of Bathurst Bay, at Bathurst Head, on 6 April, Roth met another 
group of Aboriginal people and stated: “There had been five deaths among this mob 
during the cyclone, 4 men and 1 woman having been crushed by falling timber.”57 
That evening, Roth met people on Flinders Island, including a man he identified as 
Marmaru, who did not report anyone on Flinders Island having been killed.58 Roth 
was accompanied on his trip by Constable John Martin Kenny, the Native Police 
officer who experienced the storm tide at the height of the cyclone, and several 
Native Police trackers, including a man named Euro, who came from the Normanby 
River inland from Cape Melville. Kenny and Euro between them spoke the 
languages of Bathurst Bay, Barrow Point and Flinders Island. As Protector of 
Aboriginals, Roth made inquiries specifically about Aboriginal deaths at sea.   
 
I could get no reliable evidence of any aboriginal remains having been 
washed ashore, a fact which was somewhat confirmed on enquiry as 
none of the Cape Melville Boys are missing. Mr James Clark has lost 
but one aboriginal that he knows of, a Cape York Native named ‘Dick 
Dead-Eye’, a very old and faithful servant of his.59 
 
The Outridge booklet, however, published in September 1899, stated:   
 
Some aboriginals from a camp near Cape Melville were assisting 
shipwrecked men out of the water. A change of wind or a sudden gust 
swept around the hills and blew the natives into the water. They struggled 
hard, but were unable to reach land again, and were driven out to sea and 
drowned.60 
 
P. P. Outridge, who can be identified as one of the authors of the Outridge booklet, 
had visited the scene several months after the cyclone, but it is unclear where this 
drowning could have occurred. Most of the vessels in Bathurst Bay did not sink until 
the early hours of Sunday morning. Before the eye started crossing the coast after 3 
a.m., the hurricane force wind in Bathurst Bay was blowing offshore and any crew 
members in the water before that time would likely be swept away from shore. The 
Aboriginal people on shore were sheltering in the hills well away from the beach. 
                                                
57 Ibid., 7.  
58 Ibid., 8. 
59 Ibid., 6. 
60 Anonymous 1899, 35. 
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After the eye passed, the wind blew directly onshore with hurricane force, making it 
unlikely that anyone on the beach at Bathurst Bay could be blown against the wind 
into the sea. Outridge fails to mention Roth’s report of eight Aboriginal people killed 
ashore, at least five by falling timber, but he may have heard about deaths ashore 
and speculated. The only previous reference is the Brisbane Courier’s report of 15 
March describing people ashore killed in an unspecified way. There is, however, one 
report of people drowning in the Wakooka Creek area. William Hamilton, captain of 
the schooner Canomie, which took Roth to the scene in April 1899, wrote in his 
journal: “The natives abreast of Noble Island and the Howicks report that they had to 
swim on to the high land several women and children being drowned about Barrow 
Point.”61 Hamilton did not venture inland with Roth, but repeated many of the 
observations of Roth, who did go ashore and speak to the local people.62 Roth 
attributed three deaths of the Barrow Point people to the cyclone without saying how 
the people died, so it is possible they were women and children who drowned during 
the storm tide. However, neither Kenny nor Roth specified any such drownings, and 
Hamilton’s second-hand report cannot be considered credible because he did not 
identify his source. The story in the Outridge booklet of a sudden gust of wind 
blowing people into the sea is also unsubstantiated, but was repeated in 1958 by 
meteorologist Herbert Whittingham, who used the booklet as his main source for 
reconstructing the path of the cyclone.63 However, neither Whittingham, nor anyone 
else at the time, had reported the number of Aboriginal people drowning as 100, and 
no reference to that figure appeared until the 1970s.  
It could reasonably be expected that such a significant part of the death toll would 
be mentioned by historians, authors, and journalists before 1971 if there was an 
earlier source.64 The president of the Royal Historical Society of Queensland, 
Norman Pixley, did not mention it when he delivered his presidential address about 
61 William Hamilton, “Account of Prospecting Voyages for Pearl Shell in New Guinea and the 
Solomons 1899–1901”, 4, John Oxley Library, OM71-4, State Library of Queensland (hereafter SLQ). 
62 Ibid. Hamilton described “mullet and rock cod” dead in “depressions” using similar words to Roth’s 
description of “putrid mullet and rock-cod”, but there is no evidence that Hamilton spoke to people 
ashore. 
63 H. E. Whittingham, “The Bathurst Bay Hurricane and Associated Storm Surge”, Australian 
Meteorological Magazine, 23, 1958, 4–36. 
64 It could be speculated that there were other deaths ashore, but the methodology used in this thesis 
cannot be applied without evidence.   
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the pearling disaster at the society’s annual meeting on 23 September 1971.65 
However, after 1971, reports that 100 or “about 100” Aboriginal people were swept 
out to sea either by a tidal wave or wind change began to appear in articles and 
books, including John Singe’s 1979 book, The Torres Strait: People and History,66 
and Evan McHugh’s 2003 non-fiction book, Shipwrecks.67 The first reference to 100 
Aboriginal people drowning appears in Hector Holthouse’s popular narrative non-
fiction book Cyclone, first published in 1971.  
 
A final count of those who lost their lives was 307: twelve white men and 
295 Asiatics and Islanders. This did not take into account about 100 
Aborigines swept out to sea and others killed in the forest country.68    
 
In his book, Holthouse links this event to the storm tide observed by Kenny, writing 
that “the back surge from the wave which caught Constable Kenny” swept the 100 
Aboriginal people away. Holthouse appears to have repeated sections of the 
Outridge booklet without acknowledging it and adding dramatic details for which 
there is no evidence. The first iteration of 100 Aboriginal people being swept out to 
sea and drowning appears in the corrections to the first draft of Holthouse’s 
manuscript, held at the John Oxley Library.69 The words “a considerable number of” 
are crossed out and replaced with “about 100” (Figure 3.8). The basis for the 
historical record today is this edit of a draft of Holthouse’s Cyclone manuscript. 
 
Figure 3.7 Hotlhouse’s draft manuscript showing the edit that changed “a considerable number of” 
Aborigines to “about 100.” 
                                                
65 Norman S. Pixley, “Presidential Address: Pearlers of North Australia: The Romantic Story of the Diving 
Fleets”, Journal of the Royal Historical Society of Queensland, 9, No. 3, 1972, 9–29. 
66 John Singe, The Torres Strait. People and History, St Lucia: UQP, 1979, 165. 
67 Evan McHugh, Shipwrecks: Australia's Greatest Maritime Disasters, Camberwell, Victoria: Viking, 
2003, 226. 
68 Hector Holthouse, Cyclone, Adelaide: Rigby, 1971, 13. 
69 Hector Holthouse, Cyclone manuscript draft, 34, in “Hector Holthouse scrapbooks, manuscripts and 
cuttings”, John Oxley Library, M797, SLQ.  
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Holthouse wrote 30 books, most of them non-fiction dealing with Queensland 
history.70 His first popular history book, River of Gold, written in 1967, is studded with 
dramatic interpretations of historical events. In the Author’s Note at the beginning of 
the book, Holthouse writes:  
Quotations from the letters, reports, and reminiscences of miners, 
carriers, Government officials, and others have been edited slightly to 
remove redundant material and make reading easier, and in places 
dialogue, based on the descriptive material, has been added, but in no 
instance has the original meaning been changed.71  
Holthouse never identified what editing was done or what material was added, so 
there is no way to judge his claim that the editing of historical documents did not 
change their meaning. Holthouse qualifies his 1976 non-fiction book, Ships in the 
Coral, in a similar way in the Author’s Note.72 There is no such qualification in his 
1971 book Cyclone. However, as mentioned, the figure of 100 Aboriginal people 
swept or blown into the sea and drowned now appears in official government 
websites and scientific literature as data. Emergency services rely on historical data 
to prepare for future disasters. A death toll from any storm tide on the Queensland 
coast is a significant piece of evidence.73 Holthouse invented the 100 Aboriginal 
dead, but the figure found its way into a Government database and, in 2012, a 
researcher at the Australian Maritime College used it as an example of the sort of 
data that could be fed into mathematical models to predict “storm surge risk under 
current and future climate conditions.” The article describes how the 100 people may 
have been swept into the sea.  
Many of these aborigines were drowned because Mahina blew in from 
the east and skimmed along the northward facing beaches of Princess 
Charlotte Bay. … The population of synthetic cyclones can help model 
70 Geoffrey Ginn, “Holthouse, Hector Le Gay (1915–1991)”, Australian Dictionary of Biography, 
National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/ 
holthouse-hector-le-gay-15850/text27049, published online 2014, (accessed 17 January 2019).  
71 Hector Holthouse, River of Gold: The Story of the Palmer River Gold Rush, Sydney: Angus and  
Robertson, 1967.  
72 Hector Holthouse, Ships in the Coral, Melbourne: Macmillan, 1976. 
73 Lucinda Coates, “An Overview of Fatalities from Some Natural Hazards in Australia”, Conference 
on Natural Disaster Reduction 1996: Surfers Paradise, Qld, Barton, ACT: Institution of Engineers, 
Australia, 1996, 49–54; Withers 1997, 39–41; Robyn Riddett, “Risk Preparedness and Cultural 
Heritage”, Historic Environment, 16, No. 1, 2002, 6–11.  
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unexpected situations like this. No one could have thought Cyclone 
Mahina would have the outcome that it did.74    
 
The Flinders Islands, Bathurst Bay, and Barrow Point people, and the Guugu-
Yimidhirr-speaking people south-east of Princess Charlotte Bay, are the traditional 
owners of the region. These groups spoke different languages and had different 
names for each other. Walter Roth identified the language used by the people living 
between Barrow Point and Cape Melville as Koko-nego-di (today described as 
Guugu-Nyiguudyi).75 As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Guugu-Yimidhirr call 
the people from Flinders Islands, Cape Melville, and Barrow Point the Bama 
Yiidhuwarra.76 Yiidhuwarra elder Daniel Gordon, a traditional owner of Flinders 
Island and a manager and ranger of the Cape Melville National Park that covers 
these areas, is the adopted son of Bob Flinders, who passed the story of the 1899 
cyclone down to him. Daniel Gordon said some of the Flinders Island people were 
visiting Cape Melville at the time of the cyclone. They knew a cyclone was coming 
and all the people went into the Cape Melville Range to shelter.   
 
DANIEL GORDON: … the people from around Cape Melville area, 
Bathurst Bay, they were taking notice of the tides and they knew there 
was something wrong with the weather because the tide was unusual ... 
So they you know, they went through all this during the past, so they 
moved it into a higher ground. There’s a shelter at Cape Melville where 
they all moved to.  
IAN TOWNSEND: Is it like a cave or a …? 
DANIEL GORDON: Like cave, yeah.77 
 
After the cyclone, the people helped find and bury the dead pearlers.  
 
DANIEL GORDON: Ah, mostly Islanders and a few, I think, Aboriginals 
were on board, too. Most of them I think Islanders as well.  
IAN TOWNSEND: There was a story I heard that’s been told over the 
years about a group of 100 local people who were swept out to sea. Did 
Bob mention anything about that?  
                                                
74 “Tropical Cyclone Wave Modelling”, Shore to Sea, Australian Maritime College, University of 
Tasmania, 1, July 2012, 37. 
75 Walter Roth, “North Queensland Ethnography, Bulletin No. 18”, Records of the Australian Museum, 
8, No. 1, 15 November 1910, 83.  
76 Peter Sutton, “The Flinders Islands and Cape Melville people in history”, in Jean-Christophe 
Verstraete and Diane Hafner (eds), Land and Language in Cape York Peninsula and the Gulf 
Country, Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2016, 96. 
77 Daniel Gordon in an interview with Ian Townsend, 2 March 2015.  
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DANIEL GORDON: No, it was only the people who were working on the 
luggers.78   
 
Popular histories, such as Holthouse’s books, tend to be narrative non-fiction, 
conforming to a type of story-telling that follows the conventions of a novel, and 
which often include references to contemporary social narratives, strong central 
characters, conflict, dialogue, and dramatic tension. As an author of non-fiction 
books set in Queensland, Holthouse was following in the footsteps of Australian 
authors Ion Idriess, Glenville Pike79 and Frank Reid,80 but might have been 
influenced in the 1960s by contemporary American writers of narrative non-fiction 
such as Norman Mailer, Truman Capote, Tom Wolfe and Hunter S. Thompson.81 
As American author William Wiegand points out, “non-fiction implies a 
willingness to be held responsible for the data included as literally factual. The 
story actually happened.”82 Narrative non-fiction, though, or what Truman Capote 
described in the 1960s as the “non-fiction novel,”83 produces a tension between 
the need to tell a good story and an obligation to reflect the best evidence. Faced 
with contradictory evidence, for example, does the writer choose the best 
evidence or evidence that better supports the constructs of a novel? Narrative 
non-fiction, the “non-fiction novel,” can have a powerful influence on social 
memory because, by seeking to be popular it is more likely to be read by more 
people than non-fiction that does not emulate a novel. As historian Paula 
Hamilton explains, “popular representations of the past have the potential to 
shape social memory, provide a mirror for it” and she notes that people more 
easily remember historical representations in popular culture.84 
 
                                                
78 ibid. 
79 Julian Croft, “Idriess, Ion Llewellyn (1889–1979)”, Australian Dictionary of Biography, National 
Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/idriess-ion-
llewellyn-6786/text11739, (accessed 25 April 2015); Glenville Pike, My Yesterdays: Life of Glenville 
Pike in North Queensland and the Northern Territory, Rockhampton: CQUP, 2007. 
80 Hugh Anderson, “Vennard, Alexander Vindex (1884–1947)”, Australian Dictionary of Biography, 
National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/ 
vennard-alexander-vindex-8912/text15657, (accessed 3 February 2019). 
81 Lee Gutkind, “Creative Nonfiction”, Writer, 117, No. 5, May 2004, 14–15. 
82 William Wiegand, “The Non-fiction Novel”, New Mexico Quarterly, 37, No. 3, 1967, 243.  
83 George Plimpton, “The Story Behind a Nonfiction Novel”, New York Times, 16 January 1966, 38–
43.  
84 Hamilton 1994, 18–20. 
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Holthouse, and other writers of narrative non-fiction since, sometimes warn the 
reader about their use of speculation as well as the uncertainty of historical 
evidence, while still suggesting what they have written is factual.85 There is no 
convention for the use of historical evidence by writers of narrative non-fiction. 
How consistently a writer uses the best evidence, or relies on secondary sources 
rather than original research, varies from writer to writer. As Wiegand points out, 
any event “is nearly always altered and re-imagined when the suggesting and 
extending power of the novelist is sought for. Few writers with this object want to 
stick to all the facts.”86  
 
Historian Arthur Marwick warns historians to be “profoundly conscious that they 
should not be trying to emulate novelists or poets. Duties, of course, pertain to 
the historian, not history.”87 Historians have a duty to history as scientists have a 
duty to science, but they can generally distinguish literature (including the non-
fiction novel, which has a duty to literary forms and story-telling) from the 
scholarly non-fiction works of a professional historian or scientist. When using 
data for research, historians and scientists have a duty to interrogate the 
sources. Holthouse was not an historian, but a writer of popular history emulating 
the novelist. Although Holthouse may have misled the reader into believing the 
book was factual,88 the obligation was not on Holthouse to write history, but on 
the reader, particularly if the reader is a scientist or historian, to distinguish the 
difference between history and historical literature before using the data.  
 
Holthouse’s popular book became the source for a number of myths in the 
cultural memory of the 1899 disaster, including that 100 Aboriginal people were 
                                                
85 For example, John Bailey, The White Divers of Broome: The True Story of a Fatal Experiment, 
Sydney: Pan Macmillan, 2001, xiii. The introduction begins with a quote from Voltaire, “All … history, 
as one of our wits remarked, is no more than accepted fiction.” Bailey then states, “… this story is 
true. I have created some scenes … but they are based on research and primary sources.” Ian 
Townsend, Line of Fire, Pymble, NSW: Fourth Estate (HarperCollins), 2017. “This book is an attempt 
to collect the best evidence, hoping to approach the truth.” Robert Drewe, The Shark Net. Ringwood, 
Victoria: Penguin, 2003. “Memory may falter and portraiture is a highly subjective endeavor, but I 
have tried to tell a truthful story.” 
86 Wiegand 1967, 245. 
87 Arthur Marwick, The New Nature of History: Knowledge, Evidence, Language, Basingstoke, UK: 
Palgrave, 2001, 81. 
88 Holthouse 1971. In his Acknowledgements, Holthouse writes: “Descriptive material comes from 
contemporary newspapers and eye-witnesses,” but he does not list his sources. 
126 
washed out to sea and drowned by a storm tide that was “48 feet” (14.6 metres) 
high.89 It was also instrumental in spreading another myth associated with the 
disaster; that an Erub (Darnley) Island woman on her honeymoon aboard the 
schooner Silvery Wave, rescued two white men and received a Royal Humane 
Society Gold Medal.90   
Moira Newi and the Pitt family of the Torres Strait 
There are few narratives told by non-Europeans associated with the 1899 pearling 
disaster, although the Outridge booklet describes several European stories relating 
the Torres Strait Islander experience. However, after applying the methodology to 
these reports, these stories can be shown to refer to an event involving the family of 
Douglas Pitt Snr, who at the time lived on Darnley Island in the Torres Strait.    
Douglas Pitt Snr was born on 31 January 1844 in Jamaica.91 He worked his way to 
Sydney in 1865,92 and in New Caledonia in 1869 married Sopa Wacando. Their 
children were Mary Ann Frances born 1869 in Noumea, William born 1871 on Mer 
Island, Edward born 1872 on Murray Island, Douglas Jnr born 1877 on Murray 
Island, Felicia born 1885 on Halfway Island, and Louisa born 1890 on Darnley 
Island. Douglas Pitt Snr is also said to have had a relationship with Sue (Wazan) 
from Murray Island, and their children were Robert Pitt born about 1879 and Annie 
(Wazan) born on Murray Island 1881.93 William, Edward, Douglas Jnr, several 
relatives by marriage, some of their children, as well as Douglas Pitt Snr, were on 
boats near Cape Melville when the cyclone struck in 1899.  
Douglas Pitt Snr had arrived in the Torres Strait in 1871 and settled on Murray 
Island, before being moved by the Queensland Government to Halfway Island and 
then Darnley Island after 1885.94 The Outridge booklet in 1899 describes Douglas 
89 Ibid., 7.  
90 Ibid., 12. 
91 George Pitt in an email to Ian Townsend, 16 August 2018.  
92 Ancestry.com, “A List of Crew and Passengers Arriving in the ship Strathdon”, New South Wales, 
Australia, Unassisted Immigrant Passenger Lists, 20 January 1865. “Douglass [sic] Pitt, cuddy 
servant, 21, Jamaica.”  
93 George Pitt 2018.  
94 Stephen Mullins, Torres Strait: A History of Colonial Occupation and Culture Contact 1864–1897, 
Rockhampton: CQUP, 1994, 73–74. See also Anna Shnukal, “The Expulsion of Pacific Islanders from 
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Pitt Jnr, “with a Murray Island native and their wives”, swimming “11 to 12 miles” 
from Ingram (Howick No. 8) Island south of Cape Melville to shore, being 
“remarkable that the two native women were able to swim with the men, but no 
doubt the latter assisted their wives.”95 Later, Outridge repeats a report originally 
published in the Brisbane Courier,96 in which Porter, captain of the Crest of the 
Wave, describes “young Douglas Pitt, having been wrecked in the Howicks, had 
swum ashore with two native women, then swimming to Noble Island, and thence to 
the mainland, a marvelous performance, a distance of 10 miles.”97 The Outridge 
booklet also described a separate report, in which five Murray Islanders swam “from 
outside Flinders Island towards Cape Melville, a distance of 12 miles.”98 Outridge 
also elaborated on an earlier newspaper account,99 describing two children 
drowning while being rescued by their mothers:  
 
… two women, also of the Torres Strait Islands, who, with their 
husbands, were thrown into the water, when their small swimming 
boat sank and left them struggling for their lives. Each woman had a 
child on her back hanging on to her hair, and all through the night the 
devoted mothers were swimming trying to reach land. In the morning 
they reached Flinders Island, but alas the children had died from 
exposure during the night, and the mothers landed with the dead 
bodies.100 
 
Not mentioned in the Outridge booklet is the story of Moira Newi, who received a 
specially-struck Queensland Government medal for “meritorious and heroic 
conduct.” Her experience was described by Thursday Island Government Resident 
John Douglas:  
 
Mohara, a girl of eighteen and unmarried, being in the company of two 
other women, her married relatives, and happening to be in a boat which 
foundered at sea at Noble Island to the south of Cape Melville, they all 
had to swim for their lives in a raging sea. Being expert swimmers they 
were able at last to reach the shore, after battling with the storm for 
many hours. Two of them — both married women — would certainly 
                                                
Mer (Murray Island): Contemporary and Modern Interpretations”, Oral History Association of Australia 
Journal, 18, 1996, 79–83. 
95 Anonymous 1899, 34.  
96 “The Late Hurricane. Return of the Warrego”, 6. 
97 Anonymous 1899, 40. 
98 Ibid., 35. 
99 “The Late Hurricane. Cruise of the Warrego”, 5. 
100 Anonymous 1899, 34. 
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have failed to do so, had it not been for the sustained assistance 
afforded them by Mohara.101 
 
Mohara, Moara, Moura, and Muara are all ways of representing the pronunciation of 
Moira [mwara].102 Moira was born in 1884 on Erub (Darnley) Island,103 the daughter 
of Harry Newi (also Niue) from Niue or Savage Island in the South Pacific, and his 
wife, Kakai. At the time of the 1899 cyclone, Moira was 15 or 16 years old and 
aboard Douglas Pitt Jnr’s cutter, Rattler. Douglas Pitt Snr and his sons Douglas Jnr, 
Edward and William had brought seven boats south to the Cape Melville area to fish 
for pearl shell.104 Other relatives of the Pitt family by marriage, including Charlie Lifu 
on the Loafer and Pedro Guivarra, originally from the Philippines, on the cutter 
Francis, were also on boats in the area. Anchored off Ingram (Howick No. 8) Island 
near the Rattler was the Pitt family cutter, Daggie.105 The Daggie was to survive the 
cyclone, but the Rattler sank with 11 people aboard: Douglas Pitt Jnr, his wife Mary 
(known as Wassie), Mary’s sisters Moira and Louisa Newi, their relative Geba (or 
Gebbie) from Masig (Yorke) Island,106 Pitt’s adopted son,107 and his nephew William 
(Allam) Savage. The crew included Billy Cedar from Erub (Darnley) Island,108 South 
Sea Islander Jimmy Ninn,109 a Flinders Island man named Collin, and a Murray 
(Mer) Islander named Ikwam.110  
 
There are several credible reports of what happened when the Rattler sank. All have 
been tested with the methodology. The witnesses are identified as are the 
                                                
101 John Douglas, Government Resident Thursday Island, to Under Secretary, Home Office, “Bringing 
under Notice the Brave Conduct of a Girl at Darnley Island Named Mohara”, 7 August 1899, 
HOM/A26, QSA, ID847564. 
102 Anna Shnukal in a letter to Ian Townsend, 17 May 2006.  
103 Ibid. Dr Shnukal writes: “Moara or Moura or Muara or Mohara are all ways of representing the 
Torres Strait Islander pronunciation of Moira [mwara].” Before being married, Moira’s surname was 
Newi or Niue, and after she was married she was known by her married surname Lifu or Wacando, 
having married William Wacando, originally from the island of Lifu. Names are often spelt in different 
ways in different documents, contributing to the difficulty identifying individuals. Where possible in this 
thesis, the more common or acknowledged spelling is used.  
104 Frank Illidge, “The Log of the Lally”, Northern Herald (Cairns), 5 December 1923, 30.  
105 “The Late Hurricane. Return of the Warrego”, 6. The boat is named Dackle in this article, but, as 
described in Chapter Two, this is an error of translation. 
106 Illidge, “The Log of the Lally”, 30. 
107 Douglas Pitt Jnr is said to have adopted the son of his brother, Edward.  
108 Illidge, “The Log of the Lally”, 30. 
109 Ibid.  
110 A. C. Haddon (ed.), Reports of the Cambridge Anthropological Expedition to Torres Strait, 
Cambridge: University Press, 1, 1935, 112; Almond, “Report on the Marine Department for the Year 
1898–1899”, lists the name as Equam.  
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interviewers and although years had passed between the event and the interviews, 
the witnesses were at the scene and the interviewers can be identified and are 
considered credible sources with no motive to lie. Their reports can be shown to 
substantially corroborate each other, although details do vary.  
 
The Rattler and the Daggie were anchored close to each other on the evening of 4 
March. When the wind increased to hurricane force before midnight, the Rattler’s 
anchor began to drag, pushing the cutter towards Bewick (Howick No. 6) Island, 
about five kilometres away.111 In the early hours of 5 March, the anchor caught on 
the bottom and the force of the wind pushed the Rattler under the waves. The boat 
sank quickly, as Edward Pitt described to Police Magistrate Frank Illidge in an 
interview in 1923.  
 
Douglas' wife handed the baby boy, four year old, to Douglas, and when 
the boat went down they swam. The crew were forward and 
disappeared. Douglas and the woman swam. and when one got tired 
the other helped them. Douglas tied the child to his back.112  
  
The four crewmen forward vanished and were later reported to have drowned. The 
survivors appear to have been separated into two groups. In 1927, Ion Idriess, 
writing as Gouger in the Bulletin, published an interview with Moira Newi (then 
known as Moira Lifu, after having married). The interview may have taken place on 
Masig (Yorke) Island in the early 1920s:113 
 
As Moira describes it: "The ship he go down an' th' wind tear our 
dresses off. But little dress underneath he cling close alla time 'cause 
the big waves wash him verra tight. My sister she no swim. She heavy 
woman; me on'y girl. She holdem hands on my shoulders, an' I swim an' 
swim an' swim. Seo an' Geba swim one side an' 'nother, an' try be 
strong an' brave. An' time pass verra hard, an' we fight, an' fight, an' 
fight.114 
 
                                                
111 Illidge, “The Log of the Lally”, 30. 
112 Ibid.  
113 Idriess “The White Man's Prestige”, 8.  
114 Gouger (Idriess), “Aboriginalities. Made in Australia”, 27. In a letter assessing the article, Shnukal 
said: “Moira would have spoken roughly like the Bulletin article” as a first-language speaker of Pacific 
Pidgin English. Ion idriess can also be placed on Masig (Yorke) Island and in the Torres Strait during 
that period.  
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It is not clear from Idriess’s account if Seo and Moira’s sister, Louisa, are the same 
person. Moira, Louisa/Seo and Geba swam in a group separated from Douglas Jnr, 
Mary, William Savage and the baby. In 1908, the former Southern Protector of 
Aboriginals, Archibald Meston, writing as “Wanderer” in the Cairns Morning Post,115 
interviewed Douglas Jnr after the family was moved from Darnley Island to the 
Yarrabah Mission near Cairns.  
 
Their boat foundered in the storm and Pitt, his wife and baby were left 
struggling in that whirl of wild waters. They bravely stuck to the little one, 
taking it in turns to carry it, and swam on for hours, till at last the child 
died of exposure, and they had to leave the body to the pitiless sea.116 
  
Both parties swam for shore, about 19 kilometres (12 miles) from where the Rattler 
sank. Idriess writes that Moira, Louisa/Seo and Geba arrived ashore south of Barrow 
Point on Sunday evening.   
 
An' sun he go down, an' wind blow us near the shore, an' sound he tell 
me waves he break on rocks, an' rocks he all sharp with oyster shell. An' 
I wait till one big wave roll an' break on rocks, an' then I push my sister 
an' scream, 'Swim! Swim!' An' she climb up in slack water jus' before 
nex' wave break. Then I push Geba an' she climb up. Then I push Seo 
an' she climb up. Then I wait, an' nex' slack water climb up myself, but 
never think I do it. I so near go down. An' all night we lie on rocks 'cause 
we so weak we no can move.117  
 
Douglas Jnr, Mary, and William Savage, appear to have come ashore on Monday 
and met Moira, Louisa and Geba.118 At some point they were joined by Adriana, the 
sole survivor of the lugger North Wales who had been washed “up onto the bushes” 
on Sunday “about half way between Bowen and Barrow points.”119 Adriana later 
described to William Hamilton walking for three days with the party of “4 women and 
                                                
115 Meston can be shown to be “Wanderer” through his other columns, which described in detail his 
ascent of Mount Bellenden Ker, his age, and his close links to Atherton identities. Meston wrote 
columns for other newspapers under various names in a similar style.   
116 Wanderer (Archibald Meston), “A Terrible Experience”, Cairns Morning Post, 30 March 1908, 3. 
117 Gouger (Idriess), “Aboriginalities. Made in Australia”, 27. 
118 Illidge, “The Log of the Lally”, 30. 
119 Hamilton “Account of Prospecting Voyages for Pearl Shell”, 1899, 2–4. Hamilton said Adriana 
came ashore Sunday evening. The North Wales went down much closer to the coast than the Rattler 
and when Moira came ashore Sunday evening in the same area she was afraid of being cut by 
oysters. For Adriana to be washed “up on the bushes” and “high up on the land”, it is more likely he 
came ashore with the storm tide in the dark on Sunday morning. 
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x [sic] men he met who were washed on shore from a cutter out at the reefs.”120 
After reaching Cape Melville, they appear to have been ferried by Porter to Flinders 
Island, where the surviving boats had anchored and tents had been erected ashore 
for shipwreck survivors.121 It was here that the family had the opportunity to tell their 
stories, before they were taken to Thursday Island. Those stories told on Flinders 
Island and to Porter appear to be the basis of what became different stories 
repeated in the Outridge booklet.  
 
Descendants of the Pitt family who have been contacted are aware of the stories, 
but generally not the details. This follows a pattern similar to the descendants of 
other survivors and victims of the disaster (see Chapter Four). One member of the 
extended Pitt family in 1899, Pedro Guivarra, originally from Masbate in the 
Philippines and the husband of Annie (Wazan) Pitt, drowned when his cutter Francis 
sank during the cyclone. He left a wife and three children behind. His grandson 
Frank (Francisco) Guivarra described his knowledge of the event as being “fairly 
limited … My father never talked about the effect of his father’s death on the 
family.”122 The role of trauma on memories of the cyclone will be discussed in the 
following chapter.  
 
The making of a myth 
 
The families who experienced the cyclone, particularly those who lost relatives, did 
not at the time have any control over what was reported in newspapers about their 
experiences. Generally, their stories were told by Europeans, and the Pitt family’s 
experience evolved into reports of three distinct events: A 10 to 12 hour swim by a 
group of Torres Strait Islanders to reach shore, two women who swam with dead 
children on their backs, and Moira Newi’s rescue of two white men from the sinking 
schooner Silvery Wave. All appear to be based on elements of the Pitt family’s 
experience, although it is likely other women on other boats had similar experiences. 
Two children from Murray (Mer) Island are listed as dead as a result of the disaster: 
                                                
120 Ibid. The manuscript has “4” and “x” added later with a question mark in the margin, but the 
numbers appear to represent Moira, Geba, Louisa and Mary, Douglas Pitt Jnr and William.  
121 “The Late Hurricane. Return of the Warrego”, 6. 
122 Frank Guivarra in a letter to Ian Townsend, 3 August 2018.  
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Felece, a two-year-old girl, and Pairo, a boy aged seven months.123 Women were 
commonly used as divers on the fishing boats of Torres Strait Islanders because 
they were considered “better divers than the men” and “the best members of the 
crew” and it is not surprising that women would also have their children on boats in 
the area.124 
 
The first report, on 15 March, that two “coloured women swam for ten hours with 
children on their backs, but the children were dead when landed,” had been sent by 
telegraph to the Brisbane Courier from its “Special Correspondent” in Cooktown, 
most likely the journalist James Fowler, who was on the steamer Warrego which 
anchored at Flinders Island on 11 March.125 On 12 March, about 30 survivors were 
sent on three luggers back to Thursday Island and the Pitt family was likely amongst 
them.126 The story did not appear again until the Outridge booklet was published in 
September 1899, describing two Torres Strait women thrown into the water with 
their husbands, each with a child on her back “hanging onto her hair, and all through 
the night, the devoted mothers were swimming trying to reach land. In the morning 
they reached Flinders Island, but alas, the children had died from exposure during 
the night.”127 When Holthouse repeated the story in 1971, he linked the Outridge 
version back to the Pitt family, with the two women “carrying her young child on her 
back clinging to her hair. When they reached land, both children were dead. They 
had died of exposure during the night.”128  
 
One of the persistent myths of the 1899 pearling disaster was the rescue of two 
white men by Moira Newi. In 1971, Holthouse wrote that “Muara” at the time had 
been married to Sammy Lifu and was on her honeymoon when she was washed 
off the schooner Silvery Wave in the dark. She “struck out for the shore more 
than two miles away.” 
 
                                                
123 Haddon 1935, 112.  
124 Ibid. 
125 “The Late Hurricane. Cruise of the Warrego”, 5. 
126 “The Late Hurricane. Further Particulars. Return of the Steamer Warrego. Loss of Life Estimated at 
400”, Brisbane Courier, 14 March 1899, 5. 
127 Anonymous 1899, 34. 
128 Holthouse 1971, 13.  
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In the darkness, almost worn out herself by battling the huge seas, 
she encountered two injured white men clinging to each other and 
about the sink from exhaustion. In spite of her own weakness, she 
grabbed them both and, with their inert bodies partly supported on 
her shoulders and back, struggled on against the sea.129  
Brisbane playwright Charles Porter had earlier, in the 1930s or 1940s, 
dramatised Moira’s experience, naming two white men she rescued as Johnny 
Adams and Paul Merrit:  
NARRATOR: So began one of the most remarkable rescue feats 
ever performed. Supporting the two white men, Maura Lifu swam 
doggedly through the mountainous sea, heading for shore two 
miles away as time stood still. 
EFX: Sound of wind and seas etc 
MERRIT: Can’t last — longer … done. 
MAURA: No, you alright! 
ADAMS: Never make it … shore too far away ... 
MAURA: Maura can do!130 
The end of the radio play states: “The script was prepared by Charles Porter from 
the eye witness accounts in the files of the Historical Society of Queensland, 
incorporated.” The suggestion is that it is based on evidence, but Johnny Adams and 
Paul Merrit did not exist. Charles Porter, a Brisbane playwright born in London in 
1910, produced radio plays in the 1930s and 1940s, sometimes one a week, telling 
one journalist, "The radio drama can provide emotional and intellectual excursions 
beyond factual realms ..."131 The popularity of radio plays at the time meant many 
people heard this account and it became part of a social memory that was repeated 
by Holthouse in 1971. Holthouse was writing after the 1967 referendum in which 
Indigenous Australians won the right to be counted in the national census, and in 
1971 Indigenous rights and histories were topics of national discourse. The myth of 
Moira’s rescue of two white men falls into the racial construct of the “noble savage”, 
129 Ibid., 9.  
130 Charles Porter, “The Pearling Fleet Disaster 1899”, Brisbane: Australian Broadcasting 
Commission, n. d., BP257/1, 69/12, NAA. 
131 “Radio Drama”, Daily Examiner (Grafton), 30 August 1938, 8.  
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which romanticised Indigenous peoples and their coexistence with nature as well as 
their physical prowess.132   
The memories of the Aboriginal people ashore 
The largest community affected by the 1899 cyclone was the combined Aboriginal 
peoples living along the coast near Cape Melville and in the hinterland of Princess 
Charlotte Bay. As mentioned, Roth reported the population of this region to be 
greater than 1,000. While the cyclone and its impact are remembered amongst 
Traditional Owners, few detailed memories remain, despite the large number of 
people ashore experiencing it.  
On a field trip to Bathurst Bay, Cape Melville, and Wakooka Creek in September 
2018, I travelled with Traditional Owner and Cape Melville National Park ranger 
Daniel Gordon. As previously described, Daniel Gordon is a Yiidhuwarra elder and 
the adopted son of Bob Flinders, whose country includes Flinders Island. Daniel 
Gordon has collected the stories, not just of Flinders Island, but from many of the 
people in the Cape Melville region, and he has taken on the responsibility of 
passing those stories on to younger people.  
When the [1899] cyclone came in they were watching the tides 
because it wasn’t a normal tide, it would come in a lot earlier and went 
back and came back in again and just kept on to and fro, and they 
knew what was happening, there was going to be a cyclone coming 
up, so they moved back into the caves, you know. Right back into the 
hillsides.133  
However, Daniel Gordon says many memories from that period have been lost 
because the country since 1899 has been “cleaned out.” Elders such as Bob 
Flinders and Roger Hart, born in the early part of the 20th century, who made 
efforts to recover memories and pass them on to others such as Daniel Gordon, 
had themselves as young children been “taken away from their homeland, taken 
132 See Hayden White, Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1978, 183. White writes: “Few of the topoi of eighteenth century thought have been 
more thoroughly studied.” 
133 Daniel Gordon interviewed by Ian Townsend at Cape Melville, 25 September 2018.  
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away for years.” Later the old people who remained “were all taken away. This 
place was all cleaned out.”134 
The Barrow Point people, particularly, suffered a catastrophic population decline 
after contact with the fishing industry, reprisals for attacks on fishing stations and 
boats in the 1880s and 1890s, and the introduction of disease. The 1899 campsite of 
Constable Kenny, near the mouth of Wakooka Creek, shows signs of earlier 
habitation (Figure 3.8), with stone tools observed amongst shells scattered across a 
300 metre length of flat ridge-top. A Traditional Owner of Barrow Point, Conrad 
Michael, described to Suzanne Falkiner a massacre by the Native Police at an 
Aboriginal camp at the mouth of Wakooka Creek, following attacks on fishing 
stations at Lizard and Barrow islands in 1881. He also described stockmen finding, 
“these heaps of bones at Wakooka — the people, they knew they were there. That 
was my father’s tribe.”135 John Haviland and Roger Hart described a story in which, 
“survivors of a police rampage on a salt pan inland from mouth of Wakooka Creek 
came upon one of the native troopers abusing a local woman and killed him on the 
spot.”136  
Figure 3.8 Stone and shells at the campsite near the mouth of Wakooka Creek, on a ridge nine to 
13 metres above sea level (photograph Ian Townsend).  
134 Ibid.  
135 Suzanne Falkiner and Alan Oldfield, Lizard Island: The Journey of Mary Watson, Sydney: Allen 
and Unwin, 2000, 118–120.  
136 John Haviland and Roger Hart, Old Man Fog and the Last Aborigines of Barrow Point, Bathurst: 
Crawford House Press, 1999, 36.  
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In the 1908 Royal Commission into the workings of the pearl shelling industry, 
Protector of Aboriginals and former pearl shell diver John Henry Schluter 
described a “rapid” decline in the Aboriginal population in that area.  
They seem to die out very fast, but I do not know what the cause of it 
is. Year after year I notice that the numbers at the different camps are 
less.137 
Ship owner Ernest Evanson was more specific about the causes of a decline in 
the number of people in camps south of Cape Melville:  
Ten or twelve years ago a big fleet of pearlers came from Thursday 
Island — some 100 or 150 boats — and disease was spread 
broadcast [sic] among the natives and they dropped off one by one.138 
The removal of children in the early 20th century to the Cape Bedford mission in 
the south, and the later removal of the surviving elderly population to places such 
as Lockhart River mission in the north, appear to have helped sever the continuity 
of memory and culture between the 19th and 20th centuries. Asked about Roth’s 
description of the campsites of the Barrow Point people and the Northern Road 
linking them, Daniel Gordon said few people would know. “No. There’s hardly any 
people to talk to about it.”139 A Traditional Owner from Cape Melville, Alice Walker, 
said there were not many people left who would remember. “When the kids were 
brought here [to the missions] they weren’t allowed to talk about it.”140 Haviland 
and Hart described how the Traditional Owners of Barrow Point, by the Second 
World War, “were mostly scattered through Aboriginal communities elsewhere in 
Queensland.”141 Anthropologist and linguist Peter Sutton described the “shattering 
cultural effects of the lugger trades and the cattle industry” and that the 
“depopulation by disease and abductions, were catastrophic … By the 1970s only 
137 “Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Commission 2 July 1908”, Report of the Royal 
Commission Appointed to Inquire into the Working of the Pearl-shell and Beche-de-mer Industries, 
Brisbane: Anthony J. Cumming, Acting Government Printer, 1908, 223.  
138 Ibid., 238. Evidence taken 7 July 1908. 
139 Daniel Gordon to Ian Townsend, 25 September 2018.  
140 Alice Walker to Ian Townsend, 27 September 2018.  
141 Haviland and Hart 1999, xv.  
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a few elderly people knew the old clanship details, and the country and its many 
sites and stories, for the area between Bathurst Head and Cape Bowen.”142  
 
Conclusion 
   
The methodology described in Chapter One applied to a review of the death toll 
reveals evidence of 298 individuals known to have died in the 1899 pearling 
disaster. There is some indication of an unknown number of unreported deaths, but 
the death toll is unlikely to have exceeded significantly the Outridge booklet’s 
estimate of 307. There is no evidence that 400 people, including 100 Aboriginal 
people, died in the cyclone, despite this figure being the officially recognised death 
toll. There is evidence that the narrative non-fiction author Hector Holthouse added 
this figure to the toll in his book Cyclone in 1971.   
 
Narrative non-fiction accounts and untested newspaper reports have not only 
contributed to the social memory of the disaster, but to unreliable data in official 
databases of the Australian Government, and in scientific research. This suggests 
that some scientists and other researchers misunderstand the nature of data in 
narrative non-fiction and journalism, and that there is a role for historians in 
reviewing databases that are based on historical records, particularly those of 
cyclones and other natural disasters. It cannot be assumed that the problems 
associated with data from the 1899 cyclone, revealed in this thesis, are repeated for 
every other historical cyclone, but the question should be considered.   
 
Nearly all the narratives associated with the 1899 pearling disaster were controlled 
by the European community, even though 96 percent of the people in the fishing 
fleets at the time were non-European. Part of the problem with recovering non-
European memories was the repatriation and emigration from Australia after 
Federation of most of the pearling crew members who survived the cyclone. 
However, there is surviving evidence that can dispel many of the myths associated 
with the non-European experience of the disaster. The recreation of the Pitt family’s 
experience reveals how myths have evolved in the media.  
                                                
142 Sutton 2016, 95–96. 
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More difficult to recover are the memories of the Aboriginal communities who 
occupied the coast around Cape Melville and the hinterland of Princess Charlotte 
Bay. More than 1,000 people experienced the cyclone, but a catastrophic population 
decrease as a result of contact with the fishing industry, as well as the forced 
removal of children from their families and the removal of the surviving adults to 
missions in the early part of the 20th century, severed memories and clanship 
details. The 1899 cyclone was a small part of a bigger disaster resulting from 
contact with settlers and particularly the fishing industry. There is evidence that 
violence, disease, dispossession, and trauma resulted in fewer memories than might 
be expected from what was, at the time, the largest community to experience the 
cyclone.  
The methodology provides better evidence for the 1899 pearling disaster and the 
non-European experience. The following chapter will elaborate on European social 
and political discourses, the actions of Queensland Government meteorologist 
Clement Wragge, and the role of trauma on how the disaster has been 
remembered.    
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CHAPTER 4 
Forgetting a disaster: The role of politics, media, and trauma. 
Those who clamour against the so-called ‘alien’ may do well to pause 
here and consider how vast they would have regarded the disaster if this 
tornado had swept away four hundred white men. Not only Queensland, 
but all Australia, and even all the nation, would have joined in a 
prolonged wail of sorrow at the awful disaster. 
Telegraph (Brisbane), 14 March 18991 
The previous chapters described the pearling disaster of 1899, comparing accounts 
in the Outridge booklet with earlier sources and revealing differing versions of events 
and data. This chapter examines what impact the cultural discourses of the time had 
on the collective memory of the disaster. Why did the pearling disaster slip from the 
collective memory while other Australian disasters, particularly cyclone Tracy, still 
resonate nationally? What makes one disaster an Australian tragedy and another 
not? The memory of the 1899 cyclone persists within some communities and 
families, but it remains largely outside wider national discourses of notable 
disasters.2 Contemporary cultural narratives reflected in the media played important 
roles in framing the pearling disaster, and the Outridge booklet reflects that narrative 
framework. The booklet set out from the beginning its statement of purpose; to 
provide an account “of the Europeans who were lost,” which was compiled “from 
press and official reports, and from the testimony of survivors,” and available to “the 
immediate relatives of the deceased and to others interested.”3 It was produced as a 
memorial by a grieving family for other families of the European victims, and those 
who knew them. It was not produced to include narratives of the foreign crews or the 
Aboriginal people affected by the disaster, except as they reflected the European 
narratives. The booklet is a piece of journalism, and as White warns, the stories 
journalists tell should not be confused with historical narratives because such 
journalistic stories are already “locked within the confines” of a contemporary 
1 “Another Great Sorrow”, Telegraph (Brisbane), 14 March 1899, 4. In the weeks following the 
disaster, estimates of the death toll amongst the alien pearlers varied significantly.   
2 See for example, Australian Government, “Historical Impacts Along the East Coast”, Canberra: 
BOM, http://www.bom.gov.au/cyclone/history/eastern.shtml (accessed 3 February 2017). 
3 Anonymous, The Pearling Disaster, 1899: A Memorial, Brisbane: Outridge Printing Company, 1899. 
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chronicle.4 The booklet is a reflection of its own intentions, a cultural narrative that 
lacks “secondary referentiality.”5 Nevertheless, the Outridge booklet has long been 
used by scientists as the primary source for information about the pearling disaster 
and the cyclone that caused it. The booklet and the newspapers that it reflected are 
evidence of the social discourses of the time and, as such, are responsible for much 
of what was to be forgotten and remembered about the pearling disaster.   
The pearling disaster coincided with colonial plebiscites that anticipated a newly 
federated and White Australia, and so the first part of this chapter will consider how 
the media (including the Outridge booklet and newspapers) reflected and shaped 
social discourses of 1899. Barbie Zelizer reminds us that journalists are “the key 
agents of memory,”6 Nigel Hunt says that “memory and identities are also shaped by 
the media,”7 and Joy Damousi emphasises that “it is usually through the media that 
people get a sense of their own past.”8 Given this strong association between media 
and memory, how did the elements of racial and political discourse in 1899 affect the 
disaster narrative? In 1899, newspapers echoed myths, reinforced stereotypes, and 
promoted and exaggerated some accounts for narrative effect. This had an impact 
on the historical record because those reports were given quasi-official authority in 
the Outridge memorial booklet, produced by the Outridge Printing Company that not 
only had close ties to the pearling fleets, but at the time was an official printer for the 
Queensland Government.9 The Outridge booklet became the authoritative account 
for much of the subsequent reporting of the disaster for the next century. As Paula 
Hamilton notes, collective memory is a factor of structures of power in society and 
4 Hayden White, The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation, 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987, 172.  
5 Ibid. 
6 Barbie Zelizer, “Why Memory’s Work on Journalism Does Not Reflect Journalism’s Work on 
Memory”, Memory Studies, 1, No. 1, 2008, 85.  
7 Nigel C. Hunt, Memory, War, and Trauma, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 120. 
8 Joy Damousi, “History Matters: The Politics of Grief and Injury in Australian History”, Australian 
Historical Studies, 33, No. 118, 2002, 101. 
9 James Clark also held shares in the Outridge Printing Company, which had contracts with the 
Queensland Government and municipal councils. See Brisbane Courier, 14 November 1899, 4; “State 
Printing”, Telegraph (Brisbane), 10 November 1900, 2; Parliamentary Debates [Hansard], 
Queensland Legislative Assembly, Tuesday, 13 October 1903, 698.  
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power plays a role in the processes by which “some memories become erased, 
some emerge in the public arena, and some remain relatively privatised.”10 
The second part of this chapter considers some of the other processes by which 
aspects of the disaster have been forgotten. The extent of the temporal and spatial 
distribution of media reporting is examined to consider the impact this had on 
collective memory. Finally, the role of trauma will be examined. South African 
novelist Andre Brink describes collective memory as being “constructed around its 
own blind spots and silences,”11 and silences are symptoms of trauma, as well as 
social exclusion.12 The trauma stemming from disaster is rarely documented, as 
American historian Dominick LaCapra explains: “It is more difficult to document 
psychic trauma or post-traumatic effects than it is to count numbers of dead or 
wounded.”13 Evidence does exist, however, of psychological trauma stemming from 
the cyclone and the case of Gustaf Fuhrman, the captain of the lightship who 
drowned during the disaster, reveals the generational impact of trauma on families 
and on memory.  
 The media and the aliens 
The pearling disaster, on 4 and 5 March 1899, occurred during heightened political 
discourses about race. Queensland Legislative Assembly elections had started on 
March 1 and were to continue across the colony until 25 March 1899. The Australian 
colonies were also in the midst of a series of referenda on Federation, with the 
Queensland referendum to take place in September of that year.14 As discussed in 
Chapter One, a significant issue that spanned all plebiscites in 1898 and 1899 was 
the anticipation of a White Australia. The newspapers’ coverage in March 1899 of the 
10 Paula Hamilton, “The Knife Edge: Debates about Memory and History”, in Kate Darian-Smith and 
Paula Hamilton (eds), Memory and History in Twentieth-Century Australia, Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press, 1994, 20. 
11 Andre Brink, “Stories of History: Reimagining the Past in Post-Apartheid Narrative”, in Sarah Nuttall 
and Carli Coetzee (eds), Negotiating the Past: The Making of Memory in South Africa, Cape Town: 
Oxford University Press, 1998, 37.  
12 Tessa Morris-Suzuki, “Collective Memory, Collective Forgetting: Indigenous People and the Nation-
state in Japan and Australia”, Meanjin, 53, No. 4, 1994, 610.  
13 Dominick LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2001, 11.  
14 Voting in the 1899 Queensland election was held at different times for different places between 
March 1 and 25. The constitutional referendum in Queensland was held on 2 September 1899.  
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pearling disaster was to be framed by these political debates featuring racial 
discourses. The labour movement in Queensland, for example, was hostile to 
“coloured aliens,” who represented an economic threat to white labour.15 In the 
election for the Queensland seat of Woolloongabba in March 1899, Labour party 
candidate Thomas Dibley’s supporters yelled, "We don't want no black labour," "We 
are for a white Australia," and "No Kanakas.”16 Candidates such as Fred Brodie, an 
Independent Ministerial party candidate for Carpentaria, expressed Federation in 
terms of the benefits for the British race. Brodie declared that, “with federation in the 
colonies federation with the whole Anglo-Saxon race would eventually follow, and the 
question of coloured labour would be dead for ever. Australia would then become 
a white Australia.”17 These sentiments were reflected widely in political discourse. At 
the Australasian Federation Conference of 1898, colonial delegates had been careful 
in choosing the words with which laws would be constructed that would restrict the 
rights of “coloured” labour to work in a newly federated Australia.     
MR. HIGGINS (VICTORIA): I would suggest the following words: There 
shall be no discrimination by state laws based on residence or 
citizenship in another state. That would attain the purpose exactly, and it 
would allow Sir John Forrest at the same time to have his law with, 
regard to Asiatics not being able to obtain miners' rights in Western 
Australia. There is no discrimination there based on residence or 
citizenship; it is simply based upon colour and race. …  
MR. WISE (NEW SOUTH WALES): If you had a colony like Northern 
Queensland, where coloured labour is employed, you could not exclude 
them.  
MR. HIGGINS: That would not be a discrimination based on residence or 
citizenship in another state.  
MR. WISE: It might be.  
MR. HIGGINS: No, it would be based on colour. We want a 
discrimination based on colour.18  
As discussed in Chapter One, a unifying force for Federation was the desire to 
create a White Australia, but for the white pearling fleet owners, foreign labour was 
15 Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008, 32.  
16 “The Elections”, Brisbane Courier, 20 March 1899, 5. 
17 “Australian Federation”, Brisbane Courier, 22 March 1899, 55.  
18 Australasian Federation Conference, Third Session, Melbourne, Parliament of Australia 
Parliamentary Library, 3 March 1898, 1801, http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/ 
display/display.w3p;adv=yes;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=third%20session%20Dataset%3Ac
onventions;rec=9;resCount=Default (accessed 20 March 2019). 
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an economic issue and it posed a dilemma. On one hand, a consortium of white 
businessmen led by James Clark had been pushing hard to stop competition from 
the “coloured aliens,” especially the Japanese, in the northern pearl shell industry.19 
(The Queensland Government had passed a bill in December 1898 amending the 
Pearl Shell and Beche-de-mer Fishery Act 1881 to prevent aliens from leasing pearl 
shelling boats.20 It was aimed at curbing the perceived Japanese attempt to take 
over the industry, but it was applied to all who were not “natural born or naturalised 
British subjects” because the British Government, an ally of Japan, insisted.)21 On 
the other hand, the industry could not operate as profitably without cheap foreign 
labour. The pearl shellers opposed the employment of European divers on the 
grounds that white men were not cut out for the job. As James Clark pointed out, 
“Whites will not engage in the fishery; the life is too monotonous.”22 In fact, white 
divers were expensive, paid at least five times what a Manilla (Filipino) diver made.23 
The pearling fleet owners needed alien labour, but resented alien competition.      
The discourse on race and labour in newspapers reflected one of the major political 
issues of 1899, and it was inevitable that the pearling disaster would become 
conflated with the White Australia narrative, as happened when the Brisbane Courier 
published its editorial opinion on 20 March 1899:  
Those who would have diving carried on wholly by white men may now 
perhaps see what an awful blow would have been dealt to Queensland 
had four hundred families in our midst been sorrowing for loved ones 
lost.24 
The historical context of the word “alien” is important here. It appeared widely in pre-
Federation newspapers and in 1899 already had a social meaning best understood 
through theories of semiotics as it applies to social and political discourse, and 
19 Regina Ganter, The Pearl-Shellers of Torres Strait: Resource Use, Development and Decline 
1860s–1960s, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1994, 106; Stephen Mullins, “From TI to 
Dobo: The 1905 Departure of the Torres Strait Pearl Shelling Fleets to Aru, Netherlands East Indies”, 
The Great Circle: Journal of the Australian Association for Maritime History, 19, No. 1, 1997, 33; 
Robert Lehane, The Pearl King, Brisbane: Boolarong Press, 2014, 141.  
20 “Queensland Parliament. Legislative Siftings”, Worker (Brisbane), 24 December 1898, 3.  
21 Ganter 1994, 106. 
22 Lehane 2014, 142. Lehane details a letter from James Clark to the president of the Queensland 
Protection League, John Crase, 6 June 1898.  
23 Ganter 1994, 29.  
24 “Further Light on the Hurricane”, Brisbane Courier, 20 March 1899, 4.  
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therefore journalism.25 The use of the word “alien” as a symbol helps to understand 
the disaster in terms of pre-existing myths regarding race (just as the use of the word 
“hurricane” will be later shown to reveal the role of nature in disaster within 
contemporary, pre-Federation, cultural discourses). In 1899, an Australian nation 
was not yet real, but anticipated, and it can be considered within the theoretic 
framework described by Benedict Anderson as an “imagined community” whose 
members conceive of themselves as being part of the nation “regardless of actual 
inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each.”26 The members of the imagined 
Australian nation, though, were to be white. “Coloured aliens” were to be excluded.  
This begs the question; what constitutes a national disaster in an imagined nation? If 
the victims are not considered to be members of that nation, it is difficult to frame it 
as a national disaster. For example, in considering why cyclone Tracy, which struck 
Darwin in 1974, was framed as a national disaster, Brad West concluded that there 
was a clear association between cyclone Tracy and the idea of what it was to be an 
Australian. The victims of Tracy were considered without question to be Australian. 
The disaster was also framed as a quasi-military event because the Australian 
military took control of relief efforts, and this linked it to the ANZAC myth, an existing 
core element of national identity since the First World War.27 The 1899 cyclone, on 
the other hand, had been framed as a disaster in which most of the victims were 
clearly not to be part of an imagined Australian nation. Likewise, in the US in 2005 
hurricane Katrina failed to gain immediate recognition as a national American 
tragedy because the media framed the victims as refugees who, like the non-
European pearling crews, were “a highly racialized and classed category that 
constitutes the antithesis of citizens.”28 
25 Roland Barthes, Elements of Semiology, Annette Lavers and Colin Smith (trans.), New York: Hill 
and Wang, 1968, 11. 
26 Benedict R. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, London: Verso, 2006, 6–7. 
27 Brad West, “Mythologising a Natural Disaster in Post-industrial Australia: The Incorporation of 
Cyclone Tracy within Australian National Identity”, Journal of Australian Studies, 24, No. 66, 2000, 
200. 
28 Courtney J. Rivard, Archiving Disaster: A Comparative Study of September 11, 2001 and Hurricane 
Katrina, PhD thesis, University of California, 2012, 46. 
145 
The pearling disaster also brought together two symbolic enemies of White Australia: 
The alien and the hurricane.29 The word “hurricane” had been used connotatively in 
social discourse, but after the pearling disaster it was often used to represent the 
turmoil of politics in association with Federation, for example, “… the wretched, willful 
misrepresentation of facts which had, like a hurricane, swept across the colony,”30 “I 
was standing on safe ground — on a rock — which all the hurricanes of oratory or 
the whirlwinds of special pleading cannot assail,”31 and “… if this federal furore has 
taught them any thing, it must surely have taught them the true worth of 
the hurricanes of shoddy patriotism which have assailed them.”32 The pearling 
disaster occurred at a time when social and political discourse was heavy with 
symbolism, and it became a symbol itself, not of a new white Australian nation, but of 
the soon to be outdated colonial industrial structure that employed foreign labour.  
Clement Wragge and the literary narrative 
The use of signifiers was also a journalistic tool of the Queensland Government 
meteorologist Clement Wragge. In naming tropical disturbances, Wragge had 
stumbled across a powerful narrative device to help him attract public attention to his 
forecasts. In the case of the tropical disturbance Mahina, which he was later to 
blame for the pearling disaster, the name was both alien, “culled from fair Tahiti,”33 
and the source of a hurricane. (It was also female, and Wragge has been credited for 
the convention of giving tropical storms female names, but he did not use female 
names exclusively.34 Nachon, the tropical disturbance he named at the same time as 
Mahina, is also heavy with symbolism.35 Nachon, from the Bible, was the male 
owner of the thrashing-floor where Uzzah was killed.)36 The symbolic use of the 
hurricane and the alien was established before the disaster, in journalism, and in 
29 See “Ancient and Modern”, NQR, 1 May 1899, 4. This is one example where the words “alien” and 
“hurricane” were brought together to disparage politicians, in this case in a poem. 
30 “Political Situation”, Clarence and Richmond Examiner, 18 April 1899, 5.  
31 “The Federal Constitution”, Worker (Wagga), 17 June 1899, 2.  
32 “Patriotic Pilly-Winky Popp”, Armidale Chronicle, 21 June 1899, 2. 
33 “The Weather”, Telegraph (Brisbane), 7 March 1899, 4.  
34 Peter Adamson, “Clement Lindley Wragge and the Naming of Weather Disturbances”, Weather, 58, 
No. 9, September 2003, 359.  
35 “The Weather. Monsoons Nachon and Mahina”, Telegraph (Brisbane), 8 March 1899, 3.  
36 2 Sam. 6:6 AV. “And when they came to Nachon's threshingfloor, Uzzah put forth his hand to the 
ark of God, and took hold of it; for the oxen shook it.”  
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literature. Their use connotatively, and often together, appeared in popular books 
such as Herman Melville’s Moby Dick, Robert Louis Stevenson’s non-fiction narrative 
A Footnote to History: Eight Years of Trouble in Samoa,37 as well as Australian 
newspaper serials by writers such as Louis Becke, who wrote stories set in the 
dangerous, romantic, and thrilling tropics.  
The native crews, knowing well the danger that menaced them, bent to 
their oars with a will, and sent the boats flying through the water. Already 
they could tell from the changing sound of the surf beating upon the 
outer reef that there was but little time left ere the hurricane would be 
sweeping across the now glassy waters of the lagoon …38 
David Arnold coined the term “tropicality” to discuss the way in which the tropics, like 
the Orient, was described in colonial and post-colonial discourse as a region that 
was both inferior to Europe and dangerous, but also romantic and paradisiacal.39  
Tropicality is a term that can be applied to a genre of colonial literature, serving to 
construct a northern part of Australia as alien and remote from most of the white 
Australian population living in the more temperate south-east of the continent. 
Wragge, who was to later write his own narrative non-fiction book, The Romance of 
the South Seas, tapped into the literary sentiments of the day and used the same 
stylised and symbolic language in his published forecasts. Two weeks before the 
pearling disaster, on 24 February 1899, Wragge wrote that a tropical disturbance he 
had named Tirau was 300 miles north of New Caledonia, “a very sword of the 
hideous Damocles, involving fear, apprehension, and soul-stirring misgiving … Still, 
however, do we distinctly affirm that the Queensland coast is not yet in danger.”40  
By personifying tropical storms and using all the symbolism of tropicality in colonial 
discourse, Wragge had tapped into a popular narrative strategy, one that was readily 
recognised by newspaper readers. By naming storms, he gave them the power of 
37 Herman Melville, Moby Dick: Or, the Whale, London: Penguin, 2003; Robert Louis Stevenson, A 
Footnote to History: Eight Years of Trouble in Samoa, London: Cassell and Company, 1892, available 
at https://archive.org/details/afootnotetohist03stevgoog (accessed 20 March 2019). 
38 Louis Becke, “In Search of a Husband. A Tale from the Coral Islands”, Cobram Courier, 18 
November 1897, 2. 
39 David Arnold, The Problem of Nature: Environment, Culture and European Expansion. New 
Perspectives on the Past, Oxford: Blackwell, 1996, 143. “Tropicality was the experience of northern 
whites moving into an alien world …”  
40 “The Weather”, Telegraph (Brisbane), 24 February 1899, 8. 
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characters in a narrative. This transformed his forecasts into a version of narrative 
non-fiction in which the author appears also as a character. Wragge’s forecasts were 
driven by his sense that a narrative with a beginning, middle and end already existed 
in nature. This philosophy is alluded to when he describes “the inflexible laws of the 
Great Master Energy” and that “no-thing in Nature is left to chance, and, scientifically 
speaking, there is no such thing as accident.”41 This may have also prompted him to 
revise his forecasts for the 1899 disaster after the fact. As described in Chapter Two, 
Wragge had been monitoring the tropical disturbance he named Tirau before the 
cyclone struck the pearling fleet at Cape Melville. The vessels anchored in Bathurst 
Bay became aware of an approaching cyclone on the evening of Saturday 4 March, 
when their barometers began to fall, but 1,800 kilometres south, in Brisbane, Wragge 
was not to learn of the disaster until five days later. Wragge’s barometric chart 
(Figure 4.1) dated Saturday 4 March, before the cyclone struck that night, showed a 
broad area of low pressure over the Louisiades, by then marked “Disturbance 
‘Mahina’.”42 Mahina had superseded Tirau, perhaps reflecting Wragge’s willingness 
to change his narrative rather than admit he had placed Tirau too far south. Mahina 
did not appear in Wragge’s newspaper forecasts until Tuesday 7 March when, 
reflecting his 6 March weather map (Figure 4.2), he described it as being “about 350 
miles [about 560 kilometres] south-east from Sudest,” an island in the Louisiades 
Archipelago in British New Guinea.43 In his 8 March forecast, published 10 March, he 
placed Mahina “300 miles [about 480 kilometres] south from the Louisiades,”44 still 
out in the Coral Sea and on 9 March Wragge, still unaware of the disaster on Cape 
York, placed Mahina 400 miles (about 645 kilometres) east-north-east from 
Townsville and moving south.45 Wragge was not to learn that a cyclone had crossed 
the coast until 10 March.46  
41 “Mr. Wragge's ‘General Remarks’”, Brisbane Courier, 10 March 1899, 5. Wragge was also to 
espouse his philosophy in a lecture tour in 1910 entitled “The Romance of the Atmosphere”, 
described in the Argus (Melbourne), 11 August 1910, 10. 
42 Clement Wragge, “March 4th 1899,” copy of map courtesy Jeffrey Callaghan, BOM, Brisbane, in 
2006. It is now at BP57/40, 3/19/1, NAA.  
43 “Meteorology of Australasia and Oceania”, Brisbane Courier, 7 March 1899, 3. 
44 “The Weather”, Week, 10 March 1899, 24. 
45 “Mr. Wragge's ‘General Remarks’”, Brisbane Courier, 10 March 1899, 5. 
46 Clement L. Wragge, Wragge's Australasian Almanac and Weather Guide for Land and Sea, 
Brisbane: Sapsford and Co., 1900, 349.  
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Figure 4.1 Wragge’s weather chart for 4 March 1899, supplied by Jeffrey Callaghan, BOM, Brisbane. 
Figure 4.2 Wragge’s weather chart for 6 March 1899, supplied by Jeffrey Callaghan, BOM, Brisbane. 
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There was criticism of Wragge’s inability to forecast the cyclone that wrecked the 
pearling fleets,47 and much later he revised his narrative to have Mahina striking the 
coast so far north that it was “unique in the annals of the Chief Weather Bureau, and 
the more so considering that it coalesced with the monsoonal storm Nachon in the 
heart of Cape York Peninsula.”48 By upgrading Nachon to a storm, he was 
suggesting that the event was so rare as to be unpredictable, whereas it was beyond 
his powers and the technology available in 1899 to predict exactly where any 
cyclone would be. By naming storms, Wragge had constructed a narrative around 
his own powers of forecasting and he was later forced to re-write his narrative to 
maintain that public illusion. Even after learning of the disaster, Wragge did not 
initially attribute it to Mahina. On 16 March, he wrote that, “all danger from a 
threatening disturbance Mahina appears to have passed away,”49 and on 18 March 
the Advertiser in Adelaide reported that the disaster was caused by the disturbance 
Nachon.50 On 22 March, 17 days after the disaster, Wragge began to re-write the 
record, blaming faulty barometers for misplacing Mahina, which he said did, in fact, 
contribute to the disaster. 
It is quite possible that had the barometer at Gomen not developed an 
error we should have been able in more precise terms to have more 
accurately located the suspicious conditions attaching to the recent 
storm ‘Mahina’ when south from the Louisiades, the western edge of 
which was a most powerful factor in causing the recent deplorable loss 
of life on our far Northern coast. Now, further, it is a positive fact that had 
we cable communication with our stations in New Guinea, working in 
connection with those in the French dependency — when in order — 
and the observatories along our seaboard, no such storm as that which 
wrecked the pearling fleet could possibly approach our littoral without our 
being able to give ample notice to all places concerned telegraphically 
connected.51  
Wragge insisted he could have accurately predicted the cyclone if the observatories 
were working properly, but even if they were, he had no way of warning the pearling 
47 For example, see “The Hurricane in the North”, Brisbane Courier, 16 March 1899, 4. 
48 Wragge 1900, 63.  
49 “Meteorology of Australasia and Oceania”, Brisbane Courier, 16 March 1899, 6.  
50 Advertiser (Adelaide), 18 March 1899, 6. The article is a strong defence of Wragge’s forecast, and 
although it is anonymous, the style, expressions, and detail suggests it was written by Wragge. “A 
summer excursion among the picturesque islands and islets that abound in that region is ordinarily a 
delight, but when the disturbance labelled Nachon by Mr. Wragge came down, the fury of the 
tempestuous winds and waves was simply irresistible.” 
51 “Mr. Wragge's General Remarks”, Brisbane Courier, 22 March 1899, 6.  
fleets off the remote Cape York coast. This explanation came more than two weeks 
after the disaster and at a time when interest from newspapers was already waning 
(Table 4.1). By then, the pearling disaster was attributed in newspaper articles to the 
“northern hurricane”, and not to Mahina. Mahina was not associated with the disaster 
until Wragge re-wrote the narrative weeks after the event, and was hardly mentioned 
and not linked to the disaster in contemporary newspaper reports of 1899. It was, 
therefore, not part of the individual memories that could constitute a collective 
memory. It was a later construct. When it was published in September 1899, the 
Outridge memorial booklet repeated the newspaper reports of Wragge’s weather 
forecasts, including his later explanation that the disaster was caused by Mahina and 
Nachon acting together. The Outridge booklet had a small circulation, limited to 
“immediate relatives of the deceased and to others interested” and so as a memorial 
booklet it was not widely distributed beyond the European families and friends 
affected.52 Wragge associated Mahina and Nachon with the disaster in his Almanac 
for 1900,53 and the myth of the two storms acting together was repeated in articles in 
1934 and 1935.54 The two-storm myth was not debunked until 1958, when 
Whittingham described it as “incredible” that Wragge would suggest the theory 
because his charts “do not support it in any way”.55
As noted in Chapter Two, Wragge had been appointed chief meteorologist for the 
Queensland Government at the end of 1886, and he began to name storms in 
February 1894, initially based on the Greek alphabet.56 He explained that it was “to 
avoid confusion” when several storms were in the Coral Sea,57 but he later said it 
was to aid memory and “by this means the public and especially the shipping 
community will readily associate any unpleasant types of weather which they may 
experience with the names of the disturbances producing them.”58 It created public 
discussion, raised his profile, and his forecasts were picked up by newspapers in 
52  Anonymous 1899. 
53 Wragge 1900, 63. 
54 “1899 Holocaust Recalled”, Telegraph (Brisbane), 17 March 1934, 7; “Australia’s Most Serious 
Maritime Disaster”, Telegraph (Brisbane), 22 April 1935, 6. 
55 H. E. Whittingham, “The Bathurst Bay Hurricane and Associated Storm Surge”, Australian 
Meteorological Magazine, 23, 1958, 35. 
56 “Meteorology of Australasia and Oceania”, Brisbane Courier, 20 February 1894, 3. The first 
recorded naming in newspapers appears to be Beta. 
57 Ibid. 
58 “Local and General News”, Queensland Times, Ipswich Herald and General Advertiser, 28 April 
1894, 4. 
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other colonies. In late April 1894, he began naming weather disturbances in NSW, 
and dubbed the first “Alpha.”59  
Wragge’s willingness to re-write his narrative can be best demonstrated by 
dissecting his narrative non-fiction book, The Romance of the South Seas, published 
in 1906. The book is a travelogue of Wragge’s adventures in New Caledonia and 
Tahiti and it is written in the present tense, but it was based on a journey Wragge 
made in December 1890 as a representative of the Queensland Government. The 
purpose was to establish weather stations in New Caledonia, from which Wragge 
could receive telegraph reports once the undersea telegraphic cable was laid in 
1893. It would mean weather observations on the eastern side of the Coral Sea 
could be sent by telegraph to Wragge’s office at the General Post Office building in 
Brisbane twice a day.60 From these reports, he would produce barometric charts of 
the region, to help him identify areas of low pressure in which a cyclone might lurk, 
so shipping could be warned. Wragge had already, in 1892, published a series of 
newspaper articles about his voyage to New Caledonia.61 His 1906 narrative of that 
same trip was changed to make the trip appear recent, but the material is almost 
identical to what he had written 14 years earlier.  
(1892) Our passengers were few, but very interesting withal. Among the 
number were several jolly school-girls, all in, the lovely springtime of the 
bewitching teens, ably chaperoned by Captain Calder, and bound to 
their beautiful island homes in Erromango and Fiji for the Christmas 
holidays.62  
(1906) Our passengers are few, but very interesting, and among them 
are several jolly schoolgirls in the glorious springtime of the bewitching 
teens, bound to their tropic homes in the New Hebrides and Fiji for the 
Christmas holidays.63  
In his 1906 book, Wragge said he had left Brisbane in December, but did not give a 
year. It was probably not an oversight; the tone of the book was of a travelogue and 
a contemporary description of the South Seas, not one from a decade and a half 
59 “Shipping Items”, Daily Commercial News and Shipping List (Sydney), 27 April 1894, 5.  
60 “Scientific and Useful”, Queenslander, 12 May 1894, 887.  
61 Clement Wragge, “Science and Travel in the Western Pacific”, Illustrated Sydney News, 2 January 
1892, 7; 16 January 1892, 7; 13 February 1892, 4; 18 June 1892, 14; 13 August 1892, 16. 
62 Ibid., 2 January 1892, 9.  
63 Clement Lindley Wragge, The Romance of the South Seas. London: Chatto and Windus, 1906, 9. 
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earlier. By omitting the year and suggesting a contemporary account, Wragge 
presented a book of non-fiction that suited his narrative, but it calls into question 
Wragge’s reliability as a source for historical data. The date of this trip has been 
interpreted by some historians as 1906,64 but it is not clear if Wragge had updated 
his 1892 story using new information. For instance, the telegraph cable was laid from 
Australia to New Caledonia in 1893. Anticipating this in his 1892 articles, Wragge 
writes:  
To me, fresh from Australia, the sense of isolation seemed somewhat 
oppressive, but some people seem, how ever, rather to prefer it. 'We 
don't want a cable,' said one. 'twould spoil business,” though in what 
manner was not quite apparent. Such extraneous supplies as do not 
come from France, where the best of the world's goods are believed to 
be produced, are imported by the regular fortnightly boats from 
Sydney.65  
In 1906, when he published his book, the cable has since been laid, so Wragge 
adjusts his narrative:  
To one from Australia and the outer world the sense of isolation is 
oppressive enough; but this, to some extent, is now relieved by the 
ocean cable which connects the island with Australia, and thus with the 
world. Yes some people liked the old regime. ‘Je n’ai besoin d’un cable,’ 
you hear one say; ‘Spoilt my business," adds an English merchant, 
though how or why is not apparent. To the convicts the cable is a bete 
noire. Should one essay to escape, and succeed in putting to sea in a 
stolen boat, the Australian police are at once advised.66 
Wragge changed the details, turning a conversation with one man into a 
conversation with two. He suggests that he learned in New Caledonia that the 
telegraph cable was responsible for the arrest in Australia of escaped French 
convicts. Wragge has again revised his narrative. Can he be trusted? He is, as White 
describes, an historical agent prospectively prefiguring his life as a story with a 
plot,67 but in Wragge’s case there is evidence that he was also retrospectively 
64 Russell Brennan and Jonathan Richards, “‘The Scum of French Criminals and Convicts’: Australia 
and New Caledonia Escapees”, History Compass, 12, No. 7, 2014, 563. Brennan and Richards write: 
“By 1906, when colonial meteorologist Clement Wragge visited the island …”  
65 Wragge, “Science and Travel in the Western Pacific”, 16 January 1892, 7.  
66 Wragge 1906, 35.  
67 White 1987, 173.
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replotting the story of his life. If, as Munslow says, the facts are never innocent and 
an historian’s job is to invest evidence with meaning so it can it be “correlated and 
placed within a context,”68 then the context in Wragge’s case is that he is willing to 
change his story. Wragge’s contribution is as an agent of memory, through his 
journalistic use of media, but it is his ability to reflect contemporary social narratives 
through his writing that is more reliable than his authority as a source for facts, 
because he tended to rearrange them to protect or enhance his reputation.  
Wragge had a powerful narrative strategy with which he might have linked the 
pearling disaster to Mahina in a contemporary Australia-wide discourse, as he had 
been able to do with other storms, but he missed the opportunity by failing to 
forecast the disaster. When he decided retrospectively to blame the disaster on 
Mahina, it was too long after the event to enter the national discourse. It would be 
decades later that journalists, finding the Outridge booklet, used the name Mahina to 
reframe the disaster to reflect the cultural narratives of their day, and to attempt to 
reinstate it as part of a national memory. 
How the pearling disaster unfolded in newspapers 
Although the name Mahina was not linked to the disaster at the time, most of the 
dramatic aspects of the disaster were widely reported throughout all the Australian 
colonies. Chapter Two describes how events unfolded during the cyclone. Here 
(Table 4.1), the timeline shows when and how news of the disaster reached 
Brisbane, from where it was picked up by newspapers and relayed to other colonies.  
68 Alun Munslow, Deconstructing History, 2nd ed., New York: Routledge, 2006, 8. 
154 
Saturday 4 March Destructive winds begin to strike the area in which the pearling fleets 
are anchored on the evening.  
Sunday 5 March The cyclone crosses the coast at Cape Melville, the eye passing over 
Bathurst Bay. Survivors swim ashore as the storm passes. 
Monday 6 March The steamer Duke of Portland, travelling north, passes through the 
disaster area. In the evening, the Duke of Norfolk arrives off 
Cooktown and signals the loss of the Channel Rock Lightship and 
other shipping beacons to the signalmen on Grassy Hill, but bad 
weather prevents sending more details. This is the first report from 
the disaster area, but it was not published until Thursday. The loss of 
the beacons is wired to the Brisbane Port Master, Captain Almond, 
who immediately instructs the harbour master in Cairns to dispatch 
the small steamer Victory to search for the lightship. 
Tuesday 7 March The steamer Kasuga Maru, heading south, passes through the 
disaster area.  
Wednesday 8 March The Duke of Norfolk arrives at Townsville and wires Brisbane with 
more details of the disaster. The Duke of Portland arrives at 
Thursday Island, where the Government Resident John Douglas 
attempts to telegraph a report to Brisbane, but the cyclone has blown 
down the telegraph line south of Coen. Douglas sends the 
Government steamer, White Star, south to help. The Kasuga Maru 
arrives off Cooktown, but poor weather prevents communication with 
the telegraph station at Grassy Hill.  
Thursday 9 March The steamer Warrego, travelling south, passes through the area and 
collects telegrams to be sent from Cooktown. The Warrego reaches 
Cooktown and communicates with the telegraph station at Grassy 
Hill, which sends a wire to Captain Almond in Brisbane with more 
details of the disaster. The Government orders the Warrego to return 
to search for survivors. The editor of the Cooktown Independent, 
James Fowler, departs with the Warrego. The initial reports from the 
Duke of Norfolk are published in newspapers.  
Friday 10 March The telegraph line south of Coen is repaired and reports are sent by 
telegraph from Thursday Island to Brisbane. The White Star arrives 
at the northern edge of the disaster area and the Warrego arrives on 
the southern edge in the evening. Both ships spend the weekend 
delivering stores and helping survivors. Reports from the previous 
day sent by the Warrego are published.  
Saturday 11 March The search for survivors continues. Most major newspapers in other 
colonies report news of the disaster.   
Sunday 12 March The Warrego arrives back at Cooktown in the evening. 
Monday 13 March The first reports from James Fowler are published. The White Star 
arrives at Cooktown in the afternoon. Constable Kenny, who had 
been on the southern side of Cape Melville, returns to Cooktown.   
Table 4.1 Timeline showing how events unfolded after the disaster. 
Newspapers in Cairns were reporting heavy rain and flooding on Wednesday 8 
March, and the Duke of Norfolk’s initial report of beacons down, the lighthouse 
missing, and vessels damaged did not appear in newspapers until 9 March. The loss 
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of life and extent of damage did not emerge until Friday 10 March, when the 
Warrego arrived in Cooktown and sent its telegrams collected from the fleet, before 
returning to the scene. As discussed, when the Warrego left Cooktown for the 
disaster scene, it took with it Fowler, the editor of the Cooktown Independent,69 who 
was also to be the “Special Correspondent” at the scene for the Brisbane Courier. 
The initial articles published in newspapers around the country originated from either 
the telegraphed reports of Fowler, or from the telegrams and letters sent from the 
fleets. Those reports had to be brought to Cooktown to be transmitted, or delivered 
to Brisbane by steamer, and it sometimes took several days for reports from the 
scene to appear in newspapers.    
Graph 4.1 Newspaper articles referring to the pearling disaster published in Australia for March 1899. 
Note that 12, 19, and 26 March were Sundays, and most newspapers did not have Sunday editions. 
(Source: Trove, National Library of Australia.)  
As reflected in Graph 4.1, the extent of the disaster was not reported in newspapers 
until 9 March, four days after the cyclone struck, because shipping had been 
disrupted and the telegraph line south of Coen knocked down.70 The rate of reporting 
rose for 10 days as new information arrived, culminating in Saturday newspaper 
spreads on 18 March detailing all available aspects of what had happened. 
69 “The Late Hurricane. Return of the Warrego”, 6; T. P. Pugh, Pugh's Almanac and Queensland 
Directory, 1899, 812; “Random Remarks,” Truth (Brisbane), 31 May 1903, 1.  
70 “The Late Hurricane. Further Particulars. Return of the Steamer Warrego. Loss of Life Estimated at 
400”, Brisbane Courier, 14 March 1899, 5. 
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Reportage quickly fell away two weeks after the disaster. (It is worth noting that the 
reports generally referred to the disaster as the “northern hurricane”. As mentioned, 
the name Mahina was not associated with the cyclone until Wragge revised his 
narrative.) 
In their study of disasters and national identity, Brad West and Philip Smith argue 
that the longer the duration of a disaster, or the more times it occurs, the more likely 
it is to be considered a “symbolic enemy.”71 In that sense, cyclones, floods and 
bushfires have been considered transitory threats. Droughts are considered national 
disasters because they endure for such a long time and affect larger parts of the 
country. However, West and Smith give the example of an exception; cyclone Tracy, 
which struck Darwin on Christmas Day 1974, destroying 90 percent of homes and 
causing about $400 million in damage.72 They show that the national discourse in 
the Australian newspaper lasted two weeks and note that “media discourses on 
natural disaster have a short half-life.”73 Cyclones, they argue, can only be 
constructed “with difficulty as a national event”74 and even then they need to have a 
narrative linking them to other states. In the case of Tracy, it became a national 
event because the disaster was framed by its association with the Australian military, 
which took control of the devastated city, and through a national relief campaign.75 
West and Smith argue that cyclone Tracy “was the first Australian cyclone to be 
interpreted as a national event.”76 Tracy was quickly portrayed in the media as 
Australia’s worst national disaster, “a nightmare of death and devastation 
unparalleled in Australian history”77 and the “worst natural disaster ever to hit 
Australia.”78 While it might be said that the journalists did not check their facts, the 
widespread representation of Tracy being the “worst” national disaster reflects both 
the cultural narrative and the social memory. This representation, says West, is 
consistent with Durkheim’s concept of social facts being specific realities that 
71 Brad West and Philip Smith, “Natural Disasters and National Identity: Time, Space and Mythology”, 
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology, 33, No. 2, August 1997, 206, http://search.informit. 
com.au/documentSummary;dn=980201378;res=IELAPA (accessed 7 February 2019). 
72 Ibid.    
73 Ibid., 206. 
74 Ibid., 208. 
75 Ibid., 213. 
76 West 2000, 198. 
77 “Cyclone toll”, West Australian, 27 December 1974, 6.  
78 John Lombard, “Man in the Centre of it all”, Advertiser (Adelaide), 27 December 1974, 5. 
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represent a social solidarity rather than “rational facts.”79 West argues that because 
the battle at Gallipoli in the First World War had become the main national myth, 
Tracy resonated nationally because the involvement of the military linked the 
disaster with Australia’s war past. In contrast, the 1899 cyclone did not provide the 
elements to create a myth for a new nation. Instead, as previously discussed, it was 
considered an event that was predominantly one that affected foreign labourers in 
the far away and dangerous tropics. In the sense that it affected the European 
community, it was linked not to the emerging new Australian nation, but to ideals of 
colonial British determination, as expressed in a letter from a London correspondent 
published in the Week newspaper:  
The blow is a heavy one for a small and young colony, but Queensland 
has, I hope, the mettle to meet it. Troubles and difficulties have often 
proved the grit of the British colonist. So may it be with you. In the 
meantime be assured that you have the warm sympathy of ‘the old folks 
at home.’80  
There was no Australian government in 1899, of course, and the disaster was 
considered a colonial Queensland responsibility. The Queensland Government did 
martial resources to provide assistance to shipwrecked sailors and Aboriginal 
people ashore.81 Significantly, though, a public appeal for funds for the families of 
those affected fell flat.82 The appeal had been originally set up to fund “the relief of 
the widows and orphans and others rendered destitute by the late hurricane in the 
North.”83 However, the only report of a widow in the newspapers was at Thursday 
Island where a “coloured woman whose husband was lost was greatly distressed.”84 
This refers to Maria Perez, wife of Marco Perez (who, confusingly, also had two 
death certificates. See Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4) the master of the schooner 
79 West 2000, 198. See also Emile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method, Sarah A. Solovay 
and John H. Mueller (trans.), George E.G. Catlin (ed.), New York: Free Press, 1964, 103. 
80 “Our London Letter”, Week, 28 April 1899, 23.  
81 Walter Roth to Under Secretary Home Office, “Report Re Distribution of Gifts to Coastal 
Aboriginals”, 9 April 1899, HOM/A23/99/5252, QSA, ID847561, 1. 
82 “Pearling Disaster. Mayor of Brisbane’s Fund”, Telegraph (Brisbane), 8 April 1899, 9. As previously 
mentioned, only three members of the public subscribed.   
83 “Relief Fund”, Queenslander, 25 March 1899, 544.  
84 “The Hurricane in the North”, Northern Miner (Charters Towers), 16 March 1899, 2. The pearling 
fleet’s indentured crews generally did not live on Thursday Island, but on their boats. Marco Perez, 
being a master of a schooner, was one of the exceptions. 
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Admiral.85 The lack of newspaper coverage of the widows of the disaster may have 
undermined sentiment towards the appeal, which was largely based in far away and 
white Brisbane. There was little or no newspaper coverage of the effect of the 
cyclone on the families of those killed.   
Figure 4.3 Death certificate of Marcus Perez, 5 March 1899, QBDM, Cooktown, 1899/1248. 
Figure 4.4 Death certificate of Marco Perez, 4 March 1899, QBDM, Cooktown, 1899/1112.86 
Paula Hamilton, in her study of the 1938 Rodney ferry disaster in Sydney, discusses 
conventional narrative frameworks for disasters in media coverage that concern 
bravery as well as “victims of fate.”87 In the 1899 pearling disaster, however, most of 
the Europeans who might have filled those narrative roles died when their vessels 
sank in Bathurst Bay.88 No-one was left to tell tales of heroism. The stories of 
heroism appearing in the press related almost entirely to the non-European crews 
and local Aboriginal people.  
85 John Douglas, “Report of the Government Resident at Thursday Island for 1898”, QVP, 1, 1899, 
100. Douglas writes: “One woman with two children has been left quite unprovided for, but with this 
exception I do not know of any case of serious destitution.” 
86 There are two death certificates for Perez. The anomaly is discussed in Chapter Three, showing 
they belong to the same person. Perez is also mentioned in the Outridge booklet as “Marcos Peres 
[sic], an excellent sailor and an old diver …” As respected as he was, his name was not included in 
the memorials because he was not European, and Chapter Three addresses the questions this raises 
about the reliability of some official records and primary sources, and their contribution to what is 
remembered and forgotten about the pearling disaster. 
87 Paula Hamilton, “Memory Remains: Ferry Disaster, Sydney, 1938”, History Workshop 
Journal 1999, No. 47, 1999, 203. 
88 As described in previous chapters, William Field Porter, the master of the schooner Crest of the 
Wave, the only vessel in Bathurst Bay to stay afloat, provided the only narrative of the white male 
hero, saving his wife and child by forcing his crew to the pumps.  
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We read of Japanese women who swam to land not knowing that the 
infants in their arms, for whom they struggled so heroically, were dead.89 
A colored man reached the shore accompanied by two colored women 
after swimming about four days.90  
… considerable bravery was displayed by the coastal aboriginals in
rendering assistance to the wrecked pearlers and in burying the bodies 
which were washed ashore.91  
The natives were burying the dead and fighting the bushmen, and 
keeping them back from the bodies.92 
The confusing nature of some of the reporting helped weaken a narrative which 
included rumours that were later disputed.     
Mr. James Clark … spoke in high terms of the attention of the coastal 
aboriginals, and ridicules the idea of the hill tribes fighting the coast ones 
over the plunder.93  
Sociologist Thomas R. Forrest identifies natural disasters as major disruptions to 
society, representing “one of life’s most significant events, both individually and for 
the community. The anniversary of a disaster becomes an expression of community 
memory.”94 In the pearling disaster, however, there were three distinct main 
communities: The Europeans, the non-European crews, and the Aboriginal people 
ashore. One of the other features that distinguishes the pearling disaster from other 
Australian disasters is the lack of commemoration in the years following the event. 
One small notice appeared in the Brisbane Courier on the first anniversary, in 1900, 
which read, “In memory of the Pearlers and Crew of the Lightship, drowned off Cape 
Melville in the hurricane of the 4th and 5th March, 1899.”95 Other newspaper 
memorials followed for three years only, remembering the European pearlers Alfred 
89 SMH, 17 March 1899, 4.  
90 “The Hurricane. A Colored Man's Bravery”, NQR, 20 March 1899, 14.  
91 “Northern Hurricane”, Telegraph (Brisbane), 20 April 1899, 2. 
92 “Return of the Warrego”, Queenslander, 25 March 1899, 545. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Thomas R. Forrest, “Disaster Anniversary: A Social Reconstruction of Time”, Sociological Inquiry, 
63, No. 4, 1993, 447. 
95 “Family Notices”, Brisbane Courier, 5 March 1900, 4  
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and Harold Outridge, Robert Cameron, and William Powell.96 Cultural conventions 
normally provide a framework for which anniversaries are observed. There is often a 
first anniversary followed by remembrance at five years, and then often 25, 50, 75 
and 100 years.97 Theories of disaster commemoration fail to explain the anomaly of 
the pearling disaster, and this is because most of the victims were not considered to 
be part of the society in which the disaster occurred. The site of the disaster was 
also so remote as to be outside the experience of most Australians who lived south 
of the Tropic of Capricorn, and it would be decades before journalists rediscovered 
and reprised the event. This fragmented retelling also had an impact on the way the 
disaster was to be remembered.  
Journalists not only use narrative structures to tell stories, but through their work they 
see the world in a “storied way.” Events are understood through stories that have a 
beginning, middle and end, and this structured narrative also includes a moral 
dimension to events.98 Often the narrative strategy or narrative type (such as a 
romance narrative, or the story of a male hero overcoming adversity) will dictate how 
an event is reported, and the event will sometimes be retold in a way that fits the 
narrative strategy. In her article on the relationship between memory and the public 
record, Hamilton looks at the 1938 Sydney Rodney ferry disaster and asks why 
some events “slip from public consciousness” and others persist.99 She concludes 
that one reason the ferry disaster was displaced from the collective memory was 
because of the “narrative strategies” used by the press, involving romance as the 
dominant story.100 Most of the dead were women, and Hamilton argues that there 
was social disapproval of these young women behaving precociously and exerting 
their independence at the time. (They had taken the ferry to visit American sailors.) 
The romance narrative was met with disapproval. Hamilton describes the Rodney 
ferry disaster as not being entirely forgotten, but having followed a different pattern of 
96 “Family Notices”, Telegraph (Brisbane), 5 March 1901, 4; “Family Notices”, Queenslander, 8 March 
1902, 504; “Family Notices”, Brisbane Courier, 4 March 1902, 4; ”Family Notices”, SMH, 5 March 
1903, 6.  
97 Forrest 1993, 446. 
98 Ronald Jacobs, “Producing the News, Producing the Crisis: Narrativity, Television and News 
Work”, Media, Culture and Society, 18, No. 3, 1996, 381.  
99 Hamilton 1999, 195. 
100 Ibid., 207. 
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remembrance because the stories were attractive to popular history retelling 
involving melodrama. As Hamilton states:  
… the disaster keeps a tenuous hold in localized popular memory,
claimed as another kind of remembering. It persists, despite being 
absent from the wider canon of heroic tragedies that are worthy of public 
memorializing.101  
Similarly, the pearling disaster of 1899 was not something that most of the Australian 
colonialists appeared to find worthy. The attempt by journalists to employ the 
narrative strategy of the hero failed because it did not conform with the contemporary 
literary narratives involving tropicality. The heroes in the pearling disaster were not 
European. As previously stated, the social discourse in all colonies was the 
anticipation of the exclusion of aliens (who, in the pearling crews, constituted nearly 
all the dead) from a White Australia. Irwin-Zarecka points out that an event “which 
does not fit with the established structures of thinking and feeling is very likely to be 
excluded from remembrance.”102 I would add that, like the Rodney disaster, the 
pearling disaster was spatially restricted, to one geographical place, and it was also 
temporally restricted, to about two weeks of news in colonial newspapers, reprised 
briefly in later published coronial inquests or family notices, but generally quickly 
subsumed by other news. As Hamilton also explains, “disasters are not usually 
regarded as the substance of scholarly work by historians; it is left rather to other 
storytellers to keep these tales alive in the cultural imagination.”103 Hayden White 
points out that an historical event cannot be separated from its retelling, and that the 
retelling is central to how the past is remembered.104 In the case of the pearling 
disaster, it was left to journalists to later retell the event as a popular, narrative non-
fiction history, and they struggled to find a narrative that resonated. 
101 Ibid., 208. 
102 Iwona Irwin-Zarecka, Frames of Remembrance. The Dynamics of Collective Memory, New Jersey: 
Transaction Publishers, 1994, 121. 
103 Hamilton 1999, 197. 
104 Hayden White, “The Historical Text as Literary Artifact”, Clio: An Interdisciplinary Journal of 
Literature, History, and the Philosophy of History, 3, 1974, 277–303. 
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Graph 4.2 Newspaper articles mentioning the 1899 pearling disaster published in Australia for 1900–
1974 (from sources collected from Trove, National Library of Australia).  
Graph 4.2 shows how the retelling of the pearling disaster between 1899 and 1974 
does not follow any pattern of memorial anniversaries. The spike in reports in 1903 
follows cyclone Leonta damaging Townsville. The spike in 1909 reflects the 
syndication in newspapers of an article referring to “Notable Events” in Queensland 
history and briefly mentioning the 1899 disaster, as do the spikes in 1927 and 1929. 
The first significant narrative retelling of the 1899 disaster occurred six days after a 
severe cyclone struck the coast north of Port Douglas on 11 March 1934, causing 
extensive damage to pearling fleets and killing 75 people. The first article mentioning 
the 1899 disaster published after the 1934 cyclone used the Outridge booklet as its 
source, and that article appears to be the basis for subsequent articles over the next 
two years.105 ABC Radio in the 1930s or 1940s ran a narrative non-fiction 
dramatisation of the event featuring Moira Newi’s rescue of two white men (see 
Chapter Three),106 but cyclone Mahina was rarely mentioned, and never as the sole 
cause of the disaster. It was not until 1971 that Holthouse declared it to be “Mahina’s 
responsibility alone.”107    
105 “1899 Holocaust Recalled”, 7. The article states that its source was a memorial booklet provided 
by Charles Vidgen. Charles was the brother of H. G. Vidgen, manager of the Olive. 
106 Charles Porter, “The Pearling Fleet Disaster 1899”, Brisbane: Australian Broadcasting 
Commission, n. d., BP257/1, 69/12, NAA. 
107 Hector Holthouse, Cyclone, Adelaide: Rigby, 1971, 15. One newspaper article in 1955, however, 
did link it to Mahina before 1971. See “Looking at Queensland”, Beaudesert Times, 30 December 
1955, 6.   
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Trauma and forgetting 
Trauma is another aspect of the pearling disaster that undermined the collective 
memory. Psychological trauma plays a role in forgetting, when survivors withdraw 
emotionally and suppress memory.108 For an event that killed about 300 people and 
was directly experienced by as many as 2,000 at sea and ashore, few personal 
reminiscences post-disaster exist, which is unusual for Australian disasters. As 
Stuart Piggin points out, “disaster memories are particularly tenacious.”109 The 
reasons for forgetting 1899 are explained in Chapter Three, but there is evidence 
that psychological trauma played a significant role. In his study of the Mt Kembla 
coal mine disaster of 1902 (which he notes has been commemorated each year 
since), Piggin divided the long-term impact of disasters into three phases: The 
anniversary phase where a legend or memory is created, a survivor phase where the 
legend is defended, and the post-survivor phases where the legend is analysed.110 In 
the 1899 pearling disaster, the first two phases failed. It is only now, in the post-
survivor phase, that the memory of the pearling disaster, or the lack of it, is being 
analysed. Of course, mining disasters usually occur close to small, relatively 
homogenous, close knit mining communities near the disaster site, where there are 
opportunities for commemoration, community support, and reflection. The 1899 
pearling disaster was remote and involved disparate communities that, while they 
shared a common purpose and experience, were fragmented and racially 
segregated.  
There is evidence that the isolation of families, unable to find support, may have also 
contributed to long-term trauma and forgetting. The family of the master of the 
Channel Rock Lightship, Gustaf Fuhrman, suffered considerably after Fuhrman 
drowned when the lightship sank in the disaster. Fuhrman was 46, leaving a wife and 
five children. He had a salary of £175 a year,111 but his widow, Helena, received only 
a £75 grant from the government after his death.112 Helena Fuhrman died of 
108 Hunt 2010, 8. 
109 Stuart Piggin, “The Mt Kembla Mine Disaster, 1902: Quarrying the Seams of Evidence 
to Assay the Human Response,” in Peter Hinton (ed.), Disasters: Image and Context, Sydney 
Association for Studies in Society and Culture, 1992, 11. 
110 Ibid., 14 
111 Public Service Board Queensland, Blue Book of Queensland, 1899. 
112 “Bystander's Note-Book”, Worker (Brisbane), 30 December 1899, 5.  
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“Pulmonary TB, general wasting and exhaustion” on 10 November 1901.113 The 
couple’s eldest daughter, Teresa, also died from tuberculosis in 1904, aged 16,114 
and the four surviving children were adopted out to two different families. The two 
sons lost contact with the two daughters. The living descendants of Gustaf Fuhrman 
state that their family rarely spoke to them about the disaster and its consequences, 
and they feel that there is a gap in their family history that they have found difficult to 
fill. In January 2011, one of Gustaf Fuhrman’s descendants, Robin Fuhrman-Luck, 
posted a message in Brisbane’s Sunday Mail asking for other descendants to 
contact him,115 but he received no reply. It was not until another of Fuhrman’s great 
grandsons, Jim McIntyre, contacted me, as the author of a novel, The Devil’s Eye, 
based on the disaster, that two branches of the family were reunited. One of the 
aspects that linked the experiences of all descendants was that, while all were aware 
that their ancestor drowned in a cyclone, they had no family memories of the disaster 
and their parents and grandparents never talked about the traumatic events that 
followed it. The descendants are unsure why the orphaned siblings, their 
grandparents, were separated. Beverley McGowan, a granddaughter of Oscar, one 
of Gustaf Fuhrman’s two sons, stated: “It has left a great ancestral hole in our 
upbringing because we weren’t even, like, I don’t think we even had a conversation 
until I was about 14.”116 James McIntyre is the grandson of Helena, one of Gustaf 
Fuhrman’s two daughters: “I heard that my great-grandfather was a ship’s captain, 
there was a terrible storm and he died in that storm. They didn’t share anything 
about Helena being orphaned from it and the Fuhrman-Luck side of things. … so 
that’s all we were told as kids; there’d been a terrible storm and he was a ship’s 
captain.”117  
Psychoanalyst M. Gerard Fromm describes overwhelming, unbearable traumatic 
experiences that “fall out of social discourse, but very often on to and into the next 
113 Death Certificate of Helena Fuhrman, 10 November 1901, Queensland Births, Death and 
Marriages Registry, Brisbane, 1901/1846. 
114 Death Certificate of Teresa Honora Fuhrman, 27 January 1904, Queensland Births, Death and 
Marriages Registry, Brisbane, 1904/4376. 
115 “Hard-to-Find Items? Long-Lost Friends or Family? Arranging a Reunion? Ask Our Readers for 
Help”, Sunday Mail, 16 January 2011, 53. 
116 Beverley McGowan in an interview with Ian Townsend, 10 May 2017. 
117 James McIntyre in an interview with Ian Townsend, 10 May 2017. 
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generation.”118 Trauma often involves family silences, which develop when children 
try to protect traumatised parents by shunning a subject that causes distress and 
when families “collude to maintain these silences to protect themselves and the 
survivor from post trauma reactions.”119 The consequence can be a third generation 
aware of a conspiracy of silence and bereft of knowledge. For the Fuhrman 
descendants, there is no direct personal memory of the disaster, and the memories 
of the disaster that exist are the result of family research undertaken in recent years. 
The memories that have been re-introduced by this research feature two of the 
myths of the cyclone that were created by narrative non-fiction authors: The deaths 
of 100 Aboriginal people as described by Holthouse (see Chapter Three), and 
Wragge’s claim that the disaster was caused by the meeting of two cyclones. This is 
described by another of Fuhrman’s descendants, Robin Fuhrman-Luck: “One came 
across from the Gulf, one came from out in the Coral Sea, and they met at Bathurst 
Bay.”120 That these myths resonate for the family, and that they were created after 
the event by narrative non-fiction authors, reveals the significance of the narrative 
form to history. It points to a perceived gap in a narrative of the pearling disaster that 
the authors felt needed to be filled by a contemporary cultural construct, and an 
explanation for the unpredictability of the disaster. These additions to the narrative 
appear to have made it more memorable.  
Conclusion 
Despite the loss of about 300 lives, the pearling disaster of 1899 failed to resonate 
as a national tragedy, and the reasons why can be understood through social, 
political, and media contexts pre-disaster and post-disaster. The political and racial 
discourses that dominated the debates over Federation, especially the anticipation of 
a White Australia, provided the framework for the initial newspaper reports of the 
disaster and, therefore, what was to be included in the collective memory. The media 
framed the disaster as a foreign one. The “alien question”, referring to the political 
118 M. Gerrard Fromm, “Introduction”, in M. Gerard Fromm (ed.), Lost in Transmission: Studies of 
Trauma Across Generations, London: Karnac, 2012, (ebook). 
119 Michelle R. Ancharoff, James F. Munroe, and Lisa M. Fisher, “The Legacy of Combat Trauma. 
Clinical Implications of lntergenerational Transmission”, in Yael Danieli (ed.), International Handbook 
of Multigenerational Legacies of Trauma, New York: Plenum Press, 1998, 263.  
120 Robin Fuhrman-Luck in an interview with Ian Townsend, 10 May 2017. Fuhrman-Luck said he 
began to research his family “about 10 years ago.” 
166 
and social debate about the benefits of foreign labour against the perceived threat to 
British racial purity, was already being addressed in the plebiscites of 1899, and the 
disastrous hurricane that caused the pearling disaster was also seen as a timely and 
symbolic answer to a political issue.121 As a reflection of the social discourses, the 
Outridge memorial booklet, published for the families and friends of the European 
victims of the disaster, was never meant to be an historical narrative. It was a cultural 
narrative and a work of journalism that should be treated with caution and yet it, and 
other accounts based on it, have been used by researchers as authoritative sources 
for data.122  
Similarly, Wragge’s version of events was to later form part of official accounts and 
contribute to myths that were to persist about the disaster, including that it was 
caused by two cyclones colliding over Cape York. Wragge is credited for naming and 
forecasting the cyclone that caused the pearling disaster, but a review of his reports 
and weather charts shows that he revised his narrative to fit the event in hindsight. 
Newspaper reports did not associate Mahina with the pearling disaster at the time. 
Wragge’s narrative device of personifying weather disturbances played a role in the 
collective memory of other weather events,123 but he failed to forecast the cyclone 
that caused the pearling disaster. The “literary gymnastic efforts”124 that he employed 
in his forecasts undermined the gravity of the disaster and rankled with readers and 
even some newspapers which published them, which described them as “strange in 
a sober meteorological report.”125 That, coupled with the excuses Wragge made for 
not forecasting the event, further undermined the contemporary cultural narrative. By 
way of comparison, cyclone Tracy, which struck Darwin in 1974, did resonate as a 
national disaster because the cyclone’s name was immediately linked to the event 
and, as West notes, Tracy quickly became associated with the existing national 
ANZAC myth because the Australian military was involved in relief operations.126   
121 “Settling the Alien Difficulty”, NQR, 20 March 1899, 25.  
122 “Tropical Cyclone Wave Modelling”, Shore to Sea, Australian Maritime College, University of 
Tasmania, 1, July 2012, 37. 
123 This was the case with Emma in 1897. See “Mr. Wragge's Spirits of the Storm”, Age (Melbourne), 
20 March 1897, 7; “Mr. Wragge's ‘Emma’”, Argus (Melbourne), 11 August 1910, 10. 
124 “Another Great Sorrow”, Telegraph (Brisbane), 14 March 1899, 4. 
125 “Blacks and Blankets”, Evening News (Sydney), 13 March 1899, 4. 
126 West 2000, 198. 
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Newspaper reporting of the 1899 disaster was temporally restricted, and the event 
was spatially restricted, which also limited the impact it had on the national 
discourse. The conventional narrative strategies of the media, in identifying bravery 
and “good victims,”127 could also not be applied to the European community which 
constituted the media audience, because most of the Europeans who experienced 
the destructive centre of the cyclone died. The application of such narratives to the 
non-European crews did not resonate because of racial stereotyping. A heavily 
racialised political debate had already painted “aliens” as the antithesis of those who 
were to be citizens of a new White Australia. The disaster affected three distinct and 
disparate communities, so there was no one encompassing, consistent narrative. 
Finally, the psychological trauma of survivors and families, and their reluctance or 
inability to speak privately or publicly, also contributed to collective forgetting. There 
is evidence of intergenerational trauma, which short-circuited the family memories of 
the disaster. This social forgetting may have also contributed to a lack of academic 
interest in the disaster by social scientists, and therefore allowed myths to be 
perpetuated in the historical record and official and scientific databases.  
The methodology in this thesis has dispelled the myths to produce better evidence 
for the disaster. The following chapter will show how better data from historical 
inquiry can contribute to science, by reconstructing significant aspects of the 1899 
cyclone that may help communities prepare for future disasters.  
127 Hamilton 1999, 200. 
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CHAPTER 5 
The Storm Tide: Applying History to Science 
We need to understand what caused such a very large storm surge as 
there [are] other parts of the Queensland coast with similar complicated 
bathymetry.  
BOM severe weather forecaster, Jeffrey Callaghan.1 
This chapter will show how historical evidence produced by the methodology can be 
applied to models of the 1899 cyclone, to prepare for future disasters. The 
Queensland Disaster Management Act 2003 guideline on mitigating the impacts of 
cyclones considers “worst case” scenario predictions for storm tides.2 One of the 
problems with preparing for natural disasters caused by cyclones is that few people 
know what a worst case looks like. Category Five cyclones passing directly over 
populated areas and producing damaging storm tides have been so infrequently 
recorded that it is difficult to get a statistically significant sample.3 In the case of the 
1899 cyclone, the damaging eye passed over and near a relatively large number of 
trained weather observers, including ships captains who recorded the event with 
barometers and by taking reliable observations, making the event almost unique. 
That a wooden sailing vessel, Crest of the Wave, survived the eye of a Category 
Five cyclone, and that a Native Police patrol survived a world record storm tide at the 
place it came ashore, is remarkable. Data from the cyclone provides an opportunity 
to learn from a rare event and the value of surviving observations to scientists and 
emergency managers is recognised in the numerous academic papers that have 
1 Jeffrey Callaghan, “Our Interpretation”, BOM, Brisbane, 2006, 4. (Typed notes courtesy of Jeffrey 
Callaghan.) 
2 Queensland Government, Queensland Prevention Preparedness, Response and Recovery Disaster 
Management Guideline, Queensland Fire and Emergency Services, 2017, 27. 
https://www.disaster.qld.gov.au/dmg/Documents/QLD-Disaster-Management-Guideline.pdf (accessed 
21 March 2019). Government risk assessments include the use of historical analysis “to cover the 
spectrum of most likely to credible worst case scenarios using geospatial intelligence.”  
3 Bruce Harper, “Storm Tide Threat in Queensland: History, Prediction and Relative Risks”, 
Conservation Technical Report No. 10, RE 208, Department of Environment and Heritage, 1999, 5. 
“The historical rarity of severe storm tides along the Queensland coast, and more particularly at any 
specific location, precludes the use of basic statistical methods using measured water level data for 
the estimation of long term risk.” Bruce Harper, Stan Stroud, Michael McCormack, and Steve West, “A 
Review of Historical Tropical Cyclone Intensity in Northwestern Australia and Implications for Climate 
Change Trend Analysis”, Australian Meteorological Magazine, 57, 2008, 121–141. The study notes 
that the eyes of fewer than 20 of 900 cyclones in the Australian database passed directly over an 
instrument that could reliably measure them.  
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been published using data associated with those observations. As discussed in this 
thesis, much of the data referring to the 1899 cyclone and appearing in the scientific 
literature come from secondary sources which can be shown to have been shaped 
by media errors as well as social and political narratives. The current entry for the 
1899 cyclone in the Australian Government’s database on disasters, the Disaster 
Resilience Knowledge Hub, is a compilation of some of that secondary source data: 
On 4 March 1899, a Category Five cyclone hit Bathurst Bay with winds 
reaching 260 kilometres per hour. A tsunami of 14.6 metres swept inland 
for five kilometres. A wave surge measuring 13 metres at Ninian Bay 
(adjacent to Barrow Point, 30 kilometres south of Bathurst Bay) 
extended inland for three to five kilometres. At Bathurst Bay, near 
Princess Charlotte Bay (Cape York), at least 307 crew members died 
from a pearling fleet of over 100 vessels plus other craft (with 152 sunk 
or wrecked, some found kilometres inland) as a result of the storm 
surge. Over 100 Aboriginal people died trying to help the shipwrecked.4 
In fact, the cyclone crossed the coast on 5 March, the winds were not measured, and 
there was no tsunami. The methodology used in this thesis shows that there is a 
reliable report of a storm tide that may be as high as 13 metres, but that height was 
not measured and is yet to be corroborated. It was not reported at Ninian Bay. 
Although the death toll may have exceeded 300, there is evidence for fewer than 300 
deaths. Fewer than 60 vessels were lost, and none was found kilometres inland. 
There is no evidence that 100 Aboriginal people died, but there is evidence (as 
shown in Chapter Three) that this figure was invented in 1971.  
Most previous attempts to map the path of the 1899 cyclone and corroborate the 
height of its storm surge have also relied on untested data from secondary sources. 
This chapter will demonstrate how historical inquiry can reveal unreliable data in 
scientific and government databases, and produce credible data in which scientists 
and emergency managers can have more confidence. This thesis will show how an 
historical methodology, described in Chapter One, can reveal the cyclone’s likely 
track and the elements that contributed to the storm tide associated with the cyclone. 
4 Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience, “Cyclone Mahina 1899”, Disaster Resilience Knowledge 
Hub, https://knowledge.aidr.org.au/resources/cyclone-cyclone-mahina-cape-york-queensland 
(accessed 7 February 2019).  
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The cyclone’s track: previous studies 
Understanding the tracks of past cyclones, and the factors that influence them, helps 
scientists better predict cyclones. Cyclogenesis, the formation of the cyclone, was 
discussed in Chapter Two. The Queensland Government meteorologist, Clement 
Wragge, on 24 February 1899, described a tropical disturbance he named Tirau 300 
miles (about 480 kilometres) north of New Caledonia.5 The technological limitations 
of the era meant that Wragge could not have known where the disturbance was 
centred, but he described an area of low pressure probably imbedded in a monsoon 
trough south of the Louisiade Archipelago in what was then British New Guinea. This 
is a common region of cyclogenesis in the Coral and Solomon seas. The cyclone is 
likely to have formed in this area a week to ten days before it struck Cape Melville. 
Previous attempts have been made to assess its track. Clement Wragge 
reconstructed a track for the Outridge booklet when it was published in September 
1899 (Figure 5.1) but, as described in Chapter Four, this was a revision of his daily 
weather charts in which the disturbance he had renamed Mahina never crossed the 
coast.6  
Most modern reconstructions have the cyclone tracking from the north-east. 
However, meteorologist H. A. Hunt in 1914 had the cyclone coming from the north-
north-east (Figure 5.2)7 and in 2011 meteorologist Jeffrey Callaghan proposed the 
cyclone came from the north, because the wind at midnight near Pelican Island 
veered south-east to south-west, as well as other observations (Figure 5.6). 
The Crest of the Wave in Bathurst Bay reported that the wind only began 
to increase between 11 p.m. and midnight whereas Olive near Pelican 
Island reported that the gales began at 10 p.m. This northerly track 
would also be more likely to bring large waves into Bathurst Bay and 
Barrow Point as … there is more open water northwest of Cape Melville 
inside the reef and the largest breaks in the reef are north of Cape 
Melville.8  
5 “The Weather”, Telegraph (Brisbane), 24 February 1899, 8. 
6 “Meteorology of Australasia and Oceania”, Brisbane Courier, 16 March 1899, 6. Wragge, ten days 
after the disaster, wrote that, “all danger from a threatening disturbance ‘Mahina’ appears to have 
passed away.” 
7 H. A. Hunt, Results of Rainfall Observations Made in Queensland, Melbourne: Albert J. Mullett, 
Government Printer, 1914, 146. 
8 “Meteorology of Australasia and Oceania”, 6. 
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Figure 5.1 Wragge’s 1899 cyclone track (Anonymous 1899, 15).
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Figure 5.2 Government meteorologist H. A. Hunt in 1914 proposed the “Bathurst Bay Hurricane” track marked J. (Hunt 1914, 146).   
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Figure 5.3 Whittingham’s 1958 cyclone reconstruction (Whittingham 1958, 22). 
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Figure 5.4 The estimated track of cyclone Mahina (Nott and Hayne 2000, 11). 
Figure 5.5 Two tracks considered for the 1899 cyclone (Nott et al. 2014, 759). 
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Figure 5.6 A northerly track for the 1899 cyclone (Callaghan 2011). 
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As with most attempts to reconstruct the cyclone’s path and storm surge, this is 
based on data from the secondary source 1899 Outridge booklet and meteorologist 
Herbert E. Whittingham’s 1958 analysis of that booklet. However, the change of wind 
direction near Pelican Island after midnight is also consistent with a cyclone 
approaching from the east. At 4.30 a.m., when the Crest of the Wave reported its 
lowest pressure, followed by a lull, the schooner was no longer in Bathurst Bay, but 
had dragged its anchor north 15 to 20 kilometres. The methodology also shows that 
the Crest of the Wave did report the wind increasing earlier in the night,9 and that 
Kenny was not in Ninian Bay, but 13 kilometres south at Wakooka Creek. This is not 
to criticise Callaghan, who used the best evidence available to him at the time, but to 
demonstrate that historical inquiry using an historical methodology can produce data 
that is more credible than data from secondary sources, and reveal different 
hypotheses for the tracks of cyclones. 
The cyclone’s track: a new hypothesis 
As described in Chapter One, there have been efforts in the US since 1990 to review 
the National Hurricane Centers Hurricane Database (HURDAT), to extend its dataset 
of Atlantic hurricanes back into the 19th century.10 Scientists have applied algorithms 
to historic data to try to better establish the tracks of cyclones, to understand the 
factors influencing those tracks. It is not the intention of this thesis to apply the data 
produced by the historical methodology to tracking algorithms. That is the job of 
scientists. However, using simple models, some of the data, such as reports of 
damage and the observations of wind direction, can be shown to better indicate the 
cyclone’s track. Part of the purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate how historical 
inquiry can produce new hypotheses for the cyclone’s movement and behaviour. 
Understanding better the cyclone’s track can also help corroborate other historical 
data, such as the observations of the world record storm tide. Previous scientific 
9 William Field Porter, “The Great Hurricane at Queensland. A Struggle for Life. An Aucklander and 
His Wife and Child. Forcing the Blacks to the Pumps”, New Zealand Herald (Supplement), 1 April 
1899, 1. Porter wrote: “About nine p.m. it got worse and blew fearfully hard, the glass going down 
fast.” 
10 Christopher W. Landsea et al., “The Atlantic Hurricane Database Reanalysis Project”, in Richard J. 
Murnane and Kam-Biu Liu (eds), Hurricanes and Typhoons: Past, Present and Future, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2004, 177–221; Christopher W. Landsea, “Counting Atlantic Tropical 
Cyclones Back to 1900”, EOS, 88, 2007,197–200. 
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studies have estimated the 1899 cyclone’s track based on incomplete data and 
data discredited by this thesis. For these reasons, a simple model has been 
devised to estimate the 1899 cyclone’s track using the better data. 
Buys Ballot’s Law states that, in the Northern Hemisphere, the centre of a cyclone is 
on the observer’s left when facing downwind.11 In the Southern Hemisphere, the 
reverse is the case, with the centre on the right with the wind at the observer’s back. 
The rule suggests that the centre of the cyclone can be estimated by drawing a line 
perpendicular to wind direction, but this assumes that winds revolving around the 
centre of cyclone follow gradients of atmospheric pressure (represented on weather 
maps by isobars) that are circular, whereas the winds tend to cross the isobars as 
they spiral in towards the eye wall. To estimate better the centre of a cyclone from 
historical observations I have applied Buys Ballot’s Law and accounted for inflow 
(the angle of deviation of the wind from the pressure gradient) which usually varies in 
cyclones between 15 and 30 degrees and reduces to zero in the eye wall. A study of 
18 US hurricanes in 2012 found the mean inflow angle was 22.6 degrees.12 (Some 
Australian models assume an angle of inflow in tropical cyclones of 25 degrees, 
based on a 1973 US study.13 For the purposes of this hypothesis I will use the more 
recent study and assume the inflow to be 22.6 degrees outside the eye wall, and 
zero in the eye wall.) I have also considered a margin of error for the practice used in 
1899 of describing wind direction as compass bearings. The difference between 
south-south-east and south-east, for example, is 22.5 degrees. If a ship’s captain 
described the wind as being from the south-south-east, he meant it was more likely 
to be from this direction than from south or south-east, implying a margin of error 
associated with those compass point observations of 11.5 degrees. Combining 
several observations should indicate a position for the cyclone on which the 
observers agree, in an area where the observations and their margins of error 
11 H. E. Willoughby and M. Chelmow, ”Objective Determination of Hurricane Tracks from Aircraft 
Observations”, Monthly Weather Review, 110, 1982, 1298. Dutch meteorologist Christophorus Buys 
Ballot proposed the rule for finding the centre of storms in 1857.  
12 Jun Zhang and Eric Uhlhorn, “Hurricane Sea Surface Inflow Angle and an Observation-Based 
Parametric Model”, Monthly Weather Review, 140, No. 11, 2012, 3587. The authors conclude: “The 
mean inflow angle in hurricanes is found to be −22.6° ± 2.2° (95% confidence).”   
13 Bruce Harper, T. Hardy, L. Mason, L. Bode, I. Young, and P. Nielsen, Queensland Climate Change 
and Community Vulnerability to Tropical Cyclones, Ocean Hazards Assessment. Stage 1 Report, 
Department of Natural Resources and Mines, Queensland, Brisbane, 2001, 45.  
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overlap. Ideally (although this is not always possible because of gaps in observations 
at the time) triangulation, from three observations north and south of the cyclone’s 
path at approximately the same time, will provide a more accurate estimate of the 
cyclone’s location. Using Appendix 2 (Observations Relevant to Remodelling the 
Cyclone), three timeframes are used as examples to estimate the positions of the 
cyclone over time, and therefore the probable track. The observations taken when 
the cyclone is closest to the coast, and therefore to the observers, are likely to give a 
more accurate position.  
 
The most reliable observations at 11 p.m and. 11.30 p.m. on 4 March 1899 were 
from the schooner Aladdin in the Claremont Islands, the Crest of the Wave in 
Bathurst Bay, and Constable Kenny at Wakooka Creek (Figure 5.7).14 Other 
observations support the hypothesis, but are less reliable. (For example, an 
observation from the North Wales near Noble Island, east of Wakooka Creek, comes 
from a passenger.) The Aladdin at 11 p.m. reported the wind from the south-west, 
the Crest of the Wave the wind veering to the south, and Kenny at Wakooka Creek 
the wind from the south-south-east (see Appendix 2). The reading of the Crest of the 
Wave is credible, although the winds striking the mountains at Cape Melville may 
have been deflected. To satisfy all credible observations, the hypothesis puts the 
centre of the cyclone about 60 kilometres east-north-east of Cape Melville at 11.30 
p.m. on 4 March (Figure 5.7). 
 
 
                                                
14 It is impossible to determine precisely the cyclone’s position from the observations because the 
estimates, although the best evidence, are approximate, but a position can be established for the 
purposes of the hypothesis using margins of error and, where possible, triangulation.  
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Figure 5.7 The approximate position of the 1899 cyclone at 11.30 p.m. The red lines at the observation points show wind direction. The short yellow lines are 
the tangents to the pressure gradients (with two lines showing maximum margins of error either side), found by allowing for angle of inflow of the wind. The 
centre of the cyclone will be along the long yellow lines which are perpendicular to the tangents (Google Earth).  
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The observations from the schooner Meg Merrilies and the cutter Spray just after 
midnight suggest the cyclone was 40 kilometres east-north-east of Cape Melville 
(Figure 5.8). The Rattler’s observation before midnight was that the wind was south-
east, which puts the cyclone on the same track, but further east, as would be 
expected for an earlier time. The Rattler is reported to have sunk about midnight. 
The Spray after midnight was aground on Stapleton Island and appears to be close 
to the eye wall where the angle of wind deviation from the pressure gradient would 
be negligible or zero. Again, the observations give only an approximation of the 
cyclone’s centre, but they agree on a position that puts the Spray just south of the 
eye.15  
At 4.30 a.m. on Sunday (Figure 5.9), Captain Porter aboard the Crest of the Wave 
recorded a low pressure of 26inHg (880hPa).16 This was recorded not in the calm 
eye, but in the eye wall of the cyclone. He wrote to his father the next day that, 
“about 4.30 a.m. … the barometer was down to 26. Then came a lull.”17 The 
Outridge booklet described the lull as lasting 10 to 15 minutes,18 and Porter told his 
father it was followed by the wind from the north-west. Porter could have only 
recorded these observations at the top of the cyclone’s eye, inside the calm eye, but 
near the eye wall. 
15 The estimated position of the cyclone is not just a matter of having observations in agreement at a 
specific time, but also of them being consistent with observations at other times. For example, the 
most southerly possible interpretation of the Meg Merrilies observation at midnight has the cyclone 
already crossing the coast south of Cape Melville, which is inconsistent with all later observations, 
including the Crest of the Wave’s 4.30 a.m. observation of the eye, the area of destruction, and the 
arrival of the storm tide. All credible observations over time can be compared to increase the level of 
confidence in the cyclone’s track.  
16 This was later revised to 4.45 a.m. and 27inHg in “Log Crest of the Wave”, in John Douglas, 
“Report of the Government Resident at Thursday Island for 1898”, QVP, 1, 1899, 100. That report 
described “a short lull.” The earliest primary sources, including Porter’s letter to his parents, are the 
more credible for the lowest recorded pressure. 
17 Porter, “The Great Hurricane at Queensland. A Struggle for Life”, 1. 
18 Anonymous, The Pearling Disaster, 1899: A Memorial, Brisbane: Outridge Printing Company, 1899, 
26.
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Figure 5.8 The approximate position of the 1899 cyclone at 1 a.m. (Google Earth).  
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Figure 5.9 The approximate position of the 1899 cyclone at 4.30 a.m. (Google Earth). 
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About 50 kilometres south-east of Porter, on the other side of the centre, Kenny did 
not experience the calm eye, suggesting the eye to his north was less than 50 
kilometres wide. Kenny at 5 a.m. reported the wind shifting north-east. Also by 5 
a.m., Porter was back in the eye with north-westerly winds.19 The angle of inflow in
the eye wall is negligible, the wind, having been drawn to the centre, now rotating in 
a circle. The diameter of the cyclone’s eye appears to have been no more than 50 
kilometres, but probably no less than 40 kilometres, if it was to pass between the 
Crest of the Wave and Kenny at Wakooka Creek, but also place the schooner and 
Kenny in or near the eye wall at 5 a.m.20 The eye wall also appears to have started 
crossing the Cape after 3 a.m., which coincides with the swamping of several 
luggers near the tip of the Cape between 3 a.m. and 4 a.m.21 Porter’s 4.30 a.m. 
observation puts the eye’s centre over Cape Melville at 4.30 a.m. The estimated 
positions of the cyclone at 11.30 p.m., 1 a.m., and 4.30 a.m. can therefore be shown. 
For this hypothesis, the cyclone’s calm eye is 40 to 45 kilometres in diameter and 
the cyclone may have been travelling about 12 kilometres an hour west-south-west 
when it crossed the coast. (It travelled 60 kilometres in five hours between 11.30 
p.m. and 4.30 a.m.) The Thursday Island Government Resident John Douglas 
toured the area on 12 March and described the damage to vegetation:  
Bewick Island, or Howick No. 5 [sic], appeared to be the southern limit of 
the cyclone. At Newton Island, south of Bewick, there appeared to us no 
indication of the storm, the vegetation being untouched, whereas 
between Bewick and Hannah Island everything in the shape of trees or 
grass had been swept clean. 
Hannah Island in 1898 was a low island two miles in circumference “covered with 
bushes and has a few trees.”22 It is not clear if Douglas was describing Hannah 
19 The cutter Spray, 30 kilometres north-east of Kenny’s position, did not report the calm eye, which 
passed to its north. Two men, Albert and Moses, whose lugger Little Bill was wrecked at Boulder 
Rocks at the tip of Cape Melville around midnight, tried to swim for the Cape, but were blown north-
east by a south-westerly wind onto Pipon Island, suggesting the centre of the approaching eye would 
pass south of them.  
20 A. R. Vidgen,“Northern Hurricanes”, Telegraph (Brisbane), 17 April 1899, 5. Vidgen paraphrased 
Kenny: “At 5 a.m. [the wind] shifted to north-east, and if possible blew harder than ever, with torrents 
of rain.” 
21 “The Late Hurricane. Letter from Mr. James Clark”, Brisbane Courier, 15 May 1899, 7. These 
luggers sank otherwise undamaged and were later salvaged. 
22 Charles B. Yule and G. A. Browning, Great Britain, Hydrographic Department, Australia Directory. 
Compiled Chiefly from Various Surveys Made by Order of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty 
Volume ii, 5th edition, London: Hydrographic Office, Admiralty, 1898, 386. 
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Island also being swept clean, but the area of destruction was south of Hannah 
Island and in a strip about 90 kilometres wide that followed the cyclone’s track. It was 
particularly marked on the southern side of the cyclone, from Cape Melville to Cape 
Bowen (Figure 5.10).23 This is the area where the forward movement of the cyclone 
produced the strongest winds. As the cyclone moved inland it weakened and slowed, 
but in the early hours of 6 March it was powerful enough to destroy most buildings in 
the town of Musgrave, 130 kilometres west-south-west of Cape Melville, and level 
the telegraph line for 50 kilometres north of the town and an unknown distance 
south,24 suggesting the cyclone maintained its track west-south-west for at least 20 
hours after crossing the coast. The cyclone appears to have eventually swung south 
and shipping reports suggest it may have crossed the coast back into the Coral Sea 
north of Townsville around 9 March.25  
23 See James P. Terry, Tropical Cyclones Climatology and Impacts in the South Pacific, New York: 
Springer, 2007, 69. “The maximum rise in sea level from surge and wind-driven waves is felt from 20 
to 50 km to the left of the storm track as the cyclone passes.” This corresponds with the area of 
destruction described ashore in 1899. 
24 “Late Bowen Cyclone”, Brisbane Courier, 14 March 1899, 4. 
25 "Hurricane Off Cooktown", Capricornian (Rockhampton), 18 March 1899, 25. “On Thursday evening 
[9 March] Captain Haswell [of the steamer Kasuga Maru] found it necessary to anchor all night under 
the lee of Palm Islands, owing to the rapidly falling glass.” 
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Figure 5.10 The 1899 cyclone’s track, idealised to satisfy all credible observations. The white line represents its west-south-westerly track. The area between 
the two red lines south of the eye represents the zone of strongest winds and rain, and area of highest predicted storm tide (satellite image Google Earth).  
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The storm tide 
There have been attempts to put a more accurate value on the height of the storm 
tide associated with the 1899 cyclone (Table 5.1). Many of these studies cite each 
other and their sources can be traced back to the 1899 Outridge booklet.  
Source Surge Storm tide Surge + Tide + Waves 
+ Run-up (m) 
Location 
Anonymous 189926 40ft 
(12.192m) 
Barrow Point 
Whittingham 195827 43ft (13.106m) Barrow Point 
Nelson 197528 13.7m Barrow Point 
Granger and Smith 199529 14m Barrow Point 
Harper 199930 14m Bathurst Bay 
Nott and Hayne 200031 5m Higher than storm tide Ninian Bay 
WMO 200632 13m Bathurst Bay 
Terry 200733 13m Bathurst Bay 
Disaster Resilience 
Knowledge Hub 201934 
14.6m Bathurst Bay 
Disaster Resilience 
Knowledge Hub 201935 
13m Ninian Bay 
Nott et al. 201436 9.1m 13m Ninian Bay 
Masters 201437 13–14.6m Bathurst Bay 
Table 5.1 Storm surge and tide levels attributed to cyclone Mahina (adapted from Hal F. Needham, 
Barry D. Keim, and David Sathiaraj, "A Review of Tropical Cyclone-Generated Storm Surges: Global 
Data Sources, Observations, and Impacts”, Reviews of Geophysics, 53, No. 2, 2015, 570.). 
26 Anonymous 1899, 18. 
27 H. E. Whittingham, “The Bathurst Bay Hurricane and Associated Storm Surge”, Australian 
Meteorological Magazine, 23, 1958, 32. 
28 R. C. Nelson, “Tropical Cyclone Storm Surges in Australia 1880 to 1970”, in Second Australian 
Conference on Coastal and Ocean Engineering, 1975: The Engineer, the Coast and the Ocean, 
Sydney: Institution of Engineers, Australia, 1975, 196. 
29 K. J. Granger and D. I. Smith, “Storm Tide Impact and Consequence Modelling: Some Preliminary 
Observations”, Mathematical and Computer Modelling, 21, No. 9, 1995, 15. 
30 Harper 1999, 4. 
31 Jonathan Nott and Matthew Hayne, “How High Was the Storm Surge from Tropical Cyclone 
Mahina? North Queensland, 1899”, Australian Journal of Emergency Management, 15, No. 1, Autumn 
2000, 13.  
32 WMO, “World Weather/Climate Extremes Archive”, https://wmo.asu.edu/content/tropical-cyclone-
largest-storm-surge-associated-tropical-cyclone (accessed 21 February 2019). 
33 Terry 2007, 67. 
34 Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience, “Cyclone Mahina 1899.”  
35 Ibid.  
36 Jonathan Nott, Camilla Green, Ian Townsend and Jeffrey Callaghan, “The World Record Storm 
Surge and the Most Intense Southern Hemisphere Tropical Cyclone: New Evidence and Modeling”, 
Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, 95, No. 5, May 2014, 765. 
37 Jeffrey Masters, “World Storm Surge Records”, Weather Underground wunderground.com, 2014, 
http://www.wunderground.com/hurricane/surge_world_records.asp (accessed 18 March 2019).  
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All are interpretations of one uncorroborated observation made by Kenny; that he 
was camped on “a ridge fully 40 feet above sea level and about half a mile from the 
beach” when “an immense tidal wave swept in shore and reached waist deep on the 
ridge” just after the wind veered to the north-east after 5 a.m.38 It is significant that all 
the reports listed can be traced to the same source and that there are eight different 
answers to the question, “How high was the storm surge/storm tide?” The original 
primary source for the data is not listed in the table and, apart from Nott and his 
colleagues, it is not cited by the authors. However, the impression given by the 
inclusion of the data in international and national databases, and in the scientific 
literature, is that the source is credible even though there is no evidence it had been 
tested. Even when the authors raise doubts about the data, there appears to have 
been no attempt made, apart from Nott and his colleagues, to find the original source 
for the data and test its credibility.    
Three scientific field trips to the area, though, have been conducted to look for 
corroborating physical evidence such as corals, shells and debris that might have 
been preserved at high elevation by waves from the cyclone. Nott and his colleagues 
looked for marine deposits in Ninian Bay and in a portion of Bowen Bay adjacent to 
the Barrow Point headland two kilometres south.39 In 2000, Jonathon Nott and 
Matthew Hayne had focussed their search for physical evidence on this northern 
section of Bowen Bay. In 2010, an honours student at James Cook University’s 
(JCU) School of Earth and Environmental Sciences, Camilla Green, conducted a 
field study at Ninian and Bowen bays, paying close attention to false indicators such 
as Aboriginal shell middens. Green also used sophisticated models to simulate 
storm tides in Ninian and Bowen bays from an 880hPa cyclone approaching from the 
north-east (Figure 5.11).  
While no debris was found at a height that could confirm Kenny’s description of the 
storm tide, models showed inundation to a height of 13 metres was theoretically 
possible by a combination of storm tide and wave setup. One model was of a 
cyclone with a minimum central pressure of 880hPa and a 30-kilometre radius of 
38 Vidgen, “Northern Hurricanes”, 5. 
39 Nott et al. 2014, 759. 
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maximum winds (the distance between the cyclone’s centre and the band of 
strongest winds around it) approaching the coast from the north-east and crossing at 
Cape Melville. It showed that such a scenario could produce a storm surge in the 
southern part of Bowen Bay of 8.279 metres around 4 a.m.40 (The simulation makes 
assumptions about the angle of approach of the cyclone to the coast, in this case 
from the north-east. As mentioned, the hypothesis of my thesis is based on evidence 
that the cyclone approached from the east-north-east, with the strongest winds 
blowing directly into Bowen Bay.) The simulated height in Green’s paper is based on 
a point further south in Bowen Bay than Kenny observed the storm tide, and outside 
the 30-kilometre radius of maximum winds (Figure 5.11. Kenny’s camp was midway 
between the points marked NB and XX). Kenny’s camp can now be shown in my 
thesis to be 30 kilometres south of the cyclone’s centre and therefore in the path of 
the strongest winds in that particular model (Figure 5.11).   
Figure 5.11 Storm surge simulation sites and nominal north-east cyclone track from Green 2011. The 
site of Kenny’s camp was not known at the time, and has been added to Green’s map to show that it 
was half-way between the simulation points, at the head of Bowen Bay (adapted from Green 2011, 
70). 
40 Camilla Green, Quantifying the Height of the Storm Surge of Tropical Cyclone Mahina, Bathurst 
Bay, Qld, 1899, Honours Thesis for the Degree of Bachelor of Planning, JCU, Cairns, June 2011, 74. 
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Nott and his colleagues in 2014 had placed Kenny’s position at Ninian Bay for 
several reasons. It matched Kenny’s description of having reached Barrow Point (his 
destination presumed to be the Barrow Point headland that forms the eastern part of 
Ninian Bay), scientific models showed that a north-easterly track for a cyclone with a 
central pressure of 880hPa produced the highest storm surge in Ninian Bay (9.1 
metres), and a sand ridge of 6.6 metres behind the beach could be shown to be 
wave-constructed. The paper concluded that a storm tide of 9.75 metres is possible 
in Ninian Bay and that the remaining 3.25 metres of water at this site may be 
explained by waves and wave run-up.41 The paper did not explain the other 
significant observation of Kenny; that the sea flooded “between two and three miles” 
(3.2 to 4.8 kilometres) inland. This inundation is not possible at Ninian Bay, because 
there is no point behind the bay where the land remains below 20 metres further 
than half a kilometre inland. As a co-author of Nott et al., and in the process of 
further historical research for this thesis, I have now placed Kenny’s position more 
precisely, at the mouth of Wakooka Creek, 13 kilometres south of Ninian Bay. This is 
based on an analysis of historical documentary evidence using the historical 
methodology described in Chapter One, followed by a visual survey of the site (see 
Chapter Three). The physical evidence observed at the site includes shells and 
stones that Daniel Gordon, a Traditional Owner and Cape Melville National Park 
Ranger, believes are evidence of an Aboriginal campsite. Geoscientific and 
archaeological surveys should be conducted before any conclusions can be made as 
to whether this corroborates any historical or geoscientific evidence. However, a 
hypothesis based on documentary evidence can be made explaining Kenny’s choice 
of this site to camp on the evening of 4 March (see also the description of the site in 
Chapter Two).  
The world record storm tide: A new hypothesis 
There have been three approaches to validating the height of the world record storm 
tide associated with the 1899 cyclone. The first approach was to search the historical 
archives for documentary evidence, the second to search for physical evidence for 
the storm tide, and the third to use available data to model the storm tide using the 
41 Nott et al. 2014, 764. 
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GCOM2D storm surge model.42 The world record storm tide height of 13 metres 
could not be validated by physical evidence, and therefore the data available to the 
storm surge model is restricted. New historical evidence and data based on the 
findings of this thesis form the basis of a new hypothesis that will help scientists 
better determine the height and nature of the storm tide.43 (The new data has not yet 
been applied to the GCOM2D model.) 
Questions remain about the validity of Porter’s observation of 26inHg (880hPa) and 
Kenny’s observation of being on a ridge 40 feet (about 12 metres) above sea level 
when a “tidal wave” came up to his waist. The atmospheric pressure recorded by 
Porter does not represent the cyclone’s central pressure because it was not 
recorded in the cyclone’s eye. The atmospheric pressure is lowest in the eye of a 
cyclone. Porter was under duress when reading his barometer because he believed 
his schooner was sinking. Although there is evidence that such a low barometric 
pressure was not believed at the time, the reason why the reading was later revised 
upward is unclear. Nevertheless, the methodology shows that the observations of 
Porter and Kenny are credible and remain the best evidence for the lowest pressure 
and the height of the storm tide. The two observations partly support each other (the 
height of a storm tide being a function of the cyclone’s central pressure).44 Green’s 
modelling, without knowing Kenny’s position, showed that a cyclone of 880hPa 
approaching from the north-east could produce a storm surge of 8.279 metres in the 
southern part of Bowen Bay and 9.1 metres in Ninian Bay, and the remaining three 
to four metres could be accounted for by wave setup. This modelling was based on 
several assumptions including the angle of approach of the cyclone to the coast. It 
does not therefore provide substantial evidence for the storm tide being as high as 
Kenny observed. Without physical evidence of debris for Kenny’s observation, the 
only other approach was to interrogate further the historical records, which has been 
the objective of this thesis, and to find the ridge on which he stood so it can be 
measured. 
42 Nott and Hayne 2000; Nott et al. 2014. The GCOM2D storm surge model was developed by 
Graeme D. Hubbert and Kathleen L. Mclnnes, “A Storm Surge Inundation Model for Coastal Planning 
and Impact Studies”, Journal of Coastal Research, 15, No. 1, 1999, 168–185. 
43 Camilla Green emails to Ian Townsend and 18 August 2010 – 18 October 2011. Jonathan Nott 
emails to Ian Townsend 14 December 2012 – 7 February 2013. Nott et al. 2014 and Green 2011 used 
and acknowledged historical data provided by me in their papers.  
44 Green 2011, 74. 
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How good an observer was Kenny? 
The methodology showed that the newspaper article based on the letter describing 
Kenny’s observation was credible. The letter’s author, A. R. Vidgen, was at the time 
a trained clerk and the manager of the Burns Philp store in Cooktown.45 His letter 
bypassed the telegraph and was handed directly to the Telegraph newspaper to be 
the source of what is today considered a world record storm tide. The letter can be 
judged credible, in that both Vidgen and Kenny were good witnesses close to the 
scene temporally and spatially, and had no reason to lie. This does not confer 
credibility to the data, however, and determining the height of coastal inundation 
Kenny witnessed depends on Kenny’s skills as an observer and on measuring the 
ridge on which he stood.  
Kenny, although in the Native Police, trained as a regular policeman and was a court 
witness in murder trials.46 As an armed patrol officer, he was required to make daily 
judgements of distance and height, but it would be unreasonable to consider his 
estimates as being as accurate as scientists might wish. It would be understood by 
those to whom he reported that he could judge distance and height adequately, 
within a level of uncertainty. This would be necessary for firing his weapons and 
calculating the width of a stream or the distance of a landmark. In 1897, when he 
was a Native Police officer stationed at Highbury, on the Mitchell River west of 
Cairns, he described in a letter to a friend a duck hunting expedition: “I had a good 
look at the river, which was about 250 yards here almost dry”; “I would be able to get 
within 50 yards of the ducks”; “I crawled along very careful untill [sic] about 70 yards 
from my ducks.”47 In this case, he considered the distance of the ducks to be closer 
to 70 yards than 60 yards or 80 yards. Kenny described the shooting distance of 
ducks in units no smaller than 10, because he had no means of measuring 
accurately under the circumstances. Such estimates of distance would paint a 
picture for a fellow shooter, who would understand the difficulty. 
45 Graham Taylor, a relative by marriage to A. R. Vidgen, in an email to Ian Townsend, 13 June 2018. 
46 Police Staff File, John Martin Kenny, A/38868, QSA, ID563796. 
47 Jack Kenny, Highbury Police Camp, letter to a friend (Alex), 11 November 1897, (courtesy of 
Kenny’s descendent Catherine Spooner). 
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Similarly, his description of the ridge being “fully 40 feet above sea level” cannot be 
taken as an exact measurement. Kenny also qualifies his estimate of “40 feet” by the 
word “fully”, meaning “at least” or to emphasise that it is not an exaggeration,48 but it 
does not mean exactly 40 feet. Kenny would not have measured the height above 
sea level and may not have meant mean sea level, but the observed level of the sea. 
There is no tidal gauge at Wakooka Creek. The normal tidal range at the two closest 
gauges today, Leggatt Island and Munro Reef, is 0.6 to 1.1 metres (between about 
two to 3.5 feet).49 In describing “40 feet” above the sea, Kenny is suggesting the 
ridge was closer to 40 feet than to 30 or 50 feet and so there is a level of uncertainty 
implied; plus or minus five feet. For this hypothesis, Kenny was describing the height 
of the ridge as being between 35 and 45 feet (10.6 to 13.7 metres)50 above the level 
of the sea that may have varied by as much as 1.1 metres (3.5 feet). Even if Kenny 
was a reasonable accurate observer, his description of the ridge being 40 feet 
(12.192 metres) high comes with a total level of uncertainty of plus or minus 2.5 
metres, if he was estimating his height against an observed level of the sea, rather 
than the mean sea level (which, for Leggatt Island in 1899, was 1.531 metres).       
Kenny’s estimate of his distance from the beach also needs qualification. Half a mile 
inland is 880 yards (or 804 metres). Kenny needed to judge distance accurately to 
shoot a target with a police issue Martini Henry carbine rifle51 which was, at the time, 
a weapon used for long range shooting competitions at targets up to 900 yards (823 
metres or more than half a mile) distance.52 He used the term “half a mile” when 
describing the distance of his campsite from the beach, and this may reasonably 
have been considered within rifle shot of the beach, between 850 and 900 yards 
(777 and 823 metres). However, how did he define the “beach”? The exposed sand 
48 Vidgen “Northern Hurricanes”, 5. 
49 Tidal Unit, MSQ, provided tidal readings for 4 and 5 March 1899, on 23 August 2018.  
50 If Kenny had described 39 or 41 feet, the impression would be that he had measured the height of 
the ridge, which he was unlikely to have done. However, as the camp was almost certainly a regularly 
used patrol camp, his description would not have been based on an observation he made on 4 and 5 
March, but on its use over years by the Native Police and possibly its qualities as a defensive 
position. 
51 “Letter from John Martin Kenny to Inspector Durham at Cairns, 22 August 1904 (re lending his 
Martini Henry rifle to the Rev. Schwarz of Cape Bedford Mission)”, in Police Staff File, John Martin 
Kenny, A/38868, QSA, ID563796; Noelene Cole, “Battle Camp to Boralga: A Local Study of Colonial 
War on Cape York Peninsula, 1873–1894”, Aboriginal History, 28, 2004, 170. Cole writes: “Snider 
rifles were used [by the Native Police] throughout the frontier period and Martini Henry rifles were 
added from 1884.” 
52 “The Rifle”, NQR, 28 November 1898, 58.  
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between the sea and the coastal dune varies depending on the tide. Because he 
could not see the beach, he may have estimated his distance from the higher coastal 
dune that he could see. His estimate that the “tidal wave ... stretched between two 
and three miles” (3.2 to 4.8 kilometres) inland is also a qualified observation. It was 
dark at 5 a.m. when the wave swept over the ridge.53 However, by light he may have 
been able to make a better assessment of its inland extent and, as will be discussed, 
he had the opportunity a month later to view the debris inland. Without knowing 
where Kenny camped and being able to measure the ridge on which he stood, the 
height for the storm tide he witnessed cannot be corroborated.  
Where did he camp? 
The methodology shows Kenny’s original report to be credible. Kenny describes 
camping at 6 p.m., an hour before sunset, on 4 March on a patrol to the country of 
the Barrow Point people. As described in Chapter Two, there were two routes Kenny 
could have taken by horseback to reach Barrow Point, but only one route that stayed 
within his patrol territory and took him along the beach as he described (Figure 5.16. 
See also Figure 2.6 and Figure 2.7 in Chapter Two). This also appears to be the 
faster, less arduous, route, avoiding mountains. It follows the beach around Cape 
Bowen to the Northern Road of the Barrow Point people, and Kenny can be shown 
to have used the beach section of the route and the Northern Road on other 
occasions.54 The Eight Mile Native Police camp near Cooktown, from which the 
Native Police patrolled the coast north to Cape Melville, was gazetted in 1874,55 and 
by 1900 the Eight Mile patrol area was well defined.56 Native Police had ridden north 
from the Eight Mile to Barrow Point for 25 years.57 The only overland route to Barrow 
53	Geoscience Australia, "Sunrisenset Program, Version 2.2", Geoscience Australia National Mapping
Division, 2005. http://www.ga.gov.au/bin/geodesy/run/sunrisenset. Sunrise at Cape Melville on 5 
March 1899 was at 6.24 a.m. See also Vidgen “Northern Hurricanes”, 5. Vidgen, paraphrasing Kenny, 
said that “it was not properly daylight till about 10 o’clock on Sunday morning.” 
54 Walter Roth, Northern Protector of Aboriginals, to Under Secretary, Home Office, “Report re 
Distribution of Gifts to Coastal Aboriginals”, 9 April 1899, HOM/A23, QSA, ID847561; Vidgen, 
“Northern Hurricanes”, 5. 
55 Queensland Police Gazette, 11, No. 98, (from information supplied by Jonathan Richards, “Native 
Police at the ‘Eight Mile’ Cooktown, North Queensland, 1874–1904”, in an email to Ian Townsend, 19 
September 2006).   
56 “Native Police Camps”, Laura Police Station files 1900, Administration files (Police), A/41364, QSA, 
ID290072. 
57 Patrols also used boats when available.  
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Point within the Eight Mile patrol area follows the beach around Cape Bowen. The 
campsites along this route would have been well established by 1899, so that a party 
of five men could ride 30 to 40 kilometres a day and arrive before sunset at a known 
and carefully chosen campsite where there was enough water for their 10 horses. 
When Kenny described making camp on 4 March “about 6 p.m.”, an hour before 
sunset, this was a planned stop at a known campsite on a regular route. The only 
site that matches all aspects of Kenny’s description is a site near the mouth of 
Wakooka Creek (Figure 5.12). It is on a sand ridge that appears to be between nine 
and 13 metres above sea level and about half a mile (804 metres) from the beach, 
there is a higher ridge between the campsite and the beach, and it is the only place 
on the coast north or south of the Barrow Point headland where a 12 to 13 metre sea 
level rise could flood two to three miles (3.2 to 4.8 kilometres) inland.58 It also fulfils 
the requirements of a campsite for a patrol of five men and 10 horses, being beside 
a patrol track Kenny can be shown to have used, with a fresh water lagoon next to it, 
and on a flat open ridgetop with grass for hobbled horses. After establishing the site 
of Kenny’s camp at Wakooka Creek from historical documents, the site was visited 
on a field trip in September 2018 and was found to also contain stone tools and 
seashells spread over a 300 metres length of flat ridgetop (Figure 5.12).59  
A subsequent archival search found oral history evidence linking the site to the 
Native Police. The Barrow Point people had abandoned a camp near the mouth of 
Wakooka Creek following a Native Police raid in December 1881.60 (For a full 
description of the evidence, see Chapter Three.) Although a thorough search has yet 
to be conducted, no evidence of another camp near the mouth of Wakooka Creek 
was seen during the field trip in September 2018. Some of the qualities that made 
the site a good seasonal campsite for the Barrow Point people — being beside the 
Northern Road, next to fresh water, near food sources, cooled by the sea breeze, 
elevated, flat and open with wongai shade trees and soft sand — would also make it 
a convenient and attractive patrol camp for the Native Police.  
58 The sand ridge appears to be stabilised with vegetation, but there is evidence of erosion on a 
mound in the middle of the ridge, and it is possible the ridge height has changed since 1899.     
59 There is also evidence of a blaze on a tree near a two-metre high oval mound in the centre of the 
site. This type of structure is sometimes associated with Aboriginal grave mounds. No archaeological 
study of the site appears to have been done.  
60 John Haviland and Roger Hart, Old Man Fog and the Last Aborigines of Barrow Point, Bathurst: 
Crawford House Press, 1999, 36.  
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Figure 5.12 The sand ridge on which Kenny camped, half a mile from the beach. This is the only ridge that touches the Northern Road. In the wet season, 
swales between the ridges fill with water to become swamps, making access to the ridges closer to the coast difficult. Far fewer shells and no tools were 
observed on ridges closer to the sea (satellite image NationalMap).  
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Figure 5.13 The flat top of the sand ridge at Wakooka Creek on which Kenny camped on 4 March 
1899 (photograph Ian Townsend).  
Figure 5.14 Shells at the Wakooka Creek site (photograph Ian Townsend). 
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Figure 5.15 The ridge at Wakooka Creek closest to the Northern Road is 850 metres from a sandy beach at the creek mouth (satellite image NationalMap). 
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Figure 5.16 Satellite photo showing the catchment for Wakooka and Saltwater creeks, the site of 
Kenny’s camp, and the patrol route (satellite image Geoscience Australia). 
Wakooka Creek 
The campsite is at the mouth of Wakooka Creek which, together with nearby 
Saltwater Creek, drains a 358-square kilometre catchment bounded by the Melville 
and the Altanmoui ranges (Figure 5.16). The lower slopes of the ranges near the 
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coast force the creeks to within 1.5 kilometres of each other before they enter the 
sea at the head of Bowen Bay. Before entering Bowen Bay, Wakooka and Saltwater 
creeks flow through an area of low salt pans and seasonal wetlands that are 
generally less than 10 metres above sea level behind a row of coastal sand ridges 
(see Chapter Two, Figure 2.10). The creeks cut through a 10 to 14-metre-high frontal 
sand ridge behind the beach. The Aboriginal track, described by Roth as the 
Northern Road in 189861 and the “main track” in1899,62 leaves the beach four 
kilometres north of Cape Bowen to avoid the mangrove-lined and tidal Wakooka and 
Saltwater creek estuaries, as well as several other estuaries further north. The track 
runs west to cross Wakooka Creek at a ford near the creek’s tidal limit, 2.4 
kilometres inland, where the road turns north (Figure 5.16). On 3 April 1899, Roth 
described meeting Kenny at a pre-arranged rendezvous point “1.5 miles” (2.4 
kilometres) inland on the “main track”. Roth, after being dropped by dinghy on the 
beach south of Wakooka Creek, picked his way west and described the landscape 
having been altered by the cyclone, seaweed hanging from the high branches of 
surviving trees, and the area smelling of dead fish. 
While travelling in this direction, one could not fail noticing that the full 
force of the wind must here have come from the east, the timbers having 
nearly all fallen towards the west.63   
This meeting of Kenny and Roth, a month after the cyclone, puts Kenny back at 
Wakooka Creek where he would have been able to reassess his observations, 
including the inland extent of flooding from the sea. Kenny returned to Cooktown 
from the scene on 9 April on the cutter Mystery,64 which appears to be when he 
described his experiences to the Burns Philp store manager A. R. Vidgen, who 
repeated it in a letter that was published in Brisbane on 17 April.    
61 Walter Roth, “A Report to the Commissioner of Police on the Aboriginals Occupying the 'Hinterland' 
of Princess Charlotte Bay Together with a Preface Containing Suggestions for Their Better Protection 
and Improvement”, 30 December 1898, A/19899, QSA, ID1154345, 22. 
62 Roth 1899, 1. 
63 Ibid., 2. 
64 “The Northern Hurricane”, Brisbane Courier, 10 April 1899, 4. 
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Figure 5.17 The ford near the tidal limit of Wakooka Creek, 2.4 kilometres inland, the rendezvous 
point of Roth and Kenny on 3 April 1899. This is not a vehicular crossing and the deep tracks cut into 
the bank appear to be used today by feral pigs and cattle. The bank is two to three metres high and a 
12-metre flood would reach the tops of the trees (photograph Ian Townsend).  
The storm tide 
Damaging storm tides are rare and their height and incursion inland is a function of 
the cyclone’s wind strength and central pressure, and the bathymetry and 
topography of the site impacted. In 2005, Katrina, a Category Three hurricane, 
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produced a storm tide of 8.5 metres (28 feet) on the Mississippi Gulf coast.65 In 
1887, seven people are reported to have drowned when a storm tide from a cyclone 
flooded Burketown, 20 kilometres inland from the coast in the Gulf of Carpentaria.66 
In January 1918, a cyclone that struck Mackay reportedly produced a storm tide of 
more than three metres.67 In March 1918, a storm tide demolished the Hull River 
Mission (now Mission Beach) near Innisfail and killed an unknown number of 
Aboriginal people. Ironically Kenny, who had survived the 1899 cyclone and was, in 
1918, the mission’s superintendent, had overseen the building of the 
superintendent’s residence on a ridge above the mission, but was killed with his 
daughter by flying timber.68 However, the most common cause of death in cyclones 
is drowning and storm tides can have a devastating effect on coastal communities.69 
Although the many factors that produce a storm tide are understood, the height of 
coastal inundation at any particular point can be difficult to predict. The height can 
depend on numerous factors interacting with each other, including the central 
pressure of the cyclone, the astronomical tide, the speed and direction at which the 
cyclone is moving, the speed of winds and the angle at which they strike the coast, 
the shape and topography of the coastline, the slope of the seabed, and terrestrial 
flooding.70 Some of these factors, such as terrestrial flooding, can be difficult to 
model and are not considered in Green’s GCOM2D model of storm tide height for 
the 1899 cyclone.71       
The historical methodology in this thesis has been able to place Kenny at the mouth 
of Wakooka Creek on 4 and 5 March 1899. It has also been able to show that the 
best evidence for the cyclone’s central pressure is 880hPa and that it approached 
the coast from the east-north-east. For this hypothesis, the observations of vessels 
show that the cyclone’s eye was 40 to 45 kilometres wide and the cyclone was 
65 US National Hurricane Centre, “Storm Surge Overview”, NOAA, https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/surge/ 
(accessed 24 February 2019). 
66 Granger and Smith 1995, 17. 
67 Ibid. This figure is based on contemporary accounts and, as this thesis has shown, accounts cannot 
be considered credible until tested with an historical methodology.   
68 Beachcomber (E. J. Banfield), “The Storm Wind”, Townsville Daily Bulletin, 27 March 1918, 3. 
69 Jeffrey Callaghan, “The Tropical Cyclone Risk in Cairns”, Natural Hazards 30, No. 2, 2003, 
129–153. 
70 Granger and Smith 1995, 16.  
71 Nott and Hayne 2000; Nott et al. 2014; Graeme D. Hubbert and Kathleen L. Mclnnes, “A Storm 
Surge Inundation Model for Coastal Planning and Impact Studies”, Journal of Coastal Research, 15, 
No. 1, 1999, 168–185. 
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moving about 12 kilometres an hour west-south-west. (These remain approximations 
based on simple models.) A hypothesis based on the best historical evidence can 
also show what factors contributed to the flooding observed by Kenny just after 5 
a.m. on 5 March 1899.  
Cape Melville is the closest point on the Queensland coast to the edge of the 
Australian continental shelf. About 50 kilometres east-north-east of Wakooka Creek, 
the continental shelf rises abruptly from a depth of several hundred metres to 20 to 
30 metres. At Bowen Bay, the seabed 2.5 kilometres offshore is three metres below 
mean sea level, gradually becoming shallower towards the shore (Figure 5.18). 
During a cyclone, as Granger and Smith point out, the “shallower water of the 
Continental Shelf will magnify the surge, as will confined locations such as bays and 
inlets.”72 As can be seen in Figure 5.10, Wakooka Creek at the head of shallow 
Bowen Bay was at the midpoint of the zone of strongest winds on the cyclone’s 
southern side. This is also the area, generally 20 to 50 kilometres from the cyclone’s 
centre, that produces the maximum storm tide and wind-driven waves.73  
5.18 The head of Bowen Bay at low tide, looking north (photograph Ian Townsend). 
72 Granger and Smith 1995, 16. 
73 Terry 2007, 69. 
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In Figure 5.10, the cyclone’s track can be seen to be approaching from the east-
north-east, and the most destructive winds to its south would push the storm surge 
over the edge of the continental shelf and into shallower water, magnifying the surge. 
The winds on the cyclone’s southern side are stronger, because of the forward 
movement of the cyclone, in this case an estimated 12 kilometres an hour. The 
mouth of Bowen Bay can be seen to match the width of the area of maximum winds, 
and it appears to be facing the area of sea most likely to experience a storm surge. 
By the time the peak of the storm tide arrived, just after 5 a.m. on 5 March 1899, 
hurricane force winds had been blowing into the bay for five hours, the water piling 
up against the beach at the head of the bay on a rising tide. This piling up of water is 
what scientists call wave setup. One study using data from Hurricane Katrina in the 
US has applied wave setup to a model of the 1899 cyclone used by Nott et at., 
showing that a setup of four metres in 1899 was plausible.74  
Brisbane meteorologist, Herbert E. Whittingham, in reconstructing the cyclone in 
1958, calculated that the astronomical high tide at Cape Melville on 5 March 1899 
was between 3.17 a.m. and 3.22 a.m.75 This is based on the high tide at Townsville 
on 5 March 1899 being at 3.11 a.m. and the high tides at Pipon and Howick islands 
occurring eleven and six minutes later. This is similar to the high tide time predicted 
at Cooktown for 5 March 1899 (published in Pugh’s Almanac) at 3.31 a.m. Because 
of the close correlation between the tides at Townsville, Cooktown, and Cape 
Melville, Whittingham assumed high tide at near Cape Melville arrived before 3.30 
a.m. on 5 March 1899.  
Maritime Safety Queensland (MSQ) was contacted during research for this thesis. 
MSQ used the tidal prediction model CPRED to show the 1899 tide times for the two 
closest modern tidal gauges: Munro Reef (23 kilometres north-east of Wakooka 
Creek), and Leggatt Island (28 kilometres east-south-east).76 The CPRED prediction 
74 S. A. Hsu and Baozhu Liu, “Wave Setup during Hurricane Katrina and Tropical Cyclone Mahina”, 
Mariners Weather Log, United States National Weather Service, 58, No. 3, 
https://www.vos.noaa.gov/MWL/201412/cyclones.shtml (accessed 11 March 2019). 
75 Whittingham 1958, 32. 
76 John Broadbent, Coastal Impacts Unit, MSQ, email to Ian Townsend, 29 August 2018. Broadbent 
explains: “CPRED is the name given by MSQ to its tidal prediction program. It is a modern program 
that is based on the work of A. T. Doodson (1921, 1926). Doodson’s work is a comprehensive 
mathematical description (model) of the tidal potential. It is still relevant today and has not been 
supplanted by more recent work.” [Arthur Thomas Doodson was a British oceanographer.] 
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program showed high tide at Leggatt Island to have been at 5.14 a.m. (2.33 metres), 
and high tide at Munro Reef to have been at 5.11 a.m. (2.19 metres). This suggests 
that high tide at Wakooka Creek was not at 3.30 a.m., but between about 5.15 and 
5.20 a.m. The height of sea level rise since 1899 was calculated to be 0.16 metres.77 
The Mean Sea Level today for Leggatt Island is 1.691 metres. The mean sea level 
for 1899 was therefore 1.531 metres (calculated by subtracting sea level rise from 
current mean sea level). Remarkably, the storm surge on the morning of 5 March 
1899 at Wakooka Creek coincided with a high tide of 2.33 metres, when the 
astronomical tide at Leggatt Island was 0.799 metres above mean sea level. For this 
hypothesis, this is the astronomical tide component for the storm tide Kenny 
witnessed.78  
Another component of the storm tide is the cyclone’s low atmospheric pressure, 
which can raise the sea level about one centimetre for every hectopascal fall in 
pressure.79 The atmospheric pressure recorded by the Crest of the Wave at sunset 
on 4 March 1899, just before 7 p.m., was 1002.37hPa.80 The pressure reached a 
recorded low of 880hPa measured in the cyclone’s eye wall, a difference of 122hPa, 
which could therefore contribute 1.22 metres to the sea level. Because Wakooka 
Creek appears to have experienced the eyewall as the cyclone passed to the north 
between 4.30 a.m. and 5 a.m., the air pressure may also have been approaching 
880hPa at that spot. If so, the combination of the astronomical tide and the 
atmospheric pressure may have contributed two metres to the sea level rise, on top 
of four metres of wave setup, just as the storm surge arrived. This would explain how 
sea water came up to Kenny’s waist on the ridge, but until the sand ridge is 
measured, a more accurate height for the storm tide cannot be calculated. However, 
because Green’s modelling of a cyclone of 880hPa approaching from the north-east 
77 Paul Finger, Tides Officer, MSQ, email to Ian Townsend, 23 August 2018; John Broadbent, Coastal 
Impacts Unit, MSQ, email to Ian Townsend 29 August 2018.  
78 Broadbent 2018. For the purposes of the hypothesis, MSQ’s model is presumed correct. The 
difference between the contemporary tide predictions and today’s modelling was explained by John 
Broadbent: “Before the modern era, the methodology and observations, if any, used to prepare 
predictions for publications, such as Pugh’s [Almanac of] 1899, are unknown. From ancient times, a 
number of non-harmonic tidal prediction processes have been devised and used. The basis and 
accuracy of these processes is highly questionable (variable) and impossible to assess. My 
experience is that they were adequate for the time but are no longer acceptable.”  
79 Terry 2007, 58.  
80 “Log Crest of the Wave”, in John Douglas, “Report of the Government Resident at Thursday Island 
for 1898”, QVP, 1, 1899, 100. 
205 
has already been shown to produce a storm surge in the southern part of Bowen Bay 
of 8.279 metres, the storm tide’s potential height exceeds 10 metres. What the 
model did not consider was Wakooka Creek’s proximity to the cyclone and the 
cyclone’s more direct east-north-east approach to the coast, wave setup of as much 
as four metres, wave runup, the funneling effect of Bowen Bay, and terrestrial 
flooding.   
Wakooka Creek flooding: A discussion 
Nott and Hayne proposed that one explanation for Kenny’s observation not being 
supported in the field work by physical evidence was that, “Kenny's camp may have 
been inundated by a peak in terrestrial flood waters or a combination of marine surge 
and terrestrial run off which may have given the appearance of a 'tidal wave'.”81 
Based on the site of Kenny’s campsite at the mouth of Wakooka Creek, this thesis 
supports the hypothesis of a combination of terrestrial flooding and marine surge. 
Kenny described an “immense tidal wave” sweeping inland just after 5 a.m., and the 
position of his campsite at the mouth of Wakooka Creek supports the theory that 
creek flooding contributed to the phenomenon.  
Figure 5.10 shows the most destructive zone of the cyclone, between 20 and 45 
kilometres from the centre’s west-south-westerly track. This is not only the area of 
strongest winds, but the heaviest rain, and it can be seen to cover the entire 358 
square kilometre Wakooka and Saltwater creeks’ catchments. At midnight on 4 
March, Kenny reported that the wind blew away the tents of his troopers and a tree 
limb fell onto his hammock. Several horses were killed by flying timber and the patrol 
moved to an open area away from the trees and covered their heads with a blanket 
against “the pelting rain, which seemed to hit as hard as hail.”82 Torrential rain fell for 
the next five hours as vegetation was shredded across the catchment, which bore 
the brunt of the most destructive winds. The volume of rain may have been 
enormous because of orographic lift, when the spiralling rain bands were forced to 
rise when they met the Altanmoui and Melville ranges, 200 to 600 metres high, 
81 Nott and Hayne 2000, 12. 
82 Vidgen, “Northern Hurricanes”, 5. 
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surrounding the catchment.83 The winds felled most trees,84 and the flood waters 
would have carried debris towards the narrow estuaries, where a rising tide and 
hurricane-force winds were piling seawater against the frontal sand ridge and 
preventing the terrestrial flood from escaping the creek mouth. The debris may have 
added to the dam-wall effect and a lake formed behind the frontal ridge. Just after 5 
a.m., at high tide, the storm surge reached the coast and the peak passed over or
around the front ridge and across the lake as if it was an extension of the sea. This 
may explain Kenny’s description of a “tidal wave” sweeping across the ridge and 
reaching waist deep.85 The ridge on which he had camped would have been 
surrounded by rising water before the storm surge arrived, but in the dark and driving 
rain he would not have noticed until the surge peak swept inland across the lake and 
spoilt his watch.86 In an article published in 1938, John Kyle Little, a Native Police 
colleague of Kenny, appears to describe this aspect of the 1899 cyclone.    
At Barrow Point in one wet season about March end, the rolling grey 
cloud masses presaged heavy wind. A handy old mangrove log off tidal 
mark made a break. The sand dune back of that was fairly high and 
behind the dune land flattened for a good space before the rise of the 
definite ridge came. We were watching for a masthead light, else had we 
not chanced the beach. Wind velocity that night lifted masses of ocean 
water over the sand dune and created an inland lake. So much the break 
of a new day told us as from various perches in scattered mangrove 
trees we shook the salt tears from our eyes and wondered where in that 
inland lake lay our packs.87 
Little’s article had started by describing aspects of the 1899 cyclone, comparing it to 
the March 1907 cyclone that struck Cooktown, and several other cyclones. Little in 
1899 was with the Native Police at Turnoff Lagoon in Queensland’s Gulf Country 
west of Burketown and could not have witnessed the cyclone at Cape Melville.88 In 
1904 he was stationed at Coen when he was replaced by Kenny, and Little moved to 
83 Terry 2007, 76. 
84 Roth 1899, 2. Roth reported that, “… a far larger proportion of trees being down than up, these, the 
further we proceeded north, having fallen proportionately north of west.” 
85 Vidgen, “Northern Hurricanes”, 5. 
86 Ibid. 
87 J. K. Little, “Great Blows. Damage in Early Cyclones”, Sunday Mail (Brisbane), 10 April 1938, 42. 
88 Jonathan Richards, A Question of Necessity: The Native Police in Queensland, PhD Thesis, School 
of Arts, Media and Culture, Griffith University, 2005, 328. 
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the Eight Mile outside Cooktown.89 Little had the opportunity to speak to Kenny and 
would have heard Kenny’s description of his cyclone experience. Little’s description 
matches Kenny’s likely experience, although Little makes two allusions that are 
difficult to interpret. Does the reference to the “handy old mangrove log off tidal 
mark” suggest the point where the beach track “made a break” or changed direction 
inland? Does the reference to watching for a masthead light refer to Kenny’s search 
for Thomas’s boat on the beach as being the reason for the patrol being there? It is 
impossible now to know, but there does appear to be an echo of Kenny’s oral history 
in Little’s article. After leaving the Native Police, Little had gone on to be a prolific 
writer of outback tales in newspapers, but he is not a credible witness for the 1899 
cyclone because it can be shown he did not experience the event and he lied by 
suggesting he did. His description, although not credible as data, can be considered 
memory.  
Implications for emergency management  
In Queensland, coastal development is often concentrated on the heads of bays and 
the mouths of rivers because they provided access and shelter for shipping, which in 
the 19th century was the main mode of transport and trade along the coast. During 
the past 100 years, urban development has encroached closer to beaches and river 
mouths. Frontal dunes, shallow bays and low lying coastal land have been modified 
for housing. In cities such as Cairns, Townsville, and Mackay, some of these 
developments are at the head of shallow bays and behind sand ridges or flood 
barriers which appear to have similar bathometric and topographic features as 
Bowen Bay and Wakooka Creek. Emergency managers have long been aware of 
the dangers, but because large storm tide impacts are so rare, there are few case 
studies that can provide an adequate understanding of the risks, particularly when 
planning for worse-case scenarios. As environmental risk scientist Ken Granger 
explained: 
For emergency managers, it is imperative that appropriate information 
and estimates are available on which to base life-and-death decisions 
89 Report from Sub Inspector Garraway re Constable J. K. Little’s Resignation, 11 July 1904, QSA, 
A/40052/04/12610, (supplied by Jonathan Richards, “Native Police at the ‘Eight Mile’ Cooktown, North 
Queensland, 1874–1904”, in an email 19 September 2006).   
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such as whether to order an evacuation of a settlement or not. More 
work is clearly needed to better understand the hazard, the attendant 
vulnerabilities and the consequent risks.90 
This thesis shows that using historical inquiry to reassess the 1899 cyclone and its 
storm tide can, by producing more credible data, potentially produce a better 
understanding of the behaviour of cyclones and the causes of coastal inundation. 
With changes in technology and the continuing development of the Queensland 
coast, meteorologist Bruce Harper has argued that storm tide risks should be 
reassessed.   
… there is an emerging and relatively strong case for a comprehensive
reassessment of storm tide risks along the entire coast. The opportunity 
now also exists for greater integration of the diverse service 
requirements of engineering, planning and counter disaster measures.91 
Understanding the risks is now more urgent due to a greater appreciation of the 
impacts of a changing climate, in which a warmer world produces more intense 
cyclones and, therefore, more and higher storm tides. To assess those risks, a better 
understanding is needed of the past frequency of severe cyclones and their impacts. 
National manager of tropical cyclone warning service policy at BOM, Alan Sharp, has 
said that the “assessment of risk attributable to many phenomena relies on the 
analysis of past history.” He also warns that, because the number of recorded 
tropical cyclones is limited and the methodologies used to gather data have 
changed, there may be unknown biases in databases. Sharp has urged a “detailed 
reanalysis of older data — at least to the start of the satellite era. This can be done 
by the Bureau [of Meteorology], but will require significant resources currently not 
available.”92 This thesis produces a methodology based on historical inquiry that 
should be considered in any reanalysis of older data, to obtain a more accurate 
picture of past cyclones and storm tides, to help scientists and emergency managers 
better prepare for future cyclones.   
90 Granger and Smith 1995, 20.  
91 Harper 1999, 18. 
92 Alan Sharp, “Assessing Risk from Meteorological Phenomena Using Limited and Biased 
Databases”, Australian Journal of Emergency Management, 23, No. 4, 2008, 11. 
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Conclusion 
 
The 1899 cyclone that caused the pearling disaster is an example of a documented 
historical cyclone that produced what is now considered a world record storm tide. Its 
value to scientists and disaster managers is recognised, but the data used to model 
it has been shown by the methodology to be from secondary sources, many of which 
can be shown to be untested and unreliable. An historical methodology, developed in 
Chapter One of this thesis, was applied in this chapter to scientifically significant 
aspects of the cyclone, including the positions of observers and their observations of 
wind direction, atmospheric pressure, and the height of the storm tide. To show by 
example how the tested data might be applied to reconstructing aspects of the 
cyclone, such as its track, a simple model has been developed. This produced a new 
hypothesis for the cyclone’s track and behaviour, the site of the storm tide’s impact 
and, from that, a detailed description of the elements that may have contributed to 
the storm tide. This hypothesis is based on data from historical inquiry and has not 
been tested by algorithms. However, the hypothesis proposes that the destructive 
1899 cyclone approached Cape Melville from the east-north-east travelling at 
approximately 12 kilometres an hour, the centre crossing directly over Cape Melville 
about 4.30 a.m. on 5 March 1899, producing a storm tide in excess of 10 metres at 
Wakooka Creek that coincided with high tide after 5 a.m. and terrestrial flooding in a 
creek at the head of a shallow bay. In other words, the 1899 cyclone appears to 
provide a potential case study for a worst-case cyclone and storm tide impact on the 
Queensland coast.93  
 
This reanalysis of the 1899 cyclone demonstrates how historical inquiry can produce 
the best available evidence for past disasters, to help science better predict future 
ones. Credible primary source data on the 1899 cyclone has always been available, 
but media errors and social and political narratives over 120 years appear to have 
had a significant influence on the historical record, Government databases, and the 
scientific literature. As scientists extend their samples of cyclones and storm tides 
back before the age of satellites and into the 19th century, to better understand and 
                                                
93 See Harper 1999, 11, for a list of storm tides and the risks of recurrence.  
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predict cyclones and the disasters they cause, and as archives become digitised and 
more easily accessed, there is increasing use by science of data from historical 
documents. It can be difficult to find, in the large amount of data now available 
online, the small number of original primary and credible sources.  
 
Once data enters the scientific literature, it can acquire a degree of credibility. 
Scientists today referring to the 1899 cyclone often cite data from previous papers, 
unaware of its origin or how it has been tested. In this way, official databases have 
become populated with unreliable secondary source data for the 1899 cyclone that 
appears to be credible, but is not.     
 
It is unknown if the problems revealed in this thesis extend to other historical 
cyclones, but the possibility that they do should be considered. Any scientific 
evaluation of an historical cyclone, the data for which is drawn largely from historical 
records, should include a review of the primary evidence for that data, if more 
confidence is to be placed in cyclone prediction and disaster planning for 
communities along Queensland’s coast.    
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CONCLUSION  
 
   
On 25 September 2018, I stood on the sand ridge south of Cape Melville where, 
nearly 120 years earlier, five men of the Native Police witnessed what would later be 
considered a world record storm tide associated with Australia’s deadliest and 
strongest recorded tropical cyclone. The purpose of this thesis, and the reason for 
visiting the remote site on Cape York, was to examine why such a significant 
disaster was never constructed as a national event and why, despite decades of 
scientific inquiry, there are discrepancies between the data used by scientists today 
and what the best evidence for the disaster shows.  
 
The approach I took was, first, to search personal and public archives for references 
to, and evidence for, the event. A methodology was then developed to test the 
credibility of documents and their data. Theories of narrative and memory were 
applied to those documents to show how and why the data changed over time. 
Finally, the best evidence was used to reconstruct aspects of the event. I have 
concluded that powerful cultural narratives were responsible for the forgetting of the 
disaster, and those narratives, coupled with media errors, were responsible for 
changing some data over time. This is not surprising. Historians have long described 
the process by which memory diverges from history that is “no longer.”1 Halbwachs 
described memory as being reconstructed “with data borrowed from the present,”2 
and White argued that history is also a narrative with a structure that prevents it from 
being an accurate record of fact.3 What is surprising is how much of the official 
record, including data in government and scientific databases, is influenced by 
narratives and based on secondary source data from memory, rather than more 
credible and primary source data from history. The 1899 cyclone has never been the 
subject of historical inquiry, and as a result, untested data has entered the scientific 
literature.   
 
                                                
1 Pierre Nora and Marc Roudebush (trans.), “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire”, 
Representations, 26, Spring 1989, 8. 
2 Maurice Halbwachs, The Collective Memory, New York: Harper and Row, 1980, 69. 
3 Hayden White, The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical 
Representation, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987. 
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In searching for the best evidence, the research led me to the site of the world record 
storm tide, the ridgetop on which the Native Police camped on 4 March 1899, at the 
mouth of Wakooka Creek, south of Cape Melville. This site is an appropriate 
metaphor for this thesis. This is the country of the Barrow Point people and, while 
descendants still use the country, no-one lives there permanently anymore. This 
ridgetop, on which shells and stone tools provide evidence for former habitation, had 
been lost to the memory of the Barrow Point people because of the greater disasters 
that befell them in the late 19th and early 20th centuries; the removal from country, 
separation of families, massacres, and disease. Relatively few survived, but 
fragmentary evidence in archives and oral histories links this ridgetop to the Barrow 
Point people and the Native Police. As Munslow says, the job of the historian is to 
“invest evidence with meaning” so it can it be “correlated and placed within a 
context.”4 The significance to science of the cyclone cannot be fully understood 
without the context of the Traditional Owners of the area, their contact with the 19th 
century fishing industry, and the actions that led to the Native Police camping on the 
site to record the 1899 storm tide. The data for the 1899 cyclone does not exist in 
isolation. It is given meaning, and its credibility better assessed, by understanding 
how and why it was recorded.  
 
Like the main track linking the campsites of the Barrow Point, described by Roth as 
the Northern Road, this thesis has shown that memory tends to follow a path of least 
resistance through time. The four-wheel-drive track used today by fishermen to 
reach Bowen Bay, which I followed to reach the Native Police patrol campsite at 
Wakooka Creek, follows the Northern Road, but not the road as it was in 1899. 
Traditional Owner and a manager of Cape Melville National Park, Daniel Gordon, 
standing on the track, described how in the early 20th century newly arrived cattle 
also followed the path of least resistance through the bush, following the tracks the 
Barrow Point people had walked for centuries. Today, the original track is obscured 
by a confusion of modern tyre tracks criss-crossed by old and new cattle pads. They 
tell several overlapping narratives woven through time, echoes of the original, but 
which have taken a turn here to avoid a fallen branch, or a detour there to water or a 
food source as the seasons change the country. These are part of the fabric of 
                                                
4 Alun Munslow, Deconstructing History, London: Routledge, 1997, 8. 
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history, but they can obscure what came before. Detours are informative, but time 
and use have changed the track from what it was in 1899. So, too, have social 
narratives changed over time and influenced the memory of the event, as can be 
seen reflected in newspaper articles. When new data appearing in media resonates 
with contemporary cultural narratives, such as the addition to Newi’s story of two 
white men, or when Hothouse adds 100 Aboriginal people to the death toll, later 
writers can be seen to follow that same narrative path. Such myths can be difficult to 
unpick. This thesis has revealed a tendency for data from secondary sources and 
even myths in media to enter the scientific literature, perhaps because some 
scientists are unaware of the differences between history and memory, and how 
political and social narratives, and media processes, can influence data over time. 
This is an area in which historians can help scientists. As Marwick states, historians’ 
skills “lie in sorting these matters out, in understanding how and why a source came 
into existence, [and] how relevant it is to the topic under investigation.”5  
 
At least two significant pieces of data of interest to science have been produced in 
the process of conducting this historical inquiry into the 1899 cyclone. Porter’s 
observation of the cyclone’s lowest pressure, 914hPa (27inHg), has been revised to 
880hPa (26inHg), after more credible data was found.6 Why the revision? The first 
figure, 914hPa, came from the secondary source Outridge booklet, published six 
months after the cyclone. New evidence shows that Porter reported “26 inches” 
(880hPa) the day after the cyclone, but at the time colleagues did not believe a 
cyclone could have such a low pressure. No vessel had, before 1899, recorded and 
survived such a low pressure in a tropical cyclone, typhoon or hurricane, but lower 
cyclone pressures have since been recorded in the Pacific.7 Unless better evidence 
is found to show otherwise, the best and most credible evidence is that Porter 
recorded 880hPa in the cyclone’s eye wall.   
 
                                                
5 Arthur Marwick, The New Nature of History: Knowledge, Evidence, Language, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2001, 27. 
6 Jonathan Nott, Camilla Green, Ian Townsend, and Jeffrey Callaghan, “The World Record Storm 
Surge and the Most Intense Southern Hemisphere Tropical Cyclone: New Evidence and Modeling”, 
Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, 95, No. 5, May 2014.  
7 G. M. Dunnavan and J. W. Diercks, “An Analysis of Super Typhoon Tip (October 1979)”, Monthly 
Weather Review, 108, No. 11, 1980, 1915–1923.  
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The extraordinarily low central pressure of the 1899 cyclone is partly supported by 
the report of its associated world record storm tide. The methodology used in this 
thesis showed that Kenny’s report of sea water reaching his waist while on a ridge 
just over 12 metres (40 feet) above sea level is credible; however, until further 
investigation, it cannot be corroborated. This thesis reveals for the first time the 
location for the ridge on which he made his observation, and there are now 
opportunities for scientists to measure its height and determine the factors that 
contributed to Kenny’s observation. While it was beyond the scope of this thesis to 
apply science to the data it revealed, a hypothesis was developed to show how the 
data could help corroborate other historical evidence, and to demonstrate the 
potential value of historical inquiry to science. The hypothesis in Chapter Five 
applied the credible data to simple models to show a cyclone of 880hPa travelling 
west-south-west at 12 kilometres an hour, with an eye 40 to 45 kilometres wide, 
beginning to cross the coast at Cape Melville after 3 a.m. on 5 March 1899, 
producing a storm tide of more than 10 metres at the mouth of Wakooka Creek, in 
Bowen Bay, just after 5 a.m. The best evidence shows that the storm tide coincided 
with high tide and the height of the sea experienced by Kenny was also likely to have 
been influenced by wave setup along the beach, as well as terrestrial flooding behind 
the sand ridges at the mouths of Wakooka and Saltwater creeks. (This hypothesis, 
although based on the best available historical evidence, is not meant to be a 
substitute for scientific inquiry.)    
Previous scholarly inquiry into the 1899 cyclone and the disaster it caused has been 
conducted not by historians, but by scientists, primarily Whittingham in 1958, Nott 
and Hayne in 2000, and Callaghan in 2008. These studies have been based on data 
from the Outridge booklet, Whittingham in 1958, and Holthouse in 1971. Green in 
2010 and Nott and his colleagues in 2014 incorporated primary evidence into 
models to more accurately describe the cyclone. Their conclusions, that the lowest 
pressure of 880hPa is credible and the storm tide height of more than 12 metres 
plausible, remain valid. This thesis, through the development of a methodology, 
produces better evidence, including evidence for the site at which the storm tide was 
observed, further demonstrating the value of applying historic inquiry to science. 
 215 
Non-academic histories have had a greater impact on the social memory of the 
event. These include Holthouse in 1971, Norman Pixley in 1972,8 John Singe in 
1979,9 Bill and Bev Shay in 1999,10 and Evan McHugh in 2003.11 They have 
generally not produced new research,12 but repeated secondary sources from the 
Outridge booklet, or repeated interpretations of Outridge, such as Whittingham and 
Holthouse. That the Outridge booklet, an account of “the Europeans who were 
lost,”13 became the de facto official history is understandable. It was a well-written 
contemporary compilation of information, a piece of journalism that included some 
primary source interviews, but was primarily paraphrasing “Press and official reports” 
without attribution.14 The booklet was subjective and followed the tendency in the 
19th century to focus, as Rivard has noted, on men in power thereby “erasing the 
many rich histories of communities and cultures that were not related to elite, white 
power-holders.”15 The booklet, when copies were found by journalists and scientists 
in the second half of the 20th century, exerted a powerful influence on memory, 
providing a summary of events and observations framed by the narratives of the 
contemporary “white power-holders”; the Europeans who made up just four percent 
of the members of the fleets in 1899. When describing the experiences of other 
cultures, it generally described them as they affected the European narratives.  
 
One of the main questions this thesis asks is why the cyclone has not had a more 
prominent place in the nation’s memory. Despite its appeal to a White Australia in 
1899, the Outridge booklet had a small circulation and failed to cement the disaster 
into the story of the new White Australian nation. The disaster is better remembered 
by descendants, and by some communities of North Queensland, and it is often 
reprised in local media stories when cyclones threaten the coast. A feature of the 
                                                
8 Norman S. Pixley, “Presidential Address: Pearlers of North Australia: The Romantic Story of the Diving 
Fleets”, Journal of the Royal Historical Society of Queensland, 9, No. 3, 1972, 9–29. 
9 John Singe, The Torres Strait: People and History, St Lucia: UQP, 1979, 164–165. 
10 John Shay and Bev Shay, The Greatest of All Cyclones Bathurst Bay 1899, Cooktown, 
Queensland: Cooktown and District Historical Association, 1999.  
11 Evan McHugh, Shipwrecks: Australia's Greatest Maritime Disasters, Camberwell, Victoria: Viking, 
2003, 209–227. 
12 Shay, however, produced for the first time a list of names of those who died, interpreted from the 
Cooktown Death Register.  
13 Anonymous, The Pearling Disaster, 1899: A Memorial, Brisbane: Outridge Printing Company, 1899, 
6. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Courtney J. Rivard, Archiving Disaster: A Comparative Study of September 11, 2001 and Hurricane 
Katrina, PhD thesis, University of California, 2012, 51.  
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cyclone’s recurrence in national media is its framing as a “forgotten” story; an 
acknowledgment that the event remains outside the national memory. As West has 
argued, cyclones are constructed as a national event “with difficulty.”16 Darwin’s 
cyclone Tracy in 1974 is the exception, portrayed in the media at the time as 
Australia’s worst national disaster.17 It is remembered, as West suggests, because of 
the involvement in the recovery of the military, long associated with national identity, 
and the framing of all victims of Tracy as Australian. The pearling disaster caused by 
the 1899 cyclone was one in which most victims were the antithesis of citizens of a 
new White Australian nation as it was being imagined in 1899 in the lead-up to 
Federation.  
 
The disaster also occurred in Queensland’s far north, a region still reasonably 
remote from most Australians. The two memorials to the disaster, at Bathurst Bay 
and Thursday Island, are seen by few people and do not therefore contribute to 
social memory as might more prominent memorials in larger population centres. 
Both memorials name the European dead, but not the non-Europeans. This should 
be corrected, and this thesis produces a list of 298 known dead. One of the 
limitations of such a list, however, is the contradiction amongst sources of the 
spelling of names, reflecting the poor quality of record keeping in 1899. Errors of 
translation and transmission compounded problems of illiterate or non-English 
speaking men who signed, or had others write their names into, ships’ articles. This 
should not, however, preclude more accurately recognising all the people who died 
as a result of the cyclone. There may, for example, be opportunities for a separate 
memorial giving a qualified explanation of the names, for a memorial in which the 
names could be updated if necessary, or for a memorial symbolising the many 
cultures involved, reflecting the pearling industry and also the Aboriginal 
communities which suffered on shore. In this way, all people are remembered and 
respected. One limitation of this thesis was the inability to do comprehensive 
research overseas to trace these men and their families. As shown in Chapter Three, 
evidence exists in Japan of a memorial with names associated with the 1899 
cyclone, but they cannot be matched to any of the known dead. It is likely memories 
                                                
16 Brad West and Philip Smith, “Natural Disasters and National Identity: Time, Space and 
Mythology”, Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology, 33, No. 2, 1997, 208.  
17 John Lombard, “Man in the Centre of it All”, Advertiser (Adelaide), 27 December 1974, 5.  
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and memorials exist in other communities that could shed more light on the names 
and backgrounds of the dead. The impact of the disaster on some small villages 
from which groups of young men left to work in Australia, never to return, may still be 
felt (as has been described, with an example of intergenerational trauma, in Chapter 
Four). In Britain’s Australian colonies the impact of 12 dead Europeans did not have 
the lasting impact that 300 Australian dead might have had, and the memorialisation 
of the event is a continuation of the influence of contemporary cultural and racial 
attitudes.  
 
This has not stopped attempts to revise events to conform with British and White 
Australian narratives. There have been attempts to dramatise Porter’s role in saving 
his ship in newspaper features and fictional recreations.18 Most recorded acts of 
heroism during the disaster, however, were performed by the non-European crews, 
and these acts became the focus of attempts at myth-making, to fold them into white 
narratives. When in 1899 Thursday Island Government Resident John Douglas 
recognised Newi’s bravery in rescuing two relatives, this was not enough to get it 
public attention. When the Queensland Government awarded her a medal for 
bravery, it was not reported in newspapers at the time. In the 1930s, the story was 
revived to become part of the “noble savage” racial construct, and Newi’s rescue of 
her relatives changed in 1934 to become the rescue of two white men.19 This story 
was repeated by journalists and non-fiction writers, including by Holthouse in 1971, 
who also added the myth that 100 Aboriginal people were swept out to sea and 
drowned. Myths have played important roles in helping an event live on in social 
memory, but this thesis has demonstrated how science has also incorporated myths 
such as the 100 dead Aboriginal people into scientific literature and, as was shown in 
Chapter Three, models of cyclone behaviour.  
 
One unexpected aspect of the thesis was the relative absence today of personal 
stories in family memories. The cyclone had a profound impact on the survivors as 
well as the families of those who did not survive, and I expected to find more material 
                                                
18 For example, Cappy Ricks, “They Were Saved by a Babe. True Story of a Terrible Storm at Sea”, 
New Zealand Free Lance, 13 April 1938, 2; Ian Townsend, The Devil’s Eye, Pymble, NSW: Fourth 
Estate (HarperCollins), 2008.  
19 E. K. P., “300 Drowned”, Sunday Mail (Brisbane), 15 April 1934, 6. This appears to be the first 
reference to Newi’s rescue of two white men.  
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in family archives and oral histories. The role of trauma was examined as a possible 
cause. Amongst the pearling fleet descendants contacted, including members of the 
Porter, Guivarra, Pitt, Fuhrman, Outridge, Vidgen, and Murray families, there was a 
marked absence of personal stories. One common comment by descendants is that 
their older relatives did not talk about it. This follows a pattern described by Damousi, 
referring to the trauma of war, of the silence of widows.20 Families contacted were 
aware of the event, but not the details, and if they described the cyclone, it was often 
to repeat myths, suggesting that an absence of family stories could be filled by 
collective memories. Collective memory requires a negotiation between many people 
to remember a shared experience or memory, and it is impossible for families to 
share an experience if it is not articulated.21 Although the pearling disaster directly 
impacted about 1,000 people at sea and an estimated 1,000 people ashore in the 
Cape Melville area and Princess Charlotte Bay hinterland, there are surprisingly few 
personal stories. This is partly because many of those who experienced the worst of 
the disaster in Bathurst Bay drowned, and most of the surviving foreign crew were 
later deported or finished their contracts and went home. In the early 20th century, 
the Aboriginal people ashore were removed from their country, and the young 
separated from their families and put onto missions, often forbidden to speak of their 
culture. The old appear to have died before many stories could be passed on. This 
thesis has found that, despite the large number of people who experienced the 
event, the high death toll associated with the disaster, a diaspora of those who 
survived, the breaking up of families and the associated intergenerational trauma 
broke the chain of custody for those memories. This thesis, therefore, contributes to 
a body of research on grief and memory.  
 
It is also notable that unlike wars, disasters, as Hamilton has pointed out, are not 
generally a topic of scholarly work by historians. Disasters tend to be geographically 
and temporally restricted, affecting one place for a short time. War, on the other 
hand, can be considered a disaster on a national or international scale, played out 
over longer periods of time. Wars are often contests involving national identity. The 
features that make the 1899 disaster forgotten — the relative absence of national 
                                                
20 Joy Damousi, Living with the Aftermath: Trauma, Nostalgia and Grief in Post-war Australia, 
Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2001, 99.  
21 See Halbwachs 1980.  
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identity and short span of media attention — are reversed in war. Communities are 
more likely to remember events if they are relevant to their social identity, and it 
appears also that historians are more likely to study those events. Studies of social 
memory in war and disaster are also functions of social memory.   
 
For science, the social memory of an event is usually not a consideration. The 
increased scientific interest in the 1899 cyclone is a result of the increasing research 
into the potential impacts of climate change and the rising costs of disasters caused 
by severe weather events. The geoscientific and meteorological study of cyclones is 
concerned with finding data that can reveal the behaviour of the cyclone and its 
associated impacts. However, as demonstrated in this thesis, when scientists use 
data from historical documents, particularly those from the 19th and early 20th 
century, they may not fully appreciate the ways in which human error and social 
discourses can influence that data over time. Even when data is initially recorded on 
sophisticated instruments, such as a barometer, by a credible witness, its credibility 
is at risk every time it is repeated. This thesis demonstrates the importance to 
science of historical inquiry and historiography, and recommends that scientists 
studying historical documents use a historical methodology, or collaborate with an 
historian, to find the earliest sources and test that data before accepting it as 
credible. Likewise, scientific inquiry can help historians better understand natural 
events and corroborate historical evidence. The two acting separately are more likely 
to produce errors, such as reports in scientific literature of porpoises found 15 metres 
up cliffs, and 100 people in Bathurst Bay blown or swept into the sea. These can be 
shown by collaboration to be not only based on rumour, error or fabrication, but 
scientifically unlikely.   
 
The thesis also identifies a problem with the increasing digitisation of archives that 
allows for easier access to historical documents and data. As shown in Chapter Five, 
there are 14 credible sources for weather observations at Cape Melville during the 
1899 cyclone, and these come from handwritten journals, government inquiries and 
reports, and newspaper accounts. Many are not available online or are difficult to 
identify amongst the thousands of more easily accessible secondary sources. The 
inclusion of secondary sources in government databases can give the impression 
that the data is credible, but the lack of references to primary sources makes it 
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difficult to test those assumptions. It is unreasonable to expect scientists to dig down 
to the primary sources for each piece of data they cite in every journal or database. 
This thesis recommends the review of databases of historic cyclones of the 19th and 
early 20th centuries to ensure historical data is credible.     
 
There is also scope for further collaborative research with scientists and 
archaeologists. The Traditional Owners of Cape Melville National Park, who are also 
the managers of the park, have expressed an interest in identifying sites where 
bodies were buried after the cyclone. There is documentary evidence for a number 
of graves on Pipon Island, five graves on Bewick Island, and between 105 and 115 
on or near the beaches in Bathurst Bay between Bathurst Head and the tip of Cape 
Melville.22 A separate study could better identify the location of graves, which would 
help with identification should remains be found. The beach at Bathurst Bay where 
many of the bodies were buried is now a tourist campsite. Similarly, the locations of 
ship wrecks could be better identified. Of 69 vessels reported wrecked or sunk in the 
cyclone, 12 were salvaged and the locations of more than 40 remain unknown over a 
120-kilometre length of coastline. Historical documents used in this thesis can better 
show their last known positions.  
 
Finally, and significantly, a collaborative historical study with archaeology and 
geoscience is needed of the Wakooka Creek campsite at which Kenny camped 
during the cyclone, and which appears, from documentary and oral history evidence, 
to also be a significant seasonal campsite the Barrow Point people abandoned in 
1881 as a result of a Native Police reprisal for attacks on the fishing industry. 
Sediments, shells, and stones on the ridge need to be examined to show if they were 
deposited by waves or people, and the ridge surveyed to show its height above 
mean sea level. This will provide data to help determine the height of the storm tide, 
in which there is international interest. There are significant cultural issues 
associated with the site that need further research. A visual survey of the site in 2018 
showed a mound in the middle of the site and a blaze on a tree nearby, which in 
                                                
22 Anonymous 1899, 34; “The Pearling Disaster. Discovery of Five More Bodies”, Torres Straits Pilot, 
25 November 1899; Walter Roth, Northern Protector of Aboriginals, to Under Secretary, Home Office, 
“Report re distribution of Gifts to Coastal Aboriginals”, 9 April 1899, HOM/A23, QSA, ID847561; “The 
Late Hurricane. Letter from Mr. James Clark”, Brisbane Courier, 15 May 1899, 7. 
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other parts of Cape York have been associated with graves.23 Because of the site’s 
links to a Native Police reprisal in 1881, including oral history of a massacre at a 
camp near the mouth of Wakooka Creek, the site needs an archaeological 
assessment in consultation with Traditional Owners.  
 
This thesis set out to examine the evidence for the pearling disaster of 1899, and the 
factors that influenced how it was remembered, reported, and scientifically studied. 
In the process, it raised research questions that are relevant to other disciplines, 
particularly meteorology, geoscience, and archaeology. Because this thesis also 
explores the roles of media and narrative on memory, it is also appropriate to 
observe that the Northern Road of the Barrow Point people could play a role in 
correcting some of the errors of memory, identify new but forgotten aspects of 
Barrow Point culture, and better express the significance to history and science of 
this remote area of Queensland. The Northern Road can be considered a metaphor 
for what has been forgotten and what might be remembered. It tells a story that links 
the present to the past, the pearling industry to the Barrow Point people and the 
Native Police who used the same campsite beside the road at Wakooka Creek, 
which also bore the brunt of one of the world’s most powerful cyclones. It could be 
used, as history is often used, to inform contemporary social discourses and, by 
example, explain the complex nature of frontier conflict. Despite what may seem to 
be criticism in this thesis of the role of media in the distortion of evidence, the media 
recorded and preserved much of the credible data for the 1899 cyclone and the 
pearling disaster. The careful presentation of evidence in the media can correct 
errors of memory, and my hope is that this thesis provides a basis for rejuvenating a 
wider interest in this scientifically and culturally significant part of Australian history. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
23 Lawrence B. Conyers, Emma J. St Pierre, Mary-Jean Sutton, and Chet Walker, “Integration of GPR 
and Magnetics to Study the Interior Features and History of Earth Mounds, Mapoon, Queensland, 
Australia”, Archaeological Prospection, 2018, published online 3 July 2018, https://onlinelibrary-wiley-
com.ezproxy.library.uq.edu.au/doi/full/10.1002/arp.1710 (accessed 14 March 2019). 
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   Appendix 1: Death Toll 1899 Cyclone
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A B C D E F G
Name Other Name Place of Origin1, 2 Fleet Position1 Age Death Cert 1899/001
Abdrahman1  Abrahaman2 India Silvery Wave Seaman 37 1209
Abdullah1, 2 Singapore Sketty Belle Seaman 27 1257
Aboo1 bin Aboo2 Sambin1 Sam 2 Singapore Silvery Wave Seaman 32 1251
Abraham1, 2 Joe1, 2 Singapore Sagitta Diver 29 1329
Abris1 Batchoo2 Batchoo1 Malay Silvery Wave Seaman 27 1211
Adriano1 Adrana2 Manilla Sagitta Sailor 25 1321
Ah Mat 1, 2 Java Sketty Belle Seaman 27 1260
Ah Mat1, 2 Malaya Silvery Wave Seaman 25 1196
Ah Mat1, 2 Singapore Sketty Belle Seaman 25 1259
Ahmet1 India Silvery Wave Seaman 28 1274
Alban1, 2 Juan1, 2 Manilla Silvery Wave Seaman 44 1226
Allinous1 Allionis2 Malaya Silvery Wave Cabin Boy 25 1206
Amos1 Amios2 South Sea Islands, Rotumah Sagitta Diver 20 1290
Andris1 Andres2 Gostene Waduga1 Ceylon Pirate (A.J. Bebrouth) Pearlsheller 31 1356
Appoo1 Apos2 Sine1 Sing2 Ceylon Silvery Wave Seaman 28 1284
Aquilar1 Aguilas2 Philip1, 2 Manilla Silvery Wave Boatswain 42 1231
Assan1 Assam2 Ali2 Egypt, Aden Crest of the Wave Seaman 25 1286
Assan1 Java2 Assam2 Java Silvery Wave Seaman 28 1263
Atthow1, 2 Edward Charles1 Queensland, Brisbane Silvery Wave Clerk 20 1341
Barqua1, 2 Captain1 South Sea Islands, Malaita Sagitta Seaman 31 1294
Bateena1, 2 Jimmy1, 2 South Sea Islands, Hondah Sagitta Sailor 31 1296
Ben1 Rotumah2 Ben2 South Sea Islands, Rotumah Silvery Wave Diver 34 1121
Benlabie1 Benlabi2 Manilla Silvery Wave Seaman 40 1228
Billie2 South Sea Islands Rattler (Douglas Pitt)
bin Abdullah1, 2 Mydin1, 2 Malay Peninsula Sketty Belle Seaman 39 1214
bin Aboo1, 2 Omar1, 2 Malaya Silvery Wave Seaman 30 1200
bin Ahmat1  Ah Mat2 Kilchi1, 2 Malay Islands Silvery Wave Seaman 27 1202
bin Alli1, 2 Cassim1 Cassin2 Malay Peninsula, Penang Silvery Wave Seaman 24 1225
bin Alli1, 2 Almon1, 2 Singapore Sagitta Sailor 25 1325
bin Assam1 Elam1 Etam2 Malaya Silvery Wave Seaman 20 1199
bin Assan1  Ben Assam2 Abboo1, 2 India, Calcutta Sketty Belle Seaman 30 1279
bin Assan1  Bin Assam2 Ali1, 2 Malaya Silvery Wave Seaman 27 1205
Bin Assan1  Bin Asson2 Malay Islands, Borneo Sagitta Sailor 29 1337
bin Brahim1  Ben Brahmin2 Doolah1 Dollah2 Malay Islands Sagitta Sailor 25 1334
bin Dolla1  Bin Dalleh2 Salleh1 Salleb2 Malaya Silvery Wave Seaman 35 1198
bin Doolah1, 2 Ali1, 2 Malaya Silvery Wave Seaman 20 1197
bin Hadji Sahib1  Bin Hadgi2 Dollah1 Dalah2 Malaya Silvery Wave Seaman 18 1201
bin Hosin1  Bin Hassin2 Cassin1 Cassim2 Malaya Crest of the Wave Seaman 26 1220
bin Jelet1, 2 Bengal1, 2 Singapore Sketty Belle Seaman 20 1256
bin Kamis1  Bin Kamin2 Matrom1, 2 Java Silvery Wave Seaman 20 1265
bin Kitchil1  Ben Kitchiel2 Osman1, 2 Singapore Silvery Wave Seaman 30 1250
bin Labbu1 Ah Wong2 Ah Wong1 Malaya Silvery Wave Seaman 22 1208
bin Munbz1 Bin Muntz2 Darani1 Tarani2 Malay Peninsula Sketty Belle Seaman 21 1216
bin Omar1 Allee1 Alle2 Malay Islands, Penang Crest of the Wave Seaman 20 1223
bin Prim1, 2 Acha1, 2 Siam Sketty Belle Seaman 20 1276
bin Sali1 Salli2 Ahmat1, 2 Malay Peninsula Sketty Belle Seaman 24 1213
bin Salleh1, 2 Dollah1 Dooleh2 Malay Peninsula, Malucca, Silvery Wave Seaman 29 1224
bin Salleh1,2 Omar1, 2 Macassar Sketty Belle Seaman 20 1281
bin Sampa1 Bin Tampa2 Naga1 Nogo2 Malay Peninsula Crest of the Wave Seaman 33 1222
bin Sarpin1, 2 Sarpin1, 2 Batavia Silvery Wave Seaman 30 1282
bin Seedin1 Bin Sedin 2 Ahmat1, 2 Java Silvery Wave Seaman 25 1261
Bob1 Singapore2 Singapore Silvery Wave Seaman 26 1254
Bob2 Aboriginal Maygalle (Barney Erromanga)
Booka Booka1, 2 Sam1, 2 South Sea Islands Crest of the Wave Seaman 33 1126
Brown1 Brain2 Charley1, 2 Singapore Sagitta Sailor 30 1322
Bryan1, 2 Malay Peninsula Sketty Belle Seaman 21 1217
Cameron1 Robert1 Scotland Sagitta Seaman 23 1343
Camoy1, 2 South Sea Islands, Rotumah Silvery Wave Tender 30 1124
Campie1 Canapie2 Java Silvery Wave Seaman 30 1271
Cassim1  Kasim2 Ahmat1, 2 Malaya Silvery Wave Seaman 24 1212
Castilion1, 2 Pilano1, 2 Manilla Crest of the Wave Seaman 25 1236
Cedar2 Torres Strait,  Murray Island) Pirate (A.J. Bebrouth) Crew
Cedar4 Billy4 Torres Strait, Darnley Island)Rattler (Douglas Pitt) Crew
Charley2 Aboriginal Maygalle (Barney Erromanga)
Charlie2 South Sea Islands Francis (Pedro Guvarra) 30
Cheefoo1 Cheopan2 Malay Islands, Borneo Silvery Wave Seaman 28 1285
Collin4 Aboriginal, Flinders Island Crew
Coomooki1  Coomarkie2 Jimmy1 South Sea Islands, Malaita Sagitta Seaman 28 1293
Crowley1 Daniel1 England Channel Rock Lightship Seaman 30 1110
Dan2 Aboriginal Maygalle (Barney Erromanga)
Dau1  Dan2 Sam1, 2 Java Silvery Wave Seaman 37 1272
Davis1, 2 Charley1, 2 Singapore Sagitta Sailor 26 1323
Dick Dead-eye3 Aboriginal
Doas1, 2 Japan Crest of the Wave Seaman 20 1173
Domingo2 Manilla North Wales (Aplin, Brown, Co)  Crew
Doolah1, 2 India Silvery Wave Seaman 25 1275
Doolah1, 2 Singapore Sagitta Sailor 27 1330
256 
 
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
A B C D E F G
Doretio1  Donetio2 Manilla Crest of the Wave Tender 30 1244
Doria1  Davia2 Malaya Silvery Wave Seaman 26 1210
Douglas5 Torres Strait, Murray Island 20
Dowdoolong1, 2 Bob1, 2 South Sea Islands, Motlop Sagitta Sailor 33 1299
Edris1, 2 Malay Islands Silvery Wave Seaman 19 1195
Espata1, 2 R.2 Manilla Silvery Wave Seaman 22 1227
Esta1, 2 Japan Crest of the Wave Seaman 20 1191
Etaro1  Etari2 Japan Crest of the Wave Seaman 30 1188
Faria1  Paria2 Martin1, 2 Manilla Sketty Belle Sailmaker 31 1232
Felece5 Torres Strait, Murray Island 2
Fotomatz1 Tokomatzae2 Noha1 Naka2 Japan Silvery Wave Diver 23 1131
Fuhrman1 Gustaf Oscar1 Sweden Channel Rock Lightship Master 46 1105
Fukushima1, 2 Japan Silvery Wave Diver 22 1133
Geusuki1 Gensuku2 Japan Crest of the Wave Seaman 31 1180
Gisa1, 2 Japan Crest of the Wave Seaman 36 1178
Gonzales1, 2 Manilla Crest of the Wave1 Tender 25 1234
Gregorio1  Gregoria2 Francis1, 2 Manilla Crest of the Wave Diver 29 1240
Guilermo2 Manilla North Wales Crew
Guivarra1  Guvarra2 Pedro1, 2 Manilla Francis (Pedro Guivarra) Master 28 1109
Haissen1  Hanson2 Fred1, 2 Egypt Silvery Wave Seaman 29 1278
Hamogutchi1  Hamaguchi2 Japan Silvery Wave Carpenter 26 1130
Hamogutchi1  Hameguchi2 Japan Silvery Wave Seaman 22 1166
Harry1, 2 South Sea Islands, Rotumah Silvery Wave Diver 23 1118
Heada1, 2 Japan Sagitta Carpenter 30 1311
Hongeo1  Honges2 Japan Sketty Belle Seaman 22 1177
Ikwam5 Equam2 Torres Strait, Murray Island Rattler 36
Ishikawa1 Ishakawa2 Japan Silvery Wave Seaman 22 1165
Isogowa1, 2 Japan Crest of the Wave Seaman 25 1193
Itchiwata1 Itchuvala2 Suga1 Luza2 Japan Silvery Wave Seaman 21 1158
Iwa1, 2 Japan Crest of the Wave Seaman 25 1194
Jacob1, 2 India Silvery Wave Seaman 50 1273
Jarno1, 2 Malay Silvery Wave Seaman 25 1207
Java1 Jack2 Jack1 Java Silvery Wave Seaman 42 1267
Java1, 2 Charlie1 Charley2 Java Silvery Wave Seaman 26 1264
Jefferson1, 2 Edward1, 2 England Silvery Wave Master Mariner 36 1111
Jerokitchi1 Jirokichi2 Japan Crest of the Wave Seaman 18 1190
Johnny2 Aboriginal Pirate (A.J. Bebrouth) Crew
Jones1 Daniel1 South America Crest of the Wave Seaman 21 1287
Joseman1, 2 Java Silvery Wave Seaman 25 1269
Kamori1  Kansim2 Japan Silvery Wave Seaman 20 1140
Kassner1 Henry1 German Channel Rock Lightship Seaman 28 1340
Kataoka1 Katooka2 Japan Silvery Wave Diver 23 1144
Kayama1 Koyama2 Japan Silvery Wave Carpenter 24 1134
Kirie2 South Sea Islands Silvery Wave 42
Kitchel1 Singapore Silvery Wave 42 1252
Klan2 Emil2 Manilla Silvery Wave
Kumenbetha2 South Sea Islands Silvery Wave
Kusmaa1  Kusman2 Malay Islands Sagitta Sailor 22 1331
Kussim1  Kassim2 Malay Silvery Wave Seaman 23 1204
Lacoon1, 2 Willie1, 2 South Sea Islands Crest of the Wave Seaman 27 1127
Lamere1, 2 South Sea Islands Crest of the Wave Seaman 29 1128
Latwako1 Japan Sagitta Sailor 35 1307
Lee1 Douglas1 Scotland Channel Rock Lightship Mate 50 1096
Levotee1 Levatee2 John1 Joh2 South Sea Islands, Malo Sagitta Sailor 26 1300
Little Jack2 Aboriginal Maygalle (Barney Erromanga)
Longwillup1 Willup2 South Sea Islands Crest of the Wave Seaman 25 1125
Lupa1  Lifu2 Billy1, 2 South Sea is, Hondah Sagitta Sailor 31 1295
Mabi1, 2 Japan Crest of the Wave Seaman 27 1185
Macassar1  Bryan2 Boyan1 Singapore Silvery Wave Seaman 25 1253
Mahomet1, 2 Egypt Silvery Wave Seaman 38 1277
Mahomet1, 2 Malay Islands Sagitta Sailor 23 1333
Mair1 Malay Islands Sagitta Diver 39 1336
Mallaree1 Aree2 Aree1 South Sea Islands, Solomon Islands, GuadalcanalSagitta Sailor 26 1303
Manila1 Charley1 Manilla Crest of the Wave Seaman 32 1246
Manuel1, 2 Manilla Crest of the Wave Seaman 26 1239
Manuel2 Manilla North Wales (Aplin, Brown, Co)  Crew
Maraonoa1  Manooma2 Jim1, 2 New Zealand Sagitta Sailor 29 1339
Mariam1  Mariana2 Japan Sagitta Sailor 22 1318
Marloo1, 2 Charlie1 South Sea Islands, Hondah Sagitta Sailor 26 1298
Masta1, 2 George1, 2 Japan Sketty Belle Diver 25 1170
Mataquil1 Molaquil2 Tommy1 Tom2 South Sea Islands, Lacoon Sagitta Sailor 41 1305
Matiwosuki1 Japan Silvery Wave Seaman 19 1168
Matsuhara1, 2 Japan Crest of the Wave Tender 21 1179
Matsuhava1  Matsuhara2 Japan Silvery Wave Tender 28 1160
Matsumura1 Matsimura2 Japan Silvery Wave Seaman 41 1167
Matthew1 Manilla Crest of the Wave Seaman 27 1245
Mau1 Tani1 Japan Sagitta Sailor 25 1312
Mayden1  Maydin2 Malaya Sketty Belle Seaman 32 1219
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Mayeda1 Moyeda2 Japan Sagitta Sailor 24 1316
Mendez1, 2 Antonio1, 2 Timor Silvery Wave Seaman 1280
Mendoza1, 2 Cataleno1 Catulino2 Manilla Crest of the Wave Diver 26 1241
Minamie1  Minami2 Japan Crest of the Wave Diver 20 1181
Moa1, 2 South Sea Islands, Rotumah Silvery Wave Tender 32 1120
Momo2 Malay Sagitta
Moonga2 South Sea Islands Silvery Wave
Mottah1  Motlop2 Jack1, 2 South Sea Islands, Mota  Sagitta Sailor 46 1301
Mottah1  Motlop2 Jimmy1, 2 South Sea Islands, Mota  Sagitta Seaman 36 1302
Murray1, 2 Robert Brown1  R.2 Scotland Sagitta Master Mariner 37 1342
Murray1, 2 Jack1, 2 Torres Strait, Murray Is Sketty Belle Seaman 28 1288
Nakamora1 Nakamura2 Japan Sketty Belle Seaman 27 1175
Nakasima1 Nakiama2 Japan Silvery Wave Seaman 21 1136
Nanda1 Shemona1 Japan Sagitta Diver 23 1309
Natu1  Natow2 Jack1, 2 South Sea Islands, Tanna Sagitta Sailor 36 1297
Navichi1 Naochi2 Japan Silvery Wave Diver 26 1163
Neave2 Tom2 Japan Sagitta
Nelson1, 2 South Sea Islands Silvery Wave Seaman 35 1116
Nemos1  Nemo2 South Sea Islands, Api Sagitta Sailor 26 1306
Nicholas1 Manilla Crest of the Wave Seaman 26 1249
Nicholas1, 2 John Henry1, 2 Queensland Silvery Wave Clerk 19 1104
Nin2 Ninn4 Jimmy2 South Sea Islands Rattler (Douglas Pitt)
Nitty1, 2 Malay Peninsula Sketty Belle Seaman 21 1218
Oaki2 Japan Silvery Wave
Okamoto1, 2 Japan Silvery Wave Tender 26 1169
Oki1, 2 Japan Crest of the Wave Seaman 23 1172
Okija1 Okagi2 Chunee1 Churee2 Japan Crest of the Wave Diver 26 1171
Ongawa1, 2 Japan Sagitta Sailor 20 1313
Onomich1, 2 Japan Crest of the Wave Seaman 28 1183
Ooka1 Ooska2 Japan Silvery Wave Tender 27 1147
Oosha1 Japan Silvery Wave Seaman 21 1159
Osaki1  Osaka2 Japan Silvery Wave Tender 22 1150
Osman1, 2 Singapore Sagitta Sailor 21 1327
Otozo1, 2 Japan Silvery Wave Seaman 24 1157
Outridge1, 2 Harold Arthur1  H.2 Queensland Sagitta Pearler 23 1114
Outridge1, 2 Alfred St John1 A.2 Queensland Sagitta Manager             39 1115
Paioro5 Torres Strait, Murray Island 1
Pantallia1  Pantillia2 Manilla Crest of the Wave Tender 37 1238
Paper2 New Guinea, Lever River Pirate (A.J. Bebrouth) Crew
Perera1  Pablo2 Pablo1 Manilla Sagitta Sailor 30 1320
Perez1 Marco1 Manilla Admiral Master 49 1112
Perez1 Marcus1 Manilla Crest of the Wave Seaman 46 1248
Poi5 Torres Strait, Murray Island 29
Pow1, 2 Jim1 Jam2 South Sea Islands, Rotumah Silvery Wave Seaman 59 1123
Powell2 William2 NSW o)North Wales (Aplin, Brown, Co)  Captain
Radin2 Raphael2 Manilla Silvery Wave
Rassemin1 Kassimin2 Java Silvery Wave Seaman 22 1268
Rattay2 Manilla Silvery Wave
Remontal1, 2 Domingo1 Dominigo2 Manilla Crest of the Wave Seaman 23 1235
Reste1  Reate2 Roderigo1, 2 Manilla Crest of the Wave Diver 23 1243
Reuben1, 2 South Sea Islands, Rotumah Silvery Wave Tender 24 1122
Robina1, 2 Emilio1, 2 Manilla Crest of the Wave Diver 24 1242
Roman1  Koman2 Manilla Silvery Wave Seaman 40 1229
Rotumah1, 2 Jim1, 2 South Sea Islands, Rotumah Sagitta Sailor 37 1292
Saigai1, 2 Japan Silvery Wave Seaman 26 1139
Sakamoto1, 2 Japan Sagitta Sailor 23 1308
Sakamotto1, 2 Japan Crest of the Wave nSeaman              24 1182
Salakin1, 2 Malaya Silvery Wave Seaman 27 1203
Sallee1 Salli2 Singapore1 Malaya2 Sagitta Sailor 26 1328
Sallie1 Salli2 Ahmat1, 2 Hong Kong Silvery Wave Seaman 23 1283
Sally1, 2 Singapore Sagitta Sailor 25 1326
Salman1 Java Sagitta Sailor 25 1338
Santiago1 Manilla Crest of the Wave Seaman 23 1247
Sasaki1  Susaki2 Japan Sagitta Sailor 27 1317
Satoraka2 Japan Sagitta
Sedior1, 2 Java Silvery Wave Seaman 40 1266
Seedin1, 2 Java Silvery Wave Seaman 30 1270
Serriman1, 2 Malaya Crest of the Wave Seaman 30 1221
Shiba1, 2 Japan Silvery Wave Seaman 20 1142
Shibosaki1  Shibasaki2 Japan Silvery Wave Diver 22 1132
Shimotto1  Shimoto2 Japan Crest of the Wave Seaman 20 1189
Siemon1, 2 Malay Peninsula Sketty Belle Seaman 30 1215
Simamotu1, 2 Japan Silvery Wave Tender 34 1148
Simatsu1  Oaki2 Oaki1 Japan Silvery Wave Tender 25 1137
Simosae1 Japan Silvery Wave Seaman 19 1138
Singapore1, 2 Bob1, 2 Singapore Sagitta Sailor 30 1324
Sitamoto1, 2 Japan Silvery Wave Diver 28 1146
Solomon1  Peter2 Peter1 South Sea Islands, Solomon IslandsSagitta Sailor 27 1291
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Solomon1, 2 Joe1, 2 South Sea Islands Silvery Wave Seaman 28 1117
Solomon2 South Sea Islands, Solomon IslandsSagitta 24
Spaniel1, 2 Pedro1, 2 Manilla Silvery Wave Seaman 28 1230
Staro1  Itaro2 Japan Sagitta Diver 27 1310
Suatura1  Suataro2 Gamasaki1 Yamasuki2 Japan Sagitta Sailor 21 1314
Suga1  Suka2 Japan Sketty Belle Diver 23 1186
Sugimoto1, 2 Japan Silvery Wave Diver 23 1161
Suka1  Suki2 Matain2 Japan Sketty Belle Diver 21 1174
Sukuchira2 Suga2 Japan Crest of the Wave
Sullivan1, 2 South Sea Islands, Solomon IslandsCrest of the Wave Seaman 24 1129
Sutepio1, 2 Japan Silvery Wave Seaman 22 1141
Sylvester1, 2 Leoni1 Leon2 Manilla Sagitta Sailor 33 1319
Tamada1 Tameda2 Japan Silvery Wave Tender 25 1153
Tamaguchi1, 2 Japan Crest of the Wave Seaman 24 1187
Tamonishi1  Tamoniski2 Japan Silvery Wave Diver 21 1162
Tanaka1  2 Ya Satara1 Japan Silvery Wave Diver 26 1156
Tanikawa1  Kawa2 Japan Silvery Wave Diver 30 1143
Tanimatsu1  Taminatsu2 Japan Silvery Wave Tender 25 1152
Tanioka1  Tanioska2 Japan Silvery Wave Tender 32 1154
Tanna1, 2 Tom1, 2 South Sea Islands, Tanna Sagitta Sailor 27 1289
Tashima1 Tashino2 Japan Crest of the Wave Seaman 22 1184
Tasima1  Tasema2 Japan Silvery Wave Cook 23 1135
Temora1 Tamara2 Tokio1, 2 Japan Sagitta Sailor 23 1315
Tenatsekie1  Tinasetsee2 Charley1 South Sea Islands, Solomon Islands, GuadalcanalSagitta Sailor 26 1304
Terriman1  Serriman2 Java Silvery Wave Seaman 33 1262
Tonga1, 2 George1, 2 South Sea Islands Silvery Wave 24 1113
Tuason1 Tuxan2 Theodora1 Thedor2 Manilla Crest of the Wave Seaman              32 1237
Unknown3 Aboriginal, Bathurst Bay
Unknown3 Aboriginal, Bathurst Bay
Unknown3 Aboriginal, Bathurst Bay
Unknown3 Aboriginal, Bathurst Bay
Unknown3 Aboriginal, Bathurst Bay
Unknown3 Aborginal, Barrow Point, 
Unknown3 Aboriginal, Barrow Point, 
Unknown3 Aboriginal, Barrow Point, 
Unknown6 Aboriginal La France/Caledonia Crew
Unknown6 Aboriginal La France/Caledonia Crew
Unknown6 Aboriginal La France/Caledonia Crew
Unknown6 Aboriginal La France/Caledonia Crew
Unknown6 Aboriginal La France/Caledonia Crew
Unknown6 Aboriginal La France/Caledonia Crew
Unknown6 Bengal La France/Caledonia Crew
Unknown6 French colonies Caledonia Captain
Unknown6 French colonies La France Captain
Unknown7 Meg Merrilies
Unknown7 Meg Merrilies
Unknown7 Meg Merrilies
Unknown7 Meg Merrilies
Unknown7 Meg Merrilies
Unknown7 Meg Merrilies
Unknown7 Meg Merrilies
Unknown7 Meg Merrilies
Unknown7 Meg Merrilies
Ushima1 Nishimo2 Japan Silvery Wave Tender 28 1151
Usin1, 2 Singapore Sketty Belle Seaman 32 1255
Usopha1 Kusop2 Mahomet1 Malaya Sagitta Sailor 25 1335
Veda1  Lodo2 Sido1, 2 Manilla Crest of the Wave Tender 27 1233
Versden1  Versoni2 Pelle1 Pelli2 South Sea Islands, Rotumah Silvery Wave Diver 27 1119
Wilson1, 2 Singapore Sketty Belle Seaman 24 1258
Yabboo1 Yahboo2 Japan Sketty Belle Seaman 27 1176
Yamamoto1, 2 Esetu1 Eseta2 Japan Silvery Wave Tender 23 1155
Yamoshita1  Yamashito2 Sukumatsu1  F.2 Japan Crest of the Wave Diver 26 1192
Yatchoo1  Batchoo2 Malay Islands Sagitta Sailor 40 1332
Yoshi1  Yoski2 Japan Silvery Wave Seaman 18 1164
Yoshmat1  Yoshimat2 Japan Silvery Wave Diver 25 1145
Yosikawa1, 2 Japan Silvery Wave Tender 25 1149
1. "1899.	Deaths	in	the	District	of	Cook	in	the	Colony	of	Queensland,	Registered	by	Arthur	Dean,	District	Registrar",	Register	of	Deaths,	Cooktown	District	– Cook,	1890–1901.
Births,	Deaths	and	Marriages,	QSA,	ID1273107.		
2. George	Bennett,	“Return	Giving	Names	and	Nationality	of	Persons	Belonging	to	Pearling	Fleet	Lost	in	Hurricane	of	4th	and	5th	March,	1899,	in	Neighbourhood	of	Cape	
Melville”,	in	T. M. Arnold, "Report	on	the	Marine	Department	for	the	Year	1898-1899”,	QVP,	3,	24	September	1899,	20–24.	
3. Walter	Roth	to	Under	Secretary	Home	Office,	"Report	Re	Distribution	of	Gifts	to	Coastal	Aboriginals”,	9	April	1899,	HOM/A23/99/5252,	QSA,	ID847561
4. Frank	Illidge,	"The	Log	of	the	Lally”,	Northern	Herald	(Cairns),	5	December	1923,	30.
5. A.C.	Haddon	(ed.),	Reports	of	the	Cambridge	Anthropological	Expedition	to	Torres	Strait,	Cambridge:	University	Press,	1,	1935,	112.
6. Douglas	Pitt	Snr,	in	"The	Late	Hurricane.	Return	of	the	Warrego.	Reports	from	the	Boats",	Brisbane	Courier,	20	March	1899,	6.
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    Appendix 2: Observations relevant to modelling the 1899 cyclone 
Date event Time Observations Tides/Sunrise/Sunset Wind direction and strength Rain Latitude Longitude Vessel/place/reference
1 March 1899 0600 1007.45hPa (29.75inHg)  13°55'56"S 143°44'41"E Aladdin1
1 March 1899 0900 1006.09 hPa(29.71inHg)  13°55'56"S 143°44'41"E Aladdin1
1 March 1899 1200 1006.77hPa (29.73inHg)  13°55'56"S 143°44'41"E Aladdin1
1 March 1899 1500 1005.41hPa (29.69 inHg)  13°55'56"S 143°44'41"E Aladdin1
1 March 1899 1800 1005.41hPa (29.69inHg)  13°55'56"S 143°44'41"E Aladdin1
2 March 1899 0600 1006.43hPa (29.72inHg)  13°55'56"S 143°44'41"E Aladdin1
2 March 1899 0900 1007.45hPa (29.75inHg)  13°55'56"S 143°44'41"E Aladdin1
2 March 1899 1200 1006.09hPa (29.71inHg)  13°55'56"S 143°44'41"E Aladdin1
2 March 1899 1500 1004.06hPa (29.65inHg)  13°55'56"S 143°44'41"E Aladdin1
2 March 1899 1800 1005.41hPa (29.69inHg)  13°55'56"S 143°44'41"E Aladdin1 
3 March 1899 0600 1006.09hPa (29.71inHg)  13°55'56"S 143°44'41"E Aladdin1 
3 March 1899 0900 1007.45hPa (29.75inHg)  13°55'56"S 143°44'41"E Aladdin1 
3 March 1899 1200 1005.75hPa (29.70inHg)  13°55'56"S 143°44'41"E Aladdin1
3 March 1899 1500 1005.08hPa (29.68inHg)  13°55'56"S 143°44'41"E Aladdin1
3 March 1899 1800 1004.40hPa (29.66inHg)  13°55'56"S 143°44'41"E Aladdin1
4 March 1899 0226 High tide at Munro Reef  1.95m 14°18'S 144°43'E Munro Reef2
4 March 1899 0303 High tide at Leggatt Island  2.09m 14°31'S 144°51'E Leggatt Is2
4 March 1899 0600 1004.40hPa (29.66inHg)  13°55'56"S 143°44'41"E Aladdin1 
4 March 1899 0900 1005.75 hPa (29.70inHg)  13°55'56"S 143°44'41"E Aladdin1
4 March 1899 0600-1200 S, light 13°55'56"S 143°44'41"E Aladdin1
4 March 1899 1200 Calm 13°55'56"S 143°44'41"E Aladdin1
4 March 1899 1200 1002.03hPa (29.59inHg)  13°55'56"S 143°44'41"E Aladdin1
4 March 1899 1300-1400 SE, light Fine 14°30'16"S 144°45'23"E North Wales3
4 March 1899 1400-1500 SE, squall followed by light wind Sharp squall 13°55'56"S 143°44'41"E Aladdin1 
4 March 1899 1500 1001.35hPa (29.57inHg)  13°55'56"S 143°44'41"E Aladdin1 
4 March 1899 <1730 SE, light breeze Drizzling rain 14°30'30"S 144°39'30"E Cape Bowen4
4 March 1899 <1730 "Light air" 13°55'56"S 143°44'41"E Aladdin1
4 March 1899 1730 SE, "with a rush" 13°55'56"S 143°44'41"E Aladdin1
4 March 1899 1800 Heavy rain started 14°30'16"S 144°45'23"E North Wales3
4 March 1899 <1800 Until 6pm, Aladdin did not expect "anything more than a breeze" 13°55'56"S 143°44'41"E Aladdin1
4 March 1899 1800 1002.7hPa (29.61inHg)  13°55'56"S 143°44'41"E Aladdin1
4 March 1899 1800 "Not much wind"  Raining 14°11'2.93"S 144°27'51.20"E Zoe6
4 March 1899 1800 SE, going SSE, fresh  Rain set in 14°10'39.25"S 144°25'55.58"E Crest of the Wave7
4 March 1899 1844 Sunset 14°10'S 144°29'E Cape Melville8
4 March 1899 1844 1002.37hPa (29.60inHg) "A light rain set in" 14°10'39.25"S 144°25'55.58"E Crest of the Wave7
4 March 1899 1900 E, moderate breeze  13°53'49.86"S 143°49'29.12"E Meg Merrilies9
4 March 1899 1900-1159 SE, moderate, freshening all evening 13°53'49.86"S 143°49'29.12"E Meg Merrilies5
4 March 1899 2020 Low tide Munro Reef 1.21m 14°18'S 144°43'E Munro Reef2
4 March 1899 2032 Low tide Leggatt Island 1.39m 14°31'S 144°51'E Leggatt Is2
4 March 1899 2100 Air pressure falling fast SE, "fearfully hard" 14°10'39.25"S 144°25'55.58"E Crest of the Wave10
4 March 1899 2100 Unnamed boat sinks  14°19'S 144°50'E Spray9
4 March 1899 2200 Mrs Porter sea sick 14°10'39.25"S 144°25'55.58"E Crest of the Wave6
4 March 1899 2100-2200 SE, strong 14°30'16.00"S 144°45'23.00"E North Wales3
4 March 1899 2100-2200 SW  14°11'2.93"S 144°27'51.20"E Zoe6 
4 March 1899 2200 1002.37hPa (29.60inHg)  13°55'33.00"S 143°44'53.00"E Olive9
4 March 1899 2200 Wind, strong "off the land", Crest of the Wave  drags N 14°10'39.25"S 144°25'55.58"E Crest of the Wave10
4 March 1899 >2215 Unnamed cutter sinks 14°30'17.41"S 144°45'37.44"E North Wales3
4 March 1899 2300 SW 13°55'56"S 143°44'41"E Aladdin1
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4 March 1899 2300 North Wales  drags anchor  SE to S 14°30'16.00"S 144°45'23.00"E North Wales3
4 March 1899 2300 995.59hPa (29.40inHg) 14° 8'S 144°26'E Crest of the Wave7
4 March 1899 2300-2400 Wind increasing 14° 8'S 144°26'E Crest of the Wave6
4 March 1899 2330 Wind veering to S Rainy squalls 14° 7'28"S 144°26'E Crest of the Wave7
4 March 1899 2330 SSE, "Stiff wind", increasing 14°28'47.25"S 144°36'48.52"E Wakooka Creek4
4 March 1899 1150 +- 05 North Wales drops second anchor 14°27'26.78"S 144°44'14.24"E North Wales3
4 March 1899 1150 +- 05 Adriana overboard 14°27'26.78"S 144°44'14.24"E North Wales3
4 March 1899 0000 +-10 Rattler drags anchor  SE 14°25'27.83"S 144°51'58.47"E Rattler11
4 March 1899 0000-0700 Jamaica describes wind change during the night SE, veering to E to NW 14°41'22.68"S 145°27'21.02"E Jamaica1
4 March 1899 0000 +-10 E 14°19'10.69"S 144°50'56.69"E Spray9
4 March 1899 0000   Zoe hits Inner Boulder Rocks 14° 9'54.56"S 144°29'14.13"E Zoe6
4 March 1899 0000   Little Bill sinks, Albert and Moses swept NE 14° 9'54.56"S 144°29'14.13"E Little Bill6
4 March 1899 0000   North Wales  sinks 14°27'26.78"S 144°44'14.24"E North Wales3
4 March 1899 0000   Wind veers SW, hurricane force 13°53'50.12"S 143°49'29.12"E Meg Merrilies5
4 March 1899 0000 982.05hPa (29inHg) 14° 7'S 144°26'E Crest of the Wave7
4 March 1899 0000 Meg Merrilies  drags NE  14°27'26.78"S 144°44'14.24"E Meg Merrilies9
4 March 1899 0000 Trooper's tent blown away 14°28'47.25"S 144°36'48.52"E Wakooka Creek4
5 March 1899 0005 Pelting rain, vivid lightning 14°28'47.25"S 144°36'48.52"E Wakooka Creek4
5 March 1899 0100 948.18hPa (28inHg)  14° 6'S 144°26"E Crest of the Wave7
5 March 1899 0200 SE to E, hurricane force 14°28'47.25"S 144°36'48.52"E Wakooka Creek4
5 March 1899 0300 Waves wash away whaleboat 13°51'S 143°52'E Meg Merrilles9
5 March 1899 0300 Tarawa driven ashore  13°54'43.08"S 143°50'7.78"E Tarawa9
5 March 1899 0300-0400 Luggers sink in a line west of Boulder Rocks 14° 9'18.79"S 144°28'2.57"E Boomerang  and others (James Clark)14
5 March 1899 0330 Zanoni  sinks  14° 9'54.56"S 144°29'14.13"E Inner Boulder Rocks6
5 March 1899 0430 880.46hPa (26inHg) 14° 4'39.06"S 144°25'53.28"E Crest of the Wave10
5 March 1899 0445-0455 Cyclone eye passes  Calm 14° 4'39.06"S 144°25'53.28"E Crest of the Wave7
5 March 1899 >0430 Lull Calm 14° 4'39.06"S 144°25'53.28"E Crest of the Wave10
5 March 1899 >0500 Calm 10 minutes 14° 6'S 144°23'E Estelle6
5 March 1899 0500 Barometer began to rise  NW, "with great force" 14° 4'39.06"S 144°25'53.28"E Crest of the Wave7
5 March 1899 0500 NW, "terrific" 14° 4'39.06"S 144°25'53.28"E Crest of the Wave10 
5 March 1899 0500 Veering NE, "harder than ever" Torrents of rain 14°28'47.25"S 144°36'48.52"E Wakooka Creek4
5 March 1899 0511 High tide at Munro Reef 2.19m 14°18'00"S 144°43'00"E Munro Reef 2 
5 March 1899 0514 High tide at Leggatt Island  2.33m 14°31'00"S 144°51'00"E Leggatt Is2
5 March 1899 0505 +-10 Storm surge 14°28'47.25"S 144°36'48.52"E Wakooka Creek4
5 March 1899 0530 +-30 Adriana washed ashore "high up on the land" 14°26'S 144°37'11.44"E Bowen Bay3
5 March 1899 0530 NW, stronger, "quite hot" 14° 6'S 144°23'E Estelle6
5 March 1899 0600 Silvery Wave sinks 14°10'3.34"S 144°27'33.49"E Silvery Wave9
5 March 1899 0600 Estelle  sinks  14° 6'S 144°23'E Estelle6
5 March 1899 0600 985.10hPa (29.09inHg)  13°56'58.53"S 143°46'36.60"E Aladdin1
5 March 1899 0600 985.40hPa (29.10inHg) 13°56'46.29"S 143°45'54.92"E Olive9
5 March 1899 0624 Sunrise 14°10'S 144°29'E Cape Melville8
5 March 1899 >0624 (dawn) Crest of the Wave sinking 14° 5'S 144°27'E Crest of the Wave10 
5 March 1899 >0624 (dawn) Meg Merrilies  grounded W 13°48'44.80"S 143°57'6.99"E Meg Merrilies5
5 March 1899 >0624 (dawn) W, "still blowing stiffly" 13°56'46.29"S 143°45'54.92"E Olive9
5 March 1899 >0624 (dawn) Wind at its height, W by N (halfway between due W and WNW ) 13°56'58.53"S 143°46'36.60"E Aladdin1 
5 March 1899 0700 < 985.10hPa (29.09inHg)  W 13°56'58.53"S 143°46'36.60"E Aladdin1
5 March 1899 0700-1000 Rain heaviest 13°56'58.53"S 143°46'36.60"E Aladdin1
5 March 1899 0700 948.18hPa (28inHg) 14° 6'45.42"S 144°27'35.51"E Crest of the Wave7
5 March 1899 0800 982.05hPa (29inHg) 14° 6'45.42"S 144°27'35.51"E Crest of the Wave7
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5 March 1899 >0800 988.82hPa (29.2inHg) 14° 6'45.42"S 144°27'35.51"E Crest of the Wave7
5 March 1899 0900 989.50hPa (29.22inHg) 13°56'58.53"S 143°46'36.60"E Aladdin1
5 March 1899 1000 Not properly daylight until 1000 14°28'47.25"S 144°36'48.52"E Wakooka Creek4
5 March 1899 1000 NW, "dies away" 13°56'46.29"S 143°45'54.92"E Olive9
5 March 1899 1200 995.25hPa (29.39inHg) NW, "strong breeze" continuing to veer N 13°56'58.53"S 143°46'36.60"E Aladdin1
5 March 1899 1200 Seto washed ashore  14°11'34.30"S 144°29'0.99"E Bathurst Bay6
5 March 1899 1200 995.25 (29.39inHg) 13°56'58.53"S 143°46'36.60"E Aladdin1
5 March 1899 1500 996.95hPa (29.44inHg) 13°56'58.53"S 143°46'36.60"E Aladdin1
5 March 1899 1600 997.29hPa (29.45inHg), NW, easing. The wind went from SE to SSE, S, SSW, SW and NW.  14° 6'45.42"S 144°27'35.51"E Crest of the Wave7
5 March 1899 1800 1000.33hPa (29.54inHg) NNE, fresh  13°56'58.53"S 143°46'36.60"E Aladdin1
5 March 1899 >1843 Moira Newi washed ashore 14°22'S 144°38'30"E Barrow Point12
5 March 1899 1800 1000.33hPa (29.54inHg) 13°56'58.53"S 143°46'36.60"E Aladdin1
6 March 1899 0000-0500 All buildings at Musgrave blown down 14°46'50.39"S 143°30'12.28"E Musgrave13
6 March 1899 0000-0500 Telegraph line down Northern extent of line damage 14°17'45.93"S 143°28'4.46"E Near Coen13
6 March 1899 >1200 Douglas Pitt Jnr, Mary Pitt, and William Savage washed ashore 14°31'19.90"S 144°40'5.68"E Cape Bowen11 
Reference key: 
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3. “Statement of Adrianna, Manilla”, in William Hamilton, "Account of Prospecting Voyages for Pearl Shell in New Guinea and the Solomons 1899-1901", John Oxley Library, OM71-4, 1. 
4.  "Northern Hurricanes", Telegraph (Brisbane), 17 April 1899, 5.
5. W. T. Atkinson, Reports and Decisions on Shipping Accidents, “Marine Board of Queensland Report on the Stranding of the Meg Merrilies”, 4 April 1899, HAR/81, QSA, ID84435.
6. Anonymous, The Pearling Disaster, 1899: A Memorial , Brisbane: Outridge Printing Company, 1899.
7. John Douglas, “Report of the Government Resident at Thursday Island for 1898”, QVP, 1, 1899. 
8. Sunrise and Sunset Results, "Sunrisenset Program, Version 2.2", Geoscience Australia's National Mapping Division, 2005. http://www.ga.gov.au/bin/geodesy/run/sunrisenset.
9. "The Late Hurricane. Return of the Warrego. Reports from the Boats", Brisbane Courier , 20 March 1899, 6.
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14. "Disastrous Weather." Torres Straits Pilot, 11 March 1899.
(NB: The observations selected represent the best evidence. They are not uniformly credible nor are they precise. This is taken into account when remodelling the cyclone in Chapter Five.) 
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